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PALESTINE

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The equality of the Araba and Jewish peoples in Pelestine would be enound by mumbers in the Teyishtive Assembly. To is not the case, as they assent it to be, that majority rule is similarly avoided in multi-mational democracies such as Belgium, banada and Switzerland. And there is very little nason to suppose that him has a similar would

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(Action (Index.) completed.)

July 11

Next Paper.

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work in Palistine.

It is to be noted, indeed, that this group do not trust their own propond system of government to deal with The vital subject of immigration. Under their proposals, the Type lature would have no pour to control immigration until the Juish population had by immigration grown to equality the Arat population. In other words, the Archo would be asked to cooperate in a system of political parity while at the same time 600,000 years were entering the country under regulations to tally immune from the operation of this system. And this fantestie proposal is to he put into effect under British toustership!

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Colonial Office, Downing Street, S.W. 1.

July 5, 1947.

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My clear Bully,

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Tenclose a folder containing a set of material which Ichud have submitted through the United hations special Johnittee. I also enclose a copy of a letter from Dr hagnes to the Chief secretary in which he asks that a copy of the evidence should be forwarded for the information of the foreign secretary and the Jolonial secretary. You will note that Dr hagnes is particularly anxious that the Foreign secretary and his advisers should study the written statement which discusses at length her Bevin's proposals of the 7th February 1947.

What you think of the Ichud document. In his covering letter to martin, sir Henry curney comments that it seems a pity that the Ichud should confine themselves to writing these memoranda and be so apparently powerless to create conditions in which the realisation of their ideas would be practicable.

Tour eve, Em Valleism

(W.A.C. mathieson)

H. BESLEY, Sou., J.B. ...

THE HEBREW UNIVERSITY, JERUSALEM.

24.6.47.

Dear Sir Henry Gurney,

I am sending you three sets of the material which the Ihud Association has submitted to UNSCOP. One copy is for yourself and the other two we would ask you kindly to have forwarded to the Foreign Secretary and to the Colonial Secretary.

We are particularly anxious that the Foreign Secretary and his advisers get to read the Statement specially prepared for UNSCOP. This is the only thing that is new. This statement discusses at length the Foreign Secretary's proposals of February 7, 1947. We think our suggestions and amendments well worth considering by him. They would make these proposals ever so much more acceptable all around. around.

I am,

Sincerely yours,

(Sgd) J.M.Magnes.

WRITTEN STATEMENT

to the

UNITED NATIONS

SPECIAL COMMITTEE

on

PALESTINE

submitted by

(UNION) ASSOCIATION OF PALESTINE

Jerusalem, June 1947

JERUSALEM P.O. 8 451

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On behalf of the Ihud (Union) Association of Palestine we have the honour of handing you the following Statement, together with copies of the Statement submitted to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on March 5th, 1946, as also of the Testimony before that Committee on March 14th, 1946. Our present Statement to the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine is inseparable from the material presented to the Anglo-American Committee, and we would ask that they be read together. The present Statement takes into account the developments of the past year.

We are handing you also 'a booklet entitled "Towards Union in Palestine", which we published in February, 1947.

RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

THE IHUD'S PROPOSALS.

From this material it will be seen that the Ihud (Union) Association advocates the following program:

I. Political.

- 1. An undivided bi-national Palestine composed of two equal nationalities, Jews and Arabs.
- 2. The transfer of Palestine, for an agreed transitional period, to the Trusteeship System of the United Nations, under which a large measure of self-government under one Administrative Authority is to be instituted from the very start and under which this self-government is to be developed increasingly.
- 3. After this agreed transitional period, the bi-national Palestine of two equal nationalities is to become an independent constitutional state.
- 4. Close cooperation between the independent bi-national Palestine and the neighbouring countries of the Middle East within the framework of the U.N.

II. Immigration.

- 5. The speediest possible immigration of 100,000 Jewish Displaced Persons.
- 6. During the period of trusteeship, Jewish immigration in accordance with the economic absorptive capacity of the country, the Jews being free to reach numerical parity with the Arabs.
- 7. Thereafter, immigration to be agreed upon between Jews and Arabs under the bi-national constitution.

III. Land.

8. Legislation for land reform, removing all discriminatory restrictions, and providing adequate protection for small owners and tenant cultivators.

IV. Development.

9. A Plan for the Development of the economic potentialities of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants.

V. Cooperation.

10. Cooperation between Jews and Arabs in Palestine and elsewhere in all walks of life - political, agricultural, industrial, social, scientific, cultural.

PUBL I C RECORD OFFICE,

COMMENTS ON IHUD'S PROPOSALS.

We shall now take the above ten points and try to elucidate each as briefly as possible.

I, Political.

An undivided bi-national Palestine composed of two equal nationalities, Jews and Arabs.

Neither a Jewish nor an Arab State. We are in full accord with Recommendation No. 3 of the Report of the Anglo-American Jommittee of Inquiry, "that Palestine shall be neither a Jewish state nor an Arab state", but "a country in which the legitimate national aspirations of both Jews and Arabs can be reconciled, without either side fearing the ascendency of the other. In our view this cannot be done under any form of constitution in which a mere numerical majority is decisive, since it is precisely the struggle for a numerical majority which bedevils Arab-Jewish relations. To enjure genuine self-government for both the Arab and the Jewish Communities this struggle must be made purposeless by the constitution itself."

Irrespective of majority-minority

The only fair interpretation of this is that the constitution provide for a bi-national Palestine of two politically equal nationalities, irrespective of who is the majority or the minority.

This principle of the political equality of the nationalities in a multi-national country cannot be emphasized too strongly. If this principle of national equality be borne in mind and adopted, it would give many a proposal for a Palestine settlement a more equitable aspect. Take for example paragraph 4 of the British proposals of February 7th, 1947. If majority rule is to be applied invariably and under all circumstances, the independent Palestine envisaged in the British proposals would be an Arab state. How then could the Jews be expected to agree? If, however, Jews and Arabs are to be two equal nationalities in the bi-national Palestine, the Jews could accept the independent Palestine without flor that the Arabs would always be outvoting them.

On the other hand, one of the main causes of Arab opposition to Jewish immigration is the fear of being swamped and dominated by a Jewish majority. If, however, Jews and Arabs are to be two equal nationalities in the bi-national Palestine irrespective of who is the majority or the minority, the question of immigration would lose its political sting and could be regulated by social and economic considerations.

Majority rule is the accepted working rule in democratic countries which are uni-national. But it is not the universal

rule in democratic countries which are multi-national, such as Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Soviet Russia, Switzerland and Yugoslavia. In such multi-national countries, the equality of basic national rights of the different nationalities is protected against majority rule. Where this is not the case, there is a dominant nationality and a dominated nationality, and this is not what we mean when we speak of a bi-national, or a multi-national country.

We have dealt with this problem at length in our Statement to the Anglo-American Committee (pp. 13-14, 31).

Deadlock

The disadvantage of this equality of national rights in a bi-mational or multi-national country is the danger of a deadlock. As a matter of fact, constitutional parity is only an expression of the necessity of compromise. It is reasonable to assume that interests other than national, as for example economic and social interests, would cause some Jews and Arabs to vote together against other Jews and Arabs, as actually occurs in mixed municipalities and in other joint boards. Once cooperation was earnestly put into practice and the basic national problems were met according to our proposals, it may be expected that deadlocks, due to purely national interests, would become rare; nevertheless, the Constitution of the bi-national Palästine would have to provide for this, e.g. by a tribunal of arbitration to be appointed by U.N.

The transfer of Palestine, for an agreed transitional period, to the Trusteeship System of U.N. under which a large measure of self-government under one Administrating Authority is to be instituted from the very start and under which this self-government is to be developed increasingly.

We ourselves have prepared an outline of the political structure of a self-governing Palestine (pp. 15-18 of the Statement submitted to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry). We think that the absence of concrete proposals for self-government is the chief weakness of the otherwise excellent recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. The Morrison-Grady Report was an attempt to supply this deficiency on a federal basis, and we regret that the full text of the Morrison-Grady Report has not been published. An examination of the full text would reveal that a bi-national solution was taken very seriously by the committee of experts which drew up the Morrison-Grady Report. We have commented on both of these reports in greater detail in our booklet "Towards Union in Palestine". (pp. 111-116)

Meanwhile, advanced British proposals in regard to self-government were made on February 7th, 1947 (Cmd. 7044 which we attach for your convenience.) We wish to comment on these self-government proposals, (paragraphs 7-17) and it will be seen that we can accommodate ourselves to many of them. Yet we are not in accord with others.

RECORD OFFICE, Administering Authority.

Britain.

No.

The British proposals of February, 7th, 1947, contain the essential features of a proposed Trusteeship Agreement. In accordance with the U.N. Charter (Chapter XII) in order that a Mandated Territory may become a Trustee Territory, an agreement has to be entered into between the Trusteeship Council and the Mandatory Government, in this instance Great Britain. The Trusteeship Agreement is to provide for an Administering Authority. Most probably Great Britain would be this Administering Authority. Despite very serious disappointments with Great Britain as a Mandatory, we wish to believe that she is capable of applying her experience of a generation here to the benefit of Palestine. We assume, of course, that the Trusteeship Council is to have much more authority and power than the powerless Mandates Commission of the old League of Nations, and that the Administering Authority will be subject to real control of the Trusteeship Council. Any such Agreement should include provisions for progressive self-government and for the safeguarding of the essential civil rights; for Jewish-Arab cooperation as the chief objective of major policy; and for a constructive social, financial and economic policy for the benefit of all of Palestine.

Local Government.

We favour the wide range of powers contained in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the British Proposals for the local administrations of the unitary Palestine and we agree that not all the Arab and all the Jewish areas need be contiguous. Some of these local districts or counties would be mixed, in order to avoid artificial administrative boundaries. We also attach great importance to the development of municipal self-government both in uninational and bi-national towns as a school of genuine democrary and cooperation.

Central Government.

We have gone into this question in considerable detail (pp. 16 ff. of Statement to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry), and we shall therefore confine our comment to such questions as arise from paragraphs 12-17 in the British Proposals of February 7th, 1947.

The High Commissioner Consultative Body. The High Commissioner, who would during the Trustee-ship period or until the elections of the Legislative Assembly continue to exercise supreme authority, would form a Consultative (rather than merely an Advisory) Body composed equally of Jews and Arabs. In selecting these members he would include representatives, not only of the Arab and Jewish Local Administrations, but also of labour and other organized interests. This

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Consultative Body would be supplanted as early as possible by an elected Legislative Assembly composed equally of Jews and Arabs.

Jews and Arabs in Executive Council.

We urge that the High Commissioner introduce Palestinians - an equal number of Jews and of Arabs - into his Executive Council without further delay, and that he progressively increase the proportion of Palestinian members.

Jews and Arabs in Central Government Organs. We urge also that the High Commissioner appoint, without further delay, Jews and Arabs in equal numbers to the Secretariat, and as heads of certain Government Departments, and as Presidents of Courts, and as District commissioners. With the exception of a few minor officials in the Secretariat, there are no Jews or Arabs in any of these key central positions.

Constitution.

One of the first tasks of the High Commissioner under Trusteeship would be the appointment of a Commission to draft the text of a Constitution. This Commission would contain, among others, an equal number of Jews and Arabs. The Commission would receive directives from the U.N., the main directive being the necessity of Jewish Arab Cooperation in all apheres in a binational Palestine of two equal nationalities.

Constituent Assembly. At the end of a stated period a Constituent Assembly would be elected with equal Arab-Jewish representation, and it might be hoped that through clarification, open debats, give and take, a majority of the Jewish representatives and a majority of the Arab representatives might produce an agreed constitution.

A Bill of Rights.

The Constitution would contain a Bill of Rights guarqnteeing the equality of the two nationalities, as also religious, educational and economic freedom to all the inhabitants of the country.

The Constitution would be confirmed by the U.N. which would also safeguard its execution.

Advice of Trusteeship Council.

In the event that in the Constituent Assembly no aggreed Constitution resulted, the various drafts prepared for its consideration and the record of its debates would be submitted to the Trusteeship Council which would be asked to advise upon future procedure.

We believe the Constituent Assembly, and the Constitution and the Legislative Assembly and other fundamental points should not wait, as the British Proposals would have it, until the time that Palestine is to become an independent State. It is our

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view that the serious attempt should be made to establish these institutions as early as possible during the Trusteeship period. This would have the double advantage of training the population in self-government and of making that much easier the transition to independence.

We are convinced that the five year Trusteeship period suggested in the British Proposals is not sufficient, in order to get an agreed solution. The chief reason for this is that after these 25 years of misunderstanding and struggle time should be given to the two people to settle down together and work together, as we know they can and as we are sure they will.

If it be found that the bi-national arrangement succeeded more quickly than we dare to anticipate now the interim Trusteeship period could be shortened, If, on the other hand, these bi-national arrangements would not work as smoothly as we anticipate the advice of the U.N. would be sought.

3. After this agreed transitional period, the bi-national Palestine of two equal nationalities is to become an independent constitutional state.

Meaning of Independence.

The question has been a sked if a bi-national state and independence are compatible. The present-day independence of multi-national states would seem to give an affirmative answer. The fact is, however, that to-day all independence is relative. Even the super-powerful states are unable just to do as they please. The existence of U.N. is prover of that. Any Union or Federation of States limits the independence of its constituent bodies. We have admitted that in case of a dead-lock in the bi-national Palestine recourse may have to be had to U.N. which also should guarantee the Constitution. These are not crippling limitations. More powerful states are appealing to U.N. or the International Court of Justice for a political or judical but in any event a peaceful seltlement of their disputes. It will be no disgrace if the bi-national Palestine which is a Union of two peoples, will be obliged to submit basic internal disputes to the same authoritative bodies.

What we mean by independence for Palestine is that it be a state standing on its own feet, not dependent - except as outlined above - upon the decisions of others, a Palestine that will be free to work out its own forms of life and government in accordance with the specific genius of its constituent peoples.

4. Close cooperation between the independent bi-national Palestine and the neighbouring countries of the Middle East within the framework of the U.N.

Foreign Relations.

The independent bi-national Palestine would be responsible for its foreign relations. It would, of course, join the U.N.

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for

Jewish representation in U.N. The independent bi-national Palestine, in the framework of the U.N. Charter, would be free to enter treaty relations with the British Commonwealth or other countries.

We have pointed out at the time (p. 13 of our Statement to the A.A.C. of I.) that the non-establishment of a Jewish State would deprive the Jewish people of their chance to be represented directly in the U.N. The Constitution of the binational Palestine might meet this difficulty by providing for equal representation of Jews and Arabs at U.N. The Jewish re-

presentatives would be looked to, to speak in Jewish matters.

Jewish Agency.

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The British Proposals provide that "on the conclusion of (i.e. during) the Trusteeship Agreement, the Jewish members of the Advisory Council would supersede the Jewish Agency for Palestine as the official Channel of communication between the Jewish community and the High Commissioner." We can agree with this provision, if it means no more than it says. But we cannot agree, if it means the dissolution of the Jewish Agency. We think that the Jewish Agency has a most important function; that of representing the Jews of the Diaspora in their relation to the Holy Land, the Land of the Jewish National Home. Palestine is the concern of millions of Jews, Christians and Moslems throughout the world, and it is for this reason that it is appropriate that the U.N., representing the international concience, should give its attention to the problem. We regard the Jewish Agency, particularly if constituted upon a broad basis, as representing the concern of world Jewry with Palestine. We tried to bring this out in our Statement to the Anglo-American Committee (pp. 15, 46, 50-52). There we have also made suggestions for safeguarding the legitimate interests of the Christian and the Arab Moslem World in the Holy Land.

Bi-national Palestine in the Semitic East. We look forward to close cooperation between Palestine and the neighbouring countries of the Middle-East. The details of this cooperation, economic, political and cultural, would be decided by the Legislature. Probably the bi-national Palestine would join the League of "rab States or some other form of regional federation. In any event we are strong believers in the mission of an independent bi-national Palestine to help develop the Semitic Middle-East and to deepen the spiritual powers of those people who are the descendants of the great Semitic people of the past.

RECORD

5. The speediest possible immigration of 100,000 Jewish Displaced Persons.

100,000 Refugees.

We are in full accord with Recommendation No. 2 of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry that 100,000 certificates be authorized immediately for the admission into Palestine of Jews who have been the victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution, and that actual immigration be pushed forwards as rapidly as conditions will permit.

In our Statement (p. 7,28f.,46-50) we called this compassionate immigration. It becomes this more and more with every day that goes by. How can there be any doubt about this?

The British Proposals of February, 7th, 1947, provide that these 100,000 Jewish immigrants be admitted in Palestine in the course of two years, at the rate of 4000 monthly. This is, of course, a great improvement over the 1500 now admitted. But we submit that, in view of the urgency of this initial compassionate immigration, the tempo be made as rapid as possible and that this tempo be fixed after consultation with those bodies as may be responsible for the financing, the planning and the implementation of this large program. Palestine is a small land, and its economy must be safeguarded; yet the Jews of Palestine as well as the Jews of the world are capable of great sacrifices, and after all that European Jewry has suffered in those terrible years, their remnants should be entitled to look forward to help and assistance from the world at large, in order to begin a new life in their ancient homeland.

During the period of trusteeship, Jewish immigration in accordance with the economic absorptive capacity of the country, the Jews being free to reach numerical parity with the Arabs.

Economic absorptive Capacity.

Further immigration to be determined by the principle laid down in the Churchill-Samuel White Paper of 1922 of "the economic absorptive capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals."

For increasing and not restricting immi gration.

But much depends on how this economic absorptive capacity is to be determined. We propose that among the directives to be given by U.N. for the Trusteeship Agreement it may be laid down that this economic absorptive capacity is to be enlarged in every way. We shall deal later on with this question in connection with land-reform and Development (s.p. 11). Thus the principle of absorptive capacity would not mean restricting of immigration, but RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

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rather increasing economic opportunities, both for the present inhabitants and for new immigrants.

Under such circumstances, the formula of the British Proposals (paragraph 10) could be amended to read that the continuance of immigration and the rate of entry would be determined, primarily in accordance with the principle of economic absorptive capacity, by the High Commissioner in consultation with his Consultative Body; and in the event of disagreement the final decision would rest with an arbitration tribunal appointed by the U.N. and on which among others the Jewish Agency and the League of Arab States should be represented.

Numerical Parity.

We have urged in our Statement to the A.A.C. of I., that the Jews should be free to reach numerical parity with the Arabs during the transition period. There may be found also details as to the demographical side of the question (p. 9). This would mean that the Jews would have the right of bringing into the country another 600,000 and more Jews. With the annihilation of 6,000,000 by the Hitler bestiality, forty percent of the whole Jewish people has been destroyed. The number of Jewish Displaced Persons does not make up even half of these 600,000. Yet there are hundreds of thousands of Jews in various countries poverty-stricken and unhappy and oppressed. Besides, there are thousands of Jews, especially young people, living under happier conditions who wish to come to Palestine not out of need or pressure but inspired by the ideal of the Jewish National Home, and they also should be free to devote themselves to the upbuilding of Palestine.


7. Thereafter, immigration to be agreed upon between Jews and Arabs under the bi-national constitution.

But whatever be the practical possibilities we think it important to emphasize this principle of numerical parity. When and if parity is reached, the Legislature of the independent bi-national Palestine may review the immigration situation, and further immigration (beyond the difference in natural increase) is to be encouraged, if agreement can be reached between the Jews and the Arabs. This would mean that Jewish immigration beyond parity would be dependent upon whether the two people had found the way of peace and understanding together.

III. Land.

Legislation for land reform, removing all discriminatory restrictions, and providing adequate protection for small owners and tenant cultivators.

Mr. Moshe Smilansky, member of the Board of our Association,



veteran farmer and during many years the Chairman of the Jewish Farmers' Association, has prepared a special Note on some aspects of this question which you will find attached to this Statement.

IV. DEVELOPMENT.

9. A Plan for the Development of the economic potentialities of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants.

The main way of increasing the economic absorptive capacity of the country is through a Development Plan which would exploit much more fully than up to the present the agricultural and industrial potentialities of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants. It has been said on several occasions that the U.S.A. Government might help finance such a Development Plan. We propose that a Development Commission be appointed at once by the appropriate agency of the U.N. to prepare such a plan, and that then a Central Development Board be set up charged with carrying out this Development Plan. Jews and Arabs should participate equally in this vital constructive work.

V. Cooperation.

10. Cooperation between Jews and Arabs in Palestine and elsewhere in all walks of life - political, agricultural, industrial, social, scientific, cultural.

We accept Recommendations 5 and 9 of the A.A.C. of I., looking towards an equality of standards in social services, in education and in other spheres of life for Jews and Arabs alike; and we accept the principle that nothing be done to reduce Jewish standards but that Arab standards be raised in every possible way. This aim can be reached only by fostering economic and cultural intercourse and cooperation between the two people and not by segregation.

RECORD OFFICE,

PALESTINE - UNITED OR DIVIDED ?

We have no belief in Partition for many reasons - religious, historical, political, economical. Indeed we regard Partition as not only impracticable, but, should it be carried through, as a great misfortune for both Jews and Arabs. We do not wish to encumber our Statement to you by engaging in polemics with the advocates of Partition. We have wanted to present the case for a united bi-national Palestine on its own merits. Should it, however, be desired, we are ready to formulate our arguments vs. Partition.

We are greatly encouraged by the advocacy of the idea of a bi-national Palestine by some delegates at the Special Session on Palestine of the U.N.General Assembly. It has been said by the Chief Delegate of the U.S.S.R. that Partition is only to be considered if a bi-national solution should prove to be impossible. It is the task of statesmanship to make it possible. In any event we think consideration of Partition entirely premature until the bi-national Palestine be given the full and fair chance to prove its worth over a number of years.

We regret to say that bi-nationalism has thus far never been given a chance. Neither the British Government nor the Jewish and Arab leaders have ever made any determined and systematic attempt to make Jewish-Arab Cooperation a chief objective of major policy. The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry made very important recommendations in this direction, as we have tried to point out, but the leaders failed to accept them and the British Government failed to implement them.

Many Jews as well as many Arabs of all classes and sections - some openly and many more privately - anxiously look upon a courageous lead which will deliver this unhappy country from the evils of political tension and nationalist passion, of mental and physical terror. We call upon the UNSCOP to take up this noble attempt, and not to accept counsels of despair, but to give a fair chance to constructive proposals which in the long run bear hope for real freedom, prosperity and peace for the two peoples of this Holy Land.

Jerusalem, June , 1947.

RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

NOTE ON SOME ASPECTS OF THE LAND QUESTION.

(by Mr. M. Smilansky)

Area of Palestine

1. The area of Palestine is about 27,000,000 dunams (1), of which about 700,000 dunams lakes and rivers. The remaining 26,300,000 are composed of four parts:

The Negev: 12,250,000 dunams the hills: 9,600,000 "

the coastal plain: 3,150,000 "

the valleys (2): 1,300,000 "

Present Cultivation

2. Out of the above lands, the following areas are under cultivation, mostly very extensive cultivation:

In the Negev: 1,500,000 dunams in the hills: 4,000,000 "
in the coastal plain: 2,250,000 "
in the valleys: 900,000 "

Total:

8,650,000 dunams

Potential Cultivation

3. It is our considered opinion that there are in Palestine at the very least 13,150,000 dunams of lands cultivable after suitable preparation. This means that 4,500,000 dunams which are not cultivated at present, are suitable for agriculture. We think that the following areas in addition to the areas cultivated at present can be prepared for cultivation:

In the Negev
1,500,000 dunams (incl. leachable salty land)
in the hills
2,000,000 " (by terracing and removing of stones)
in the coastal plain in the valleys
250,000 ") swamps and levelling the dunes)

Irrigation

4. To give an idea of the present primitive state of Palestine agriculture, it is noteworthy that the area of irrigated lands in Palestine is at present 500,000 dunams, while the irrigable lands are about 5,500,000 dunams. The following is a fair estimate of the distribution of irrigable lands:

- (1) 1 dunam = 0.23 acres = 1000 square metres.
- (2) mainly the valleys of Esdraelon and of the river Jordan.

RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

In the Negev 2,000,000 dunams in the hills 500,000 "
in the coastal plain 2,250,000 "
in the valleys 850,000 "

Wate**r** Resources 5. Experience has taught that Palestine which had been considered a barren country has rich resources of water. These resources are to be found both on the surface and sub-soil. In almost every part of the country deep wells have been dug, and hundreds of cubic metres per hour of water found.

Rain water

Torrential rains fall during the winter months, and most of these which fall in the hills are not absorbed by the soil but flow into the sea, to the amount of milliards of cubic metres every season. If reservoirs were built in the hills, and dams where the hills lead into the plains, a substantial part of this water could be utilized.

Lakes and Rivers Palestine lakes and rivers are huge water resources. The rivers flow into the sea and the lakes are exposed to evaporation by sun and wind. A large part of these water resources could be made available for irrigating our lands.

Springs

There are in Palestine many sweet water and salt water springs. Up to now, not much has been done in the way of developing the existing springs, or of searching for those underground. Salt water could also be exploited for agriculture by mixing the salt water with sweet water.

According to experts there are in Palestine water resources sufficient to irrigate about 4,000,000 dunams. These resources may increase in the future, as we learn to use them more rationally, so that we may be able eventually to irrigate the whole of the 5,500,000 dunams of our irrigable lands.

Conditions for Development 6. The earth of Palestine can bring forth abundance, if the following five are combined: Sun, water, fertilizers, science, and money. We have sun almost all the year long. Resources of water exist as we have shown, and it is but necessary to find and exploit them. Fertilizers will be provided by agricultural development itself and with the help of science. Science will also teach us the way to get cheap electricity, so that we shall be able to obtain nitrogene from the air with the help of electric power. This is, of course, only one example of the application of science for agricultural development. It goes without saying that large-scale plans of this kind cannot be realized without the necessary financial means, as indicated in the chapter IV. (Development) of this Statement.

Present Agricultural Population

7. The agricultural population of the Arab villages and the Jewish settlements of Palestine is made up as follows:

	Arabs	Jews	Total
In the Negev in the hills	60,000 500,000	1,000 10,000	61,000 510,000
in the coastal plain in the valleys	150,000 30,000	50,000 25,000	200,000 55,000
Total	740,000	86,000	826,000

There are also 70,000 Arabs and 70,000 Jews in the country-side who are not occupied in agriculture.

Potential Agricultural Population 8. Experience proves that an area of 25 dunams of irrigated land vill support a family. An area of 50 dunams of unirrigated level country, hen cultivated rationally, will also support a family (five persons in the average). In the hills, an area of 100 dunams would be required for the same purpose. The irrigable 4,000,000 dunams could therefore support 800,000 souls. The rest of the cultivable lands includes 4,000,000 dunams of level, non-irrigated lands - for in the hills, too, there is more than a million dunams of level land or gentle slopes - and these lands could support 400,000 people. Another 5,000,000 dunams of hill country, which are included in the area of cultivable lands, can support 250,000 people.

The cultivable lands of this country could, therefore, support 1,450,000 people, instead of the present 826,000. We may assume that the rural population not occupied in agriculture will increase proportionally; that means there could be 260,000 such people instead of the present 140,000. Thus there is room for an additional 750,000 people in connection with agriculture alone, apart from the growth of the cities which will come in the wake of the increase of the rural population.

Protection of Small-holders and Tenants

9. It is our considered opinion that the new settlers will not have to displace one single Arab fellah from his land, for there is enough room for both the old and the new settlers in our country. Yet at the same time a land law ought to be promulgated forbidding a fellah to sell his last 25 dunams of irrigated land, his last 50 dunams of non-irrigable land, or his last 100 dunams of land in the hill region. Also, leaseholders should be protected against their lease being taken from them.

RECORD OFFICE,

"Uncultivable" 10. In this small country of ours, about half the lands - lands.

ca. 13,150,000 dunams - are considered non-cultivable at present. But science will find new ways, and what is considered impossible today may very well be possible in the next generation. Coming generations will profit from that.

A large part of these lands will have to be afforested; part has already become woodland by the efforts of the Government and of Jewish settlement. Afforestation, too, is a branch of agriculture which can support many thousands of families and workers.

(Translated from the Hebrew).

THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE,

WRITTEN STATEMENT

to the


ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY

JERUSALEM

bу

THE IHUD (UNION) ASSOCIATION OF PALESTINE

Jerusalem, March 5, 1946



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THE IHUD (UNION) ASSOCIATION.

The Ihud (Union) Association was formed in September, 1942. It is not a political party. It is a group of individuals belonging to different parties and of independents belonging to no party. Though members of Ihud may have varying views on details, they are united in the firm conviction that there is but one way of meeting the Palestine problem - that of Jewish-Arab cooperation. We are appending the declaration made when the Ihud (Union) Association was formed.

The Ihud (Union) Association stands for the union of Jews and Arabs in a bi-national Palestine based on the parity of the two peoples; and for the union of the bi-national Palestine with neighboring countries. This Union is to be a Regional Union under the auspices of the UNO.

JEWISH-ARAB COOPERATION.

Jewish-Arab cooperation in Palestine has never been made the chief objective of major policy. Sporadic and, at times, serious attempts have been made in this direction. A history of these attempts would be most illuminating. But whenever such attempts encountered difficulties, as they were bound to, they were all too lightly abandoned. The result is that, after 24 years of the Mandate, there is more political tension in the country than ever before. Far from securing "the development of self-governing institutions" as required by Article 2 of the Mandate, and far from "fostering the establishment of a full measure of self-governing institutions", as promised in the Churchill-Samuel Statement of Policy in 1922, Palestine is governed bureaucratically by a colonial administration, without a legislature and without the participation of Jews or Arabs in the more responsible positions of Government. The fault lies with all concerned Jews, Arabs and British.

The establishment of Jewish-Arab cooperation is not an easy matter, and it is particularly difficult in the political sphere to which we shall address ourselves. It is here where the crux of the situation lies. Personal relations between Arabs and Jews are, on the whole, still fair. There is no deep racial animosity between these two related Semitic peoples. There is no present religious animosity. In the cities there is a certain amount of economic ecoperation, but less than there used to be, and there would be much more under settled political conditions. There is a large measure of cooperation between villages in the farming districts. It is worthy of note, that even with the present political tension, where the leaders on both sides hardly ever meet, and with the boycott propaganda going on, country Jews and country Arabs meet in a friendly way and cooperate with one another. They do not want to be at war with one another. But in all these fields cooperation is impeded because of political, "national" animosity.

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POLITICAL COOPERATION.

Some of our members are old residents here. We know that Jews and Arabs have cooperated and can cooperate in all spheres of life, including the political. But political cooperation will not come of itself. There is one condition for its achievement - that Jewish-Arab cooperation be made the chief objective of major policy, and that this policy be carried through authoritatively, day by day, year by year.

We shall endeavour to give an outline of how we picture this to ourselves. We are well aware of the imperfections in our practical suggestions. On one thing we are absolutely clear: The way out of the impasse is Jewish-Arab cooperation.

PALESTINE NOT A JEWISH STATE AND NOT AN ARAB STATE; BUT A BI-NATIONAL COUNTRY.

We do not favour Palestine as a Jewish country or Palestine as an Arab country, but a bi-national Palestine as the common country of two peoples.

One of the leaders of the Jewish labour movement in Palestine gave a definition in 1931 of a bi-national country which we think pertinent:

"In a bi-national country the two nations have equal freedom and independence, equal participation in government and equality of representation, and one people shall not be stronger than the other... They must make the country into a country of nationalities. This is altogether different from a nationalist country."

For proof that a multi-national country is not just an artificial concoction, but "a tried and tested method of government", we would refer you to three books, the one by Professor Janowsky, "Nationalism and Nationalities", published in 1945 by Macmillan; the second by Professor H. Seton-Watson, "Eastern Europe between the wars 1918-41", published in 1945 by the Cambridge University Press; and the third, "National Self-Determination" by A. Cobban, Oxford University Press, 1945.

PALESTINE NOT JUST AN ARAB LAND OR JUST A JEWISH LAND.

Palestine is not just an Arab land like any other Arab land, or just a Jewish land.

For one thing, it is a Holy Land for three monotheistic religions, of which two-Judaism and Christianity- had their origin here, whilst the third, Islam, regards Jerusalem as next in holiness to Mecca and Medinah.

Lord Milner, who declared himself "a strong supporter of pro-Arab policy" and a believer "in the independence of the Arab countries... I look forward to an Arab Federation", is quoted by the Peel Royal Commission (page 41) as stating in 1923 that:

"Palestine can never be regarded as a country on the same footing as the other Arab countries. You can not ignore all history and tradition in the matter...The future of Palestine cannot possibly be left to be determined by the temporary impressions and feelings of the Arab majority in the country of the present day."

We agree with the further comment of the Royal Commission (page 42), that "the case stated by Lord Milner against Arab control applies equally to a Jewish control".

ARAB LEAGUE: REGIONAL UNION.

With Lord Milner, we, too, believe in the independence of the Arab countries, and we would want them to achieve this as soon as possible, and we consider the formation of the League of Arab States a step forward. We look forward to a Federation or a Regional Union of some of the Middle Eastern countries. The Pact of the Arab League foresees this (Article 9). We would want the bi-national Palestine to be a member of this Regional Union. We are hopeful that the League of Arab States will take a broad view of the Palestine problem and recognize the necessity of a bi-national Palestine, if not today then tomorrow, as being the one possible form of independence for Palestine and as being in the interests of the Arab states themselves. Palestine must be lifted out of the parochialism to which its tiny size might condemm it. Palestine represents an inter-national, inter-religious idea of deep concern to millions of Jews, Christians and Moslems throughout the world.

HISTORICAL RIGHTS OF JEWS IN PALESTINE.

Another reason why Palestine cannot be regarded as just an Arab land like any other, is because of the indissoluble historical association of the Jewish people and of Judaism with this land. This connection has never ceased, ever since the days of the Hebrew Bible, its prophets, legislators and psalmists. The Jewish religion is universalist in its tendencies; but it is inextricably bound up with the Jewish People and with the Land of Israel for its actual fulfillment. The very idea of Palestine as a modern entity is the result of Jewish activity. Moreover, 52 nations of the world recognized this in the Mandate for Palestine, in endorsing the idea of the Jewish National Home in Palestine. The Churchill-Samue! Statement of Policy in 1922 declared that it is essential that the Jewish people "should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance."

RECORD OFFICE, One of our members, Professor M. Buber, who was one of the founders of the Zionist ^Organization, is ready to testify before you as to the profound significance of Palestine for Judaism and the Jewish people.

By their labour and skill here in the past generation, the Jews have shown how truly they love this sacred soil. It is now the home of 600,000 Jews. They have their schools, their farms, their synagogues here. They have introduced science into agriculture and industry, and have thus raised the standard of living for all the population. They have found new sources of water and power. They have brought with them progressive social ideas. They did their full share in the war effort in every way.

It is upon this basis that one may say, that the Jews have certain historical rights in Palestine, and have proved themselves worthy of these rights.

NATURAL RIGHTS OF ARABS IN PALESTINE.

On the other hand, the Arabs have certain natural rights in Palestine. They are the large majority of the country's inhabitants. They have lived here for centuries and tilled its soil. On every side we see the remains of Arab culture. The holy places and the tombs of their fathers through many generations are here, and they have developed a deep feeling for what they call the Arabism of the country.

HONOURABLE COMPROMISE.

We regard the historical rights of the Jews and the natural rights of the Arabs as, under all the circumstances, of equal validity, and it is the task of statesmanship to find ways of adjustment between these contending claims. Neither people can get in Palestine all its wants, and both peoples will have to make concessions. The way of honourable and reasonable compromise must be sought.

IMMIGRATION VERSUS SELF-GOVERNMENT.

In the Report of the Royal Commission it is stated (page 136) that "what the Arabs most desire is independence. What they most flear is Jewish domination". What most Jews desire is immigration. What they most fear is Arab domination. A chief objective of policy must be to remove this fear of domination on either side. We propose methods of achieving this. As to the Jews, in place of the desired unrestricted immigration, we propose a substantial immigration, but with limitations. As to the Arabs, we propose, in place of the desired independent sovereign Arab state, the maximum amount of s.elf-government in a bi-national country.

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THE POLITICAL PROBLEM.

The three main elements in the political problem are: Immigration, Land, Self-Governemt. We shall deal first with immigration and land, and then with self-government.

We envisage three distinct periods:

First, the present period and as long as the Mandate lasts.

Second, the period of Trusteeship under the UNO.

Third, the period when a bi-national Palestine is no longer a Trust Territory but a self-governing unit within a larger Regional Union.

II

IMMIGRATION: FIRST PERIOD

100,000 Immigrants now

Everyone is deeply concerned with the fate of the many thousands of Jewish displaced persons who are at present languishing without a home, or unable or unwilling to go back "home", and eager to come to their true Home, where brothers and sisters are ready to welcome them with open arms. We regard it as imperative that an interim ad hoc compassionate immigration of the 100,000 refugees recommended by President Truman be made possible without delay. As far as practicable, these refugees might be divided into 25,000 children, 25,000 parents, relatives and older persons, and 50,000 young people. This would bring creative forces into the country, and also be an historical act of great mercy.

The financing of this immigration and its accommodation in Palestine might be shared by the Jewish Agency, the American Joint Distribution Committee, the Hadassah Women's Organization of America and other Jewish bodies, together with UNRRA and/or the Social and Economic Council of UNO.

The number of Jewish displaced persons exceeds 100,000, and we assume that other countries besides Palestine will open their gates.

Arab Opposition

The immigration of 100,000 persons will doubtless be opposed by Arab spokesmen. We do not think, however, that this opposition need take on an extreme form. We base our opinion on the following:

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- 1. 100,000 additional Jews are not a threat to Arab numbers. In 1936 the Arab population was increasing at the rate of 24,000 per annum (Royal Commission page 282). It is conjectured that the present rate of Arab increase is about 30,000 per annum. It has been established that, during the five years 1939-44, the total Arab increase amounted to about 150,000, and the total Jewish increase to about 83,000. Thus in these five years the net Arab increment exceeds the Jewish by about 67,000. If, therefore, 100,000 Jews were now to come in, the actual proportionate growth of the Jewish population would be no more than about 33,000. This is not a particularly frightening number.
- 2. If 100,000 Jews come in, the total Jewish population would then be about 700,000. This is less than a figure agreed upon just about 10 years ago, in 1936, in talks between some leading Arabs and some leading Jews. These talks took place after the outbreak of the Arab revolt and in an endeavour to find a compromise. The provisional agreement was, that after 10 years the Jewish population, which was about 400,000 at the time, might become 800,000. Had this agreement come into effect, there might be 800,000 Jews here now, instead of 600,000. The agreement was, most unfortunately, not acceptable in some quarters. But if in 1936 the idea of 800,000 Jews by 1946 did not frighten leading Arabs then, it is difficult to believe that 700,000 should frighten them now.
- 3. Whereas it was possible for Arab leaders to get the Arabs to revolt in 1936, it would be not so easy now. The plain Arabs have had their fill of fighting. It would not be so easy as in 1929 to trump up the religious issue. The fellah and the Arab worker have learned a great deal since then, and they are not quite so naive politically. Moreover an Arab youth is growing up, which if nationalistic, is at the same time open to progressive ideas. A mere exercise in arithmetic will suffice to dampen insurrectionary ardour: 1,200,000 Arabs minus 700,000 Jews = a majority of half a million Arabs. That is a large enough figure to keep even the most unlettered from getting excited, much less ready to risk their lives.
- 4. The argument of some Arabs, that they oppose the entry of a single extra Jew, because that is one step nearer to the Jewish State, may seem attractive theoretically. But it is, in fact, only a figure of speech, symbolizing their very deep opposition to the Jewish State. For a Jewish State there would have to be a majority of Jews. An additional 100,000 is not equivalent to setting up a majority.

IMMIGRATION: SECOND PERIOD

It should be borne in mind, that the Churchill-Samuel Statement of Policy in 1922 declared, that for the fulfillment of the policy of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, "it is necessary that the Jewish community in Palestine should be able to increase its numbers by immigration".

RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Parity in Numbers

As a long-term immigration policy we propose that, in the bi-national Palestine, the Jewish population should have the chance through immigration of becoming one half of the population. That means, that the Jews would, upon the basis of present population figures, have the opportunity of doubling their numbers, there being about 600,000 Jews here now and about 1,200,000 Arabs. It would really mean more than that, since the Arab natural increase is higher than the Jewish (2.7:1.3), thus leaving room, even after parity had been achieved, for additional numbers of Jews to catch up each year with the greater Arab natural increase.

Rate of Immigration

How long it would take, approximately, under favourable circumstances, for Jews through immigration and natural increase to reach parity, can be estimated upon the basis of the population trends on pages 281-282 of the Royal Commission's Report. Although these calculations were made in 1936, it would appear that the ratio of Arab increase and Jewish increase has remained stable. We can therefore take the figures of the Royal Commission as roughly correct for 1946. Upon that basis it would take eleven years from now, i.e. up to 1957, for the Jews to reach parity at the rate of 60,000 immigrants a year; 14 years, i.e. up to 1960, at the rate of 50,000 a year; 18 years, i.e. up to 1964, at the rate of 40,000 a year, and 24 years, i.e. up to 1970, to reach parity at the rate of 30,000 Jewish immigrants a year. Any annual Jewish immigration below 30,000 would never let the Jews catch up with the Arabs.

ECONOMIC ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY

We continue to support the principle laid down in the Statement of Policy of 1922, that immigration is not "to exceed whatever may be the economic absorptive capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals".

In view, however, of the basic importance of this principle, we hold that a change should be made in the method of determining this absorptive capacity. In effecting this change there seem to us to be three main elements.

Immigration Board

First, a special body, an Immigration Board, is to be set up to determine economic absorptive capacity. This body would consist of representatives of the Mandatory (or of the Administering Authority under the Trusteeship System) and of the Jewish Agency and of the Arab League.

Jewish Achievements

Second, account must be taken not only of the views of economic, financial, agricultural and other experts, but also of those imponderables which have enabled the Jews to extend the economic absorptive capacity of the country beyond anything the experts had considered possible. When Sir Herbert Samuel was High Commissioner in 1920-25, it was the accepted view, that Palestine, with agriculture as its chief industry, could not hold more than 3,000,000. There were 805,000 inhabitants at mid-1924, of whom 628,000 were Moslems. But now, Lord Samuel in his recent speech in the House of Lords, with the general tendency of which we are in accord, mentions the possibility of a population of 4½ million within a generation. The conviction that Palestine can absorb economically a much larger population than had at one time been considered possible, is due primarily to what the Jews through their zeal and science and capacity for sacrifice have already shown to be the possibilities. These achievements would hardly have been possible by any other people, simply because we know of no other people with the same enthusiasm and love, and the same determination for developing the capacity of Palestine to absorb their brothers and sisters, their own homeless People. Moreover, we think that the Jews could not have achieved this anywhere else. These are factors that must be reckoned with in determining economic absorptive capacity.

Development Plan

Third, a systematic effort must be made, and not by the Jews alone, to develop the economic potentialities of the country. There has been much talk of a Plan of Development for the benefit of the whole country and all its inhabitants. In order that this may be made a reality, we favour the appointment of a Development Board, consisting, as before, of representatives of the Mandatory (or of the Trusteeship Council) and of the Jewish Agency and of the Arab League.

The Development Plan might be financed by a loan at a low rate of interest. Provided there was political peace here, this loan might be attractive to the vast amount of accumulated capital lying idle in lending countries, more especially the United States.

The appointment of these two special Boards - immigration and development - with Jewish and Arab representatives to deal with fundamental problems, illustrates what we mean when we say that Jewish-Arab cooperation should be the objective of major policy.

IF PARITY IS REACHED

We propose further, that when and if parity is reached, the two peoples are to review the immigration situation in the Legislature of the time, and that further Jewish immigration (beyond the difference in natural increase) is to be encouraged, if agreement can be reached between the Jews and Arabs. This would mean that Jewish immigration beyond parity would be dependent upon whether the two peoples had found the way of peace and understanding together.

IMMIGRATION: THIRD PERIOD

We propose further that if and when there be a Union of the binational Palestine with neighbouring countries, the question of an enlarged Jewish immigration is to be taken up again in the Palestine Legislature, as well as in the Federal Council of this Union. With the widening of the Arab background through Union with other countries, the Arabs of Palestine would no longer need to fear being "swamped" by the Jews. The present acute importance of majority-minority in Palestine would have lost its main point, and the Arabs of Palestine could then afford to look at Jewish immigration with greater liberality. Indeed, by that time a normal admission of Jewish settlers to the other countries of the Union, without of course extending the boundaries of the Jewish National Home, might well become a question of practical politics. Arab statesmen have expressed a similar view on more than one occasion. The Jews could certainly be of great service in helping the development of backward parts of the Union.

LAND

This is basic for both Jews and Arabs. For the Jews, a return to the soil is essential in order that this city people may be restored to normal health. Land is also of immediate importance in order that new settlements may be established for the absorption of new immigrants. For the Arabs it is important in order that their basic industry - agriculture - may be safeguarded. From every point of view we think that land reform of a progressive nature is essential. We see every reason why Jews and Arabs should cooperate in this.

We assume that if an answer be found to the question of immigration, a settlement of the land question will inevitably follow. This is bound up in large measure with the Development Plan which we have mentioned.

One of our members, Mr. M. Smilansky, who has lived in this country for over 50 years, and who was for a long time head of the Farmers' Association, is ready to testify before you on the land problem.

Having discussed the question of immigration which is nearest the heart of the Jews, we now come to the question of self-government which is nearest the heart of the Arabs. These are the two main factors to be weighed one against the other.

III

TWO ANNOUNCEMENTS

To prepare the ground for this, it is necessary, in our opinion, that two concurrent announcements be made as to the objectives of major policy. The one without the other is not sufficient.

The one announcement would be: There is to be no Jewish State, there is to be no Arab State, there is to be a bi-national Palestine, a common country for two equal peoples; and there is to be the fullest measure of self-government.

The second announcement would be: 100,000 Jewish displaced persons are to be admitted without delay, and the objective of policy is to be numerical as well as political parity for the two peoples.

THE ARAB CONTENTION

The Arabs say that "the existence of the Jewish National Home, whatever its size, bars the way to the attainment by the Arabs of Palestine of the same national status as that attained, or soon to be attained, by all the other Arabs of Asia" (Royal Commission, page 307). That is so. And they ask if they are not as fit for self-government as the Arabs of other countries. They are.

ARAB CONCESSIONS

But the whole history of Palestine shows, that it just has not been made for uni-national sovereign independence. This is an inescapable fact which no one can disregard. Although the Arabs can not have a uni-national independent Arab Palestine, they can enjoy independence in a bi-national Palestine together with their Jewish fellow-citizens. This will afford them a maximum of national freedom. What the binational state will take away from them is sovereign independence in Palestine. There are other Arab states with sovereign independence. But we contend that the sovereign independence of tiny Palestine, whether it be Jewish sovereignty or Arab sovereignty, is a questionable good in this post-war period, when even great states must relinquish something of their sovereignty and seek union, if the world is not to perish.

Reference: RECORD OFFICE, We contend that, for this Holy Land, the ideal of a bi-national Palestine is at least as inspiring as that of an Arab sovereign Palestine or a Jewish sovereign Palestine.

JEWISH CONCESSIONS

On the other hand, the bi-national Palestine would deprive the Jews of their one chance of a Jewish state. But this bi-national Palestine would be the one state in the world where they would be a constituent nation, i.e., an equal nationality within the body politic, and not a minority as everywhere else. The absence of a Jewish state would make more difficult direct access by the Jewish People to UNO. To compensate for this, some form should be devised for giving the Jewish People a recognized place within the structure of the United Nations Organization.

Nevertheless, the concessions the Jews would have to make on these matters are, we think, more far-reaching that the concessions the Arabs of Palestine would have to make. But the hard facts of the situation are, that this is not a Jewish land and it is not an Arab land, it is the Holy Land, a bi-national country, and it is in the light of such hard facts that the problem must be approached.

THE ADVANTAGES OF A BI-NATIONAL PALESTINE

Before proceeding to outline our suggestions as to the political structure of the bi-national Palestine, we should like finally to point out some of the advantages of bi-nationalism based on parity in a country which has two nationalities.

Failure of Minority Guarantees

1. The breakdown of the minority guarantees provided for in the Versailles Peace Treaties is proof that in a bi-national country, the only safeguard for a minority is equality with the majority. There is no prospect of peace in a country where there is a dominant people and a subordinate people. The single nation-state is a proper form for a country where there is but one legally recognized nationality, as for example the United States. But in countries with more than one recognized nationality, and these are numerous in Europe and in Asia, bitterness is engendered among the minority because of the civil service, the military, the economic key positions, foreign affairs, are in the hands of the ruling class of the majority nation. Parity in a multi-national country is the only just relationship between the peoples.

Switzerland

2. The multi-national state is an effective method of affording full protection for the national languages, cultures and institutions of each nationality. That there can be full cultural autonomy combined with full allegiance to the multi-national political state is proven in Switzerland's history for more than 100 years. The Swiss are divided by language, religion and culture; nor do the linguistic and religious groupings coincide in the various cantons. Yet all of these divergences have not been obstacles to political unity. This is a newer form of democracy which is as important for multi-national states, as the more familiar form of democracy is for uni-national states. The Swiss example is most relevant to Palestine, although there are of course many points of difference.

Other Multi-national Countries

The Soviet Union is a newer example of a multi-national state. The new Yugoslav state is an attempt at multi-national federalism. Professor Seton Watson outlines a bi-national solution of the agelong problem of Transylvania. Roumanian domination, Hungarian domination, partition had all been tried without success.

Bi-Nationalism a High Ideal

3. In many senses the multi-national state represents a higher, more modern and more hopeful ideal than the uni-national sovereign independent state. The old way of having a major people and a minor people in a state of various nationalities is reactionary. The progressive conception is parity among the peoples of the multi-national state. The way of peace in the world today and tomorrow is through federation, union. Dividing up the world into tiny nationalistic sovereign units has not been the success the advocates of self-determination had hoped for at the end of the first world war. (Cobban, "National Self-Determination"). The peoples who have been placed by fate or by history in the same country have warred with one another for domination throughout the centuries. The majority have tried to make the state homogeneous through keeping down the minority nationalities. The federal multi-national state, based on the parity of the nationalities, is a most hopeful way of enabling them to retain their national identity, and yet of coalescing in a larger political framework. It results in separate nationalities, yet a single citizenship. This is a noble goal, to which the youth of multi-national countries can be taught to give their enthusiasm and their energies. It is a modern challenge to the intelligence and the moral qualities of the peoples constituting multi-national lands.

RECORD OFFICE,

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IV

SELF-GOVERNMENT

We shall deal with this as with immigration - in periods.

FIRST PERIOD: SELF-GOVERNMENT DURING MANDATE

During the transitional period of the Mandate, i.e., up to the time when Palestine becomes a Trustee Territory, immediate steps should be taken by the Mandatory Power to institute a larger measure of self-government. Towards this end we would make two interim ad hoc recommendations:

- (a) The appointment of Jews and Arabs in equal numbers to the Executive Council of Government, to the Secretariat, as Heads of certain Government Departments, and as District Commissioners in appropriate places.
- (b) The appointment of a Consultative Body composed of equal numbers of Jews and Arabs. The High Commissioner would act as Chairman, and he would bring before this body such matters as he wished to communicate to the public and as he wished to have an expression of opinion on. The Consultative Body would have no legislative or executive functions.

SECOND PERIOD: TRUSTEESHIP

(a) We favour the transfer of Palestine to the Trusteeship System of the UNO.

REGIONAL TRUSTEESHIP

- (b) We favour the setting up of a Regional Trusteeship Body for Palestine which is to be composed of representatives of the Administering Authority, the Jewish Agency and the Arab League. The Administering Authority will be a Christian power, doubtless Britain, and will thus be representative of the Christian world. The deep interest of the Christian world in the Holy Land is not to be minimized. The Jewish Agency is representative of the Jewish world in matters affecting Palestine. The Arab League represents the various Arab states, which are for the most part overwhelmingly Moslem, and all of them are concerned with the fate of Palestine.
- (c) We favour making the Immigration Board and the Development Board mentioned above responsible in the first instance to the Regional TrusteeShip Body.

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CONSTITUTION

- (a) The working out of the first draft of a basic constitution for a bi-national Palestine would be entrusted to a special Commission on which, among others, the Jewish Agency and the Arab League would be represented and which would in the first instance be responsible to the Regional Trusteeship Body. This Draft Constitution Commission would receive directives from the UNO, the main directive being the necessity of Jewish-Arab cooperation in all spheres in a bi-national Palestine based on the parity of the two peoples. The Draft Constitution Commission would have to secure the aid of competent experts, expecially from the successful multi-national countries.
- (b) The draft Constitution thus worked out would be presented to a Constituent Assembly of Jews and Arabs equally represented, in the hope that through clarification, open debate, give and take, an agreed constitution might result. In case no agreed constitution resulted, the matter would be referred for decision to the Trusteeship Council of the UNO, both the Jewish Agency and the Arab League being invited to participate in the discussion before the Trusteeship Council.
- (c) The Constitution would contain, among other things, a Bill of Rights guaranteeing religious, educational, economic and national freedom to all the inhabitants as individuals, and to the national communities and the religious bodies.

ORGANS OF GOVERNMENT

A. Federal Executive

(a) Head of the State

He is to be appointed by the UNO, if possible upon nomination by the Palestine Legislature. His term of office is to be four years, and he is to be eligible for re-election.

- (b) His functions are to be:
 - 1. To preside over the Legislature.
 - 2. To cast the decisive vote in case of a tie.
 - 3. To appoint, with the concurrence of the Legislature, the Heads of Central Government Departments (Federal Administration).
 - 4. To preside over the Federal Executive Council which is to consist of the heads of a given number of Government Departments (Federal Executive Council).

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- (a) A Legislature is to be elected democratically.
- (b) The country is to be divided into a number of districts (cantons or counties). Some of these districts will be mainly Jewish, some mainly Arab, and some mixed. In some districts, such as Nazareth and Bethlehem, the Christian Arabs would be the important part of the population. The Legislature is to consist of an equal number of Jews and Arabs.

We prefer election by geographical districts rather than election on a communal basis. Regional patriotism is highly developed in some parts of Palestine. The difficulties of communal elections are apparent in India. Election by districts has the advantage: 1. of giving increased importance to local bodies, which is desirable generally; 2. of enabling Jews and Arabs in mixed districts to vote for members of both communities. In general, we assume that, "in vital matters some Jews and some Arabs will vote together" (Royal Commission, page 960). This would mean that separate national interests would not dominate every situation. There are economic interests, social securit,, standards of life, trade, agriculture, industry, labour, commerce abroad and other factors which will draw some Jews and some Arabs together.

- (c) The Legislature is to have the normal functions of a Federal Legislative Body, including the passing of the budget.
- (d) In case of a tie, the Head of the State is to have the casting vote.
 - C. Local Districts (Cantons, Counties) including Municipalities

These are to have wide autonomy, including the right of taxation. As to the Swiss cantons and their relation to the Federal Government, Professor Janowsky says (pages 37, 38, 42, 44, 45):

"The Swiss State is a confederation of 22 cantons each enjoying broad powers of self government ... Within 14 of her 22 cantons German is spoken by over 90% of the people; one canton is overwhelmingly Italian in speech and three French. The four remaining are linguistically mixed ... The people are further divided by 'confessional' differences, 57.3 being Protestant and 41% Catholic. However, the religious and linguistic groupings do not coincide ... German, French and Italian are all recognized as official languages in relation to the Central Government. The individual cantons, too, where the population is sufficiently composite, have assured equality of language ... The peoples of the particular cantons also possess organic unity: a Swiss nation, yet a Bernese and a Genevese people ... Swiss Federalism rests solidly on the

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decentralization of governmental functions and on respect for local sentiment. Cantonal and communal institutions are zealously guarded by the population ... Clinging to their ancient usages, local and cantonal communities preserve the character of nationalities ... Federalism has left the cantons some of the most essential functions of Government - law and order, education and direct taxation ... To be sure, the development of commerce and industry has led to a strengthening of the Central Government. But its sphere of activity has been mainly economic and social - railroads, factory legislation, insurance, contracts, sanitary precautions. Educational and cultural affairs remain predominantly the province of local bodies ... It is the multi-national state which has rendered possible both political unity and cultural freedom."

D. National Communities

- (a) In the bi-national Palestine there would be two National Communities, the Jewish National Council and the Arab National Council, with powers of taxation. Their practical province would be cultural.
- (b) On the other hand there would be a Joint Commission of these National Councils for the purpose of devising ways and means of familiarizing the one people with the culture of the other.
- (c) Members of the Civil Service down to the lowest grades would have to be bi-lingual, This is not difficult to achieve, as the experience of the past twenty years has shown.

E. The Central Religious Bodies

The Central Religious Bodies are to have recognized judicial functions in questions of personal status, such as marriage and divorce (Mandate for Palestine, Article 9).

It has been our purpose in the above to give a bare outline of the problem of political structure in some of its aspects.

V

THE UNION OF THE AUTONOMOUS BI-NATIONAL PALESTINE WITH NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES

This has been referred to above. This Union is called for by historical, geographic, economic and political considerations.

RECORD OFFICE, It is beyond the frame-work of this Statement to discuss the political structure of this Union.

VI

IF THE ONE OR THE OTHER REFUSED

It may be asked what would be the position, if the one or the other of the two peoples refused their cooperation in carrying out such plans as we have proposed.

Our answer is, that both peoples would eventually cooperate, that indeed there would be no other way for them - provided, that Jewish-Arab cooperation in a bi-national Palestine based on parity be clearly and sincerely and determinedly made the main objective of major policy.

OFFERS OF LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS

The history of the offers of a Legislative Council by the British Government is instructive in this connection.

The offer of 1922-23 was accepted by the Jews and rejected by important sections of the Arabs. It was therefore suspended.

That of 1930 was accompanied by the following statement by the British Government:

"His Majesty's Government desire to make it quite clear that while they would deeply regret an attempt on the part of any section of the population to prevent them from giving effect to their decision, all possible steps will be taken to circumvent such an attempt, if made, since they consider it in the interests of the population of the country as a whole that the further step now proposed should no longer be deferred."

The offer of 1935 was accompanied by a similar declaration, but it was not implemented. The Jews refused, and the Arabs half refused and half accepted, waiting to see what the Jews might do.

The two peoples may be excused for thinking that these proposals had strings attached and were not made seriously.

JERUSALEM MUNICIPALITY

Last year Government made the interesting and constructive proposal for tri-partite parity in the political structure of the Jerusalem Municipality. The Jews accepted, the Arabs refused. Immediately, without further attempt, the proposal became a dead letter.

NEITHER PEOPLE COULD STAY OUT

Our contention is, that if any of these proposals had been gone through with sincerely and authoritatively, the side staying out would eventually have come in. Life itself would have been too strong, the insistence of their people would have been too compelling, to justify their absention for any length of time. The issues at stake, the welfare of the individual and the community, are too important for any responsible body to have maintained its opposition for long.

If a Regional Trusteeship Body is to come into being, if the Jewish Agency and the Arab League are to be invited to sit on this Body, if immigration figures, and absorptive capacity, and development, and a constitution are to be discussed in this Body; and if there is to be a Constituent Assembly, and Self-Government, a Federal Executive, a Legislature, Autonomous Districts, National Councils and other organs of Government - if these are to be, no side can stay out for long.

AN AUTHORITATIVE POLICY

What is required is, that Jewish-Arab cooperation be made truly and intelligently the basis of major policy, that this be announced with authority, that it be carried through with authority. The result would be such, as we are convinced, that Jews and Arabs would find the way of life, of friendship and partnership with one another, not only in Palestine but throughout this whole part of the world.

VII

A PALESTINE SOLUTION

What a boon to mankind it would be if the Jews and the Arabs of Palestine were to strive together to make their Holy Land into a thriving, peaceful Switzerland situated at the heart of this ancient highway between East and West. A "Palestine Solution" is required for the Palestine problem. This would have an incalculable political and spiritual influence in all the Middle East and far beyond. A binational Palestine could become a beacon of peace in the world.

Jerusalem, March 5, 1946.

J. L. Magnes, CHAIRMAN 61940

APPENDIX

DECLARATION OF THE ASSOCIATION "UNION" (IHUD)

(September, 1942)

- (1) The Association "Union" adheres to:
 - (a) The Zionist movement, insofar as this seeks the establishment of the Jewish National Home for the Jewish people in Palestine;
 - (b) The struggle throughout the world for a new order in international relations, and a Union of the peoples, large and small, for a life of freedom and justice, without fear, oppression and want.
- (2) The Association "Union" therefore regards a Union between the Jewish and Arab peoples as essential for the upbuilding of Palestine and for meeting its basic problems. The Association "Union" will strive for cooperation between the Jewish world and the Arab world in all branches of life social, economic, cultural, political thus making for the revival of the whole Semitic world.
- (3) The main political aims of the Association "Union" are as follows:
 - (a) Government in Palestine based upon equal political rights for the two peoples;
 - (b) The agreement of the steadily growing Yishuv and of the whole Jewish people to a Federative Union of Palestine and neighbouring countries. This Federative Union is to guarantee the national rights of all peoples within it;
 - (c) A Covenant between this Federative Union and an Anglo-American Union which is to be a part of the future Union of the free peoples. This Union of the free peoples is to bear the ultimate responsibility for the establishment and stability of international relations in the New world after the war.

RECORD OFFICE,

ORAL TESTIMONY

BEFORE THE

A N G L O - A M E R I C A N C C O M M I T T E E

O N P A L E S T I N E

Jerusalem, March 15, 1946

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(Transcript)

ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY HEARING IN JERUSALEM, PALESTINE Thursday, March 14, 1946

APPEARANCES:

Dr. J. L. Magnes, Professor Martin Buber, Mr. M. Smilansky, Representing Ihud.

PROCEEDINGS

(The hearing convened at 2:35 p.m., Mr. Justice Singleton presiding.)

Mr. JUSTICE SINGLETON: Dr. Magnes, you appear representing Ihud, I gather.

Dr. MAGNES: Yes, sir.

Mr. JUSTICE SINGLETON: And also Professor Buber and Mr. Smilansky.

Dr. MAGNES: Yes, sir.

Mr. JUSTICE SINGLETON: Which of you would like to address us?

Dr. MAGNES: Might I read you a couple of words first?

Mr. JUSTICE SINGLETON: Thank you.

Dr. MAGNES: In preparing the Written Statement which the Ihud Association had the honor of submitting to you we had assumed we would embark at once upon discussion with you. The procedure, however, is that witnesses have begun their testimony by addressing through you the public at large. We also feel this to be our duty. We shall, however, try to be brief so that the time for discussion may be ample.

We shall ask your permission to proceed as follows: Professor Buber will present a brief paper on what our Zionism means to us and why we so ardently believe in the return to Zion. I shall then try to bring out some of the points of our written statement. Mr. Smilansky will in the course of the discussion want to emphasize two points, first, that Jewish-Arab cooperation is possible, and second, that there is sufficient land in the country for the absorption of a large Jewish immigration.

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Mr. Smilansky has lived and worked in Palestine for more than 55 years, and I venture the statement that there is no one who has so intimate a knowledge of these subjects. Professor Buber, who is now to speak, is not only an internationally known writer and scholar, but he was also one of the pioneers of the Zionist movement since the days of Theodor Herzl.

Professor Buber and I wish to make it clear that we are not speaking in the name of the Hebrew University. There are various opinions there as elsewhere. We are speaking as residents of the country and as Jews who feel it to be their duty to give voice to a view which, though differing from the official Zionist program, is nevertheless shared, as we know, by large numbers of the population.

Mr. JUSTICE SINGLETON: Professor Buber.

PROFESSOR BUBER: Mr. Chairman, it is impossible to survey the problem you are trying to meet without an understanding of the very roots of Zionism. For only through this understanding will the observer realize that he faces something quite different from the well-known national antagonism, and therefore that methods other than those of political routine are called for.

Modern political Zionism, in the form it has taken during my nearly fifty years of membership in this movement, was only developed and intensified, but not caused by modern anti-Semitism. Indeed, Zionism is a late form assumed by a primal fact in the history of mankind, a fact of reasonable interst at least for Christian civilization. This fact is the unique connection of a people and a country. This people, the people Israel, was once created by the power of a tradition that was common to some semi-nomadic tribes. Together these tribes migrated, under very difficult conditions, from Egypt to Canaan because they felt united by the promise to them of Canaan as their "heritage" since the days of the "Fathers." This tradition was spectacular and decisive for the history of mankind in that it confronted the new people with a task they could carry out only as a people, namely to establish in Canaan a model and "just" community. Later on, the "prophets" - a calling without any historical precedent - interpreted this task as obliging the community to send streams of social and political justice throughout the world. Thereby the most productive and most paradoxical of all human ideas, Messianism, was offered to humanity. It placed the people of Israel in the center of an activity leading towards the advent of the Kingdom of God on earth, an activity in which all the peoples were to cooperate. It ordered every generation to contribute to the upbuilding of the sacred future with the forces and resources at their command. Had it not been for this idea, neither Cromwell nor Lincoln could have conceived their mission. This idea is the origin of the great impulse that, in periods of disappointment and weariness, ever and ever again encouraged the Christian peoples to dare to embark upon a new shaping of their public life, the origin of the hope of a genuine and just

cooperation among individuals as well as nations, on a voluntary basis. But within the people that had created it, this idea grew to a force of quite peculiar vitality. Driven out of their promised land, this people survived nearly two millennia by their trust in their return, in the fulfillment of the promise, in the realization of the idea. The inner connection with this land and the belief in the promised reunion with it were a permanent force of rejuvenation for this people, living in conditions which probably would have caused the complete disintegration of any other group.

This serves as an explanation of the fact that, in the age of national movements, Judaism did not simply create another national movement of the European type, but a unique one, a "Zionism," the modern expression of the tendency towards "Zion." In this age the hostile forces which consciously or not, see in Judaism the Messianic monitor, quite logically attacked it more and more violently. Yet simultaneously, in Judaism itself, a great regeneration had started. Out of an inner necessity this movement of regeneration chose for its aim the reunion with the soil and, again out of an inner necessity, there was no choice other than the soil of Palestine and its cultivation. And with an inner necessity the new Jewish settlement on this soil centers in the village communities which, in spite of their differing forms of organization, all aim at the creation of a genuine and just community on a voluntary basis. The importance of these attempts surpasses the frontiers of Palestine as well as of Judaism. Given the chance of unhampered development, these vital social attempts will show the world the possibility of basing social justice upon voluntary action. Sir Arthur Wauchope who, as High Commissioner in the years 1931-1938 had the opportunity of acquainting himself with this country and this work, was right in pointing out that these "astonishingly successful" communal settlements are an example of cooperation for the whole world and can be of great importance for the foundation of a new social order.

At one time the productive strength of the people Israel in this country was a collective strength in the most sublime sense. Today the same might be said of the productive strength which the returning Jews have started to display in this country. It is the productive strength of a community directed towards the realization of real Community, and as such, it is important for the future of mankind. Mankind is fundamentally interested in the preservation of a vital and productive Jewish people, such as can grow if fostered by the unique connection of this people and this country.

From this the principle of Zionism results. It is concentration in Palestine of the national forces fit for renewing their productive strength. This principle again results in the three irreducible demands of Zionism. They are:

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First: Freedom to acquire soil in sufficient measure to bring about a renewed connection with the primal form of production, from which the Jewish people had been separated for many centuries and without which no original spiritual and social productivity can arise.

Second: A permanent powerful influx of settlers, especially of youth desiring to settle here, in order incessantly to strengthen, to amplify and to revive the work of reconstruction and to protect it from dangers of stagnancy, isolation and the forms of social degeneration particularly threatening colonization in the Levant.

Third: Self-determination of the Jewish community about their way of life and the form of their institutions, as well as an assurance for their unimpeded development as a community.

These demands, formulated simply in the concept of a "National Home," have been recognized, but not yet adequately understood, by large parts of the world. The tradition of justice, which I have mentioned and which must be realized within every community and between the communities, makes it clear that these demands must of necessity be carried out without encroaching upon the vital rights of any other community. Independence of one's own must not be gained at the expense of another's independence. Jewish settlement must oust no Arab peasant, Jewish immigration must not cause the political status of the present inhabitants to deteriorate, and must continue to ameliorate their economic condition. The tradition of justice is directed towards the future of this country as a whole, as well as towards the future of the Jewish people. From it and from the historical circumstance that there are Arabs in Palestine, springs a great, difficult and imperative task, the new form of the ageold task. A regenerated Jewish people in Palestine has not only to aim at living peacefully together with the Arab people, but also at a comprehensive cooperation with it in opening and developing the country. Such cooperation is an indispensable condition for the lasting success of the great work, of the redemption of this land.

The basis of such cooperation offers ample space for including the fundamental rights of the Jewish people to acquire soil and to immigrate without any violation of the fundamental rights of the Arab people. As to the demand for autonomy, it does not, as the greater part of the Jewish people thinks today, necessarily lead to the demand for a "Jewish State" or for a "Jewish majority." We need for this land as many Jews as it is possible economically to absorb, but not in order to establish a majority against a minority. We need them because great, very great forces are required to do the unprecedented work. We need for this land a solid, vigorous, autonomous community, but not in order that it should give its name to a state; we need it because we want to raise Israel and Erez Israel to the highest level of productivity they can be raised to. The new situation and the problem involved ask for new solutions that are beyond the capacity of the familiar political categories. An internationally guaranteed agreement between the two

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communities is asked for, which defines the spheres of interest and activity common to the partners and those not common to them, and guarantees mutual noninterference for these specific spheres.

The responsibility of those working on the preparation of a solution of the Palestine problem goes beyond the frontiers of the Near East, as well as the boundaries of Judaism. If a successful solution is found, a first step, perhaps a pioneer's step, will have been taken towards a juster form of life between people and people.

Mr. JUSTICE SINGLETON: Thank you, sir.
I understand, Dr. Magnes, the most convenient course is for you to address us now, is it?

Dr. MAGNES: Yes, sir.

Mr. JUSTICE SINGLETON: Thank you.

Dr. MAGNES: Our view is based on two assumptions, first, that Jewish-Arab cooperation is essential for a satisfactory solution of the difficult problem, and second, that Jewish-Arab cooperation is not only essential, it is also possible. The alternative is war, but the plain Jew and the plain Arab do not want war. There are many thousands here, Jews and Arabs, who stand aghast at the revelation, that Jewish and Arab militarists seem to be eager to fight it out on the field of battle. We do not know who would win this war. We only know that thousands of innocents would be the victims.

The militarist mentality throughout history is not able to believe, that complicated situations can be resolved other than by force of arms. I would like to assure you, gentlemen, that the vast majority of plain, inarticulate Jews and Arabs are not anxious for war. They want understanding and cooperation, and to achieve this they would make many concessions and sacrifices. It is necessary to give them the chance for this. But hope must not be too long deferred. All the world today is pressed for time; time presses also in this ancient land.

At the beginning of the war there was a real opportunity for bringing Jews and Arabs together in the face of the common danger. A proposal was therefore made to Government for the appointment of what was called a Consultative Body, consisting of equal numbers of Jews and Arabs, for the purpose of bringing Government and the population closer to one another in the war effort. This proposal was rejected, the more's the pity. A great opportunity has come again. Who knows if there will be another? It is our fervent prayer that your Committee will be able to meet the challenge with which destiny has faced you.

This is a land suigeneris, a Holy Land for three monotheistic religions. It is therefore not just a Jewish land or just an Arab land. The Arabs have natural rights here. They have been here and tilled the

soil for conturies. The Jews have historical rights here. They have yearned for this land for centuries. The Bible was created here, and the Jews by their labor latterly have shown themselves worthy of these historical rights.

We regard the Arab natural rights and the Jewish historical rights as, under all the circumstances, of equal validity. We look upon Palestine as a bi-national Jewish-Arab land, a common motherland for these two Semitic peoples, who have the privilege of acting as trustees for millions of their co-religionists all over the world. In such a land it is not fitting that one people should dominate the other. A Jewish State means domination of the Arabs by the Jews; an Arab State means domination of the Jews by the Arabs. The fear of this domination is deep and genuine in both peoples. This fear is the double-edged sword of the problem. It becomes the task of statesmanship to find the way of dissipating this fear and of supplanting it with cooperation, development, peace.

You are thus faced with the necessity of trying to establish an equilibrium between two forces. What is it that most Jews want? It is immigration. Give us the chance of an ample immigration and many of the sincerest advocates of the Jewish State will forego the State. What is it that most Arabs want? It is self-government. They are certainly not behind other Arabs in their capacity for self-government. Give them the chance of ample self-government, and many of the sincerest opponents of Jewish immigration will acquiesce. But to achieve this double objective, immigration and self-government, concessions have to be made by both peoples. No one can have all he wants in this country. A feasible and honorable compromise must be sought.

The purpose of our statement to you is to help you, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, to find the way of reasonable, constructive compromise. We therefore suggest to you that you adopt concurrently two basic principles, and that you announce these principles concurrently. One without the other would be but fragmentary.

These principles are, first, that Palestine is a bi-national country for two equal peoples, both of whom are to have equal political rights and duties. We call this political parity. Second, that Jewish immigration is to be encouraged up to parity with the Arabs. This is numerical parity. And the immediate thing to be done in this direction is to admit, without further delay, President Truman's 100,000 displaced persons.

Let me first deal briefly with immigration. We postulate three periods. The first period is now, today. You are authorized to make ad hoc recommendations as to the unhappy thousands languishing without a home. We pray you to help these 100,000 come back home to this Jewish National Home, and this without further delay. They might be divided into 25,000 children, if there are so many left, 25,000 parents, relatives,

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older persons, and 50,000 young people. You would thus help to bring creative forces into the country and you would be performing an historical act of great compassion.

These 100,000 are not a threat to Arab numbers. In reality they would constitute a net gain for the Jews of not more than 33,000. According to Government figures the Arab natural increase during 5 years of war was about 150,000, 30,000 a year. The Jewish increment was only about 83,000, including natural increase and all forms of immigration. Thus, there would be a net Jewish gain of not more than 33,000, and this is not such a frightening number. The total Jewish population would then be 700,000. This is a smaller number than was envisaged during discussions between some Jews and Arabs, in 1936, after the outbreak of the Arab revolt. They were trying to find the basis of an understanding, and it was agreed between them that after 10 years, this very year 1946, the Jews would constitute 40 percent of the population, that is 800,000 persons. I find it difficult to reconcile myself to the thought that this agreement was not ratified. Had it been, there would be 800,000 Jews here today instead of 600,000, and that with Arab good will.

If some Arabs say they oppose the entry of one single extra Jew because that is one step nearer to the Jewish State, it is but a figure of speech symbolizing their deep opposition to Jewish domination through a Jewish State. But to achieve a Jewish State there would have to be a Jewish majority, and an additional 100,000 Jews are far from being equivalent to a Jewish majority.

As to the second immigration period, we envisage the opportunity for the Jews of becoming one-half of the population. How long might this take? Government figures show that at the rate of 60,000 a year it would take 11 years from now, that is up to 1957; at the rate of 50,000 a year, up to 1960; at the rate of 40,000 a year, up to 1964; at the rate of 30,000 per annum, 24 years, that is up to 1970. Any annual Jewish immigration below 30,000 would never let the Jews catch up with the Arabs, owing to the much larger Arab natural increase.

As to absorptive capacity, I recall that during Sir Herbert Samuel's administration it was believed that the country, which in 1924 had 805,000 inhabitants, of whom 628,000 were Moslems, was eapable of absorbing up to 3,000,000 with agriculture as the chief industry. In his recent speech in the House of Lords, with the general tenor of which we are in accord, Lord Samuel speaks of the possibility of $4\frac{1}{2}$ millions within a generation. He can say this because the Jews through devotion and capital and science have proven that the absorptive capacity is much larger than the experts once thought. But to enlarge the absorptive capacity to the full requires the implementation of a great cooperative development plan for the benefit of all the inhabitants.

For these two basic matters, absorptive capacity and development, we propose the creation of two Boards to consist of representatives of the Mandatory, of the Jewish Agency, and of the Arab League. We look upon the Mandatory as representative of the Christian world, the Jewish Agency as representative of the Jewish world, and the Arab League as representative of the Arab and the Moslem world. This may indicate also the stress we lay upon the international and interreligious aspects of the Palestine problem.

In the third stage of the immigration policy the question arises as to the situation, if and when parity in population may have been reached. The answer to this would depend upon two factors, first, upon whether by then the two peoples have found the way of peace together, and second, upon the formation of a wider United Nations Regional Organization, a regional Union of neighboring countries in which the bi-national Palestine would be an autonomous member. Such a Union would afford the Palestine Arabs a wider Arab background and would thus help to remove the present acute importance of majority-minority in Palestine.

The second principle, the adoption of which we urge, is the binational Palestine based upon political parity. This brings us to the problem of self-government. Concessions will have to be made by both peoples. The Arabs would have to yield their ambition to set up an independent Arab State. But the whole history of Palestine shows that it has not just been made for a uni-national sovereign independence. Yet the Arabs will be able to enjoy the maximum of national freedom in a bi-national Palestine, equally with their Jewish fellow citizens. What the bi-national State will take away from the Arabs is sovereign independence in Palestine. We contend that sovereign independence in this tiny land, whether it be Jewish sovereignty or Arab sovereignty, is not possible. It is moreover a questionable good in this post-war period, when even great states must relinquish something of their sovereignty and seek union if the world is not to perish.

We contend that for this Holy Land the ideal of a cooperative, peaceful, bi-national Palestine is at least as inspiring as that of an Arab sovereign Palestine or a Jewish sovereign Palestine.

On the other hand, the bi-national Palestine would deprive the Jews of their one opportunity of a Jewish State. Nevertheless, this bi-national Palestine would be the one country in the world where the Jews would be a constituent nation, that is, an equal nationality within the body politic and not just a minority as everywhere else. Moreover, the absence of a Jewish State would make more difficult direct access by the Jewish people to the United Nations Organization. To compensate for this some form should be devised for giving the Jewish people a recognized place within the structure of the United Nations Organization.

Bi-nationalism based on parity has distinct advantages in a country which has two nationalities. It is a comparatively new way. Full cultural autonomy is combined with full allegiance to the multinational State. National identity is safeguarded, yet there is coalescence in a larger political framework. That this is possible is proven by Switzerland during the past 100 years. The Swiss are divided by language, religion, and culture. Nor do the religious and linguistic groups coincide in the 22 cantons. Yet all these divergences have not been obstacles to political unity.

There are various forms of the multi-national State. In some ways the United Kingdom is one form, Soviet Russia is another, South Africa another, the new Yugoslavia another. Professor Seton Watson in his new book, "Eastern Europe Between the Wars 1918-1941," tells of a plan under discussion now for a bi-national Transylvania. Hungarian domination, Roumanian domination, and partition had been tried in vain.

Multi-nationalism based on parity is a newer form of democracy which is as important for multi-national States as the more traditional form of democracy is for uni-lateral States. The old way of having a major people and a minor people in a State of various nationalities is reactionary. In many senses the multi-national ideal represents a higher ideal, more modern and more hopeful than even the uni-national sovereign State. There is no prospect of peace in a country where there is a dominant people and a subordinate people. Parity in a multi-national country is the only just relationship between the peoples. This is the progressive conception. It is a noble goal to which the youth of multi-national countries can be taught to give their enthusiasm and their energies.

Let me take up briefly the question of self-government in the binational Palestine. We divide this also into three periods. As to the short term, for as long as the Mandate persists - we ourselves favor transfer to trusteeship - two immediate steps should be taken: One, the appointment of Jews and Arabs in equal numbers to responsible positions in the Central Government - as members of the Executive Council, as members of the Secretariat, as heads of Departments, as District Commissioners, as Presidents of Courts. There are no Jews or Arabs in any of these positions. It is a sad commentary that after 25 years of the Mandate, which requires the establishment of a full measure of self-governing institutions, the country is further away from this than ever.

We renew also the proposal for a Consultative Body to be presided over by the High Commissioner. It would have no legislative or executive functions, but the High Commissioner would bring before it all matters of public concern on which consultation was regarded by him as beneficial. This would be good preparation for the next stage, that is, the period of Trusteeship.

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We have presented you with certain suggestions as to the political structure of Palestine under Trusteeship. We may be charged, perhaps justly, with engaging in the favorite pastime of constitution-making, and we make no claim that better suggestions cannot be put forward. Yet our justification is that we have given these matters considerable thought.

The first step which we propose in this period of Trusteeship is the setting up of a Regional trusteeship body, to be composed of representatives of the Administering Authority, the Jewish Agency, the Arab League. The Absorptive Capacity Board which I mentioned before, and the Development Board which I mentioned before, are to be responsible, in the first instance, to this regional trusteeship body until other provisions are made.

We propose further the appointment of a Commission on Constitution, on which there should be representatives of the Administering Authority, the Jewish Agency, and the Arab League. When this Constitution, with its Bill of Rights, is drafted, it is to be brought before the Regional trusteeship body. Then a Constituent Assembly, composed of equal numbers of Jews and Arabs, is to be convened. Where they don't agree, the decision is to be left to the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations Organization.

I am near my conclusion. I shall give, but very sketchily, some of the headings we presented in our written document for the consideration of the proposed Constitution Commission.

The Head of the State is to be appointed by the United Nations Organization. He is to appoint the heads of departments, with the concurrence of the legislature, and preside over the Executive Council. The Legislature is to consist of equal numbers of Jews and Arabs. In case of a tie, the Head of State, who presides, is to have the casting vote. The Legislature is to be elected democratically by districts, or they may be called counties or cantons. Some districts would be mainly Jewish, some Arab, some mixed; some districts would be mainly Christian-Arab as, for example, Bethlehem, Ramallah, and Nazareth.

The two National Councils, Jewish and Arab, would have cultural autonomy and there would be a Joint Commission for the purpose of planning how to familiarize the one people with the culture of the other.

It may be asked what if the one or the other of the peoples refused?

Our answer is that both peoples must eventually cooperate. Indeed, there would be no other way for them, provided, and this is basic to our whole conception, provided that Jewish-Arab cooperation in a bi-national Palestine based on parity be clearly and sincerely and authoritatively made the main objective of major policy. It has never been the main objective of major policy.

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The issues at stake are so important for the welfare of the individual and the community that no responsible body could stay out for long. Offers of a Legislative Council were made in their way and then abandoned. A tripartite political structure for Jerusalem was proposed and then dropped.

Our contention is, that if any one of these proposals had been gone through with sincerely and authoritatively, no side could have stayed out for long. If now, under our proposals, a regional trusteeship body is to come into being, if the Jewish Agency and the Arab League are invited to sit on this body; if an Absorptive Capacity Board is to be appointed; if a Development Board is to be appointed; if appointments are to be made to high responsible positions in the Central Government; if, then, a Constitution Commission is to be appointed; if there is to be a Constituent Assembly and self-government, federal executive, legislature, autonomous districts and other organs of government - no side can afford for long to withhold its adherence. The demand of life itself, the insistance of the people would be too strong.

Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, what a boon to mankind it would be if the Jews and Arabs of Palestine were to strive together in friendship and partnership to make this Holy Land into a thriving, peaceful Switzerland in the heart of this ancient highway between East and West. This would have incalculable political and spiritual influence in all the Middle East and far beyond. A bi-national Palestine could become a beacon of peace in the world.

MR. JUSTICE SINGLETON: Thank you, Doctor Magnes, for your instructive address. I am not proposing to ask you any questions about the details of it, but I'm not sure whether you would like to answer this question or not. You need not. Have you been able to discuss this matter with those whose views have been put before us at all in the last few days or weeks?

A. Well, there is incessant discussion going on, and there is discussion going on in the press. Our little organization issues a monthly publication that is taken up and answered, and the discussion goes on in that way. If you refer to a tête-à-tête discussion recently on these problems, I regret to say that such has not taken place.

DOCTOR AYDELOTTE: Doctor Magnes, I imagine the members of the Committee heard with a great deal of satisfaction your statement that the problem before us is a complicated one. We have been repeatedly assured on both sides that it was extremely simple. But it looks difficult to us, and we are glad to know other people think it difficult.

I would like to ask you questions about one or two details. You said that you thought cooperation between Arabs and Jews was possible. You said that you thought the situation had deteriorated in recent years. I would like to ask you whether you think the setting up of political Zionism as a goal for the Jews had had the effect of preventing friendly relations

between Jews and Arabs - whether that had been partially responsible for the deteriotation in these relations.

A. Would you permit me to formulate your question a little differently?

DOCTOR AYDELOTTE: Yes.

A. Perhaps you mean to say not the setting up of political Zionism but setting up the program of the Jewish State.

DOCTOR AYDELOTTE: That's what I mean, yes.

A. Might I formulate the other part a little differently? Not to prevent friendly relations, because there are friendly relations between Jews and Arabs today, but whether these friendly relations are as consistent and as intensive as they used to be.

DOCTOR AYDELOTTE: Didn't I understand you to say that relations between Jews and Arabs had somewhat deteriorated in recent years?

A. I didn't use that phrase. I did say that in 1936, even after the Arab revolt had broken out, a number of Jews and a number of Arabs - not the least in their communities - met in order to try and find the way of understanding. I said further, that at the beginning of the war, at the end of 1939 and the beginning of 1940, Arabs and Jews came closer together in face of the common danger, and I contended that at that time there was the opportunity of establishing a Consultative Body which might bring Arabs and Jews and Government into closer touch with the purpose of cooperating the better in the war effort. Since then, I think it is true to say that the relations between Jews and Arabs have not improved - that, on the contrary, in many senses, they have deteriorated.

Then, in order to answer your question fully: There is no doubt that setting up the program of the Jewish State as the official program of the Zionist Organization has helped in this deterioration.

DOCTOR AYDELOTTE: That was the question that I wanted to ask. And I would like to ask you another question about this matter of parity. I think you know about Professor Notestein's paper which indicates that in his opinion, at least, equal numbers of Jews and Arabs would be forever impossible because of the different rate of natural increase. Suppose, for one reason or another, parity were impossible; suppose it were impossible for that reason, or suppose that the economic absorptive power of the country was found not to be great enough to admit that many Jews. Would the fact that parity could not be attained be fatal to your plan?

A. On your assumption, which I do not share, as to absorptive capacity, because I believe the absorptive capacity of this country is very great, that would not invalidate the conception of a bi-national state. Even though the Jews remained a minority over a period of years, the con-

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ception of a bi-national state based on parity would give this minority - or if the Arabs ever became a minority- equal political rights as a community. That is the basic thesis of our contention. That is what we mean to say when we put forward this idea of the multi-national state, based upon parity among the various nationalities.

There are two aspects to it in our case. One is the political aspect; the other is the numerical aspect.

I assume you accept in your question the political aspect.

DOCTOR AYDELOTTE: I was assuming for the moment the numerical one seems to be harder to predict.

A. It is harder to predict, and in these figures that I gave, you will observe that if the Jewish immigration is ever less than 30,000 a year, there is absolutely no chance for the Jews to catch up, because the Arab natural increase is greater than the Jewish. It is 2.7 for the Arabs and 1.3 for the Jews. Might I add a word on that?

Assuming that 60,000 Jews a year were permitted to come in for eleven years, so that the Jews would reach parity with the Arab population, there would always be this difference, owing to the increase in the Arab population, and thus a further chance for Jewish immigration to catch up to the Arab increase, which is larger than the Jewish increase. I don't know if I have made myself clear.

DOCTOR AYDELOTTE: Yes, I see the point. Yet you have also got to contemplate the possibility, that there wouldn't be enough Jews in the world who would want to come to Palestine to keep pace or bring the population to parity in the long future.

A. I don't know on what grounds you base that, but my own opinion is this:

DOCTOR AYEDELOTTE: Your opinion is doubtless much better than mine. I thought it was one of the possibilities, at least. I would like to ask another question.

You spoke with great regret that the agreement of 1936 wans't accepted and consequently, 200,000 Jews who might be in Palestine at this moment are not her. I think the Committee would be interested to hear you say anything you think it wise to say about the circumstances of that agreement - the reasons for its not being accepted - but I don't want you to say anything you don't think wise to say.

A. I should have to consult those who with me signed the document, who were among those who conducted these discussions, before I should feel free to tell you who the people were or to let you know further about it.

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DOCTOR AYDELOTTE: If you feel free to make any further comments on the subject in written form, it would be a matter of great interest. I would like to finally ask a question of Professor Buber. Did I understand you to say, sir, that the majority of the Jews do not, in your opinion, favor a Jewish State in Palestine?

PROFESSOR BUBER: I think that state and majority are not the necessary bases for Zionism.

DOCTOR AYDELOTTE: I gathered that, but I thought I saw the sentence in your paper to the effect that the majority of Jews do not favor a Jewish State.

- A. You see, there are no statistics for it. A great part of Judaism cannot tell what it thinks about it. We have no communication with them, but I think a very great part of the Jewish people think a Jewish State is necessary for Zionism.
- Q. You think a great part of the Jewish people think a Jewish State is necessary?
- A. Yes, a great part think -a very great part think it is necessary- that a Jewish State is necessary.
- Q. The sentance I was referring to in your paper is as follows: "As to the demand of autonomy, it does not..." I beg your pardon, I think I misunderstood your sentence. Thank you very much.
- MR. CROSSMAN: I would like to say two sentences before I question Doctor Magnes. I was asking about you this morning, and somebody told me you were the only reasonable man in Palestine. When I was listening to you, I began to see why he paid you that compliment.

I am not going to discuss the details of your plan because I feel if that were possible, nobody would possibly not want to see it done. The real problem is whether it is practical, and it is entirely on that question of the practicability of your ideas that I wanted to get your advice. I would like to put something to you first:

Do you agree that the success or failure of your complete scheme depends upon the following four things:

- 1. Agreement between the political leaders on both sides;
- 2. Deerease on both sides of nationalistic fervor among the rank and file:
- 3. Confidence on both sides that the other side is going to keep to its agreement to give up its ultimate desires - confidence that it will go on agreeing to that later on;
- 4. An administration capable of the extremely skillful job of conducting this together. Those four are very important elements for success?

- A. Permit me not to deal with the fourth for the moment.
- MR. CROSSMAND: Yes.
- A. You question the practicability of this plan.
- MR. CROSSMAND: Just discussing it.
- A. I question the practicability of your question. (Laughter). I will tell you what I mean. This plan, or a plan similar to this, is designed to do those very things that you have in mind and that you have these grave doubts about. Your doubts are not only grave but justified. But how are you going to get agreement among the political leaders?
 - MR. CROSSMAND: That is what I was going to discuss.
- A. Yes, how are you going to get this confidence? How are you going to get the other points that you made? Our answer is, through life and not just through discussion, through establishing vital interests for both of the peoples, by establishing contact not in a sting society but in Boards, which have to do with the determination of the absorptive capacity of the country. Both peoples are interested in that maybe one pro and the other contra. There will be a third man representing the mandatory or administering authority. Then through establishing a Development Board. I should say both peoples are interested in that affirmatively. Both peoples would benefit from it. If you, therefore, establish a degional trusteeship council representing both peoples, and go through all these organs of government which I have mentioned here, that is the way to bring people together who are at the present time unhappily far apart and who simply can't be brought together by appealing to abstract qualitiles.
- Q. Thank you, sir. You have been putting forward your pamphlets for some time since 1943, and therefore these ideas of yours are pretty well known in Palestine. What is the size of the membership of your organization?
- A. The membership is a small membership a few hundred. The organization is not a political party. It has never attempted mass meetings for the purpose of gaining memberships; it has never distributed membership blanks around; its purpose is to clarify some of these problems; to put forward a program; to arouse discussion. This little publication that I mentioned to you, this monthly, I think has about 500 regular subscribers, aside from the number sold here and there. But we do know this little publication penetrates into every editorial office and to other places and arouses thought.
- Q. Now, so that there has been time for these ideas to get fairly well known here?
- A. Yes, Might I add, Mr. Crossman, it isn't only our organization that believes in the bi-national Palestine; there are other organizations

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who are political parties and who are out for large numbers of members, who also believe in this program. There may be differences between us and them on this or that point, but our general tendency and theirs is the same.

I should like to add to that, that we know from ever so many indications that a large part of the inarticulate section of the population believes more or less as we do. This inarticulate part of the population isn't organized either because of our fault, or because a moderate program doesn't have the same attractiveness in days of war as an extreme program has. The point I would like to make is, there are large numbers of inarticulate persons in the community who also feel more or less as we do.

- Q. But because they have no political form of expression, they vote for the more extreme policy?
- A. I don't say they even vote for the more extreme position; they aren't counted.
- Q. But still you feel that Arab-Jewish relations have deteriorated lately, despite all the efforts of getting together?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. Taking the leadership on both sides, do you feel in the Jewish Agency today there are men in the key positions who sympathize with your ideas?
 - A. I hesitate to speak for them.
- Q. It is a vital question because here you have an organization which you agree has a very strong control over the Jewish community here.
 - A. I think you would get a clearer answer by asking them.
- Q. Yes. Now, do you agree that since the Jewish Agency is mentioned as a key agency in the conciliation, the question of whether or not it would accept your views is a key to the success or failure of the scheme?
- A. Put these things before the Jewish Agency and the Arab League and see.
- Q. You feel that the Agency as at present constituted could, in fact, take part in this conciliation?
 - A. What do you mean by "as at present constituted"?
 - Q. With its present executive and its present structure?
- A. Well, I'm talking of the Jewish Agency as an organization that has been recognized internationally by the Mandate. It isn't a Jewish Agency

composed of this or that person or this or that number that I have in mind. I have in mind the Jewish Agency.

- Q. I see. Then, on the side of the Arab League, what part could the Arab Higher Committee play in your plan?
- A. That is a problem, of course, that undoubtedly would arise, and I can't give a clear answer befause I am not authorised to give that answer. But what I should like to say is this: That we make the Jewish Agency and the Arab League parallel. Why? We haven't put in here the Vaad Leumi, which might perhaps be parallel to the Arab Higher Committee. The Vaad Leumi is a local body. The Arab Higher Committee is a local body. We mention international bodies, including the Administering Authority as representing Trusteeship Council - the Jewish Agency as representing the Jews all over the world, and the Arab League as representing the Arabs and Moslems of the world, insofar as Palestine is concerned. So that there is a counterpoise. There is the Jewish Agency, an international body here, and the Arab League, an international body there. What would be the relationship later on between the Vaad Leumi and the Jewish Agency, or the Arab High Committee and Arab League is something we havn't dealt with here. It is something we have discussed, but we believe that would be complicating the problem if we discussed it now.
- Q. On the fourth point I made on the administering of it, you feel there would have to be changes in the structure of the Palestine administration, apart from the addition of the Arabs and Jews, as suggested, in key positions in order to carry this out?
- A. Yes, I feel there would have to be self-government, but I have been talking about self-government upon the basis of parity.
 - Q.I meant in the transitional period.
- A. Yes, in the transitional period during the Mandate, yes, I think there ought to be immediate changes. It seems to me well, I was going to say inexcusable. You will excuse me if I use the word. It is probably inexcusable that there isn't a larger measure of self-government in this country, and that doesn't mean that the hundreds of English officials who are here are not good men. They are. They are all interested and they all do their work as far as is required of them. But they are not part of this country. There are hundreds of minor positions which would be very well filled by Jews and Arabs, and I venture to say very often aswell, and perhaps in some instances, even better. I am not directing criticism at anyone; I'm only talking about the situation as it has developed. What I referred to here, however, was not these hundreds of minor positions here and there; I referred to these important responsible offices in the central government.

I realized that when reading I made a mistake by saying there wasn't a single Arab or a single Jew in the Secretariat. There is a Palestine

Arab in the Secretariat. There is no Palestine Jew, so far as I am aware, in the Secretariat. But aside from that little error, there is no Jew in the Executive Council of the Government, or Arab. There is no Jew or Arab in what is called the Advisory Council; there is no Palestinian Jew or Arab at the head of any department. I could name departments to you that could be very well filled - non-controversial departments - that could very well be filled by Jews and Arabs. There is no Jewish or Arab District Commissioner; there is no Jewish or Arab President of a Court.

That is a situation which we contend is impossible. ¹t is treating a community as though they were children. This is a mature community. The only way, after all, to teach self-government, is to distribute responsibility. You can't get self-government by having other people govern. That is something which we contend ought to be done now. And this Consultative Body that we have suggested to you, that ought to be done now.

Q. What it comes to is, you feel there would have to be a profound change of heart in the government and in the Arabs and Jews, and the declaration of policy and principle which you outlined would be the beginning?

- A. Not a mere declaration; it would have to be really meant.
- Q. Quitc.
- A. It is a very important point.
- Q. I agree.
- A. You probably know of that passage in the White Paper of 1930, when the British Government proposed the establishment of a legislature similar to that proposed in 1922, and in the statement it was declared that no matter what side stayed out, this thing was going to be put through, but it wasn't.

One can't blame the communities for thinking, that when these declarations of policy are made, there is a string attached to them.

What we propose to you is, that this declaration of policy be meant and be put through authoritatively. It can't be put through overnight. Doctor Aydelotte said this was a complicated problem. We regard it as a very complicated problem.

What we mean by making Jewish-Arab cooperation the main objective of major policy is this: That it has no be done day by day and year after year, and people have to be trained especially for the service. There is a great English Colonial Service in the Sudan. You have to train them to understand what it is all about, and not regard this as merely the day's job and that is the end of it.

0F RECORD OFFICE, I remember years ago having a talk with a good friend of mine, who is unfortunately not now in the British Administration, an Englishman, on this very problem, and when I advanced arguments similiar to these, he said, "But this is not our job; this is your job," that is, the Jews and the Arabs. It is indeed primarily the job of Jews and Arabs.

But it can't be done unless there be this authoritative Body with all of the weight that government everywhere has standing behind it.

MR. CROSSMAN: Thank you very much indeed.

MR. CRUM: Doctor Magnes, suppose that this Committee recommended a bi-national State to our respective Governments and that that suggestion also included the suggestion that the Mandatory Power attempt to put it into force or into effect. Is it your suggestion that British and American arms be used for that purpose, if need be?

A. Well, Mr. Crum, I don't know just how many arms in general would be necessary. It would depend, I think, very largely on the way it was put - on the conviction with which it was meant - on the men who are going to try to work all of this out.

If your Governments will decide on the policy of a bi-national Palestine, you just can't put it into effect overnight. You have to go through a long process, and it is some of the steps in this long, rather wearisome education process that we have tried to outline.

- Q. In one of your articles, which I think was filed here, you suggested, I believe, that the English and American Governments should back the proposal.
- A. Yes, I did. I proposed that in an article in the Foreign Affairs in January, 1943. And I proposed a Commission like yours at the time.
 - Q. I would take it you meant by "power", by force, if need be.
- A. I suppose so, in the last analysis, I don't want to shirk that problem. If one starts out on the assumption, however, that force is going to be used, one will have much less patience in trying to work it through without force. You have to try to determine in advance that this is reasonable; that this is just, more or less, all around; that there are men of good will to be found everywhere, and of course, committees or boards who are going to try and pick out good men; who are going to have expert advice; who are going to do it gradually. You can't introduce a bi-national state all at once. But if, in the last analysys, the time comes when a show of arms will have to be made, well, then I don't want to invite the United States Army here. I should regret very much to see it here, if you want to ask me my personal opinion. May I add one more word:

At that time, presumably, there might be agreement in the Security Council of the UNO which would know how to do this thing better than if we invited the British Army or the American Army or any other army.

MR. CRUM: Does your organization reject completely the idea of partition?

- A. I would like to give you my own opinion. We have no official stand on that. My own opinion is, that I reject partition absolutely. I think it is a moral defeat for everyone concerned. It is a confession of failure.
 - Q. Let us assume that.
 - A. But you mustn't assume that.
 - Q. It might be the only answer.
- A. No, it isn't at all the only answer. You have, in the first place, in these two tiny partitioned states, the same problems in small as you have in this larger bi-national State. You have a majority and a minority. How are you going to treat them? If you are going to treat them as majorities and minorities one dominant people and one subservient people that is one way to do it. If you are going to treat them as we propose, on the lines of parity in the Jewish State or in the Arab State, why not do it in the complete state? Moreover, you would find, I think, that the administrative boundaries would be very hard to set up.

And what is of greatest importance to me is this: That you then separate the Jews from the Arabs instead of bringing them together. You separate them as though they were two dogs fighting on the street and you had to put them into separate kennels. That is not the case. Some people may use that figure of speech, but it isn't true. The only way to get people to work together is to get them to live together, to get to know one another, and you can't do that by putting them into separate compartments.

If you put them into these compartments, what is going on now in both the Arab and Jewish schools will be accentuated to a very large degree. Unfortunately, at the present time you have a large amount of the bitterest nationalism, which you might call chauvinism, being given expression to both here and there.

I dread the day when, a few years' time after this partition, you will get a group of young Jews and a group of young Arabs on both sides of this irridentist border going after one another, in just the same way as our militarists today want to have the field for a trial of arms. Why do that? It's a large problem. No one can guarantee its success, but it is worth trying. It is a great challenge; it is the

RECORD OFFICE, Holy Land. Why mangle this conception of the Holy Land? Here are two peoples, descendants of the great Semitic peoples of antiquity. They can naturally work together. We have to find the way; we have to try to convince everyone this is just and that is sound. You don't have to do this partitioning. It is entirely artificial. It may seem simple; it is only facile.

MR. MANNINGHAM-BULLER: You regard the desire on the one hand to maintain a majority and the desire on the other to attain a majority as perhaps the chief factor in keeping the Arabs and Jews apart, is that right?

A. Yes.

- Q. You spoke of an internationally guaranteed agreement between the partners. I wasn't quite clear about it, but you said something to Mr. Crossman about it being imposed in advance. If it was imposed in advance, you would not be suggesting a guaranteed agreement, would you, stopping one side from going on in its desire to attain a majority?
- A. Pardon me if I say I don't quite catch the implication of your question. I don't think I used the words "imposed in advance."

 What I did mean to say was, that a policy should be declared in advance a policy of the bi-national Palestine, based upon parity between the two peoples. I said that that policy would have to be adopted and announced concurrently with a further statement about immigration. Then I said in order to have this policy carried out, this policy of political parity, there would have to be a number of stages, and we propose a number of these governmental institutions.
- Q. If you made that declaration of policy now, it would in no way silence the clamor for a majority, would it?
- A. It certainly would not, in the beginning, at least. It wouldn't silence anything at the beginning. That policy has to be carried out, as I tried to indicate before, over a period through these various channels.
- Q. Assume you declare that policy and assume you carry it out in the way you suggest. Would you not still be met with the demand, perhaps, on one side to maintain its majority and a demand on the other side to attain its majority?
- A. Yes, undoubtedly, and that would be fought out in this Regional Trusteeship Council in the first place, and we propose this Absorptive Capacity Board, or call it Immigration Board, and other boards and committees.
- Q. Do you think it would be fought out within the conciliation which you suggest?

- A. Oh, no. Naturally, it would give rise to a large discussion everywhere.
- Q. In your paper in the paragraph about the rate of immigration, you said, "Although these calculations meaning the Royal Commission's calculations were made in 1936, it would appear that the ratio of Arab increase and Jewish increase has remained stable."
 - A. Yes.
- Q. It is a fact, is it not, that the Royal Commission trend of population figures have been subject to a certain amount of criticism?
- A. Well, I took the precaution of discussing these figures with officials in the Immigration Department of the Government. We went over them rather carefully and what I have said here is the result of those discussions.
 - Q. Thank you.
- MR. PHILLIPS: Assume for the sake of argument that your plan met with the interest of other Governments, how would you begin, what steps would be the first ones to take to set your plan in operation? I think I understood you to say you regarded the centre as the most important part of the machinery, would you therefore start by appointments at the centre of Arabs and Jews; if so, how would you attract them, would you give them portfolios at once, that form of responsibility, or would they be in the first instance merely assistants to the High Commissioner? How would you start the ball moving?
- A. If I venture to mention the names of certain Government Departments, I am sure that those who head them will not think that I am directing my attention to them personally. I would start by appointing Arabs and Jews in equal numbers as heads of certain departments; as for example, I would begin with the most innocuous department in all of Government, the department of archaeology. I know the Director of the Department; he is a most efficient man, most obliging, a good head of this department, but I know some Jews, I know some Arabs who could be equally good heads of that department. Take, for example, the Department of Health. The Director of the Department of Health, who served in that capacity for over 20 years, has now gone. The present Director is about to resign. I think I read some place a new Director had been appointed or was about to be appointed. I said to myself at the time: Are there no Jews and no Arabs in this country who are medically well enough trained and who know enough of administration to head this most humane of all the departments of Government? Take, for example, the Department of Agriculture and of Forestry. We have a large number of Jews and of Arabs here who know a great deal about agriculture and about forestry. My friend, Mr. Smilansky, knows a great deal about agriculture. He was Chairman of the Farmers' Association for a large number of years. Take the Department of Posts and Telegraphs, the Director has resigned and is

now the Chairman of the Jerusalem Municipal Commission, an excellent man, if he will pardon me saying so, he may be here or he may not, but at any rate, a man who is very well liked everywhere. But when he left the Department it was only natural that the Englishman, his name is Irish, so he may be an Irishman, was appointed in his place. I said to myself at the time, is there no one here in Palestine who is fit to be the head of the Department of Posts and Telegraphs? Take the railroads, the Director of the Railroads is really an excellent man. What I mean to say is, he has improved the service, he knows his job and he is an expert at it. That is the thing for which he was trained. I doubt whether some of the others were trained for these jobs I have been mentioning. I am sure there are some men who could handle that job. I would not put a Jew or an Arab as head of the police; I would not put a Jew or Arab at the head of the Department of Education; I would not make a Jew or an Arab at the present time, at any rate, a Chief Secretary; I would not make a Jew or an Arab Chief Justice. There may be some others perhaps. I would not make him the Financial Secretary at the moment, although I think you could find Jews and Arabs who know something about figures. They might come in later. I have just tried to give you an indication of what I think can be done without too much delay. It has been delayed long enough, and if this Commission is really - pardon me saying this - is really to do something vital as I know it wants to do, here is the field for it, living men. Take the districts. The District Commissioners are most important people. They are important because they come into contact with the population. They and their assistants or the Assistant District Commissioners know what is going on in the village and in the farms and the factories and the rest of it. They do the best they can. Most of them get to know at least one of these two languages, Hebrew and Arabic, for the most part Arabic; but that is just the place where people living in this country and making it their permanent home, born here, educated here, would fit in very well. They could come into touch with the population through all of its stratifications in a much more thorough-going way, I think at any rate, than the best of men with the best of goodwill who come from the outside. The Consultative Body that I mentioned I believe would be a wonderful training ground for the future Legislature.

- Q. And so you would begin first at the centre?
- A. Yes, as the first step, and the second step might be the Consultative Body.
- Q. Yes. Just one other thought, in describing the set-up of your Council, did you or did you not refer to the world wide interest, the Christian interest, in the Holy Places?
 - A. Yes.
 - Q. Have you thought of any representation of that in the Government?

A. Well, I tried to indicate, that in our view the Administering Authority, the Mandatory Authority, Great Britain, is the representative of Christianity. In the Mandate for Palestine, I think it is Article 9, you have a paragraph giving religious courts certain jurisdiction. We have not really addressed ourselves with any detail to that. There are a number of views about it. As far as the Holy Places are concerned I believe you would not find a single person, I think that is not exaggerated, you would not find a single person who will not agree, that as far as the Holy Places are concerned, there must be some kind of special dispensation, so that they could remain Holy Places and that one could have free access to them for pilgrims and for others who want to visit them. I think if you would seek that area where there is least difference of opinion you would find it right there.

MR. PHILLIPS: Thank you very much.

MR. MACDONALD: Just one question, Dr. Magnes, perhaps you will remember we last discussed problems of refugees and inter-related matters in Brooklyn some seven, eight, nine years ago, and since then there has come this supr me tragedy which even the most pessimistic of us then did not imagine, so my question to you on your scheme is just this: could it be put into effect in your judgment in time to be instrumental in saving this last remnant which many of us have seen in our recent tour through Europe?

A. I emphasized that. I said, in all the world time presses and time presses also in this ancient land. I said further, there are three stages in connection with this immigration policy: the first stage is now, today. We pray, let us have these 100,000 people. What is the delay? When the terms of reference to this Committee were published on November 15th there was a great deal of discussion in this country, and I happened to be one of those who thought he could find within it a large number of positive aspects. I thought the association of America with it was one of these; I thought the emphasis on the desire for an agreed settlement was one of these, and I thought this was a positive side of it, that your Committee was authorised to make ad hoc interim recommendations. In the first place, the policy declared there would be no interruption of the then quota of Jewish immigration. There was this interruption unfortunately, though the numbers have been made good since. I would like to tell the Committee I have never seen guite so much distress, quite so much tension among all persons whatever political views they held as one could observe and feel then when it was realised that this quota of 1,500 a month had stopped. It stopped, I do not remember exactly for how long but for a couple of months I think, and then one was told: despite what is said in this document by the Secretary of State that everything was to be done to ensure that there was to be no interruption of the present rate of immigration, it was nevertheless interrupted. Then the Committee was authorised to make ad hoc interim recommendations upon its findings in Europe, and it seems to me the Committee did a wise thing, that was discussed here pro and con, in

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going to Europe first, because there is the scene of this tragedy. You have been there. Will you pardon me if I ask a question. Why are not the 100,000 permitted to come in? I am asking you now instead of you asking me.

- Q. I suppose your question is, why did we not recommend in an interim report that they should be admitted?
- A. I should not want to put the thing in that way, that would be getting too close to the skin.
 - Q. You asked us why are they not admitted.
- A. That is what we are interested in, not in the interim report. We are interested in having them come. We want them and I can tell you, I have been attending these sessions and I have heard questions as to the economic absorptive capacity. We think economic absorptive capacity is a criterion of immigration in the long term policy, but not with these 100,000. We want them in and we will share with them, if the country has not enough work - there is enough work we think, there is enough money here; there is more money in this country, unfortunately I would like to say, than there ever has been in its long history. Well, let some of that money be spent. There are some houses that have more rooms than they ought to have, let them be occupied. The people here are ready, I think you can accept it literally, people here are ready to share what they have. Give them the opportunity for it. These 100,000 will open their hearts, it will be a saving work. I cannot put it in any other way. Why should it not be done? Why not? You have the authority to recommend it.
- Q. May I say first, so far as the interim report is concerned, I am sure its not having been issued was no indication that every member of this Committee did not feel the poignant tragedy and also the urgency of the problem, but I come back to my question, would it not be assumed that the admission of these 100,000 on the basis of your conception of the agreement between Jew and Arab would be dependent upon Jewish-Arab agreement on that point?
 - A. Absolutely not.
 - Q. You mean you would ask the Mandatory Power to open the door?
 - A. Yes.

SIR FREDERICK LEGGETT: I take it you make your proposal with one important objective in mind, that is to provide a basis upon which these two parties can get together and get away from the two extreme courses to which they are now attached?

A. Yes.

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- Q. I take it you do that because the whole history of mankind shows agreements are not made between equals; they are often made between people each of whom can do the other very great harm. Now taking the evidence we have heard, is it not true that unless both sides see clearly the objective to which they are going and can agree upon it, that to bring new people here now would be to bring them into a battlefield.
 - A. No, I do not think so.
- Q. Do you agree it is absolutely essential that the two sides should agree upon the objective?
- A. I think it is very very desirable, but I do not think you are going to get that now. I think that is just chasing a will-o'-the-wisp. You will get it, not by sitting down and working for agreement in advance; you will get it through life, through these steps or other steps in actual practice that you take. It depends what the steps are. If they are steps directed to that end, I am sure you will get it in the course of many years. It will not come from today to tomorrow.
- Q. I am afraid I did not make myself quite clear. Is it not your view that if these steps are taken, minds which are at present locked on one particular idea will begin to see the practical ways in which they could get to greater agreement, just as, for example, between the employers and workpeople in a particular industry, if there is a means by which they can get together and discuss matters, though they are not equal, they will probably find a way in which they can live together?
- A. All the better if you can achieve that, if you can bring the Jews and Arabs together you will be fulfilling one of your great functions. I do not know if that is an answer to the question.
- Q. It is partially, I think. Now may I raise another point. You were talking about urgency, and all of us who have been in Europe agree upon that urgency, but we saw there young men who were thinking they were coming here to fight. Since we have been here we found something of that atmosphere. I again ask you whether it would be right to bring those young children here if the only way open or the only way determined upon by either side is to fight.
- A. I am going to give you an extreme answer even though it were the only way I would bring them. But that is not the only way. All over the world young people have learned how to fight, that is what this war has been, teaching them how to fight. It is impossible after a war of these dimensions to unlearn that today or tomorrow. That fighting atmosphere is unfortunately going to persist for years and years to come, a whole generation has been brought upon it. Unfortunately also a generation of my own people. A generation of Americans too has now been brought up on something entirely new. There is probably going to

be conscription or compulsory military service even there. Why should our young people be regarded by you as exceptions? It is the Jews who should take exception to this militarism among our people. I take exception to it. I take exception to this militarism, to this chauvinism, to this, I cannot use any other words, to this atmosphere of terror. We know it; you hear about it. We feel it in our flesh and blood; you read about it. You do not know the forms that this terror takes. It is not only the terror of the bomb, and there are those among us who know what this is very well from their own experience. Nevertheless, I answer you again. If this were the only way, if we knew they were coming here in order to do this fighting, yes. But they are not coming here to do this fighting. Mr. Smilansky would just like to say a word. He says it becomes our duty to try and create conditions, so that this spoiling of our young cease. That is what we want.

I cannot tell you how we condemn these things. I would like to say one more thing which will not be particularly popular, I am afraid. I have heard here in these sessions people express their great regret at what our youth are doing, some of our youth are doing. They mean that very sincerely. What I would like to say is, this is not just a question of our youth. Some of these young men who go out with bombs and guns are among our most idealistic youth, idealistic men and women, just as you find in other countries where rebellion goes on, ready to sacrifice their lives for what they believe to be a higher cause, to save their people, and the question. I ask is, who sends them? It is not the young men who send them, it is older men who send them. Those are the people you should be directing your attention to.

SIR FREDERICK LEGGETT: Thank you. May I just say how wonderful it has been to hear this afternoon a counsel of conciliation put forward.

MR. BUXTON: You said something on a subject which may go to the very heart of the decision we are trying to make. You said that perhaps a great many Jews would forego their aspirations, their passion for a Jewish State if liberal immigration were allowed; if that is your belief or conviction, not merely a hope or expectation, would you give me two or three reasons for that belief.

A. One reason is this, that some of my friends, not all, who are for the Jewish State, have no hesitation in saying, when they argue privately, that although they believe in the Jewish State with all their heart for the various reasons that have been adduced here, they feel it probably will not be granted, and what they really do want is immigration. The argument oscillates back and forth between state and immigration. Some say, if we cannot get a Jewish State in all of Palestine, we want a Jewish State in part of Palestine, partition, because in that way the Jews would be recognized internationally as a unit, as an entity, and that has its advantages in helping Jews in other parts of the world. The argument is put forward, supposing Jews had a seat in the United Nations Organization it would not be necessary for somebody else to come and plead

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their cause. There are very good reasons for wanting this political representation. Some say if we cannot get the State, give us partition. There are many people, if you would talk to them, who say, to be sure, immigration is the thing that we want, and the reason we want the State is because through the State we will get immigration. There are on the other hand some who want the State for the State's sake. They are State mad, not realising that the State is something these days that perhaps needs revision in its whole conception and practice. They want the State for the sake of the State. There are others, however, who want the State for the sake of immigration. That is another reason why I say, if immigration were given without the State there would be many people who would not be satisfied a hundred per cent, but who would acquiesce, would forego the State.

- Q. You are inclined to think that the fervour of these folks would die down somewhat if they had this immediate relief to the Jewish problem?
- A. If you could arrange in some way the immediate release, you might say from captivity, of these 100,000 human beings who are our brothers and sisters, I can almost guarantee you, that the tension which fills our lives and which destroys the morality of so many of our young people, would be relieved.
- Q. There is another question somewhat more abstract In your discussion of the bi-national State you would set up a new Agency, a group of Arabs, and you refer to the Jewish Agency. Is not that in a way, Dr. Magnes, an indication of a lack of trust in the ability of the Jewish population as a population, the Jewish people and the Arab people to manage their own affairs without the intervention of outside agencies?
- A. Mr. Buxton, this little country which has been fought over through the centuries by all the armies of antiquity and by the armies of modern times, is a place sui generis. It has the interest of millions of people throughout the world. It is not as though it was Bulgaria, for example, which is of interest to the Bulgarians, perhaps also to another Power at the present moment. Bulgaria is a little country that revolves on its own axis and of which one hears nothing concerning its literature, its music, its schools or its ideals. But Palestine is a country that is peculiar. Our Bible calls the Jewish people a peculiar people. They are a peculiar people, as Professor Buber pointed out, peculiar in this, that they have this peculiar relationship to this peculiar country. You cannot therefore say that the Jews of Palestine are the only Jews in the world concerned with this country. The same thing, if not to the same degree, applies to the Arabs. The third Holy Mosque in Islam is the Mosque of Aksa. The Dome of the Rock is one of the most beautiful architectural monuments in the whole Moslem world, therefore Moslems outside of Palestine are also concerned with this country. Mahomet's mystic flight is said to have had its origin here. Turning this over to the Arabs of Palestine is just as shortsighted, we

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should say, as turning it over to the Jews of Palestine. Now there are organizations representing these Jews and these Arabs on the outside. There is the Jewish Agency. That has been the great instrument for the building up of this country. You go around this country and most of what you will see is due to the efforts of the Jewish Agency. The Arab League is but a young creation. It has not had the opportunity, let us say, of doing anything at all comparable to what the Jewish Agency has been able to do for Palestine, but it is the only body that we know of representing the Arabs and the Moslems on the outside; and this Jewish Agency is recognized by the Vaad Leumi here and this Arab League is recognized by the Arab Higher Committee, accepting them for the moment as the counterpart of the Vaad Leumi. For that reason, because of the international character of Palestine, because of its inter-religious character, we talk about this Regional Trusteeship Council which is to include also a representative of the Mandatory or of the Administering Authority, Great Britain, which is also interested in this country, not because the British live here, not because their officials are here, but because this is the Holy Land of Christianity. This is where Christianity had its origin, where it had its great decisive historic experiences. It was peopled by Jews at the time; and Great Britain is interested and the rest of the Christian world is interested because of that. Therefore we say, it is not sufficient to have a local Government, although, as you see, we propose local self-government. But on certain of these basic problems we propose, at first at any rate, that this international force, represented through the Administering Authority, the Jewish Agency and the Arab League, should come together and try to work out a number of these things such as we propose.

- Q. I daresay you are right, but what you say seems a little paradoxical to me. A few minutes ago, you were stressing the value of allowing native Arabs and native Jews to assume active management of their own affairs. On the other hand, you say let us bring together two international groups to manage their affairs for them. Will you not reconcile those two points of view for me, please?
- A. It is a perfectly legitimate question, yes. The objective is to have the local Jews and the local Arabs conduct their own affairs, conduct their own government. How are we going to bring that about? That is our whole argument. We are going to bring it about, so we think, by steps something like those we have proposed. We do not go at once to the Vaad Leumi and the Arab Higher Committee for that, because we feel that the problem of immigration, taking that in the first place, is something that goes beyond the borders, beyond the confines and the ability of just local groups. Immigration concerns the rest of the world. One of the sources of Jewish immigration is the rest of the world; it is the source of Jewish immigration, and it is the Jewish Agency, which is an international body, that has thus far been dealing with immigration. All of the Jews are interested in that, just as all the Arabs throughout the world are interested in that, therefore as a first step we say, in order to help bring this about, do not go to the

local people; local people are fighting around too much, go to the international authority, go to the wider background. It is our conviction, at least our hope, that the Arab League is going to be much more moderate than any local Arab body in any country. I think the Arab League has thus far given evidence of that in its constituent documents. If you read the paragraph on Palestine you will find that, I think. Recent statements made by one of its representatives indicate that we have to encourage them. It will not be so easy for the Arab League to be more moderate than the local people, any more than it is so easy for the Jewish Agency to be more moderate. But I do think that will be the case, and for that reason we feel at the beginning, however it may turn out afterwards, in order to bring this about, in order to bring people together, which is what we want, and we want to bring them together upon the basis of actual live practical things, their own interests, you have to bring into the picture these larger international forces to persuade and to be persuaded. If it were possible just to say that this thing could be carried out, as we propose it, through turning it over to the local people, it would be very good. The way we propose is more complicated. I think, however, it is more practical.

- Q. You foresee the time when the local people will take over their own affairs, will that be in a decade, or a couple of decades?
 - A. However long it may be, yes, that is the objective.
- MR. CRICK: A few miscellaneous questions, first a domestic one. You are the head of a relatively young seat of learning which I suppose is governed by a Trust Deed or some such instrument, is that so?
- A. No, it is not so. As I said at the beginning I am not representing the Hebrew University today, so this question -
 - Q. ... is purely personal.
- A. Is asked in the knowledge of that statement. The Hebrew University is organized upon the basis of what is called the Hebrew University Association, which is a company registered in accordance with the laws of Palestine, an educational association.
 - Q. How many students have you?
- A. I think there must be 700, 750 now. At the peak of the registration before the war there were over 1,200. On account of enlistments this might also be interesting to you as being characteristic of what the Jewish community tried to do during the war, the number went from 1,200 to 300. It has now risen to 700 or 750.
 - Q. What proportion of the student body is non-Jewish?

- A. A very small proportion. You mean the Arab, yes, there are a few Arab students at the University even today, I say even today.
- Q. I take it, there are no restrictions on a religious basis on entry into the University?
- A. On the contrary, we can furnish you with a copy of the Constitution of the University and the first paragraph says, that entrance to the University is open to all persons regardless of religion, race, colour or social standing.
- Q. I take it you would greatly welcome an influx of non-Jewish students?
 - A. We should indeed.
- Q. Would you be prepared, you personally, would you be prepared to consider as one gesture of conciliation the possibility of changing the name, let us say, to the University of Palestine? (Laughter.)
 - A. I am not inclined to laugh at that question at all.
- MR. JUSTICE SINGLETON: If I may suggest it, I am not sure that Dr. Magnes ought to be called upon to say whether he personally would consider changing the name of an Institution of which he is the head.
- A. I would nevertheless like to answer that question with your permission.
 - Q. Just please yourself.
- A. I think it a very serious question. The choice is open to the Hebrew University to be either the University of Palestine or the University of the whole Jewish people. With our eyes open and quite consciously, thinking that we knew what we were doing, we chose the Hebrew University, the University of all the Jewish people, for a very simple reason. It. has to do in a measure with the basic remarks that Professor Buber presented here. We are in Palestine in order that we may fructify and revive Judaism. That is the basic reason. The reception of displaced persons is something we had not any knowledge of when the Hebrew University was established, although there was a sufficient amount of persecution of the Jews, but not to that extent. Our basic conception is, that by the establishment of this Jewish community here we shall be strengthening the Jewish people in its mind and in its spirit, in its ethical and in its religious aspirations. You may ask why? The reason is peculiar to this peculiar people. If you will permit me to say so, in Christianity it is primarily the Church that is the visible society which Christianity, in accordance with its basic principles, is bound to see incorporated in the world. In Judaism it is not the Church. In Judaism it is the People. That is one of the basic peculiarities of Judaism. It is hardly a Church

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at all. It certainly is not an Ecclesia. It has no head, it has no synod, it has no sanhedrin. It is a voluntary association, as Professor Buber has pointed out, for the purpose of trying to establish a just society, and it is the conception of Judaism, that this just society has to be established first of all by the Jews among the Jews, and that through establishing it first of all among the Jews, perhaps it will be possible to help establish the just society in other parts of the world. The Hebrew University is there in order to study Judaism, in order to delve into its sources, in order to study Judaism and bring it into touch with all the disciplines of mankind. The Jewish people has had contact with almost all the cultures and civilizations and races of mankind, and we have our experience of them. It seems sometimes that every one of us has seen and has known these other peoples; and for that reason too we must try to get at the sources of our own life and of our own mind. One of the sources of our life is this country itself, this Holy Land, where our mind, our spirit reached its greatest florescence. We have to try and get to our sources in literature. We have therefore a great library. I say great, because it is great for this part of the world. This is the largest library in existence anywhere round here. It has 460,000 volumes on its shelves. It has a large manuscript collection. It is endeavouring to become a great spiritual centre. That is the reason I have tried to convey to you why we have accepted this choice, a Hebrew University which has to be the University of the Hebrew people, of the Jewish people. On the other hand, I should not like you to have the impression that we are not trying to serve this country, that we are not trying to be as far as we can the University of Palestine. Our University is open to everyone, and I am glad to say that people of various kinds have availed themselves of the facilities of the Hebrew University. If you come to our library any day you will probably see some monk in his gown, and in our Department of Arabic Studies, the Hebrew University has a greater library of Arabic and Moslem literature in the European sense of the term than any Arab University or any Arab Library. The Arab Libraries have more manuscripts than we have, more Arab editions, but the Hebrew University is one of the great libraries in the world bearing upon Arabic studies. I recall the days several years ago - the fact that it does not happen now is an indication of this deterioration you were speaking of - when pupils attending Arab institutions were brought into our library in order that they might see with their own eyes for the first time what their own people in times gone by had created. Moreover, there are many other ways in which we serve Palestine. I do not wish to go into the whole thing.

MR. JUSTICE SINGLETON: I think you have answered it.

- A. This is the purpose now of my remarks: we extended an invitation to the Committee to visit the University; we have not yet had an answer from the Committee and we do hope you will come.
 - Q. I can assure you that one does, and I think we all hope to come.

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A. I do not know if there are any further questions.

JUDGE HUTCHESON: I would like to ask a question. I would like to preface my questions by saying, Dr. Magnes, I am not ready to assess your proposals, but I am a fairly old man and I recognize moral power when I see it. I want to say, Sir, that I can say in the words of my Leader -"Behold an Israelite indeed in whom there is no guile". I would like to take up the illustration which was presented to us, I do not know whether it was by Mr. Ben Gurion or somebody else, I have lost the author of it, but the illustration sticks, of some person coming in here from Africa or some other place, knowing nothing about this business, sitting down hearing what we have been hearing in this room. I want to ask you as a man who has wisdom to gather together and the courage to propound, what seems at first blush without more careful analysis certainly to be inspired by a sense of justice and fair play whatever its other merits, I want to ask you a question as to how this stranger coming in here would see these proceedings. I ask you first, would he see the Jew in this way, chafing under and in rebellion against his minority status. In all the countries in the world the Jew has for some time now been engaged in a determined effort to acquire majority status and a Jewish State in Palestine, which he claims is his home, by converting the Arab majority there into a minority. Is that a fair statement, not a full statement, but a fairly close statement of the effect of these various demands on a stranger who knew nothing about the underlying situation?

A. I am afraid it is.

Q. The Arab, claiming Palestine as his home and quite unwilling to accept minority status, the Arab proposes to resist to the utmost all efforts to bring this about and demands the immediate setting up of an Arab State. Is that a fair analysis of what we have been hearing?

A. I think it is.

Q. The Mandatory, desirous of propitiating and ultimately reconciling the dissidents and unwilling therefore to take a firm and final stand for either, the Mandatory, like Veblen's famous leisure class, has throughout this whole period exhibited a certain amiable inefficiency when confronted with force or fraud, and then he goes on: "The Christian neglected if not completely forgotten by both warring factions, the Christian, with his Holy Places sacred to all Christendom, many of them Arabs, having equal and in many instances better birthright claims to Palestine, their very existence apparently ignored by the great Christian nations of the world, stand helplessly by, caught in the whirl of the conflict but unchampioned and undefended". Have you heard any one do anything much for the Christian people in this land during these controversies or say anything much; I have not.

A. Do you mean during the years?

- Q. I am talking about in these hearings. Now I want to ask you whether that person, having gone through all that business and then come here today and heard you, might begin to think maybe there are some more like you. Would he have any real justification for thinking so, are there any moderates like you, who have the moral courage to stand against a stream of vigorous tendency and propound the theory he thinks is just?
- A. If you will just modify the question a bit and instead of saying moderates like me, say moderates, my answer is in the affirmative. I have two friends here, I look about this room and I see many friends over here, and as I look around I can point out large numbers to you.
- Q. You think there are other moderates here with the courage and the character that you exhibited.
- A. That I exhibited, I do not know; the courage and character, yes.
- Q. I would like to ask you one final question, you are not denominated a Christian but you talk as I should like Christians to act. Are you also by any chance from America? (Laughter.)
 - A. I seem to be better known to this gathering than I am to you.
- Q. I knew you had been there. I did not know that you had lived there.
 - A. You said you were an old man; I am older than you.
 - Q. I doubt it.
- A. And in order to prove it you have to go to the records of San Francisco, California, where I was born.
 - Q. In 1879?
 - A. In 1877.
- MR. JUSTICE SINGLETON: You have Mr. Smilansky with you. Is there anything he wishes to say. There is also one question I want to ask you.
- A. Mr. Smilansky says he has handed in his statement in writing and is not particularly anxious to talk. He would be talking in Hebrew and I would be translating.
- Q. If he will hand in the statement translated, will that serve the purpose? Then if we have anything to ask him on that we can do so another day.
- A. I would like to repeat that I wish you could get something of the fervour of his conviction, that Arab-Jewish relations are possible

of adjustment. He has written about it, he has talked about it, he has worked for it, worked in it. That is the point, and I think just his presence here, without his having said a single word, the presence of a man who has been faithful to this ideal for more than 55 years, is eloquent testimony to the fact that Arab-Jewish relations are not incapable of being improved. He believes it with his whole heart. He is older than any of us here, and he is struggling every day in order to prove it in life.

- Q. I should have been very glad if I could have been taken round some part of Palestine by the one time President of the Farmers' Union. That matter can be discussed another time.
 - A. He says with the greatest of pleasure.
- Q. What I was going to say to you was this, I notice in your scheme, the document you have let us have, you talk about the Legislature. The Legislature would have to deal with the question of immigration I suppose, or some officer under the Legislature.
 - A. That is a basic question.
- Q. What I am leading up to is, you say in case of an impasse the head of the State is to have the casting vote. I wonder, have you considered in such curcumstances, where you could find the head of the State.
 - A. I say among members of this Commission.
- Q. I am sure, Dr. Magnes, it would be the wish of every member of the Committee that I should thank you and those with you for coming to see us this afternoon and above all for your very helpful answers to questions.
- A. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you in the name of my friends here, in the name of all of those who do believe in reconciliation between these brother peoples, who speak languages that are very closely related to one another, who have a long, ancient and honourable tradition together, I want to thank you for all of them for your patience and kindness.

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Palestine No. 1 (1947)

PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE OF PALESTINE

JULY, 1946-FEBRUARY, 1947

Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Parliament by Command of His Majesty

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PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE OF PALESTINE JULY 1946-FEBRUARY 1947

(1)

Extract from the Speech by the Right Hon. Herbert Morrison in the House of Commons on 31st July, 1946, describing the "Provincial Autonomy Plan" for Palestine (with explanatory map)

Representatives of His Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States, whom I shall describe as the expert delegations, have completed their examination of the recommendations made in the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on the problems of European Jewry and Palestine. (1) The experts made unanimous recommendations on both sides, British and American, as to the policy to be adopted in respect of all the matters covered by the report of the Anglo-American Committee; and I think that I should outline, inevitably at some length, the main features of their proposals.

The expert delegations first dealt with the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee regarding the position of the Jews in Europe. The events of recent years, after Hitler's rise to power, have given a special emphasis to the character of the Jewish National Home as a sanctuary for those who could reach it from among the tragically few survivors of European Jewry. It is the pressure of immigration from Europe that has so intensified the difficulties of the Palestine problem. The Anglo-American Committee recognised that Palestine alone cannot meet the immigration needs of the Jewish victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution, and recommended that our two Governments, in association with other countries—for the whole world shares the responsibility—should endeavour immediately to find new homes for all displaced persons, irrespective of creed or nationality.

The expert delegations proposed that our two Governments should adopt the following means of making an immediate contribution to the solution of this problem. First, they proposed that our two Governments should seek to create conditions favourable to the resettlement of a substantial number of displaced persons in Europe itself, since it is recognised that the overwhelming majority will continue to live in Europe. In the British and American zones of Germany and Austria, our two Governments are doing their utmost to assist resettlement and to eradicate anti-Semitism. In Italy and the ex-enemy satellite States, the authorities will be required by the Peace Treaties to secure to all persons under their jurisdiction human rights and the fundamental freedoms. As regards the countries in Europe, the expert delegations recommended that our Governments should support the efforts of the United Nations to ensure the protection of those rights and freedoms. Further, by assisting to re-establish political and economic stability in Europe, we should continue to contribute to the restoration of those basic conditions which will make possible the reintegration in Europe of a substantial number of displaced persons, including Jews.

But, when all that is possible has been done in Europe, it is clear that new homes must be found overseas for many whose ties with their former communities have been irreparably broken. The expert delegations outlined the following measures—some of which are already in train—designed to promote this movement. First, we should continue to press for the establishment of an International Refugee Organisation designed to deal effectively with the problem of refugees and displaced persons as a whole.

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(1) "Miscellaneous No. 8 (1946)," Cmd. 6808.

Secondly, we should give strong support at the forthcoming General Assembly of the United Nations to an appeal calling upon all Mem, Governments to receive in territories under their control a proportion of the displaced persons in Europe, including Jews. I should here interpolate that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have already given a lead in this matter by accepting a commitment to promote the resettlement of about 235,000 Polish troops and civilians and their dependants. This is, of course, in addition to refugees admitted during the period of Nazi persecution, of whom some 70,000 Jews remain in the United Kingdom. His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions have been informed of the action being taken by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, and they will, we hope, support the appeal to Member Governments of the United Nations, an appeal which will include an invitation to receive a number of displaced persons in the territories under their control. I also understand that the United States, where 275,000 refugees, including 180,000 Jews have permanently resettled in the same period, are now resuming normal immigration and expect to receive some 53,000 immigrants each year from the European countries from which the displaced persons are drawn. Finally, pending the establishment of an International Refugee Organisation, we shall, in co-operation with the Government of the United States, continue to promote the resettlement of refugees and displaced persons through the agency of the Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees. Plans are in preparation, in co-operation with the nations concerned, for resettling large numbers of displaced persons in Brazil and other South American countries.

It will thus be seen from what I have said that the broader aspects of the refugee and displaced persons problem have not been overlooked, nor the restoration of conditions in Europe permitting the re-integration there of as many displaced persons, including Jews, as may wish to remain. The ability and talent of Jews and others is needed for the difficult tasks of reconstruction that lie ahead. At the same time, we are taking urgent and practical steps to ensure that other countries as well as Palestine will contribute to the resettlement of those displaced persons, including Jews, who must look elsewhere than to Europe for their permanent homes.

In formulating a new policy for Palestine, the expert delegations accepted as a basis the principles laid down in the third recommendation of the Anglo-American Committee, that Palestine as a whole can be neither a Jewish nor an Arab State, that neither of the two communities in Palestine should dominate the other, and that the form of Government should be such as to safeguard the interests in the Holy Land of both Christendom and the Moslem and Jewish faiths.

The expert delegations argue as follows: The political aspirations of the two communities in Palestine are irreconcilable. The conflict which these aspirations have provoked is so bitter, that there is little hope of securing within any reasonable period that measure of co-operation between Arab and Jew which would make possible the establishment in Palestine of a unitary system of Government, consistent with these basic principles, in which each people played its part. The only chance of peace, and of immediate advance towards self-governing institutions, appears to lie in so framing the constitution of the country as to give to each the greatest practicable measure of power to manage its own affairs. The experts believe that, in present circumstances, this can best be secured by the establishment of Arab and Jewish Provinces, which will enjoy a large measure of autonomy under a central Government.

It is their proposal that, for this purpose, Palestine shall be divided into four areas, an Arab Province, a Jewish Province, a District of Jerusalem and a District of the Negeb. The Jewish Province would include the great bulk of

RECORD OFFICE, the land on which Jews have already settled and a considerable area between d around the settlements. The Jerusalem District would include Jerusalem, Bethlehem and their immediate environs. The Negeb District would consist of the uninhabited triangle of waste land in the South of Palestine beyond the present limits of cultivation. The Arab Province would include the remainder of Palestine; it would be almost wholly Arab in respect both of land and of population. The provincial boundaries would be purely administrative boundaries, defining the area within which a local legislature would be empowered to legislate on certain subjects and a local executive to administer its laws. They would have no significance as regards defence, Customs or communications, but, in order to give finality, the boundaries, once fixed, would not be susceptible of change except by agreement between the two Provinces. A provision to this effect would be embodied in any trusteeslip agreement, and in the instrument bringing the plan into operation.

The provincial governments would have power of legislation and administration within their areas with regard to a wide range of subjects of primarily provincial concern. They would also have power to limit the number and determine the qualifications of persons who may take up permanent residence in their territories after the introduction of the plan. The provincial governments would be required by the instrument of government which establishes the fundamental law to provide for the guarantee of civil rights and equality before the law of all residents, and for the freedom of interterritorial transit, trade and commerce. The provincial governments would have the necessary

power to raise money for the purpose of carrying out their functions.

There would be reserved to the Central Government exclusive authority as to defence, foreign relations, Customs and Excise. In addition, there would be reserved initially to the Central Government exclusive authority as to the administration of law and order, including the police and courts, and a limited number of subjects of all-Palestine importance. The Central Government would have all powers not expressly granted to the provinces by the instrument of government. An elected Legislative Chamber would be established in each Province. An executive, consisting of a chief Minister and a Council of Ministers, would be appointed in each Province by the High Commissioner from among the members of the Legislative Chamber after consultation with its leaders. Bills passed by the Legislative Chambers would require the assent of the High Commissioner. This, however, would not be withheld unless the Bill is meansistent with the instrument of government, whose provisions would afford safeguards for the peace of Palestine and for the rights of minorities.

It would also be necessary to reserve to the High Commissioner an emergency power to intervene if a Provincial Government fails to perform, or exceeds, its proper functions. The executive and legislative functions of the Central Government would initially be exercised by the High Commissioner, assisted by a nominated Executive Council. Certain of the departments of the Central Government would be headed, as soon as the High Commissioner deems practical, by Palestinians. The High Commissioner would establish a Development Planning Board and a Tariff Board composed of representatives of the Central Government and of each province. In the Jerusalem District, a council would be established with powers similar to those of a municipal council. The majority of its members would be elected, but certain members would be nominated by the High

Commissioner. The Negeb District would be administered, for the time being, by the Central Government.

This plan for provincial autonomy would greatly simplify the problem of Jewish immigration into Palestine. Though final control over immigration would continue to rest with the Central Government, this control

THE RECORD OFFICE, would be exercised on the basis of recommendations made by the Provincial Governments. So long as the economic absorptive capacity of the province was not exceeded, the Central Government would authorise the immigration desired by the Provincial Government. It would have no power to authorise immigration in excess of any limitations proposed by the Provincial Governments. Thus, though the Government of the Arab Province would have full power to exclude Jewish immigrants from its Province, the Jewish Province would, normally, be able to admit as many immigrants as its Government desires.

As part of this plan, the experts suggest that it would become possible to accept the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee for the immediate admission of 100,000 Jewish immigrants into Palestine, and for continuing immigration thereafter. The experts prepared a plan for the movement of 100,000 Jews from Europe into the Jewish area of Palestine, and this plan would be set in motion as soon as it is decided to put into effect the scheme as a whole. The immigration certificates would be issued as rapidly as possible, and every effort would be made to complete the operation within 12 months of the date on which the immigration begins. The immigrants would be selected, primarily, from Jews in Germany, Austria and Italy, and priority would be given to those who have already spent some time in assembly centres in those countries and to others who, though no longer in those centres, were liberated in Germany and Austria. Within those groups, priority would be given to building craftsmen and agricultural workers, young children, the infirm and the aged. The bulk of the 100,000 would be drawn from Germany, Austria and Italy; any certificates available for the Jews in other countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe would be issued only to orphan children. Shipment would proceed at the maximum rate consistent with the clearance of the transit camps in Palestine, in which the immigrants would be temporarily accommodated until they could be absorbed.

Under this plan, the United States Government would be asked to undertake sole responsibility for the sea transportation of those Jewish refugees, to whom I have referred, from Europe to Palestine. They would provide the ships and would defray the whole cost of sea transportation. They would also provide food for the immigrants for the first two months after their arrival in Palestine. The cost of transferring and settling this number of persons in Palestine would, of course, be considerable. The Jewish organisations have accepted the financial responsibility, and the experts saw no reason why the required finance should not be found from reparations, from contributions by world Jewry and from loans. The experts accepted the recommendation of the Anglo-American Committee that improvements of the economic and social conditions of the Arabs in Palestine were desirable. The programme which they suggested would include the provision of a health service comparable to that already available to the Jews, an expansion of educational facilities, the provision of cheap credit for the Arab cultivators, and other measures designed to increase the productivity of the land, the promotion of the co-operative movement, the development of light industries and improvements in both rural and urban living conditions.

The expert delegations gave warning that, for some years, the implementation of these and other plans for the improvement of economic opportunities and living standards in Palestine would impose heavy capital costs not eligible for loans, and would constitute a severe strain on the finances of Palestine. The setting up of the provincial system would also entail a deficit in the budget of the Arab Province which would have to be met by a Central Government subvention. Further financial aid for

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Palestine would be required if the plan, as a whole, is to be carried out. meet this situation, the experts suggested that the United States should asked to make a substantial grant to the Government of Palestine, to be used principally for financing Arab development projects not suitable for self-liquidating loans, and for assisting in the meeting of extraordinary expenditure during the transitional period, while this country should be asked to take ultimate responsibility for meeting Palestine's annual budgetary deficit up to the time when increased revenues made this

unnecessary.

The experts believed that the need for economic development in Palestine should be considered against the background of the Middle East as a whole. They understood that the Governments represented in the Arab League were now examining the possibilities of economic development in their countries, and they, therefore, suggested that if any of those States found difficulty in obtaining international loans for this purpose the United States should authorise large-scale development loans. These loans would be made through an appropriate agency for the development of the Middle East region, including Palestine. Most large-scale development from which Palestine could benefit should be undertaken in co-operation at least with Transjordan, and probably with Syria and Lebanon. The experts proposed that, subject to the consent of the Government of Transjordan, the common water resources of both Palestine and Transjordan should be surveyed as soon as possible by consulting engineers acting under government auspices.

I have now completed my outline of the recommendations of the expert delegations. His Majesty's Government, believing that these recommendations represent the best line of advance towards a solution of the problem, informed the United States Government of their willingness to accept them as a basis for negotiation. We had hoped before the Debate to receive from President Truman his acceptance, but we understand that he has decided, in view of the complexity of the matter, to discuss it in detail with the United States expert delegation who are returning to Washington for the purpose. The President is thus giving further consideration to the matter,

and we hope to hear again from him in due course.

Meanwhile, however, the situation in Palestine will brook no delay. We are inviting the representatives of the Jews and Arabs to meet us for discussion of these problems and we hope that we shall be able to bring before them as a basis for negotiation the plan recommended by the expert delegations. If it is found acceptable, our intention would be that it should be embodied in a trusteeship agreement for Palestine. But I should make it clear that we mean to go ahead with discussion with Arabs and Jews of a constitutional scheme on these lines. We believe that it offers many

advantages to both communities in Palestine.

The Jews will be free to exercise a large measure of control over immigration into their own Province, and to forward there the development of the Jewish national home. The Land Transfers Regulations will be repealed. It will be open to the Government of the Arab Province to permit or to refuse permission to Jews to purchase land there, but the area of the Jewish Province will be larger than that in which Jews are free to buy land at present. The Arabs will gain, in that the great majority of them will be freed once and for all from any fear of Jewish domination. The citizens of the Arab Province will achieve at once a large measure of autonomy and powerful safeguards will be provided to protect the rights of the Arab minority left in the Jewish Province. To both communities the plan offers a prospect of development, of which there would be little hope in a unitary Palestine.

0F RECORD OFFICE, LON DON In the long term, the plan leaves the way open for peaceful progress and constitutional development either towards partition, or towards federal unity. The association of representatives of the two Provinces in the administration of central subjects may lead ultimately to a fully developed federal constitution. On the other hand, if the centrifugal forces prove too strong, the way is open towards partition. Our proposals do not prejudge this issue either way. We believe that this plan provides as fair and reasonable a compromise between the claims of Arab and Jew as it is possible to devise, and that it offers the best prospect of reconciling the conflicting interests of the two communities. This, however, must be made clear. The full implementation of the experts' plan as a whole depends on United States co-operation. I hope that that will be forthcoming. If not, we shall have to reconsider the position, particularly as regards the economic and financial implications, and this is bound to affect the tempo and extent of immigration and development.

These, then, are our proposals. I ask the indulgence of the House for the fact that I have had to stick closely to my notes in the circumstances in making this speech, because a great deal of this speech was necessarily based upon the recommendations of the expert delegations, and I was exceedingly anxious to be accurate in what I said. It would, in any event, be impracticable to enter, at this stage, into greater detail regarding proposals which it is intended shall form the basis of discussion with representatives of the Arabs and Jews whom we have promised an opportunity

for consultation before a final decision is reached.

I commend these proposals to the House, and I would urge upon both communities in the Holy Land to give them their most earnest consideration. While our consultations are proceeding, I would appeal to all men of good will on either side to co-operate with the Government in suppressing terrorism and in bringing to justice those responsible for crimes of violence. Let nothing be said or done that will render it more difficult to reach a final settlement. The world is weary of this senseless strife of Jew and Arab. and sickened by its barbarous incidents. It calls upon them to end a sordid chapter of history, and join with the civilised nations in building the foundations of a nobler and happier world. Their friends everywhere will anxiously await their verdict. Mere negation, however, does no good and would be particularly dangerous and regrettable in a combustible situation of the kind with which we are dealing. There is a responsibility on both Jews and Arabs to be willing to sit down as practical people to discuss, to negotiate and to talk with a view to reaching a practicable solution, with the expedition and with the sense of urgency which this grave problem demands.

[The explanatory map appears at the end of the Paper]

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Constitutional Proposals put forward by the Arab States Delegations to the Palestine Conference on 30th September, 1946

1. The first step would be for the High Commissioner to establish, by nomination and after consultation with the leading Palestinian elements, a Provisional Government consisting of seven Arab and three Jewish Ministers of Palestinian nationality. The legislative and executive powers of the present administration in Palestine would be transferred to the Provisional Government as soon as it has been appointed. The High Commissioner would retain a power of veto throughout the transition period.

2. Simultaneously, the High Commissioner would initiate the preparation by the Provisional Government of an electoral register on the basis of one stage adult male suffrage. As soon as this register was prepared, the Provisional Government would hold elections for a Constituent Assembly in accordance with an electoral law to be enacted by them. This Constituent Assembly would consist of 60 members. The electoral law should provide for the adequate representation in the Constituent Assembly of all the important sections of citizenry, as defined in paragraph 4 (vi) (a) below, in accordance with their respective numbers.

The representation of Arabs and Jews in the Provisional Government would be without prejudice to the proportions to be determined in the constitution for the representation of Arabs and Jews in the Legislative Assembly. The method of election of the Constituent Assembly would similarly be without prejudice to the permanent electoral law (see paragraph 5 below).

- 3. The Provisional Government would prepare and submit to the Constituent Assembly a draft constitution for Palestine. If the Constituent Assembly proved unable to reach decision on the terms of the constitution within a period of six months from the date of its opening, the Provisional Government would reconsider their draft in the light of the Assembly's debates, would revise it if necessary, and would then enact it themselves.
- 4. The Provisional Government in drafting or enacting the constitution, and the Constituent Assembly in debating and voting on it, would be bound by directives issued by the High Commissioner. With the exception of these binding directives, the constitution, as decided by the Constituent Assembly would not be subject to the power of veto by the High Commissioner. These directives would provide for the embodiment in the constitution of the following principles:—
 - (i) Palestine should be a unitary State.
 - (ii) It should have a democratic constitution, with an elected legislature.
 - (iii) The constitution should provide guarantees for the sanctity of the Holy Places, covering inviolability, maintenance, freedom of access and freedom of worship in accordance with the status quo.
 - (iv) The constitution should guarantee, subject to suitable safeguards, freedom of religious practice in accordance with the status quo throughout Palestine (including the maintenance of separate religious courts for matters of personal status).
 - (v) The law of naturalisation should provide amongst other conditions that the applicant should be a legal resident of Palestine for a continuous period of ten years before his application.

- (vi) The constitution should provide guarantees for:-
 - (a) Full rights of citizenship for:—
 - (1) Any person falling under Part I and, subject to (3) below, any person falling under Part II of the Palestinian Citizenship Order, 1925-41.
 - (2) Any person who acquired Palestinian citizenship by naturalisation before May 1939.
 - (3) Any person who acquired Palestinian citizenship after May 1939, under the Palestinian Citizenship Order, 1925-41, and has been permanently resident in Palestine for a period of ten years.
 - (4) Any person who in future acquires Palestinian citizenship by naturalisation under the new law of naturalisation referred to in sub-paragraph (v) above.
 - (b) The right of any resident in Palestine to apply for and acquire Palestinian citizenship on the same terms and conditions without discrimination on grounds of race, religion or language.
 - (c) The right of religious bodies or other societies and individuals to maintain, in addition to educational establishments administered by public authority, private schools and universities, subject to the compulsory teaching of Arabic in the schools and to Government control for the purpose of maintaining educational standards and preventing subversive teaching with the object of creating common allegiance.
 - (d) The right of Jews to employ the Hebrew language as a second official language in districts where they form an absolute majority.
 - (e)—1. Securing that the electoral law for the Legislature shall provide for the adequate representation of all the important sections of the citizenry, as defined in subparagraph (a) above, provided that in no case shall the number of Jewish representatives exceed one-third of the total number of the members.
 - 2. Securing that the constitution shall provide for the adequate reflection in the Executive and the Administration of the distribution of the representation in the legislature.
- (vii) Unless and until legislation provides otherwise, Jewish immigration into Palestine should be entirely prohibited, and the existing land transfer restrictions should remain unchanged. The constitution should provide that any change in the above two matters can only be effected by law requiring the consent of the Arabs in Palestine as expressed by a majority of the Arab members of the Legislative Assembly.
- (viii) The guarantees concerning the Holy Places should be embodied in a declaration made to the General Assembly of the United Nations by the Independent Palestine State, which would bind itself thereby that those guarantees should not subsequently be modified without the consent of that Assembly.

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- (ix) The guarantees concerning the rights of the Jewish citizens which are prescribed in the preceding provisions should not be subject to amendment without the consent of the Jewish citizens of Palestine as expressed by a majority of the Jewish members of the Legislative Assembly.
- (x) Machinery should be provided, through the establishment of a Supreme Court, for determining whether any legislation is inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution, and it should be open to any citizen of Palestine to have recourse to that tribunal.
- 5. When the constitution had been adopted, the Provisional Government would proceed forthwith to hold the first parliamentary elections. The first Head of the Independent Palestine State would then be appointed, by whatever procedure was laid down for the purpose in the constitution. The Head of the State would forthwith assume full powers under the constitution. The Mandatory Power should effect the termination of the Mandate and recognise the independence of Palestine. A Treaty of Alliance should be concluded to define the future relations between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Independent State of Palestine.
- 6. During the transition period, substantial numbers of Palestinians should be progressively brought into the administration.
- 7. Every effort should be made to complete with the least possible delay the stages described in the preceding paragraphs, notwithstanding the non-co-operation of any section of the Palestine citizenry. The assumption of powers by the Head of the Palestine State should take place not later than 31st December, 1948.

(3)

The Proposals submitted by the British Delegation to the Palestine Conference on 7th February, 1947, and also Communicated to Representatives of the Jewish Agency

- 1. Article 2 of the Mandate for Palestine defines the responsibilities of the Mandatory Power in the following terms:—
 - (a) To place the country "under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble."
 - (b) To place the country under such conditions as will "secure the development of self-governing institutions."
 - (c) To safeguard the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.

Article 6 of the Mandate, which deals with Jewish immigration and the settlement of the Jews on the land, reads in part as follows:—

"The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions."

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- 2. During the last twenty-five years, efforts have been made by the Mandatory Government to associate the population of the country with the Administration, but these have invariably broken down because it has not been possible to find a basis of co-operation acceptable to both Arabs and Jews. It has therefore not been possible to establish political institutions leading towards self-government.
- 3. A time has come when development in the direction of self-government can no longer be delayed. So long as government is imposed from without, neither community has the incentive to develop that sense of responsibility without which the two peoples in Palestine cannot live together in harmony. Forms of government must therefore be established which have their roots in the people of the country and which offer a prospect of full independence within a reasonably short period.
- 4. To this end it is proposed that the people of the country shall be given a large measure of responsibility for local affairs and shall be associated with the Central Government as soon as the new policy is put into effect; that British participation in the Government shall not continue for longer than is necessary to effect the transition from Trusteeship to complete independence; and that a definite time limit shall be fixed for this period of transition. The period suggested is five years. In other words, it is proposed that His Majesty's Government should administer a five-year Trusteeship over Palestine, with the declared object of preparing the country for independence.
- 5. Under these proposals, His Majesty's Government would be carrying on the obligations which already rest upon them under the Mandate. At the same time, they would be looking forward to an early termination of the Trust, and would be acting in full conformity with the provisions of Article 76 of the United Nations Charter.

If it emerged from the present discussions that the initiation of such a policy would command substantial acquiescence from both communities in Palestine, interim arrangements in harmony with this policy could no doubt be made in advance of its formal approval by the United Nations.

6. The essential features of the proposed Trusteeship Agreement are outlined in the succeeding paragraphs.

Local Government

- 7. Areas of local administration would be delimited in such a way as to include in each a substantial majority either of Arabs or of Jews. To the local Administrations the central Government would devolve a wide range of powers, legislative, administrative and financial, including some share in responsibility for the police. As the local administrative boundaries would not have the character of State frontiers, it would not necessarily follow that all the Arab or all the Jewish territory need be contiguous.
- 8. Safeguards would be provided for the rights of the Jewish population in Arab areas and of the Arab population in Jewish areas. The rights of these minorities would include:—
 - (a) Adequate representation in local legislatures;
 - (b) A reasonable proportion of posts in the local Administration;
 - (c) Freedom of religious practice in accordance with the status quo, including the maintenance of separate religious courts for matters of personal status;
 - (d) The right to maintain their own educational institutions;

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(e) The right to use their own language in their communications with the Administration and in the Courts of Law.

It would be a special responsibility of the High Commissioner to ensure the maintenance of these rights.

Immigration

- 9. The British Delegation cannot accept the contention of the representatives of the Jewish Agency that the rate of Jewish immigration into Palestine as a whole should be determined by the Jews alone. Nor can they accept the demand of the Arab Delegations that all Jewish immigration into Palestine should cease forthwith. They do not contemplate either a settlement which would bring to an end the development of the Jewish National Home, or the admission of Jewish immigrants without reference to the effect of their entry on the rights and position of the population of the country. Any provisions made for future Jewish immigration must rest upon consideration for the well-being of Palestine as a whole.
- 10. With this end in view the Trusteeship Agreement would provide for Jewish immigration, at a rate of 4,000 monthly, for a period of two years. This would guarantee the entry of approximately 100,000 additional Jewish immigrants. During the remainder of the period of Trusteeship, the continuance of immigration and the rate of entry would be determined, with due regard to the principle of economic absorptive capacity, by the High Commissioner in consultation with his Advisory Council; and in the event of disagreement the final decision would rest with an arbitration tribunal appointed by the United Nations.

Land Transfers

11. Control over transfers of land, including the power to amend the existing Land Transfers Regulations, would be conferred on the local authorities.

Central Government

- 12. The High Commissioner would continue to exercise supreme legislative and executive authority. He would, however, endeavour to form an Advisory Council so composed as to include representatives, not only of the Arab and Jewish local Administrations, but also of labour and other organised interests. Despite this composition, it is probable that voting in the Advisory Council would tend at first to follow communal lines. Since, however, the functions of the Council would be advisory and not legislative, the High Commissioner would be required to give due attention to the views of minorities. On the conclusion of the Trusteeship Agreement, the Jewish members of the Advisory Council would supersede the Jewish Agency for Palestine as the official channel of communication between the Jewish community and the High Commissioner.
- 13. During the period of trusteeship, the High Commissioner would introduce Palestinians into his Executive Council, and would progressively increase the proportion of Palestinian members in that Council.
- 14. It would be the duty of the central Government to stimulate the economic development of the country through the agency of Development Boards including both Arab and Jewish members.
- 15. The central Government would be responsible for ensuring that adequate provision was made by the local Administrations for the enforcement of minimum wage rates and conditions of labour.

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Termination of Trusteeship Agreement


16. At the end of four years a Constituent Assembly would be elected. If agreement was reached between a majority of the Jewish representatives and a majority of the Arab representatives in the Constituent Assembly, the High Commissioner would proceed forthwith to take whatever steps were necessary to establish the institutions of the independent State.

17. In the event of disagreement in the Constituent Assembly, the various drafts prepared for its consideration and the record of its debates would be submitted to the Trusteeship Council which would be asked to advise upon future procedure.

Conclusion


18. Throughout the period of mandatory rule in Palestine, it has been the object of His Majesty's Government to lay the foundations for an independent Palestinian State in which Arabs and Jews would enjoy equal rights. The state of tension between the two peoples which has existed hitherto has continually thwarted the attempts of the mandatory Power to progress towards this end. His Majesty's Government are not prepared to continue indefinitely to govern Palestine themselves merely because Arabs and Jews cannot agree upon the means of sharing its government between them. The proposals contained in the present Memorandum are designed to give the two peoples an opportunity of demonstrating their ability to work together for the good of Palestine as a whole and so providing a stable foundation for an independent State.

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TOWARDS

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
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and

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(1868—1947)

Builders of the Jewish National Home

and

Pioneers of the Bi-National Idea

If we do not give every member of the public the opportunity of considering the Jewish-Arab question, we will be committing, I think, an unpardonable sin. Why do I think so? For two reasons. First: it was Judaism which brought me to Zionism and I cannot but believe that Judaism, Religion as I understand it, is our moral code; and Judaism bids us find a way in common with the Arabs living in this country. Secondly: I am almost certain that at the end of the war it will not be easier than it is now to shape the development of our life in the way we desire by bearing our influence on those who determine the course of affairs. The more I return to this matter, the more do I become convinced that politically as well as morally, the Jewish-Arab problem is the decisive question. I insist that we must reach an understanding of this question, and we can succeed in this only if we are offered opportunities of meeting and discussing the matter. I think that even at this late hour we must endeavour, through IHUD, to find ways of speaking and conferring about this question with clear insight and full knowledge of its importance. And that paragraph on national discipline printed on the Shekel cannot deprive us of the right to speak and understand.

HENRIETTA SZOLD (1942)

Can we resign ourselves to this calamity of partition—even if the pill be coated with the emblem of sourceignty? We are confronted by the question, What comes first, the reunion — even if incomplete — of the remnants of the Diaspora in their Homeland, or the empty splendour of sovereignty, the fictitious glory of a dwarfish state, whose absorptive capacity will be very limited?

All the attention of our National Institutions is concentrated on the two alternatives—either partition, or the continuance of the Mandate and the 'status quo'. I hold the Mandate much in esteem, despite all its shortcomings. I known full well how good it is to be master in one's own house, even if the property be small. I know, too, how bad it is to have to depend on others. But the most important thing is peace with the Arabs. Any solution found and put into practice against the will of the Arabs endangers our future. Let us learn from the past: fifty-two peoples, including the greatest powers, have signed an obligation to establish a

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National Home in Palestine for us; and now we find that the Mandate is in danger of losing its force—because the thing was done against the will of the Arabs.

We must recognize the kinship existing between the two branches of the Semitic race, and the duty of both parts to act in accordance with the principle: "that which it would not have the other branch do unto him, that it should not do unto the other". From this follow the principles of equality—parity—and of non-domination of either people by the other. Both these principles were accepted and proclaimed by various Zionist Congresses. The Arabs, on their part, must consent to the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine and abandon their objection to immigration and land sales to Jews.

Is this within the realm of possibility? In my opinion it is. We must only find a way of reconciling the two national movements, the Zionist and the Arab, which seem conflicting and mutually exclusive, but which are in reality complementary to each other, and able to live side by side in peace and harmony. I have been in search of this way for years, and from my long experience I have reached the conclusion, first, that it is not the fault of the other party only that so far the way has not yet been found; and secondly, that "if any one tell thee, I have striven and have not found, then believe him not."

H. M. KALVARYSKI (1937-38)

TO THE READER

THIS BOOKLET is issued by the IHUD (Union) Association in Palestine. The majority of articles are translated from previous numbers of BA'AYOTH, the Hebrew monthly of IHUD. Those specially written for this English edition are marked with an asterisk in the Table of Contents.

The spirit, attitude and aims of IHUD have been clearly enough set out in the articles by Dr. J. L. Magnes and Prof. M. Buber to necessitate exposition here. Moreover, every page bears witness of this spirit and of the practical consequences, both political and economic, which ensue therefrom.

The articles in this selection are political for the greater part, but they also deal with the ethical and cultural sources and consequences of our political views. Such papers as portray the economic aspects prove, however, that the latter are inseparably bound up with the political aspects of this complex problem, which 's Palestine. Such articles have been chosen for the economic section of this booklet as point to what has already been achieved and what is possible of achievement in the way of Jewish-Arab co-operation.

We do not claim to have a monopoly of right views and correct estimates. The short editorials, reproduced with their dates, indicate that our forecasts have sometimes been wrong; our hopes often frustrated. We have reprinted them here as they stand so that the reader may judge for himself to what extent our political outlook and analysis have proved right.

Wherever necessary, explanatory notes, setting out the background of events and situations, or explaining non-English terms, have been added in footnotes or at the beginnings of articles, particularly of the short editorials. Most articles, however, are self-explanatory, Readers unacquainted with the political structure of the Yishuv in Palestine are advised to begin with the article by Mrs. Luft, which will help them understand the background against which our opinions and criticisms are to be examined.

Thanks are due to the following persons, who have helped in the preparation of this booklet: Dr. B. Berger, Mrs. M. Blaukopf, Mr. H. Masaryk, Mr. G. Michaelis, Mrs. Roth, and Mr. Brian Stone, who have helped prepare the English version of articles written in Hebrew; Mr. W. Edinger, Dr. M. Spitzer, and Mr. G. Stern, who have given valuable advice; and, last not least, Mr. Immanuel Koplewitz, who has acted as secretary to the editorial board.

Jerusalem, February 2, 1947.

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THE BI-NATIONAL APPROACH TO ZIONISM By MARTIN BUBER

WHEN some years ago, a group of Jews from Jerusalem and elsewhere in Palestine combined their efforts in founding the IHUD (Union) Association, and later created the monthly BA'AYOTH as its organ, the main problem occupying their minds was the one usually referred to as the Arab question. This problem consists in the relationship between Jewish settlement in Palestine and Arab life, or, as it may be termed, the intra-national basis of Jewish settlement.

The intra-national approach is one which starts out from the concrete relationship between neighbouring and inter-dependent nations, when considering the given economic and political facts and when considering decisions within their domain; the international view, on the other hand, gives predominance to the necessarily more abstract relations between civilised nations as entities. It is one of the most important characteristics of our revolutionary age that intra-national considerations are gaining in significance, when compared with international ones. As long as the traditional colonial policy, the "legitimate" rule over the destinies of remote peoples, was indisputedly maintained, the intra-national point of view was denied its natural precedence. With the growth of self-confidence in the nations and with their increasing desire for self-determination, concrete geographical conditions became absolutely and relatively more important factors. Especially was this the case where historical connections existed and where new possibilities were opened up for the joint erection of a new cultural and social structure. This accounts for the fact that international politics soon became the scene of a dispute between the colonial point of view and considerations of neighbourliness. It may be assumed that this state of affairs will only suffer a radical change in the course of a future stage of global development, when the actual and all-embracing co-operation between the nations, brought about by an enormous calamity, will give concrete substance to international activity.

Jewish settlement in Palestine, which was embarked upon in order to enable the Jewish people to survive as a national entity, and which, in its social, economic and cultural aspects, constitutes an enterprise of universal significance, suffered from one basic error, which handicapped the development of its positive features. This basic error consisted in the tribute paid by political leadership to the traditional colonial policy, which was less suitable for Palestine than for any other region of the globe and certainly less fitting the Jewish people than any other nation. Hence, political leadership

was guided by international and not intra-national considerations. Instead of relating the aims of the Jewish people to the geographical reality, wherein these aims had to be realised, the political leaders saw these aims only against the background of international events and in their relation to international problems. Thus, Palestine was embedded into international entanglements and attempts towards their solution, isolating it from the organic context of the Middle East, into the awakening of which it should have been integrated in accordance with a broader spiritual and social perspective.

Whoever pointed to this state of affairs as constituting a decisive factor in the shaping of the future, had to realise that the Zionist public and their leaders were, in this respect, blind to reality. This blindness was bound to prove fatal. To a large extent, this attitude and its practical consequences are responsible for the fact that the self-confidence and desire for self-determination prevailing among the Arab population of Palestine have found a militant form of expression.

AT A TIME when colonial powers are forced into the defensive and have to give up position after position, even a nation with big-power backing could dare to settle in a country the population of which is maturing politically, only if it were sincerely bent on creating a real community of interest with that population; if it were prepared, at the price of inevitable sacrifices, to make the development of the country a joint concern; if it would enable the partner to co-operate actively in the enterprise and make him share the advantages gained. This applies in a still greater measure to a nation which cannot count on bigpower support and which has to be careful not to mistake what is only the ephemeral interest of this or that big power, for genuine backing. What was needed at the outset of the settlement enterprisein any case at the initiation of the modern one, undertaken with an international perspective — was a clearly defined programme of "do ut des" (give and take). Such a programme should have provided for the collective integration of the backward Arab population, as a whole, into Jewish economic activities and should have secured, in exchange, the indispensible demands necessary for the survival of the Jewish people as a national entity: free immigration, free acquisition of land, and the right of self-determination. What was actually put into practice, even when it seemed to answer real necessity, as was the case with the principle of 'Jewish Labour'1, was bound to have results almost contrary to the above programme. In these circumstances, those in the Arab camp, who wanted to shape the

i.e. the principle that all hired labourers, both in industry and agriculture, should be exclusively Jews; first, because only thus can Jewish immigration be absorbed into the economy of the country, and new place be created for additional Jewish immigrants; second, because Arab labour, for the most part, is not organized in trade unions, and cheaper, and thus may undermine the principle of employing organized labour only.

awakening Arab national movement in a negative, defensive manner, instead of allowing it to develop positive and social features, which would have threatened their interests, had an easy task.

In this faulty development of the Arab movement, as well as in our own, another characteristic feature of our age becomes dreadeningly apparent: the hypertrophy of political factors as compared to economic and cultural ones. This world of ours should, by dint of gigantic problems, be forced to bury phraseology and give way to matter-of-fact reality. Such a state of affairs should make politics only the facade of the economic and cultural structure. This facade has only to represent the economic and cultural structure, and not to exercise an influence impairing it. But instead of contenting itself with this rôle, the political principle claims to be the only decisive and active one. Hence, whenever real, that is, essentially economic clashes of interests between two nations occur, it is not the actual extent of the divergences, which determines the struggle, but the exaggerated and over-emphasised political aspect of these divergences. Nurtured by fictitious political ideas, this surplus factor has become more powerful in the public arena than economic realities themselves, since in any emergency, these economic factors cannot act but through their political agents, and, therefore, have to put up with and pay for the latter's encroachments. Whilst the real conflicts might be easily solved, political fictions precipitate the crisis, by adding the emotional surplus; the crisis, in turn, increases the power of professional politicians. Such is the vicious circle.

It is frequently claimed that power lies with captains of industry, but this would only be true in unaffected conditions. More often than not are conditions affected by the mass intoxication with fictions, without which, it seems, most people can no longer go on in this dreadfully complicated world. In between come the catastrophes, that is, the time when the fictions become reality, because they were allowed to reign supreme. The power of professional politicians over the intoxicated masses is almost unlimited, although in the hour of catastrophe they have to share this power with military or gang leaders, unless they manage to unite both these functions — as, for instance, by holding one post officially and fulfilling the other function de facto, only. The "Jewish-Arab Question" has indeed become a classical example for all this.

What are we to call the Cassandra of our time? Whether we choose the proud name of "spiritual elite" or the somewhat contemptuous reference to "certain intellectuals", it comes to the same. I am referring to those, who, equally free from the megalomania of the leaders and from the giddiness of the masses, discern the approaching catastrophe. They do not merely utter their warnings, but they try to point to the path which has to be followed if catastrophe is to be averted. This path is not unalterably defined. With history slipping further down the dangerous slope, they have to change the

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plan and adapt it to the remaining possibilities. They do not prattle about the goal, they want to attain it. Thus, they have to analyse reality in its changes, brought about by the suggestive interplay of political fictions, in order to arrive at a correct appreciation of facts; in order to reach their target eventually. Since they are out to realise these aims in fact and since they refuse to accept hopeless, heroic gestures as a substitute for the triumph of the national rescue work over immense obstacles, they are called defeatists. Because they remain faithful to the ideal and do not allow its replacement by the Asmodaeus of a political chimera, they are looked upon as quislings. Because, day and night, they summon up all inner forces so as not to submit to despair, and because they invoke the helpful power of reason, they are described as men whose hearts are left cold by the misery of their people.

Such are the convictions and such the fate of the group of men in whose midst IHUD and BA'AYOTH came into being.

DOES THIS Cassandra act? She, too, only speaks. She does not act because she is not authorised to do so and because at this juncture action without authorisation would be madness. But her speeches are as many deeds — because they point to the path. The history of the present and the coming generations will prove that her speech was action and the road indicated, the only one leading to Jewish revival in Palestine.

We describe our programme as that of a bi-national state — that is, we aim at a social structure based on the reality of two peoples living together. The foundations of this structure cannot be the traditional ones of majority and minority, but must be different. We do not mean just any bi-national state, but this particular one, with its particular conditions, i.e., a bi-national state which embodies in its basic principles a Magna Charta Reservationum, the indispensible postulate of the rescue of the Jewish people. This is what we need and not a "Jewish State"; for any national state in vast, hostile surroundings would mean pre-meditated national suicide, and an unstable international basis can never make up for the missing intra-national one. But this programme is only a temporary adaptation of our path to the concrete, historical situation — it is not necessarily the path itself. The road to be pursued is that of an agreement between the two nations — naturally also taking into account the productive participation of smaller national groups — an agreement which, in our opinion, would lead to Jewish-Arab cooperation in the revival of the Middle East, with the Jewish partner concentrated in a strong settlement in Palestine. This co-operation, though necessarily starting out from economic premises, will allow development in accordance with an all-embracing cultural perspective and on the basis of a feeling of at-oneness, tending to result in a new form of society.

Essential pre-requisites for such an agreement are the two principles, which I have described as decisive for the immediate future of mankind: the precedence of economics over politics; and that of the intra-national principle over the international one.

The cleansing of the Jewish-Arab atmosphere is much more difficult today than it was only a few years ago. Above all, this is the result of an entirely fictitious programme, which does not comprise any possibility of realisation, and which relinquishes the realistic Zionism of toil and reconstruction — the Biltmore Programme. This programme, interpreted as admitting the aim of a minority to "conquer" the country by means of international manoeuvres, has not only aroused Arab anger against official Zionism, but also made all attempts at bringing about Jewish-Arab understanding suspicious in the eyes of Arabs, who imagined that these attempts were concealing the officially admitted real intentions. Yet, even today, such a cleansing of the atmosphere — an indispensible preliminary condition for the establishment of agreement — is not impossible. This can only be done, however, on the basis of the primacy of reality. It is necessary to create conditions which will prove that the common interests, now overshadowed by political considerations, are more real, more vital than the differences hitherto so successfully emphasised by the professional politicians on either side. This is what J.L. Magnes, when giving evidence before the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry, defined as reaching agreement "through life and not through discussion". The realities of life should be given a chance to force the walls of political fictions. Magnes was right in going as far as to hope for an "agreement among the political leaders" themselves. Life, when given a chance, will prove strong enough to force a new line of action upon the politicians. The evil does not lie with politics as such, but with its hypertrophy.

Equally important for the intended agreement is the precedence of the intra-national principle over the international one. Prevailing Zionist policy hitherto adhered to the axiomatic view that international agreement had to precede, nay, determine the intra-national agreement with the Arabs. It is imperative to reverse this order: it is essential to arrive at an intra-national agreement, which is later to receive international sanction. This order will recommend itself also to the Arabs, even if today their political leaders refuse to admit it, because the Palestinian State they aim at will, in the present international situation, only come about if demanded jointly by Jews and Arabs—that is, only after Jewish-Arab agreement will have been established.

In the present state of world politics, the intra-national principle tends more and more to assume a constructive role, whilst it remains for the international principle only to sanction the results of the former. In other words: as a consequence of agreements between nations, super-national structures will of necessity come into being,

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based, from without, upon common economic interests and joint economic action, and cemented inwardly by the singleness of purpose in the cultural and social domains. Within this common concern of two or more nations, economically unified and culturally diverse, the political activities will partly be the joint action of all and partly the result of the separate action of each group; but all this diversity of effort will be moulded into a whole, by a great vision, shared by all and creative. Finally, these new social structures will be fitted into a super-territorial pattern, corresponding with our present "international" principle, but more vital and more active.

In the Middle East, no such larger integration will come about without a genuine agreement between Jews and Arabs and its international sanctioning. In the same manner, the essential Jewish demands can only be realised by way of such an agreement. Only if the Jews are able to offer the world the peace of the Middle East—as far as this depends upon them—will the world concede those demands to Jewry. For, one thing is certain: not only this or that Great Power needs a peaceful Middle East, but the nations of the world at large.

SINCE we embarked upon our struggle against fictitious political thinking, the power of these fictions over the Yishuv has, it seems, been increasing continuously. First, a programme was drawn up that could not be realised by political means; when this became apparent, a desperate and foolhardy section of Jewish youth resorted to violence—which is more vain still. The whole history of national movements, in which revolutionary and violent measures play no small part, was invoked to serve as a lesson that was no lesson—for it is evident that lessons drawn from history can only be applied if the particular character of the situation has been recognised: the weight of the interested powers, assessed, and the inter-play of forces between and within these states, as they affect the particular problem, analysed. But this very investigation— an essential preliminary—was not undertaken; had it been, it would have laid bare the absurdity of a policy of violence in our situation.

It should, of course, be borne in mind that genuine despair was prevailing, brought on by an action of extermination never before experienced by any other nation, as well as by the indifference of the world in the face of this action. Yet, despair does not usually render judgment more keen; rather does it lead to an intoxication by political fictions. Professional politicians here, as elsewhere, have made all the despair, all the misery of the nation, the demand for rescue, so many factors in their calculation. It is not the calculation that matters, however, it is reality; and the politicians of the world power most interested, instead of watching reality, had their eyes pinned on to these calculations. By so doing, they heightened the feeling of despair, especially since after an action of extermination

of this kind, the poor human soul is inclined to see extermination lurking everywhere.

Nevertheless, the feeling continues to spread over the Yishuv that something is wrong with official Zionist policy; that irretrievable opportunities have been lost. The number of those, who re-examine their position, is growing. Our pains-taking efforts have not remained without result. It is now of the utmost importance to prevent this dis-illusionment from developing into destructive pessimism and to shape it into constructive resolution. More emphatically than ever has it to be shown that a solution is still possible. To bring this solution about will be more difficult and less satisfactory now, than at any earlier stage, but its realisation is still within our reach: it will bring us back to our path of constructive work.

To point to the way and to aim at the solution in the present and more difficult conditions is a task which can only be fulfilled by dint of a supreme effort. To this end, we seek allies everywhere and appeal for their support.

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A SOLUTION THROUGH FORCE?

By J. L. MAGNES

This is the stenographic record of an address given by Dr. Magnes in New York, on July 17, 1946, before an important Zionist organization which had invited him to discuss the political situation. The discussion which followed has been published in the Jan.—Febr. 1947 number of BA'AYOTH, the Hebrew Monthly of IHUD.

EVERYBODY who considers the Palestine question has to ask himself two things. First, what does he really want? Second, how does he expect to get that? Those who have answered the question to themselves and have said, we really want a Jewish State or the Jewish Commonwealth, have very good reasons for that, and I don't have to go into those reasons.

The tragedy that has happened to the Jewish people, its virtual homelessness, the lack of a voice in the United Nations Organisation or anywhere else, those are negative reasons on the one hand, very powerful. There are positive reasons also for a Jewish State, namely, that the Jewish people ought to be given the opportunity, as every people is given, to set up governments, to try its hand at that very difficult exercise of power which one calls sovereignty, government. That would be a great challenge to the Jewish people. Instead of giving advice from the sidelines, it would be in the midst of the struggle itself, which every people ought to have the privilege of confronting.

A Jewish State would give all of that presumably, at least in theory, and more besides.

As I said, it is not necessary for me to tell you, who have been in favour of that, what the arguments for a Jewish State are. It is an entirely different question as to how you are going to get it. You have to try to make up your mind on that with as much clarity, insofar as it is possible, as you make up your minds on the question of the Jewish State itself.

I don't know if those who advocate a Jewish State have given sufficient thought, systematic, orderly, responsible thought, to that second problem. How are you going to get it? I should like to express the opinion, which is not my personal opinion alone, that a Jewish State can be gotten, if at all, only through war, war in the literal sense of the term, fighting with arms insofar as the arms are available; insofar as they are not available, they are to be secured.

Those who have been for a Jewish State and who have been trying to build up Jewish armed groups are not only logical but they are

also realistic, because they know that if they want a Jewish State and want it hard enough, the only way to get it — you may perhaps succeed in getting it — is through the use of arms, through warfare. If you teach the Jewish youth, as so many of us are teaching them — mistakenly it seems to me — that the only hope for the Jewish people is a Jewish State, that the Jewish people is doomed everywhere, in America as elsewhere, and that betimes a Jewish State has to be established; if you teach the Jewish youth that — that Judaism, the Jewish spirit, the Jewish religion, Jewish culture are all in danger of deterioration, if not extinction, if there be no Jewish State — then of course, with an idealistic Jewish youth such as we have in Palestine, in America and elsewhere, this idealistic Jewish youth will draw the conclusion which I have tried to draw for you, even though you yourselves don't draw it, that the way to get that is through force.

You see that the Jewish youth is ready to go out on that battle-ground. When British soldiers are killed in their beds within what is presumably the hospitable city of Tel Aviv, when officers are kidnapped, when bridges are blown up, when all of these things take place that have been taking place, that is the logical and the natural and the inevitable consequence of the theory which our youth is being taught, that without a Jewish State we are lost. If not to-day then to-morrow.

Those, therefore, who have advocated a Jewish state and who condemn what is being done are, I think, taking an illogical ground. The youth who go out at night with their bombs and their other weapons are ready to sacrifice their own lives there, and not just talk about it here. They are drawing the natural and inevitable conclusion, the only conclusion that can be drawn from the premise that a Jewish State is absolutely necessary.

I DO NOT regard it as my function to-day to argue with you. I am just trying to put the problem to you. I should like to put another side of the problem to you. Before I do that let me say why I am sure that a Jewish State cannot be achieved, if it can be achieved at all, except through violence and warfare.

You can talk to an Arab on everything in the world: you cannot talk to him about the Jewish State. You cannot talk to him about a Jewish State because a Jewish State means, in the definition of it, the rule by Jews of others, of others who live in that Jewish State. You may try to persuade him that Jewish rule is going to be just and generous, and we may all believe that; we certainly all hope for that. But that is prophesy, and one cannot be guided by that.

If you talk to an Englishman, and he is another factor in the situation, you will find that there are differences of view. There have been some Englishmen who have thought that a Jewish Palestine could be a bastion to the British Empire at this very sensitive centre

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These Englishmen believed that it was necessary to have a loyal Jewish Palestine in order to safeguard what they then foresaw would, actually even more than they could then foresee, become a crucial centre of communications. You don't find as many Englishmen saying that to-day as you did then or as you did a year ago. The conception of a loyal Jewish Palestine has disappeared. Both Englishmen and Jews have to realize that a people is loyal or a state is loyal when it is to their interests to be loyal, and we see to-day that situations may arise which may prompt us to think, correctly or mistakenly, that our interests do not lie with England, and we are therefore endeavouring to show England that she need not count upon our loyalty.

In general, the conception of loyalty on the part of the Jews has long since disappeared out of the British vocabulary. I think you ought to know that. I am not trying to assess the blame for it.

You have, therefore, these two main factors: The Arabs, not only of Palestine, but the whole Arab world, and beyond that, the world of Islam. Then you have the British factor, which you are not going to eliminate, however hard you try, because Palestine is too important for the British scheme of things.

You would find that to get a Jewish state from either of them, or with either of them against the other, would mean the application of force, warfare. That also is something that those who are engaged upon this terror understand. They say, the only way we can get it from Britain is through force, because Britain has shown in Ireland or in India that when sufficient force is applied concessions are made. I don't want to go into what to me are fundamental differences between Palestine and the Jews on the one hand and Ireland and India on the other hand. I think they are radically different and the analogy is a basically false analogy. But it is correct when they say, if you want the State, the only way you can get it is through force.

Jabotinsky knew that long years ago. He was the prophet of the Jewish State. Jabotinsky was ostracized and condemned and excommunicated, and we see now that almost the whole Zionist movement has adopted his point of view. There is not sufficient credit given to Jabotinsky and the Revisionists for their foresight and for their loyalty to this idea, which all these years was exceedingly unpopular, at least on the surface. He saw that the only way to get a State was through force.

He said in his early writings: "Has it ever been known that a people would willingly give up its soil? No more would the Palestine Arabs yield their sovereignty without force." He endeavoured to get the

¹ See the article by Professor Koebner, Ireland — the False Analogy, in this booklet.

British to understand that, and he found a large following among the Poles, those Poles who are now carrying on these pogroms. They wanted to get rid of the Jews in Poland and therefore accepted his plan of evacuation.

All these things were in his mind and were recorded by him more or less in a prophetic way. These things are being adopted now by those who excommunicated him and who pilloried him and who made his life a great burden. I tell you that in order to indicate that sometimes ideas have a way of marching and of accomplishing themselves long after they have been subjected to derision and opposition, and not Jabotinsky's ideas alone.

I WOULD LIKE then to put before you another side of the problem. There are those who say they want a bi-national State, and they have tried to put to themselves the question how they are going to get it. They want a bi-national State because they think that, in the first place, that is a worthy ideal, a high ideal, an ideal to which the Jewish youth can be educated to give their best mind, their best spirit. They have this in mind also because of the practical situation. We find the Arabs there, a fact which, of course, cannot be overlooked, although it has been overlooked over and over again.

I met with a group not so long ago and they asked me to say something on this problem, a group of leaders in the community here, a couple of hundred of them. At the end of that meeting one man came up to me and said, "Well, you know perfectly well that whenever we want to come to an agreement with the Arabs we can; it is the British." So I said to him, "Why don't you come to this agreement with the Arabs, if you think it is so simple?"

I have heard that said by many people on many occasions: "Of course when we choose to come to an agreement with the Arabs we can." Well, there was a time when that might have been possible. That time is long since past. The Arabs have grown in political maturity, and the Arabs are more and more afraid of us. So the initiative is out of our hands. When that man said, "We can come to an agreement with the Arabs whenever we want"—he meant that the political initiative was still in the hands of the Jews. It is not; it has passed out of the hands of the Jews.

The question therefore is — I am not trying to go into the question so much as to why we want a bi-national State; I have indicated that in a few words — the question that I want to ask and try to answer is, how do we expect to get it? We have worked out a program for that, which was presented in writing to the Anglo-American Committee; and was supplemented by oral testimony, which is also available in print. I don't expect in the brief remarks that I make to go into the same detail that you can find in these documents ².

² "Palestine — A Bi-National State." Publ. by IHUD (Union) Association of Palestine, New-York, August 1946.

We want to get the bi-national state through, as far as possible, argument, persuasion, not through the use of force; certainly not through the use of Jewish force; not through warfare. And we think we can get that.

The reason we think we can get it is because we know of Arab circles in Palestine who are in favour of it. We know there are Arab circles outside of Palestine who favour it. I have had two conversations in New York with important representatives of the Arab world and they favour it.

So that the question that I ask and the question that I answer is just this: What do we want? We want a bi-national State, because we think the Jewish genius for government can be given full play through the bi-national State. How do we expect to get it? Through argument, persuasion, and finally through life itself. And this is an important point which I should like to make with you as one of the details we have tried to work out.

We were greatly disappointed that the Anglo-American Commission did not go further in the report. They adopted a great deal of what we said, sometimes in the very words of our statements. But they overlooked a primary consideration, namely, that the process of self-government be begun at once, expedited.

WHY DO WE think that that is so important? Because in that way Jews and Arabs would come together in one of the most important concerns of life, Government. We therefore contended, and we still contend, that there should have been a concurrent declaration on the part of the Anglo-American Committee, proclaiming a bi-national State on the one hand and the beginnings of self-government on the other. The Arabs want, above all things, self-government. The Jews, for the most part, want above all things, immigration. We have tried to make these balance one another. Our formula is: political parity and numerical parity for the two nationalities.

Our proposal is that immigration be permitted up to parity, equality. That would give the Jews the chance of five to six hundred thousand additional immigrants until parity was reached. It would not mean the discontinuance of immigration when parity was reached, because the Arab birth rate is higher than the Jewish, twice as high. So that the additional Jewish immigration would be at least that much, in order to make up the disparity between the birth rates.

Moreover, it is our contention that if there be some political peace, as there might be, in connection with a bi-national State, the Jews and the Arabs could work out together some further arrangement as to additional Jewish immigration, after parity was reached and after the disparity of the birth rates had been covered.

In our programme we have worked out a series of steps. We proposed three stages for this self-government; now, before the Mandate ends; to-morrow, when trusteeship takes over Palestine; and in the

third stage when Palestine becomes an independent autonomous unit within a larger federation in that part of the world.

We think that those things are practical. We certainly know that they cannot be introduced through warfare. We think we can find a common language, a language of understanding and of peace with the Arabs, as we have found with many individuals. We think if the binational State with self-government were made the policy of the British and of the American Governments and of other governments, and this policy were adhered to, and if both the Jews and the Arabs understood that that was the policy for Palestine which had the approval of the United Nations, we think that the Jews and the Arabs in the course of a not very long period would be finding one another increasingly, year by year. You find that to-day. You find it in the government itself. There are Jews and Arabs who participate in government, but in the lower positions. There was this government strike. The Jews and the Arabs carried it on together. The Jews were in the minority, the Arabs were in the majority. But the Jews and the Arabs stuck together because the interests of their life required it. It wasn't an abstract formula that was presented to them.3

Jews and Arabs work together in the country districts. The Kibbutzim and the Fellahin are on good terms. They are not on such good terms to-day as they were a year ago, and they probably will not be on such good terms to-morrow as they are to-day, if all of this goes on. But they have laid the basis of understanding and co-operation between them. Not on the basis of a Jewish State but on the basis of life, of what one can give to the other, of what one can receive from the other.

There are Arab workers organizations now, particularly the leftwing workers organizations, which have as a plank in their platform the co-operation between Jews and Arabs, although on other matters they are almost as chauvinistic as some of the Effendi Arabs themselves. But it is an indication that points the way.

We cannot afford to lose much time. The sands are running out. The war that is taking place now — and it is warfare — the beginnings of warfare were inevitable, they were not to be avoided as long as the Jewish State was the official policy of the Zionist movement. It has not been the official policy of the Zionist Congresses as yet; for that reason those of us who are opponents of the Jewish State still feel that we have the right to be members of the Zionist Organization, to buy the Shekel as we do. I am hoping that with the developments of the next six months, before the Zionist Congress takes place, there will be a greater measure of calm and of understanding. But if we simply keep reaffirming what the Biltmore Programme began, and simply shake our fists and say to Great Britain, You are our enemy, and say to the Arabs, You are our enemy—that is what we are

³ See the article by G. Baer, Jewish and Arab Workers — Divided or United?

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I have to add one point. The IHUD group is not the only group advocating the idea which I put forward to you to-day. The Hashomer Hatzair advocates these ideas, with certain differences, but the general tendency is the same, and they are an important group. I should like to say that in the Mapai there are also persons who are not unimportant and who at least flirt with the idea of the bi-national state. And in the Aliyah Hadasha I think there is a majority now who are for a bi-national state. I would like to say that some of the Zionist Executive, who do not say this publicly, nevertheless say it privately, "Oh, if you could get what you are after, how happy we should be."

THERE ARE some in the Zionist Executive who talk about the Jewish State and who also would be very glad if there could be partition. We oppose partition. We oppose partition not only for all the reasons that are usually given, but because partition is going to mean the intensification of chauvinism on both sides.

When you draw these borders, when you draw these frontiers and have the Jewish schools on the one side of the line and the Arab schools on the other side of the line, have you any idea what is going to be taught in them? Well, I have. There is going to be the hatred by the Jews of the Arabs and the hatred of the Jews by the Arabs. That is being taught to-day. But it is not being taught in the same way, because, after all, we meet, we see one another. If there be this partition and there be those water-tight compartments, there is going to be a hatred engendered in comparison with which this present day hatred is just a plaything. Moreover, those of you who are thinking of the Jewish State and who are ready for this warfare, which will be inevitable, which will be much more serious than it is to-day, may think that we Jews have these great caches of arms, which we have —this Yagour is only one, as you probably know. You may think that we are better armed than the Arabs, and we are, much, much better armed, and we are better trained than the Arabs. Well, all of our sons and all of our daughters go out for training, and we are going to get at least 12,000 trained men and women from the Jewish Brigade, and we are going to get among the 50,000 young men and women who are coming in among these hundred thousand refugees I don't know how many who have been or are being trained.

The day we lick the Arabs, that is the day, I think, when we shall be sowing the seed of an eternal hatred of such dimensions that Jews will not be able to live in that part of the world for centuries to come. That is something that you had better try to avoid.

I have great confidence in some of these leaders who are to be in Paris for a meeting soon, confidence even in some of the most violent of them, that they may be ready now to make these admissions that this is not the way. Lo zeh ha-derech,⁴ this is not the way.

I can only repeat to you that this is the inevitable way on the basis of the Jewish State. I do hope the idea of the bi-national State is going to be taken seriously, taken up seriously in Paris; if not in Paris, it certainly will be in the coming Zionist Congress. By that time I am hoping that the movement of the 100,000 will have begun in good earnest, and that many who are engaging upon all of this simply out of understandable despair, will say, It is time to lay down our arms; and this would be the beginning, this is what we want.

We cannot maintain a Jewish State or a bi-national State or a Yishuv in Palestine if the whole surrounding world be our enemies. We may be doing this and we may be doing that, but the existence of that Yishuv or that State, or whatever one calls it, will be precarious, and that is not what we want nor what the Jewish people require.

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⁴ That was the name of the first article by Ahad-Haam, the leader of spiritual Zionism, criticising some ways of the Zionist Movement. The title of that article has become a slogan of earnest criticism.—Ed.

JEWISH PALESTINE TO-DAY THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND

By GERDA LUFT

IT HAS never been easy for the outsider to understand Palestine well enough in order to arrive at a correct idea of its diverse political and social tendencies. Despite the smallness of the country and although it was only during the war years that the Jewish Yishuv had increased its population, attaining the 600,000 figure, various forces, most complexly inter-connected, were at work in the framing of this growing social organism. Palestine Jewry, moreover, was going through an uninterrupted process of transformation, which often gave rise to swift and surprising changes and innovations.

One of the factors responsible for these phenomena, often referred to as "dynamic development", is to be found in immigration. The waves of immigrants reaching Palestine during the past decades were different from one another, both as regards their social and political ideologies and the social and cultural traditions of the countries, whence they originated. This alone would have amply sufficed to give rise to ever new tendencies of development. We have only to bear in mind the differences between an immigrant from Central Europe, to say nothing of England, on the one hand, and one from Yemen, on the other; or, again, between an American business man and an underground combattant of World War II, in order to realise that a welding of these various elements presents problems equal in propensity to those confronting much bigger countries and that the process of adapting the immigrants to the Yishuv already in the country must of necessity change, threaten and fertilise Palestine Jewry.

Yet, immigration as such was not the only factor which, from the outset, led to intense political activity and to the formation of a great many parties and factions. Responsible, too, was the passion for discussion, in general, and of ideological discussion, in particular, prevalent among many of the immigrants, especially those from Russia and Poland. This tendency, along with a keen suspicion of compromise and the spiritual attitude upon which it rested, was inherited by the succeeding generation, comprising the elements growing up in Palestine itself and those reaching its shores from other countries. Those with a leaning towards historical speculation could spend an amusing hour or two reflecting on the possible nature of development in Palestine during the past decades, had the bulk of immigrants come, not from Eastern and Central Europe, but from the Anglo-Saxon countries.

Apart from the extreme splitting up into parties and groups, Jewish public life in the past 25 years has been characterised by the predominance of the working-class. This trait has continued to the present day with far-reaching effect, both favourable and dangerous. As a country of immigrants, Palestine is free from rigid lines of caste or clearly-defined social strata. Consequently, the vested interest of groups and influences emanating therefrom were to a great extent non-existent. One of the distinguishing features of Jewish Palestine was that it did not have a working-class, in the European sense of the term, opposed to a capitalist class. On the contrary, it may be recorded that one of the main aims of Zionist colonisation has been to create a working-class in Palestine. The idea of a return to the soil and to productive work has been one of the guiding principles of Zionism since the end of the last century, and the creation of the Jewish worker, first in the field of agriculture, and later in that of industry and all other branches of economy, figured among the chief aims of Zionist settlement. There were two contributory factors to this end: colonisation and most particularly workers' colonisation attracted the finest elements of Zionist youth, whilst the developing institutions of the Zionist Organisation threw in all their efforts to promote the creation of a working-class and the safeguarding of its interests.

As a result of these tendencies, the workers in the Jewish Yishuv got the start of all other social strata, as far as social standing, organisation and political influence are concerned. The remainder only took to organising themselves very gradually. Even today, with economic groups already very sharply defined and with the existence of associations representing the interests of citrus growers, industrialists and traders, the depreciating term, déclassé, used in Europe when a son of an industrialist or intellectual takes to agriculture (a usual process in old-established societies), is very largely unknown among the Yishuv. The contrary may be said to be the case, for not only is this process considered perfectly natural, but a lad leaving Secondary School straight for the Kibbutz (communal settlement) is generally looked upon as joining the élite, which realises the aims and ideals of the Zionist Movement in its purest and natural form.

Until recently, this preponderance of the working element and its organisations had imprinted its peculiar stamp of social progress upon the Yishuv. To this preponderance and its recognition by the Zionist Organisation, the success of social experiments in the field of agriculture and the marked emphasis of co-operative forms of activity in the Yishuv is largely due. This survey will show, however, that nowadays, the overwhelming influence of the working-class cannot be considered as constituting an unmixed blessing.

THE WELTER of political and social forces and factions, so characteristic of the Jewish Palestine of today, had already begun to make

itself felt in the early stages of the war. The economic structure of the Yishuv had undergone a fundamental change. Several new political groups had emerged; the Jewish catastrophe in Europe made people see the Jewish question and the Zionist Movement in a new light. The vortex of totalitarian war recalled memories of WW1, and many cherished the hope that the end of this war would afford Zionism another great chance as the first had done with the promulgation of the Balfour Declaration. Added to all this, WW2 had for many years cut Palestine off from the outside world, making the countries of the Diaspora seem even more remote than ever. The result was an intensified concentration on internal affairs and problems. All these factors, in short, combined to bring about the social, political, and — most important of all — the psychological changes, characteristic of Palestine Jewry today.

Let us first consider the economic changes in the Yishuv brought about by the war. In the first case, it removed the problem of unemployment, which had made itself felt early in the forties, and laid the foundations of war prosperity, as remarkable in its effects as that previously caused by the influx of immigrants. The cutting off of Palestine from foreign trade; the stationing in the country of strong Allied forces, who were large-scale consumers, as well as the possibility of feeding them and of manufacturing in the country itself great quantities of products, which were normally imported from abroad, gave an enormous impetus to the whole economic life of Palestine. Shortage of manpower was experienced everywhere and there was an almost unlimited purchasing power in the face of a limited quantity of supplies. Ever new projects could thus be launched under the stimulus of war.

Agriculture underwent a process of consolidation (with the exception of citriculture, which was with difficulty saved from ruin by means of Government loans until the end of the war.¹) As for industry, it was provided with opportunities for expansion, unprecedented in the history of the country.

The fullest advantage was taken of all these varied opportunities, largely because of the adaptability of the Jews and also because they could dispose of specialists of a European standard. As a result of the war, industry in Palestine ranks equally with agriculture and citriculture. The war years, too, have seen the development of new branches of industry, e.g. that of diamonds.

The consequences of this rapid economic rise were two-fold. Industrialists, hitherto badly organised and to a great extent backward in their social ideas and views as to the place and the interests of industry within the social framework as a whole, now closed their ranks and built up an organisation, which corresponded more closely to their social and economic interests. The workers, for their part,

1 See the article, Citrus Growers Have Learnt to Cooperate, by M. Smelansky.

took advantage of this boom in employment in order to expand their already wide-spread trade union organisations still further and to force the industrialists to bear at least part of the social expenditure which in more developed countries is shared by workers, employers and the State. This struggle for better conditions greatly contributed to the preservation of that predominance, which workers and their organisations had previously enjoyed—though, during the war, the employers made the first serious attempt to consolidate their own positions. By means of the establishment of a Jewish industry and the organisations connected therewith, the war had created new and important interest-groups, which are bound to come to the fore politically, sooner or later.

Within the working-class, too, the importance of the industrial workers has grown considerably, quite apart from the fact that the 'Histadruth' (Jewish Federation of Labour) and its subsidiary societies (such as the contracting firm of 'Solel Boneh') are by now playing a leading role as contractors. Emphasis of these points is necessary, seeing that in the present rather vague circumstances, these factors in the existing parties do not make themselves felt as strongly as their intrinsic social and economic importance might lead us to expect.

THE NEW groupings, which emerged in Palestine during the war, cannot be classed as political parties in the usual sense, that is, groups representing definite social interests, with their respective ideologies, fulfilling the functions nowadays ascribed to "pressure groups." The traditional classification, no doubt, also yields valuable results. Generally speaking, we may say that the Labour Parties, in the accepted sense, tend to the 'Left,' that the Bourgeois Parties and groups represent the interests and ideologies of the 'Right'; that the religious circles, for the greater part, are not fighting for the attainment of religious aims only, but tend to the Right rather than the Left — apart from the equally-well-organised religious workers, with agricultural settlements of their own. These concepts, however, are no longer fully adequate to-day, and apart from the Parties, there are groupings determining the trend of public life, which cannot wholly be brought within the rigid categories of parliamentary institutionalism. To these might be added the military and semi-military organisations and, in a certain sense, the Youth Movements as

The influence of the Jewish catastrophe in Europe on the political attitude as well as the social values of Palestine Jewry cannot be over-estimated. The work of up-building in the country acquired an unprecedented significance and importance as constituting the salvation of the scattered remnants of European Jewry. The links connecting the Jews of Palestine with the gruesome happenings in Europe during the recent decades are as powerful as they are manifold.

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They could easily become associated with the often fantastic hopes, entertained in connection with changes expected to be brought about by the war and the eventual peace treaties, for the Jewish cause along with many others. These hopes had been kindled by leaders who had lost touch with reality and who refused to look reality in the face even when the facts could no longer be denied. Both catastrophe and the exaggerated hopes thus aroused resulted in a mood of excessive expectation and excitement, which made rational argumentation seem dull and lifeless by contrast, and left the door open at the same time to every type of fanaticism.

This fanaticism was further enflamed because, throughout the war years, Palestine had been cut off from the outside world, this state continuing even at present, to a large extent. What is more, there is an ever-growing number of young people in this country, unable to speak or read any other language beyond Hebrew. They are consequently thrown back upon themselves and their surroundings. They feel no urge, and in some cases, it must be added, have no possibility, of acquainting themselves with the outside world; of evaluating its interests, intentions, views and cares and of bringing these into some relationship with Palestinian and Jewish questions as a whole. This generation is intensely suspicious of all that is not Jewish — even more, of all that is not Palestinian-Jewish. In many cases, what is lacking is not only awareness and knowledge of the non-Jewish world, but any real knowledge of the Golah (Diaspora); of the interests, relationships and developments which Jewry cherishes and has undergone within the far-flung and complex Jewish community, the world over. Thus, out of this faith in, and devotion to Palestine, there has arisen not only a state of ignorance regarding non-Palestinian Jewry, but the staunch belief that Palestine alone could decide Jewry's fate. Strange as it may sound, in a community fighting for large-scale immigration, there has developed a kind of Palestinian isolationism, a convulsive concentration on the Palestinian section of the Jewish community.

It is hardly necessary to assert that this development ran parallel with the intensification of nationalism throughout the world, as also with a world-wide faith in the potency of physical force. The period of dis-illusionment before the war, and the war years themselves, had not passed without leaving their traces on this country. The indescribable experiences, through which many of the immigrants reaching Palestine during and after the war had passed, naturally exercised a very profound influence on political feeling and thought in the country.

IF WE AIM at an understanding of the political parties and factions prevalent in Jewish Palestine of our day, we must never lose sight of the very complex psychological development, occasioned by the war years, but which is in part also rooted in previous phases of world

development and in pre-war Zionist colonisation. A survey of these groups must commence with the working-class, which remains to this day the politically decisive element, determining the trend of the country, and more particularly of the Zionist Organisation. What is still more important is that it controls the political apparatus.

In recent years, quite a number of different parties have arisen within the working-class. For the Palestinian each one of these has its distinct political colouring; the outsider, however, is confronted with a confusing jumble.

The largest and most powerful of the working-class parties and at the same time the one behind the Executive of the Jewish Agency and the Vaad Le'umi (representative body of Palestine Jewry), is the "MAPAI" (Mifleget Poale Eretz Yisrael). Some fifteen years ago, this body grew out of fusion of the two parties then dominating the Left, thus obtaining a majority within the Working Class Movement. Of these two parties, one was the "AHDUT HA'AVODAH," which, on the whole, corresponded to the "Right Poale Zion" of the Diaspora. It was Marxian in outlook and adhered to the Social Democratic International; the other, the "HAPOEL HATZAIR," proclaimed a kind of non-Marxian organic Socialism, inspired by the late A.D. Gordon. The Mapai, headed by Ben Gurion, which succeeded these two, is responsible in the main for the tenacious proclamation and maintenance of the Biltmore Programme, with its avowed aim a Jewish State. The same Party is also responsible for the turn towards "activism" given to political propaganda in this country and hence for the dangerous intensification of the Anglo-Jewish conflict, resulting in the impasse in Anglo-Jewish relations, to date.

In recent years, an opposition wing has broken away from this central and most powerful body. This Opposition Movement entertains more radical and extremist views both as regards Socialism and the Zionist policy. At the outset, conflict with the majority only arose on internal Labour questions. Later, however, the Opposition took up its stand as a separate party, known as the "AHDUT HA'-AVODAH" and joined forces with another minority group, the "Left Poale Zion." Finally, it adopted an attitude in questions of "activism" and foreign policy, which was keenly antagonistic to that of the Mapai. Whilst the latter party, to-day, advocates partition, the former rejects and combats it. In matters of "activism," "Ahdut Ha-avodah" advocates an even more extreme policy than the party from which it has broken away. "Ahdut Ha'avodah" is at present one of the most ardent champions and propagators of the activist course within the working-class movement.

Within the ranks of the Mapai, a not inconsiderable minority—mainly former adherents of the rightist groups of the Hapoel Hatzair—is opposed to terrorism and, at bottom, loyally follows the Weizmann course. Outwardly, however, this minority has always adhered to discipline and dumbly submitted to majority decisions. It has never

considered the moment ripe to come out into the open with its opposition to terrorism with all its repercussions on propaganda, politics and education. It excuses its attitude by a desire to maintain the unity of the Party, thus preserving the predominant position it occupies within the Labour Movement as well as within the Jewish Agency Executive, the Vaad Le'umi and the Zionist Organisation.

Beside these two groups, the "HASHOMER HATZAIR" has gained strength in recent years. Whereas formerly, it was a purely Kibbutz movement (i.e., a movement towards settlement on the land), at its last conference, it constituted itself as a Party, welcoming as members urban elements as well, whether labourers or intellectuals. The "Hashomer Hatzair" has always been opposed to partition, and nowadays more than ever. Moreover, it has been and still is loud in its proclamation of the necessity to bring about an understanding with the Arab population. Together with the IHUD group and other likeminded circles, it goes to form the 'League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and Co-operation.' It is violently opposed to the tacit condonation of, to say nothing of co-operation with, the terrorist organisations, which it classes as "fascist."

At times, the "Hashomer Hatzair" actively opposed terrorism. Yet, it makes a distinction, which is fairly easy for Palestinians to grasp, but pretty difficult for the outsider, between the permissible use of violence for the direct protection of immigration on the one hand, and acts of terrorism and violence and sabotage, on the other, which it condemns. This distinction has kept the "Hashomer Hatzair" back from joining in a common front with those who reject political violence as a matter of principle. Like the "Ahdut Ha'avodah", the "Hashomer Hatzair" insists on the necessity of an understanding between Zionism and Soviet Russia. All three—Mapai, Ahdut Ha'avodah and Hashomer Hatzair—draw their strength from within the network of the agricultural settlements, which is of decisive importance for their Youth Movements.

Finally, we must mention a working-class party, at present playing a bigger role than before, and recently admitted within the ranks of the Histadrut. The Palestine Communist Party, which is now more to the fore, is "non-Zionist" rather than "anti-Zionist" in its propaganda among the Jews. It has a press of its own and organises its own meetings. At the last elections for the "Assefat Ha-Nivharim" (Parliamentary Representative Assembly of Palestine Jewry), it succeeded in returning three candidates. The Palestine Communist Party contributes one more distinct voice to the anti-English propaganda chorus. So far, however, none of its representatives occupies a leading position in any national institution, hence it can exercise no influence on the formulation of policy.

Mid-way between the working-class parties and the bourgeois groups comes the "ALIYAH HADASHA". Though founded but a few years ago, it emerged the second strongest party in the Yishuv from

the 1944 elections for the Assefat Ha-Nivharim, whilst in the Zionist Congress elections, held in October 1946, Aliyah Hadasha proved the strongest Central party. In recent years, it attracted attention and hostility, mainly because of its unequivocal repudiation of the use of force in politics. Despite the antagonism and threatened position resulting from this attitude, there was no deviation from this stand.

The political aims of the Aliyah Hadasha are: the safeguarding of sufficient immigration; the abolition of the existing land-laws and the securing of the necessary possibilities for the development of the Zionist colonisation work, in addition to a strengthening of Jewish autonomy in the country. The party has fought the Biltmore Programme as being illusory and politically harmful. Whilst proclaiming Jewish-Arab understanding as one of the most important aims of Zionist policy, it has been indefatigable in its efforts to prevent an irreparably widening breach with England, since it maintains that in the long run, Anglo-Jewish co-operation is inevitable. As far as the home policy is concerned, Aliyah Hadasha has formulated a progressive programme and has proposed a series of internal reforms in the Yishuv.

The "MIZRAHI" (the Party of the religious Zionists) has in recent years comprised the most ardent propagators of the Biltmore Programme. In politics, it identifies itself with the Mapai, to the extent of supporting the official course pursued by the Executive. It is more maximalist in attitude than the Mapai, and in matters of home policy it tends to the Right.

The Religious Labour Movement, the "HAPOEL HAMIZRAHI", is stronger than the bourgeois mother-party, from which it has not wholly separated either ideologically or organisationally. In social questions, however, as distinct from cultural ones, it is very close to the Mapai.

Mention must be made of "AGUDATH ISRAEL," the non-Zionist wing of Orthodoxy. It is difficult to assess its numerical strength since it does not take part either in the elections of the Zionist Congress or the Assefath Ha-Nivharim. Its stronghold is the old Yishuv in Jerusalem, which in recent years found an important if somewhat heterogeneous ally in new immigrants from Poland, Germany and Hungary. Besides the "Aguda" there has arisen amongst these circles a Youth and Labour Movement, similar to the Hapoel Hamizrahi in that it is more "left" than the mother-party. This year, the "Agudah" has suffered two severe losses in the death of Rabbi Moshe Blau, leader of the so-called "Old Yishuv"; and of Dr. Isaac Breuer, leader of the orthodox movement of Frankfort on Main, Germany. Both were bitter opponents of terrorism (from which religious circles were not entirely free), and both assessed the importance of the Arab problem.

The bourgeois parties proper are not as easily recognisable for what they are as are the parties of the Left. Yet, it is easy to spot

the circles behind the bourgeois interests. They comprise groups round the Mayor of Tel-Aviv, Mr. J. Rokach; round the owners of old orange plantations and some, not all, sections of industrialists and land-lords, as well as certain influential Sephardic circles. The influence they exercise is stronger than lack of an adequate party organisation would lead us to believe. This is due to the narrow majority they enjoy in the Tel-Aviv Municipal Council and to the publication of a widely-read daily, the "Haboker". Respecting realities rather than ideologies, these circles are at bottom opposed to driving the conflict both with the English and the Arabs to extremes. At the same time, however, they are anxious on retaining their popularity. With regard to terrorism, these circles have adopted an anti-activist attitude, though tempered with characteristic caution. With the atmosphere as it is at present, they cannot prevail over the majority in this respect. They recently came to the fore with an anti-partition proclamation, thus forming a united front with the Revisionists, on the one hand, and the activist "Ahdut Ha'avodah" and the socialist and bi-nationalist "Hashomer Hatzair", on the other. This is but an illustration of how transient political attitudes may lead to the most diverse combinations in Palestine Jewish politics today.

A typical illustration of what was said above about the uninterrupted and often surprising process of transformation is inherent in the fate of the "GENERAL ZIONISTS" in Palestine, who have today ceased to play a decisive role in public life, though they figure in all elections and have their representatives in the leading national institutions. For years, there continued to exist in the country the two groups of A- and B-Zionists, hailing from the Diaspora, particularly Poland. They were led by their old functionaries, fairly recent immigrants. The A-Zionists were originally followers of Weizmann, in as far as foreign policy was concerned and in their close collaboration with the Left. Consequently, as far as Palestine was concerned, they were almost completely dependent on the Mapai. When this latter party, headed by Ben Gurion, turned its back on the traditional Weizmann policy, the local A-Zionist organisation (now under the energetic leadership of Dr. Sneh) followed suit. The influential daily "Haaretz" remained loyal to the old party line, whilst many General Zionists, particularly from Germany, found a new political home in the "Aliyah Hadasha".

This new orientation of the A-Zionists paved the way for their reunion with the B-Zionist group, recently effected. Up to the present, the main social and economic support of the B-Zionists was forthcoming from the bourgeois circles mentioned above, for whom the ideological conflicts within Zionism in the Golah were more or less alien, but who sympathised with the B-'s because of their pointedly Rightist bourgeois views. There are certain indications, now, that the fusion of A-'s and B-'s has given rise to some uneasiness in these circles, both because of the pro-Histadrut tendency of their new allies

and because of their support of "activism". It was no surprise, therefore, that in the last elections they supported the otherwise quite insignificant "Maccabee" list.

None the less significant is the fact that the clear dividing line, formerly separating the "REVISIONISTS" from the rest of the Yishuv, has today been blurred to a great extent. At the recent Zionist Congress elections, the Revisionist Party, which once more sent in its candidates, secured second place with some 14% of the total votes. What is more significant by far is that Revisionist ideology, in respect of political strategy and of political tactics, has today infiltrated the minds of many who have no connection whatsoever with the Party as such. This can be said of the maximalist and activist circles within the Labour Movement as well as of the wide circles of the Centre bloc. Strictly speaking, the radicalisation of the Yishuv, as a whole, is due to this infiltration of the Revisionist ideology.

IT HAS already been mentioned that the existing parties present no exhaustive picture of the political groupings to-day. In fact, many a fait accompli has often been brought about by groups which do not identify themselves with any of these parties. Since the terrorist groups of Stern and IZL were formed, several years ago, the fact had to be faced that the course of politics was no longer determined by parliamentary action alone, but in a decisive way by the terrorists, especially during the past year. In stating this, we do not refer to terrorist acts in the narrow sense of the term only, such as the assassination of Lord Moyne, in Cairo; the acts of sabotage against railways and coastal stations; or the blowing-up of the King David Hotel. Even more important, perhaps, than these individual acts is the general stream of propaganda which precedes their being put into effect and the very copious literature serving these ends. The Jewish Resistance Movement of the Haganah as well as IZL and Stern have their own radio transmitters for propaganda use, for the spreading of news suppressed by the local censorship and, above all, for the arousing of a war-like anti-English spirit. Moreover, houses and walls in Jewish towns and colonies are plastered with illegal pamphlets, which are being published very frequently and almost regularly, and reaching a wide public. It is not too much to say that this literature is probably more influential to-day than the legal press, which is also mainly devoted to the political struggle. Thus, there is a veritable hail of propaganda storming down over Jewish Palestine to-day. Though varied in style and violence of expression, it is aimed at inflaming national and nationalistic passions and arousing violent discussion of England's policy in Palestine. It requires a good deal of objectivity and a thorough knowledge of the situation to resist this propaganda and attain a true picture of what is actually happening and what should be done, when confronted with such a welter of truth and falsehood. Especially in view of the fact that it

is the very nature of underground movements and acts of terrorism to present the whole community with many a fait accompli, thus exercising a decisive influence on politics.

Naturally, those most strongly influenced by this pamphleteering are the youthful elements. Neither the home nor the school to-day decisively influences that large section of the youth which is passionately interested in politics. The well-organised youth-movements attached to the political parties take care to mould the younger generation along a line more or less in keeping with activism. Strenuous efforts are naturally also being made by the terrorist groups to win over new recruits. It is not surprising therefore that the educational problems arising are occupying many a serious mind, yet a real solution is hard to come by in the present atmosphere of unhealthy excitement, violent propaganda and narrow chauvinism.

Hitherto it was one of the characteristics of Palestine Jewry that social questions and experiments played a leading role in youth circles and dominated public life. In fact, the peculiar character of Zionism lay therein that it attempted to combine the national renaissance with a social one. This was to a large extent possible seeing that a national economy in Palestine had to be built up from the very foundations. This afforded a unique opportunity of developing new social forms. To-day, however, the national factor completely overshadows the social. True, the working-class is as strong as ever and the social institutions have lost none of their strength, while the collective and co-operative settlements are gaining strength and ground. Yet, in Palestine as elsewhere, there prevails the historical law, according to which national aspirations drive the social ones into the background until a minimum of the former have been satisfied. More than once, we have seen this law at work in the Middle East. More than once, we have witnessed the harnessing of social movements to the service of national and nationalist aims. Where this is the case, the usual ideas of "right" and "left" lose their customary meaning. Nowadays, it seems as if Palestine Jewry is passing through a similar process of changing political conceptions, without an awareness of the various political groups thus affected. Jingoism, today, is by no means confined to those sections of Palestine Jewry who profess allegiance to the political right; a nearer approximation to the truth is that large sections of the working class, constituting the vanguard of social reform and experiment, are at one and the same time in the forefront of the nationalist and activist movement. It is just these developments which make it so extremely difficult to come by an accurate picture of present-day Palestine. A close and constant study of these changes in their details and often surprising jolts is the prerequisite of a true understanding of the political and social situation in this country.

OUR REPLY 1

By MARTIN BUBER

OUR MONTHLY is entering upon the second year of its existence. Those who today read again its first issues will feel most strongly how much the Zionist atmosphere has changed in this short time, though it is not customary to admit the fact. Our evaluation of the true position, which was earlier condemned as cowardly defeatism, has now come to be accepted more generally, but those who now adopt it as their own view forget to mention the fact that previously they were mistaken. Our realistic views regarding immigration, which were then pilloried as being minimalistic to a criminal degree, have now, by open or tacit admission, become the basis of all proposals, however much attempts are made to adorn these proposals with the claim of political declarations (a claim that is absolutely incapable of literal fulfilment). During the last few months I have often met respected public figures who have told me in all earnest that the days of fevered haggling are now past—without realising, apparently, that they are beginning to say things that have been said by us over and over again. Only the second part of our thesis (i. e. that a constructive proposal is required that will fit into the framework of the Near Eastern policy of the Great Powers) has yet to meet with acceptance—which is not in the least surprising, seeing that this would impose a direct obligation. Generally speaking we may say that, while things are now being seen differently, the phraseology has remained unchanged.

The things we are bound to fight for are clarity, the coordination of knowledge and conviction, and political rectitude. By political rectitude I mean refusal to put up with brittle illusions after their brittleness has been recognised; and refusal to issue declarations involving claims that are known to be unrelated to the facts and incapable of realisation. The fanatical adherent may achieve a certain effect and a certain amount of influence on the political stage, so long as his faith is genuine; but the fragments of a faith once broken can have no political effect, because no inner power is attributed to them any more.

It is clear from a survey of the situation that the 'official' polemic against us has really lost its basis. The polemics of the right wing opposition continue, but they are being carried on at such a low level that there is no need for us to deal with them. However, outside the 'parliamentary' conflict, in certain youth circles who deserve atten-

¹ A detailed and, on the whole, decent article criticizing IHUD had appeared in "Herut", the illegal wall-paper of a terrorist organization.

tion in view of their personal sincerity, the kind of criticism which is truly fundamental is crystallising out just now. This calls for a further fundamental clarification on our part.

This kind of criticism begins on a definitely personal note. It is based on the supposition that the editors of this journal and its contributors 'are for the most part recruited from Mount Scopus (Har Ha-tzofim)'; which is untrue, as far as the great majority of our contributors is concerned. It then goes on to state that they are indeed 'tzofim' (observers), who take no part in life here below, but are content to lift up their 'still, pure, admonitory' voices from the height of the 'moral Olympus'.

This critic errs. He seems to imagine that only the man who cries aloud suffers. But such is not the case. Those who suffer most deeply have ceased crying. As long as we cry, we do not know how to help. Those who have been in hell, and have returned to the light of day again, have learned to speak quietly and clearly. For it is only in this way that the truth can be spoken, and there is nothing that can help us except the truth. And truth is rather unpalatable at times. Sometimes it is harder to speak the truth than to lose control, lash out and call upon others to do the same. But he who knows the truth, the truth that alone can help us, is compelled to speak out, no matter whether a whole people is listening or only a few individuals.

However, this criticism goes further and undertakes to prove that what we are saying is not the truth at all. It bases itself on the supposition that we are following the road of compromise, without reservation and as a matter of principle. But neither is this true. All we maintain is that there are situations for which compromise provides the only way out, and that everything depends on being able to recognise such situations when they eventuate. We do not believe compromise to be 'the high road of development', but we are of the opinion that we must not shrink from it if, in a given situation, compromise, and compromise alone, can lead us to the high road. Compromise as such is neither good nor evil; if or when it is fitted by its nature and content to save our cause, and if there is no other way of salvation, then it is good. By its nature and its essence it must only be adopted if it is in harmony with our cause; it must not threaten our cause's foundations or falsify its maxims while appearing as its saviour. We had to ponder this; we had to confront the nature of compromise with the nature of our cause. And when the result we reached was found to be a positive one, it was our bounden duty to say so, to affirm publicly the bitter truth that in a uniquely difficult situation there can be no easy way out. We had to say that the way of claims and declarations, the way of losing control and lashing out, cannot save us, but only the hard way that leads through com-

² The Hebrew University of Jerusalem is situated on Mt. Scopus, and is therefore often shortly called 'Har Ha-tzofim'. Some of the members of IHUD are in some way or other individually connected with the University.

promise to real service of this country. For that indeed is our goal: to be able to work in peace, with all our might. That is the high road, and there is no other way.

Now the critic would try to teach us, with the help of a long list of grandiose examples, beginning with the Prophets and Socrates and ending with the Encyclopaedists and George Washington, that in all 'great, fundamental matters' compromise is inadmissible. In reality these examples, if they are subjected to a careful historical examination, merely go to show that what is most important is to make a practical distinction between the absolute and the relative. In all matters touching the absolute, compromise must be ruled out. But for the sake of the absolute, it is permissible and defensible to act within the sphere of the relative as the situation demands; provided always that compromise is not in conflict with the claims of the absolute. In a catastrophic situation Jeremiah, in order to save Israel and the Thorah, proposed a way out which amounted not only to a compromise, but to downright submission—a solution which I myself could never have brought myself to propose. Socrates knew no compromise when he was called upon to testify to the truth; but his disciple Plato did not betray the master when, his ideal Republic having turned out to be unrealisable, he proposed an alternative scheme. The men of the French Revolution, who were spurred to action by abstract principles and a lust for power based upon them, rather than by a combination of ideas and a correct diagnosis of the situation, defeated their own ends. Our critic is ready to quote examples 'from Prometheus to Ghandi'. Well, as to the politics of Prometheus, I am not sufficiently well informed. In any case, tradition records curious compromises he made with the Gods — though, no doubt, in this he deceived his partners. The mention of Ghandi surprises me even more; for if he is to succeed, it will only be on the basis of a compromise with the Moslems.

Naturally, everything depends on making the right compromise at the right time. But that is exactly what I am talking about. There are people among us who appear to be guided in their attitude by the lunatic motto of 'the twelfth hour being past', meaning that there is nothing to lose any more. Our critic is not one of them. He will not cease fighting, against the whole world, if need be. He has elected to follow the path of 'heroism'. This heroism prompts him, not to look in front or around him, but to rush about and lash out in all directions. This heroism is not the heroism of Prometheus, but that of Don Quixote, but a tragic Don Quixote, tragic in the fullest sense of the word.

Our reply to this youth stricken with tragic blindness has been given in every issue of our journal. We shall continue to give it in every future issue. Our reply is based on a presupposition which touches on the absolute and brooks no compromise. This premise is the faith, which no catastrophe can shake, that a great future awaits

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the people of Israel. For this people, the guardian of such an inheritance and the possessor of such powers, there can be no question of simply ending its life as one of the 'small nations'. Even as we see it today, reduced to a tenth, crushed and violated as it is, a creative task is waiting for it still. Today it is up to us to recognise the beginning of this task, for it is an hour that offers labours such as few other hours in history have imposed; and in conjunction with the rise of the Near East, in whose most important centre the remnant of Israel is gathering. This task cannot be solved in isolation; in isolation, surrounded by hate and distrust, it cannot even be imagined. To win a truly great life for the people of Israel, a great peace is necessary, not a fictitious peace, the dwarfish peace that is no more than a feeble intermission, but a true peace with the neighbouring peoples, which alone can render possible a common development of this plot of land as the vanguard of the progressing Near East.

During the quarter century we have so far had at our disposal we have not laid the foundations of that peace, either economically or politically. On several occasions when peace seemed to come within our reach, we did much to prevent it. Our economic life was built up as a barrier rather than as a point of contact, and our policy, instead of producing a constructive plan working towards an equilibrium, only submitted to the Powers claims for greater rights than were compatible with the realities of the situation. No doubt there were occasions when Zionist leaders, if not in practice, at least in their formulas, drew certain conclusions from their realisation of the fact that it is impossible to live in a house of cards. But their experience that declarations, and declarations alone, were sufficient to score success after success, made them lose sight of reality. At the present moment, however, precisely because foreign policy is more to the fore than at any other time, and because we shall not be able to evade the necessity for a solution much longer, we can see on the political horizon the hour when a firm hand will put us back on the terra firma of reality and confront us with the question: what proposals have you to make for the peaceful development of the Near East?

Even those who are most favourably disposed towards us will be compelled to pose this question; and they will be forced to ask it because it is we who come to them with claims. Those who even then have nothing to say beyond the mere repetition of trite claims of the past will find they do not enjoy a sympathetic audience. Everything will depend on whether another answer, a true one, will have matured in us by that time. It is this true answer for which we are striving to prepare the ground with what we are saying in this Monthly.

September, 1945.

INTO THE ABYSS

By NATHAN HOFSHI

"For thus saith the Lord God, the Holy One of Israel; in returning and rest ye shall be saved; in quietness and confidence shall be your strength; and ye would not." (Is. XXX, 15)

The disaster has happened. Explosion and destruction, blood and fire, dead, wounded and "prisoners"—to quote the expression of the "victorious" commander at Sharon and Emek Hefer-destruction and ruin of property, life and soul-such is the picture that has been haunting us ever since that ill-starred day of 1st November. Our Yishuv has gone up in flames of hate, anger, despair and battle-cries. The sermons that have been preached for years, both orally and in writing, against the "terrorist gangs", as "Etzel" and the Stern Group were called, are forgotten, and so are the "purges" carried out against these gangs by our own forces in view of the danger they constitute to Zionism, to our people and our country. Now the doctrine of the "demonstration of Jewish power" has carried the day. The sabotaging of railways, the blowing up of guardrooms and policestations, have suddenly become Zionist acts of redemption. Jewish history is repeating itself: for it was thus, 2000 years ago, that our heroic Zealots brought destruction upon our people and country in the blind faith that they were redeeming and liberating them, and it is thus that our blind believers in violence are to-day leading us into the terrible abyss with the song of redemption and salvation on their lips.

"There is nothing to lose any more". That is what I hear from enthusiastic youngsters whose thoughts are immature and whose minds are in the grip of hollow phrases. "There is nothing to lose any more", that is what I also hear from men whose hairs are grey with age, men hypnotised by the deceptive slogan: "We shall be victorious to-morrow or be lost for ever". And thus many have at last arrived at the belief that we can obtain "by the strong hand and the outstretched arm" what we cannot accomplish by peace and understanding. But if some level-headed man takes the risk of raising his voice and uttering a warning against this disastrous path, if he calls on them to think this matter of life and death over again, he is told to keep quiet and is accused of indifference to the sufferings of his persecuted and stricken people—and there the "discussion" ends.

HOW DID all this come about? Is there, and was there, not a way out of this fateful situation?

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Fortunately this is decidedly not the case. "Zion shall be redeemed with judgment, and her converts with righteousness",—that is not an abstract vision, but a practical possibility. The Zionist renaissance movement did not base its hopes on power and violence. We had farreaching opportunities of action in peace, in returning and rest, and in concord with our neighbours.

This is the crux of the question. And now let us answer the question whether there is a way to peace in our work of upbuilding in this country or if, as is enthusiastically being proclaimed to the masses, there is no hope of an understanding with the Arabs, but only in our power and the strength of our hands? The truth will again spread and grow and shine forth in all its splendour and all its bitterness. What was once silenced with noisy contempt when the words of truth were published by the late Yitzhak Epstein (in Ha-Shiloah 1907/8), has found its terrible vindication in the subsequent course of events. It has been vindicated with regard to two vital points of the first magnitude:

- a) Without an understanding with our Arab neighbours, we are building on a volcano and our whole work is in jeopardy.
- b) It is definitely possible to reach an understanding. There were various serious opportunities which the Zionist leaders let slip owing to their ostrich-like policy and the blind faith they put in our "strong hand" and in that of our British allies. (The latter, unfortunately, disappointed the faith and confidence that was again and again placed in them, and this aroused violent hatred and bitter despair in the frustrated Zionists.)

The second point is decisive. And every time I speak with one of our enthusiastic and naive youngsters, he looks at me, sometimes with pain, anger and surprise in his eyes and cries out: Indeed? You really have proof of the fact that there have been possibilities of agreement which were rejected by our leaders? Should I believe you more than them? Or do you mean an agreement which involves the sacrifice of all our aspirations?

No, my dear friend, you need not take my word for it. On the contrary, go and investigate yourself, look at the various documents, study the matter in all its aspects; then you will find where the truth lies. One thing, however, I must grant you at the outset: you will never find an Arab willing to agree to the Biltmore programme, to the claim for a Jewish State in Palestine, just as you will never find a Jew willing to agree to an Arab State in Palestine. Biltmore and Zionism are not by any means identical. The Revisionists, with Jabotinsky at their head, clamoured for a Jewish state, just as they clamoured for a Jewish army and all those other manifestations of physical power which those in the Zionist movement who were then opposed to this programme, are now endeavouring to outdo in the ardour of their warlike enthusiasm. The Revisionists have since left

the Zionist movement. They, and more particularly the terrorist gangs which sprang from them, have been looked upon as destructive elements. To-day the Revisionists declare with perfect truth that those who abandoned them have enthusiastically accepted and adapted their teachings.

Well then, was there or was there not, the possibility of an agreement on the basis of large-scale Jewish immigration into Palestine? Is it true that the refusal came from our own responsible leaders?

Let those who want to know read in Medzini's "Ten years of Politics" of the Jewish-Arab conference which was to take place in Lebanon in 1913, but was prevented by our leaders on the ground that "it is not necessary, the Government is on our side." Let them read of the energetic warning given by one of the Arab leaders in reply to our refusal. Further, let them read the details of the plan which was accepted in 1919 by King Feisal, the pan-Syrian Congress and the leaders of the Palestine Istiklal party. This plan, which was excellent in all respects, especially in respect of free Jewish immigration into Palestine, was rejected by the "Commission of Delegates" of the then Zionist leadership, who were actuated by contempt for the Arab movement and by faith in our power in Europe and America. Since then, there have been further opportunities, especially in 1928 and again in 1930. And then in 1936 — in the midst of the terrible disturbances — an agreement was proposed granting 30,000 Jewish immigrants annually for the next ten years. This proposal, too, was turned down, since our national "prestige" demanded everything or nothing. And it was thus that we paved the way for the "Patria," the "Struma" and similar tragedies... Even in recent years, there were various important proposals, as recorded by B. Rabinowitz in "Zionism and the Arabs" and the pamphlet "Banativ" (On the Path), both published in Hebrew by the League for Jewish-Arab Cooperation. The last Arab offer, as recorded by "Banativ," was submitted to the Jewish Agency in the beginning of 1943 through the League for Jewish-Arab Cooperation, the main points being as follows:—

- 1) Palestine to be a bi-national State.
- 2) Jewish immigration to be kept within such limits as to enable the Jews to reach numerical parity with the Arabs in the course of some years. (This paragraph meant the immigration of 700,000 persons in the very near future.) No decision to be made regarding immigration after parity has been reached.
- 3) Bi-national Palestine to join a federation of the neighbouring countries.

Shertok rejected the Arab offer, it being "contrary to the fixed policy of the Jewish Agency"!

And thus it was that 'Biltmore' defeated logic, Jewish interest and the peace of people and country.

DESTRUCTION and explosions, dead and wounded, despair and anger against the British who made promises and who disappointed us. And that is what has been going on ever since the Balfour Declaration: childish enthusiasm and implicit faith in the British saviours — and then, when this faith was inevitably disappointed — utter despair, charges of bad faith against the saviours of yesterday. All this has repeated itself since the Labour Party came to power. Once more we rose sky-high on the wings of messianic hopes: Labour had promised us free immigration and a Jewish State.

And to-day? The Bevin Statement — an unbridled outbreak of utter disappointment, demonstrations of armed strength by means of explosions and destruction. War. And in a war between the Jewish Yishuv of 600,000 souls and the mighty British Empire, the Yishuv, needless to say, has been defeated by the British army and continues to be defeated. Those who are going to war to-day, should not complain of dead and wounded. The responsibility for manslaughter and destruction rests with those who prevent the people from grasping the true situation. But the true situation is as follows: There is an Arab people in this country and there are Arab peoples in the Middle East all round us. The British and Americans are taking account of these peoples in making their plans here, and we Jews have to take account of them, too. I am very much afraid and I have a right to demand that my fear be heeded — that all the diplomatic declarations of our leaders to the effect that "there is no conflict between the Arabs and ourselves," will not save this unhappy country. Again Dr. Magnes has made a "last-minute appeal" for Jewish-Arab understanding in Palestine, and again, as usual, he has met with contempt and anger.

Battle-cries in the press, at meetings and funerals of the fallen. But the question remains: why these victims, why this heroism? Why should we not pursue the path of peace? Why should we not be able to reach by peaceful means what we are trying to reach by warlike ones, if we pursue this path with the same devotion? Why should we not bring into the country tens or hundreds of thousands of immigrants with Arab consent instead of bringing a few hundreds at the price of endless suffering and bloodshed, threatening the very foundations of our national life? Must we really sacrifice all the happiness and welfare of our people, both in Palestine and in the dispersion, to this Moloch called the State?

My people, your would-be benefactors are leading you astray. Your prophet is a lying prophet. And the warning of Jeremiah is like unto a voice crying in the wilderness!

Into the abyss!

January, 1946.

IRELAND — THE FALSE ANALOGY By RICHARD KOEBNER

THE DRAWING of analogies is an extremely common feature when attempts are made to strenghten one's case. This proneness is particularly characteristic when Palestine forms the subject of discussion. The analogy drawn in this connection is Ireland — but, it is a wrong one.

I do not know to what extent our activist extremists argue along these lines, since I am not personally acquainted with them; but what I do know is that a great number of people condone, or at least, do not condemn acts of violence, because they think that, in the long run, they will further the Zionist cause. Ireland provides these speculative patriots with an argument. In that country, a relatively small people has, by acts of violence, forced the mighty hand of Britain, so the argument runs. Jews are by no means the first or only ones to base their arguments on this analogy. To quote the nearest example — those Arabs who have supported acts of violence in their midst, are adepts of this Irish theory. The mere fact that our real opponents make use of the self-same argument ought to give pause to those of us who advocate it, but we will not go into that at the moment.

We will not press the point that no analogy is absolutely correct and that nothing ever repeats itself completely in history. After all, why should not the causal nexus, on which our theorists insist, repeat itself? Again, we shall disregard the fact that the question of terror and armed resistance is not solely one of cause and effect, but has a moral angle to it, too. Finally, we do not wish to enter into a theoretical argument as to what extent and in what circumstances a small nation like ours is in a position to impose its will upon a great power by force or by the threat of force. We shall do our utmost to be "Real-historiker," examining the validity of the Irish "parallel," and to meet our "Realpolitiker" on their own ground.

The Irish National Movement has, at times, employed violent methods and it did end up by realising some of its aims. This much is common knowledge. But whereas the "post hoc" is clear, the "propter hoc" stands in need of further elucidation. What have been the gains; by what means have they been achieved; and to what extent have acts of violence really benefited the Irish nation?

THE HISTORY of the Irish National Movement is complex in the extreme. We do not wish to simplify it here as crassly as our "Real-politiker" are wont to do (those to whom we are addressing our-

selves). Yet, a certain amount of simplification is necessary to bring out the main features, which make a checking up on the analogy possible.

The Irish National Movement has its origins in the violent repression and expropriation of the Irish people, which began under the Tudors and was continued with the utmost ruthlessness during the revolutionary epochs of the 17th century; under Cromwell, after the triumph of the Puritan rebellion; and under William III, after the Glorious Revolution. The two latter waves of repression already constituted a reaction to the liberation movement. The early history of the Irish National Movement, then, was unfortunate in the extreme and cannot serve as an argument. The same applies to the period of the French Revolution: the rebellion of the United Irishmen, 1798, which followed the attempt at reconciliation between the English and Irish — between Protestants and Catholics. The result of this rebellion, resented by all Irish patriots, was the constitutional union of Ireland and Great Britain, which existed until 1921.

Our "Realpolitiker" cannot consider these early days of Anglo-Irish conflict as constituting a precedent. The object of comparison is Ireland since the union, in January, 1801; more especially, the development of Anglo-Irish relations since the rise of the Irish National Movement under Parnell, which dates from 1878 onwards.

The problem confronting the Irish National Movement was how to get the English out of Ireland. England was ruling the country in two ways:

- a) Irish lands were the property of English land-lords, whether directly or indirectly. The Irish peasant had sunk to the position of a tenant with stiff rental conditions.
- b) Ireland's parliamentary representatives were condemned to a permanent minority status, which made it impossible for them to forget their past national independence.

With regard to both these forms of rule, the Irish fought against a powerfully-established system of vested interests. This system belonged only to a narrow social stratum, as far as the former point was concerned; as to the latter, it was a case of conflict between the interests of the state and a national principle, comparable to the problems of the German border provinces and those within the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The latter analogy becomes even more apparent in view of another aspect, only very gradually discovered, of the modern Irish national problem. There were two kinds of Irishmen: Catholic Celts, and the Protestant offspring of English and Scots settlers. The Anglo-Irish, for the greater part, occupied the northern province of the Island—namely—Ulster. But there was no clear and rigid geographical division any more than there was between Germans and Czechs in Bohemia. Anglo-Irish negotiations had been disastrously affected by the exist-

ing antagonism between the Celtic Irishmen and the Orangemen (as the Scots-Irish were then called). Since the time of the union this antagonism had not made itself felt much until the end of the 19th century. In varying degrees, Catholic and Protestant peasants had the same interests. Only when Gladstone's Home Rule Bill of 1886 brought the immediate possibility of the rule of the Catholic-Celtic majority over the Ulster minority within reach—rule by Dublin over Belfast—only then did this antagonism flare up.

Home Rule was not granted, however. Gladstone had been defeated twice, in 1886 and in 1893. By degrees, however, the land law in Ireland was amended to the advantage of the Irish peasantry. The last and decisive step was taken by Lord Balfour's Conservative Government, through the Land Purchase Law of 1903, which enabled the peasants to buy their land cheaply from the landowners by means of Government subventions.

This reform was welcomed by the Irish, and its financial stipulations were loyally carried out until 1932. But there was a catch in it: It did away with the main interest shared both by Irish Nationalists and Ulstermen. When the Liberal Party, which was again in power since 1905, wanted to fulfil its promise of Home Rule and tabled the third Home Rule Bill of 1912, Ulster prepared for armed resistance, thus affording the 20th century the first example of an organised private army ready to oppose law and order. The Ulstermen were encouraged by the Conservatives and the House of Lords. Proposals to solve the problem by partition of the country were rejected by both sides. The Home Rule Bill was passed by Parliament, but it had not yet become law when England entered the war against Germany in August 1914. In view of the need for unity in face of the enemy, the Southern Irish under the leadership of John Redmond agreed to a postponement of the solution.

Meanwhile, however, the Ulster movement and the Government's attitude towards it had given rise to new developments in the Irish camp. The Irish Parliamentary party had lost ground, and the radical national party, the Sinn Fein—till then insignificant—had gained followers. They, too, had organised and armed. The decisive point in this development was that the Government apparently did not feel strong enough to suppress the Ulster movement and mobilize all efforts to put Home Rule into effect.

During the war, the radical national Celtic movement which demanded more than Home Rule gained momentum. While reform on the Gladstonian basis still envisaged a union with Britain in matters of foreign policy and trade, Sinn Fein aimed at nothing less than complete independence and the institution of a republic. The new national trend was towards complete severance of cultural relations, too, by means of a return to the old Gaelic tongue.

When the Home Rule Bill finally became law in 1920, the Southern Irish turned it down. A revolutionary Government was set up which

broke off relations with the existing bodies representing the Government. Now Ulster was prepared to accept partition, which was effected. Since then, Northern Ireland forms an annexe to the United Kingdom, with a parliament of its own, with conditions such as the Liberals had desired for the whole of Ireland. Meanwhile, however, Civil War was raging in the South, as well as war with the English police. The English police force—called the "Black and Tans"—met the terrorism of the Irish rebels with counter-terrorism no less cruel; but they were not strong enough to put an end to their opponents. This could only have been done by employing a regular army.

Under these circumstances, Lloyd George and his Coalition Cabinet decided to try a compromise, which had been advocated before the war by the Premier's ex-liberal colleague, now his opponent, Lord Asquith. Lloyd George had declined to make this attempt so far. The constitutional basis of this compromise was the concept, as yet new, of "Dominion Status". The large overseas settlers' colonies of the British Empire, the "Dominions", had gradually arrived at the status of independent states within the framework of the Empire during the last 70 years. The latest and most far-reaching concession that had been made to them was the recognition of their right to independent decisions in matters of foreign policy,-ratified at the Imperial Conference of 1917. Consequently, the Dominions sent their own representatives to the Peace Conference. The new solution of the Irish question was to amount to this that the new Free State, erected by revolutionary methods, was to receive the same status which the Dominions had attained gradually and by separate laws and agreements. This offer went much further than mere Home Rule; it did away with all that remained of Dublin's dependence on Westminster. But at the same time it left unsatisfied the most extreme aspirations of the Sinn Feiners. The Republic, with de Valera at its head, was not recognised and the King's suzerainty was once more acknowledged; furthermore, Northern Ireland was not incorporated in the new Free State, but was to retain its constitution of 1920.

Consequently, a strong faction within the Sinn Fein, led by de Valera, violently protested against the Treaty. On the other hand, Arthur Griffith, the founder of the Movement, as well as his collaborator Michael Collins, agreed to the compromise, and succeeded in winning over the majority to their side. So the treaty was put into effect. The resistance of the radical Republicans, however, did not subside, but now began to assume the proportions of ruthless terror against the representatives of the majority; Griffith and Collins themselves fell victims to this conflict, along with many others. But the treaty party emerged victorious, and until 1932, Anglo-Irish relations remained peaceful on the basis of the agreements reached by them.

In that year, however, de Valera came into power again and embarked on a policy of severance from England, in particular, and the

Empire, in general. This policy, however, was no longer pursued by means of physical violence. For a number of years, there was a tariff-war between Eire and Great Britain. By means of one-sided legislation, de Valera changed certain clauses of the treaty, for instance the one regarding the oath of loyalty to the King. During the appearement period, the government of Neville Chamberlain renounced its right of garrisoning the Irish treaty ports. Finally, de Valera declared Eire neutral in the war against Hitler.

WE HAVE outlined some stages of the modern phase of the history of the Anglo-Irish conflict. The question now arises whether we, the Yishuv of Palestine and the Zionist Movement, have something to learn from it and if so, what. First, we must make up our minds which of the national parties of Ireland we are going to liken to ourselves, the "Irish" Irishmen, the Celts of the South, or the Ulstermen, the Anglo-Irish who predominate in the Northern counties. Our nationalist interpreters of history are only thinking of the former, who now have their independent state. Bernard Shaw, however, once complained that the Balfour Declaration created a new Ulster. The truth of the matter is that both these comparisons are accurate in some minor points only. With the Ulster Irish we have this much in common that we constitute an enclave in a world of different nationality, and that we are interested in British protection of our national existence. But the conditions which ensure such protection in the case of the Ulster Irish, are lacking in ours. We are not a kindred people to the English, and our country is separated from theirs, not by mere narrow straits, but by the whole Mediterranean and Continental Europe.

With the Celtic Irish we have this in common that like them we are striving to achieve an independent national life, but unlike them we do not enjoy a majority status in any geographically definable territory. True, official Zionist policy aims at such status and demands English and American assistance in order to attain it. Now the adepts of the Ireland theory consider that this assistance can be secured by force, arguing that England has been yielding to violence in the case of Eire. But, as a matter of fact, Irish violence, if it attained anything at all, arrived exactly at the opposite of what we want to get the English to do in Palestine: the English left Ireland and abandoned the Irish to themselves. Paradox is too polite a word for this particular brand of drawing analogies.

We shall now proceed to the question what methods were employed and what measure of success attended them. To begin with, let us put an end to an idea the absurdity of which should be obvious to all, but which is still playing a regrettably large part in the imagination of many Palestinian Jews, viz. that the English suffered military defeat at the hands of the Irish and were driven to capitulation by sheer physical force. The truth of the matter is that the first epoch

of the conflict, the epoch of Parnell, ended with the renunciation of methods of physical violence on the part of the Irish National movement. Instead it was now waiting for the political moment when Gladstone's slogan of Home Rule for Ireland would have a chance of realisation with his party's return to power. No doubt, during the later epochs of the conflict, since 1912, the Irish were cruelly disappointed in this hope, and physical violence, first by the Ulster Irish, then by Sinn Fein, dominated the political scene. But there was no final trial of strength. Asquith postponed it from 1912 to 1914, until the outbreak of war spared him the trouble. In 1921, Lloyd George broke off the war and tried the method of negotiation, before really decisive forces were thrown into the struggle by the English. In the words of Michael Collins: "We had not beaten the enemy out of our country by force of arms".

Irish methods of violence assumed a great variety of different forms. For the first epoch, the time of Parnell, the following methods were characteristic: acts of sabotage on country-seats, attempts on the lives of estate owners, refusal to pay rent, boycott of land-lords who had driven out their tenants. Only the last-named had Parnell's unqualified approval. The political struggle was not yet militarily organized. The acts of violence were for the most part perpetrated by oppressed peasants, inspired by hate and vindictiveness, with the support of individual fanatics. After the interval from 1887-1912, the new phenomenon of irregular armies sprang up, accompanied by acts of terrorism from ambushes.

There can be no doubt whatever that these various types of violence had a moral effect on the English. But this effect assumed two contradictory forms: on the one hand, a desire to appear the embittered Irish and to find a way out of a disastrous situation by means of compromise: on the other, a stiffening of resistance in the English camp, a determination not to yield to violence. During all phases of the struggle, both tendencies existed side by side. The former tendency found expression in the gradual concessions of Gladstone and finally in his conversion to the principle of Home Rule. But his efforts were paralysed by the fact that the terror had assumed proportions which made the majority of his fellow-countrymen unamenable to the idea of concessions. The murder of the Chief Secretary and his Under-Secretary in 1882 in Dublin (the so-called Phoenix Park murders) had a particularly disastrous effect; Parnell was no less appalled by this senseless act of cruelty than the English; his reaction was identical with that of Dr. Weizmann after the assassination of Lord Moyne in November 1944. He felt this incident to be a stab in the back. Events vindicated his attitude when in 1886, Gladstone's Home Rule Bill met with embittered resistance in England. After the rejection of the Home Rule Bill the acts of sabotage continued, but they did not intimidate the English any more. They ceased entirely when Balfour (then Chief Secretary for Ireland) intervened with a strong hand. The Irish found themselves reduced to parliamentary forms of resistance.

In the fight for the third Home Rule Bill, Asquith, like the Irish leader Redmond, at first under-estimated the danger of an armed Ulster. Later the pro-Ulster attitude, adopted by the Conservative party leaders and by numerous army officers, forced upon him a realisation of the true situation. The danger confronting him was simply that of civil war, not only in Ireland, but in England too. Hence his hesitation and evasions, which could not inspire confidence in his determination to carry the Bill through. Now we cannot by any stretch of the imagination conceive of a situation in which the Palestine question could in any way lead to civil war in England; here, too, the analogy fails.

Finally, there remains Lloyd George's change of heart in 1921: instead of real war a compromise on the basis of Dominion Status. If there is anything in this that calls for explanation, it is the fact that Lloyd George turned to this solution only after the counterterrorism of the Black and Tans had greatly increased the bitterness of the victims. The solution itself corresponded to the world situation. The war against Germany, the Austro-Hungarian anarchy and Turkey had been brought to a successful conclusion under the slogan of "the self-determination of peoples". It was impossible to threaten an autonomous organisation of the Irish with a war of annihilation after similar autonomy had been recognised in the case of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. It was equally impossible to refuse the application of the concept of Dominion Status in the case of Ireland, after having not only accepted it for the overseas settlers' colonies, but also having admitted it into the official future programme for India. So there were the strongest moral reasons for avoiding war and striving for a compromise, provided Ireland was ready to accept it.

In our present situation, we too may look forward to all sorts of compromise proposals, not only from England, but from the U.S.A. as well. But the example of Ireland cannot lead us to expect that the Western Powers will seek compromise in a direction which involves the renunciation of force where we are concerned and at the same time the use of force against the Arab countries. Moreover, Winston Churchill put the point well when he said that in 1920-21 the British Government found themselves in a situation which admitted of only two possibilities: "War with the utmost violence or peace with the utmost patience". The British Government in the end took the risk of choosing the latter alternative. But we can hardly apply this choice of alternatives to our own case. We certainly do not wish to experience "war with the utmost violence" at the hands of the British; but will "utmost patience" serve our purpose and further our aims?

To sum up: the example of Ireland cannot give rise to speculative hopes. But it can, and does, give rise to apprehensions. The constant

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conflicts between Unionists and Home Rulers, between Irishmen and Ulstermen, have again and again resulted in the postponement of a solution, and this postponement, so far from improving the situation, has aggravated it. The same applies to the repeated rejections of compromise solutions on the part of the various parties.

WE MAY ASK, however, whether de Valera was not right after all in refusing to resign himself to the compromise of the 1921 treaty and in embarking upon a more radical course in restoring the independence of the Irish Free State? The question would appear to be beyond the scope of our present enquiry, seeing that de Valera's policy since 1932 has never resorted either to armed violence or to terrorism. In fact, the Irish President was himself threatened by a yet more radical group. However, the causes and consequences of de Valera's policy in the thirties may give us occasion to touch on the last aspect of the Irish question which is of direct interest to us, viz., the results of a radical national movement for the people whose future it claims to work for. The motives which brought de Valera to power in 1932 were largely economic in nature. The Irish people was feeling the effects of the world-crisis; but just as Hitler taught the Germans to seek the root causes of their troubles in political conditions, so did de Valera the Irish. The Anglo-Irish treaty of 1921 plays a similar part in his propaganda to that of the treaty of Versailles in Hitler's. He then attempted to establish a system of economic autarchy calculated to make Ireland independent of the English market, "reversing that policy which made us simply the kitchen garden for supplying the British with cheap food". This policy turned out to be a failure; geographical circumstances proved stronger than economic nationalism in Eire.

What else was achieved? The symbols of Royal power were removed: but this measure was itself of no more than symbolic value. Of deeper significance was the fact that Ireland was being wrenched out of the British defence system: first by the withdrawal of the British garrison from the Irish treaty ports, and then by de Valera's declaration of neutrality after Great Britain had declared war on Germany. In both cases it may be doubted whether a different attitude would have been possible: the vast majority of the population approved of the policy of its leader. But in each case this policy has served to promote a line of development which was diametrically opposed to the natural tendencies of Irish national consciousness: viz. the alienation of wide and important sections of men of Irish descent from the national cause of the Irish state. The gulf between Ulster and Eire has been widened. There has been a perceptible cooling off in the attitude of Americans of Irish extraction towards their ancient homeland. Nor is that all. Emigration from Eire to the United Kingdom has once more increased. For a hundred years, the population of Eire has suffered continual losses through emigration.

At first it was possible to explain the downward trend which began with the great famine of 1846 as the result of the bad living conditions of the Irish country people. But emigration and decline of population did not come to a standstill when the agricultural reforms of Gladstone and Balfour removed this cause. Not only America and other overseas countries, but also the country of the "oppressors", England, continued to attract Irish immigrants. It was only when the economic world crisis of 1929 began to counteract this attraction, that Irish emigration was temporarily reduced to a fairly low figure. After the outbreak of war, however, there has been a fresh increase. Large numbers of Irishmen left the country which enjoyed the safety of neutrality and linked their fate with that of Great Britain. They entered the British Army where, like many descendants of Irish immigrants before them, they greatly distinguished themselves; or they accepted work in the British armament industries.

Does not this fact convey a warning to us? The national agitator, acclaimed by the masses and able to inspire many individuals to sacrifices of various kinds, may easily jump to the conclusion that the strongest and most progressive attractiveness of his people is embodied in his person and his slogans. But this confidence is not solidly based. Telegrams of admirers can be counted; disaffected fellow-countrymen cannot; but they are none the less real as potential forces and potential losses for being beyond the reach of statistical enquiry. The main point, however, is this: national agitation is neither directly nor indirectly the most important means of creating sound economic and cultural conditions for the people it wants to build up. For this task of upbuilding, work of quite a different kind is required.

December, 1945.

POSTSCRIPT 1 — July, 1946.

Recent voices from England are calculated to convey the impression that I have been mistaken. On the occasion of the events at the end of June 1946,¹ various Englishmen both of the Right and the Left got up to draw the attention of their Government to the warning example of Ireland. But what is the real truth of the matter? The warning was given to Great Britain, and it must not be construed as meaning that the warners wanted to encourage our armed 'fighters for freedom'. They got up and warned the British Government against pursuing a policy which must inevitably lead to bloodshed and unspeakable bitterness. But it does not follow from this that bloodshed and acts of despair will be crowned with our victory. Neither did the warners mean to say that the British Government must accept

¹ The sudden searches of the premises of the Jewish Agency and other public institutions and of numerous agricultural settlements, the arrest of several leading Jewish Agency members as well as of several thousand citizens in the communal settlements and in the towns.

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the radical claims officially put forward by us in order to prevent a repetition of the bloodshed in Ireland and of the Irish wrath incurred. In part, the warners pleaded for a political solution in accordance, with the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry: neither a Jewish nor an Arab State, i.e. nothing that might be said to correspond to the Irish example. Other warners pleaded for partition and it was precisely in this sense that they quoted the Irish example. Partition on the Irish model would mean a kind of Jewish Ulster. I trust I have succeeded in showing in the course of my essay that this is the very example that does not bear transplantation. Tel-Aviv never can hope to take the place of Belfast.

POSTSCRIPT 2 — December, 1946.

The liquidation of the Mandate, still a remote issue when this article was written a year ago—though already envisaged by the Peel Report in 1937 and more seriously by the White Paper of 1939—has meanwhile, in consequence of the incessant outrages of Jewish terrorists, gained ground in English public opinion, and doubtlessly is eagerly wished for by a large proportion of the English people. Leaders of Zionist public opinion have been quick to adapt themselves to the new situation, and just as they have changed front in the question of partition, so they have professed acquiescence in the British leaving Palestine at an early date. It seems by no means impossible that impending negotiations are to lead to a solution which comes near this demand. If so, the way is prepared for the advocates of terrorism to boast of having helped the Zionist cause, and that the Irish analogy has proved right in spite of all dissimilarities. But that will be a fallacy again. When Irish nationalism went to extremes in the policy of separation, it could, consciously or unconsciously, rely on the English retaining an interest in the island in general and Ulster in particular. If the English guit Palestine—or, for that matter, Jewish Palestine—no residue of interest is to be expected. Palestinian Jews will be thought a people better to be forgotten than to be remembered. Is that outcome to be wished for?

When the Irish Home Rule movement was still in its infancy, *Punch* voiced a warning which may not have attracted much attention in its days, but is certainly worth being unearthed to-day and adapted to our situation. The warning runs (vol. 74, p. 46):

'To teach Home-Rulers that England's difficulty is not Ireland's opportunity, however Ireland's importunity may be England's difficulty'.

Say 'Eretz-Yisrael 1946' instead of 'Ireland 1877', and you have the real analogy.

LETTER OF RESIGNATION TO DR. WEIZMANN By DAVID WERNER SENATOR

In December, 1945, Dr. Senator resigned from the Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine. His reasons are set out in this letter. It was first published, in Hebrew, in the September 1946 number of BA'AYOTH. It was first printed in English in the October 1946 issue of Commentary (New York) because "it would be useful if a larger Jewish public in America knew more about the situation in December 1945." A few paragraphs have been deleted in order to avoid any personal controversy.

Dear Dr. Weizmann,

As indicated in my cable to you, I shall try in this letter to explain the reasons which prompted me to resign from the Executive of the Jewish Agency to which I have belonged for almost 16 years, namely since March 1930.

I have taken this decision not lightly, but after full consideration of the facts and recent developments in the Zionist movement.

Of course, I cannot put down black on white in detail all the reasons which have led to my decision. This is a great handicap: I shall personally suffer therefrom because I am still less able to explain these reasons in public. But I shall attempt in this letter to you to give an outline of the situation which caused my resignation.

During the almost 16 years I have been a member of the Executive, I have formally been a representative of the non-Zionists. But you, my colleagues and the people who nominated me as their representative know that I was a Zionist before the Balfour Declaration and that I had come to Palestine long before Hitler. Whatever work I did in the framework of the activities of the Jewish Agency, I have done as a Zionist, a member of the Yishuv and a Jew. I think I have always been loyal to the cause and to my colleagues, although and even when I was in disagreement with them, and also to those non-Zionist groups who have chosen me as their representative.

When, a few years ago, the Zionist movement actually changed the political programme of Zionism, substituting the Basle Programme [which called for a "publicly and legally assured home in Palestine"], by the Biltmore Programme [which called for a "Jewish Commonwealth"], I thought that a great political mistake had been made.

But I did not resign then, because I did not see sufficient reason to do so, since nothing else but a political programme, a political ideology to be realized in some more or less distant future, was involved.

Now, however, the position is completely different.

You have been in this country a year ago and for the first time since six years you had an opportunity of seeing for yourself what is going on in the field of Jewish political education, how our party system works and what are the real determining factors in Jewish politics. This situation which you noticed with great anxiety and which you tried to improve, has deteriorated even further. The tragic fate of our people, the utter despair of each of us in Palestine who has relatives or friends in the D. P. camps in Europe and cannot bring them over here, the knowledge of people rotting in these camps and on the other hand the indifferent attitude of the world powers towards this problem, their—and particularly the British—lack of action, and lately the Bevin statement, must be regarded as strong contributing factors to the general feeling here of which the pronouncements and decisions of the Executive and acts of the Jewish youth are but an expression.

The leadership of our movement, the majority of my colleagues in the Executive here, and of course men like Dr. Silver, have either been led by the "Stimmung" of the masses instead of influencing them, or are responsible for creating or inciting the destructive political attitude of the masses instead of directing them in a statesman-

I respect my colleagues in the Jewish Agency Executive, including those to whose political opinions I take the greatest exception. They know what they want. I disagree with them fundamentally, I believe that they are leading our people and our cause into a chaos, but they surely are entitled to their views as much as I am entitled to mine, and only future history will show who was right.

I regret perhaps even more the attitude of some of my best personal friends who, in order to save party unity or the so-called unity of the Movement, seem ready to sacrifice their personal beliefs, although they probably see the dangers involved as much as I do.

Recent developments have brought a further deterioration, but at the same time a clarification of the situation.

At the World Zionist Conference in London, Dr. Joseph and Dr. Sneh became members of the Executive in key-positions. Moreover, the strength of Dr. Silver, both as a member of the Executive, and as the President of the ZOA, has been added to this wing.

In Palestine, the powerful personality of Ben Gurion dominates the

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scene, leading the Movement and the Yishuv by his driving power, persuasion, influence and authority.

I have elaborated a little on the psychological situation. I come now to the Bevin statement.

The Bevin statement has been carefully analyzed by Ben Gurion both at the meetings of the Executive and in his speech before the Assefat Hanivcharim. It is perhaps useful to review our political situation internally and externally in relation to this speech. Before the Bevin statement we were told that the Coalition and Conservative governments, those governments in which we had a friend like Churchill, had betrayed us. When the Labour government came to power, that government in which we believed to have a large number of good and old friends, most of us felt relief. But soon rumours started about the future policy of H.M. Government, unrest in Palestine followed, and then came the Bevin statement.

It seems to me that there should be some political logic in the attitude of political leadership. It must be prepared, in decisive hours, to draw the consequence of political success or failure.

Now, either the Labour government, which comprises close political friends of members of our Executive, has betrayed them and ourselves and consequently the Biltmore policy pursued by our radical group has collapsed—and that is the impression which is obtaining—then our Executive, or at least, those members who were the radical exponents of this policy, should have resigned. That would have meant to the Jews and to the world at large, including the British government, a significant political change, and indeed, I have made this proposal, which was however rejected. It is no answer to say that it would have been impossible to form another Executive. In almost every party, perhaps with the exception of the General Zionists 'B', one would have been able to find representatives of a different political attitude, and one could have enlarged the Executive by adding representatives of the Hashomer Hatzair and the Aliyah Hadasha. Such a re-grouped Executive could once more have been headed by you.

But a different analysis of the Bevin statement is at least possible. The Bevin statement, admittedly unfortunately worded in many respects and very disappointing with regard to the immediate future, particularly concerning immigration, could still be regarded as an attempt at abolishing the White Paper policy by bringing in the Americans, and we, I think, are interested in putting forward such interpretation.

But what actually happened was a very strong condemnation of the Bevin statement, not only by the Chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive in Jerusalem at a public meeting of the Assefat Hanivcharim, but even before that by means of rioting in Tel-Aviv, for which of course, as always in such cases, everybody declines responsibility. Moreover, even in anticipation of the Bevin statement,

when rumours were spread about the future policy of H.M. Government, acts of sabotage on a very large scale were committed in the whole of Palestine.

You in London and I, who happened to be away from Palestine, in Johannesburg, have publicly condemned these acts, but in Palestine I am informed they were condoned by the Jewish public, and not by the Jewish public alone. This is a point to which I shall have to refer again.

All of us are united in the question of immigration. A man like Magnes, whose political views certainly differ in the extreme from those of Ben Gurion, has said privately and in public that he is in favour of "illegal immigration". So did I. So did others. I am going a good deal further. If our people are prevented by force from landing in this country, I think we have no other choice than to resort to force. But in these matters extreme caution is required: the attacks on the Police Stations were in my opinion a mistake, although it is of course possible to construe a direct connection between these acts and the fight for immigration. One may argue that this is a borderline case. What one cannot argue is that if Government forces are attacked—and that was the case both in Tel-Aviv and at the Police Stations—and if subsequent loss of Jewish life ensues, that this is murder. It is contrary to all experience to believe that if thousands of people assemble on the one side—even unarmed—and thousands of soldiers on the other side, bloodshed can be avoided, particularly in an atmosphere as tense as it has become in Palestine not only since yesterday.

A political leadership must be aware of this situation and of the consequences of its actions.

Coming back to the Bevin statement, I believe that the policy announced by Mr. Bevin in fact means the imminent abolition of the White Paper and an attempt to solve the Jewish and Palestinian problem by introducing the American factor. Of course it does not mean the fulfilment of the Biltmore Programme. But even the resolutions adopted now in the American Senate and the American House of Representatives, while outspoken and favourable with regard to immigration (reverting as they do to the Churchill White Paper formula of 1922 of economic absorptive capacity) do not promise a Jewish State.

At this stage, I would like to say a few words with regard to the political contents of the Biltmore Programme, as I see it. If it is not assumed that the Great Powers are prepared to transfer the Arabs of Palestine from this country to other Arab countries, the Biltmore Programme can only mean partition. But here again, a workable partition seems to be possible only if at least a partial transfer is effected. I don't say that it is impossible, or immoral, but I doubt whether any partition could be arrived at which would be feasible from the economic, political and military points of view.

The Biltmore Programme and its possible consequences have a direct bearing on the present psychological situation in the Yishuv, and not only in the Yishuv but also in the leadership of American Zionism. A psychology has developed both in the Yishuv and the Zionist leadership here, and the Zionist leadership in America, and likely enough also in most other countries, which regards compromise as treason and political thinking as weakness.

Regrettably, the Arab front is expanding and Arab reaction and resistance are stiffening to a point when they may soon go over to attack. We have indeed succeeded for a considerable time in belittling Arab nationalism, and in the last year the Arab League, in the eyes of the Jewish and particularly Zionist public. But in the meantime Arab nationalism and the Arab League have gained considerably in strength on the world political scene.

At the same time we are being told that we have to fight the English, of course not the English people, only the English government. It is the third English government we are fighting: we have tried them all, a Coalition government, the Conservative government and now the Labour government, but still we maintain the fiction that our fight does not concern the English people.

And now, the newly elected leader of American Zionism in his first political utterances, privately and publicly, attests to the stupidity of the American President who is being duped by the shrewd Englishmen and led into the trap of the Anglo-American Committee. Let us fight with all means at our disposal this first attempt of America to become a partner in the Palestine problem, for instance by boycotting the commission! Thus Dr. Silver.

That, Dr. 'Weizmann, is the political background against which votes are being taken in the Executive and decisions of major importance made. It is a political and psychological background for a spirit of despair and violence which I cannot associate myself with.

I refuse to find myself again in a situation in which I was when returning to Palestine from South Africa. There, as a member of the Executive of the Jewish Agency, I have on the 2nd of November condemned emphatically the acts of violence which had been perpetrated in Palestine. Here, as such member, I have apparently to condone them and to bear a moral and in my opinion also political responsibility therefor. It may happen again that I shall read in the newspapers about acts for which morally and politically the Executive and every individual member thereof will be held responsible. I refuse to be a party to that game. That in fact is the main reason for my decision.

Obviously, I could not discuss these matters here, except with my colleagues, but to them I had given notice during the meeting and I have also informed the Actions Committee of my attitude before they decided on the unlimited powers to be given to the Executive to act in accordance with its political wisdom. After all that has

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happened and in view of the personal composition of the Executive, I have no confidence in its wisdom and I am not prepared to share responsibility for what I believe an utterly dangerous and destructive course.

With kindest personal regards,

Yours very sincerely,

David Werner Senator

Jerusalem, December 24, 1945.

CITRUS GROWERS HAVE LEARNT TO COOPERATE

By MOSHE SMELANSKY

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Citrus culture in our country is a common Jewish-Arab enterprise. The Arabs introduced it, the Jews improved and perfected it. Jews and Arabs united when, at one stage of its development, destruction threatened it, and *together* they succeeded in averting the danger.

When the first Jewish pioneers came to the country to settle, a few citrus groves already existed at Jaffa and at Acre. They yielded a variety of citrus fruits: lemons, mandarins and oranges. Of these the chief place was taken by the so-called 'Shamuti' orange, which later became known all over the world by the name of 'Jaffa Orange'. It was juicy, had a pleasant smell and tasted delicate. Being round in shape, its peel was thin and of fine texture. At that time the quantity of citrus produce was still very limited, and the fruits exported went in baskets on deck, the trade of citrus packing being still unknown in Palestine.

In those days there was no irrigation system except for the primitive practice of well-digging. Wells were sunk into the sandy ground and their insides supported by stone walls which reached down to just above the water level. The second stage of building a well consisted of making a henzira, a well within a well, which was tightened and fastened by iron rods and then lowered into the initially sunk well by means of chains. The water was drawn by 'antilli', little wooden boxes connected with one another on a wheel which was rotated by a camel, mule or donkey. The quantity of water varied from five to ten cubic metres per hour.

The water came from the upper level of soil, which consisted mostly of fine sand. Consequently the water would contain a fair amount of sand, too. The sand deposited from the upper layer of earth would undermine the foundation of the well, which would sink lower and lower and finally break down. The 'henzira', though intended to be a safety device to forestall and prevent a breakdown, was not always effective.

Tree culture was also still very primitive. The young, newly grafted tree-plants, for instance, would be surrounded by a heap of sand before the onset of winter, which was intended to protect them from the violent gusts of this season. This practice, however, though serving its purpose, would lead to the decay of the roots and the lower parts of the stems, a tree-disease which was known as 'Komuz'.

The soil between the trees was well tilled and properly cared for. The hoeing was thoroughly and even affectionately carried out, for COPYRIGHT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

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the Arab is a great lover of the soil. The summer ploughing of his lands is an agricultural work of art for the Fellah. The Arab also loves the tree, and I myself have seen many an Arab citrus grower kiss the most beautiful tree of his grove as a token of his affection.

The Arabs learnt the art of packing their produce from Greek packers who had been brought to Palestine for this purpose. But this, too, was quite primitive in those days, and fruits of different species would be packed into one and the same box.

The Jews improved the system of irrigation. A Jewish engineer invented a filtering device which filtered the water before it was drawn from the well so that the danger of breakdowns was neutralized. Instead of 'antilli' the Jews put a pump into the well. At first all the pumps were brought from abroad, then later they were manufactured locally as well. The Jews now replaced the camel, mule or donkey by the motor which was to drive the pump. This made it unnecessary to pump the water from the upper layer only. The new pumps were strong enough to draw water from the second, or even the third, the lower layers being richer sources of water than the upper ones. In order to penetrate to these layers, special pumping pipes had to be drilled into the bottom of the well. Finally the primitive practice of sinking wells was entirely abandoned. From now on wells were drilled into the ground by modern machines, which were of course worked on the surface, so that there was no need to dig a hole into the soil. Pipes were now sunk into the earth, penetrating to great depths, sometimes hundreds of metres. The new wells achieved a record of water-pumping, supplying quantities as large as 500 cubic metres per hour. This meant that their working capacity was fiftyfold and hundredfold that of the primitive wells.

The Jews also perfected the packing of the fruits. They introduced the so-called 'American' packing system which replaced the former method of packing the fruit in baskets. From now on the fruits were packed in wooden boxes, each containing fruits of one species and size. This innovation found a favourable reception on the markets. The Jews furthermore contributed to the development and improvement of tree culture. The sand heaps formerly employed were abandoned, and instead the tender plants were protected by supporters, at first of wood and later of iron. Thus the roots were saved from decay. They could now be exposed to the fresh air and sunshine, and the hitherto prevailing diseases ceased their destructive activities. The Jews also perfected the means of warfare against the numerous insects that harm the trees and plants and spread diseases. Jews and Arabs alike began to attend lectures given by experts on agricultural subjects at the experimental stations of Rehovoth and Mikveh Israel.

The Jews learned the practice of hoeing and weeding from the Arabs. They also learnt from them how to manure the soil with cow dung. On the other hand, the Arabs learnt the application of artificial fertilisers from the Jews. The common Jewish-Arab work resulted

in a tremendous rate of progress in the sphere of citrus cultivation. Fifty years ago there were only 5,000 dunams of citrus groves in Palestine. Twenty-six years ago the number had increased to 30,000. In 1938 there were a little less than 300,000 dunams of cultivated citrus groves in this country, and in that year over 15,000,000 boxes of citrus fruit were marketed abroad.

The bulk of Palestine's exports up to the outbreak of war consisted of citrus produce, which constituted about 80% of all exports. The number of employees in the citrus industry had assumed immense proportions, for out of every five inhabitants, one was making a living in this way. About the same number of citrus groves was owned by Arabs as by Jews.

The Jews also perfected the citrus trade. This had been handled hitherto by local merchants, mostly speculators, and by brokers abroad. The Jews, for the greater part, founded cooperative societies and sent their produce to overseas markets at their own expense. They opened up new markets for the citrus produce of this country, adding Germany, Poland and the countries of Central Europe to the list of purchasers. The Jews also introduced an entirely new species of citrus produce, the grapefruit, which was a success and soon became famous all over the world.

But unfortunately Jews and Arabs did not cooperate over the commercial aspect of the citrus problem, nor did they market their produce on a common basis. The Arabs neither founded cooperatives of their own nor would they join those already established by the Jews. In regard to the agricultural side of citrus growing, Jews and Arabs were friendly and considered each other as colleagues, and their union proved to be a blessing to both. Commercially, however, Jews and Arabs went their separate ways. The cause of trouble between them was the heavy competition which ensued, bringing harm and losses to both sides. The Jews and Arabs could not find a common approach to the export of their fruits, and the Administration did nothing to mend the cleavage. Nor did it take action to protect our Palestinian produce against foreign competition. Following the famous Ottawa Empire Economic Conference (1932), at which our country was denied preference on British markets, heavy duty was imposed on citrus produce from Palestine marketed to England; and in the course of the following years, from 1933 to 1940, Palestine's citrus growers paid not less than LP. 2,854,000 in duty alone to England. A still greater loss was sustained by the growers on account of the political status of Palestine, which made it an 'open door' to any country wishing to place its goods on our markets. Palestine's export, on the other hand, was greatly curtailed and encountered manifold difficulties: import restrictions, heavy taxation and the strictest foreign exchange regulations made it impossible for the growers to receive ready money for their sold goods. We were thus left with the alternative of purchasing or bartering foreign goods,

which were often superfluous and of a kind that was also manufactured locally.

The actual citrus crisis set in on the eve of the outbreak of war. The wild competition between exporters resulted in a lowering of the standard which Palestine's citrus industry had hitherto maintained, the quality of the fruit deteriorated and the following drop in prices was only a natural consequence. The restrictions on foreign markets and the heavy duty imposed on our exports made the crisis complete.

\mathbf{II}

The war dealt the final blow to the citrus growers of Palestine, who found themselves in a state more desperate than ever before. The war blocked the overseas markets and 15,000,000 boxes of juicy, beneficent citrus fruits, which had been tended and gathered in by honest toil, decayed and lay like manure on the fields. Only then did all, Jews, Arabs and even the local Government, realise that *union* was the only way out of this crisis and that union at times of emergency, but also when all was normal, was the only road leading to success. For it was then that Jews, Arabs and the Government united.

The results of this unification were as follows: A Citrus Control Board was established with the aid, approval and participation of the Government. The Board consisted of eleven members, four Jews, four Arabs and three Britons. Furthermore, a Citrus Marketing Board was formed. It comprised six members, two Jews, two Arabs and two Britons. In addition there were also two General Secretaries, one Jewish, from among the best established veteran citrus growers in the Yishuv, and one Arab, also a veteran citrus grower. The two boards have been active for six years in rendering assistance to citrus growers in every way and in facilitating the export of their produce. Though theirs was by no means an easy task, and in spite of the regrettable fact that they did not always enjoy the full support of the Government and of the Palestine public, it must yet be recorded with satisfaction that the common effort of Jews and Arabs was, in the long run, an undeniable success. Throughout the period of office of the two boards there was almost always perfect understanding and accord between the members of these bodies in regard to the various issues of citrus cultivation. There were also, of course, differences of opinion, but these were not caused by opposed nationalisms, but by the existence of different economic viewpoints which would gather Jews and Arabs in opposition to Jews and Arabs. When it came to voting, the constructive attitude of both parties to the citrus trade and the concern of both Jews and Arabs for its future were the only deciding influences.

What were the activities of these common Jewish-Arab committees during their years of existence?

At the outbreak of the war two blows were simultaneously struck at the citrus trade of Palestine. One came from without, where

the sea route had ceased to serve trade purposes and our country became completely isolated and dissevered from the markets of the world. The second blow, from within, was the repercussion created by this disruption of communications and its successive exclusion of most of the purchasing markets. The moneylenders, banks and private usurers, who had in normal times been only too eager to grant loans to the growers, knew very well that their debtors would now be driven into a position where it would be impossible for them to meet their obligations. For how, indeed, could they pay if they were unable to sell their produce? The moneylenders also knew quite well that the citrus grower had to continue the cultivation of his grove, that hoeing, manuring and irrigating had to go on if the groves were not to die. The moneylenders, however, were eager to secure the endangered position of their capital, and urged their debtors to pay in any circumstances, failing which they would be liable to forfeit their property. The destruction of the whole citrus industry meant nothing to them, so long as they could be sure of their money. *

The united Jewish and Arab citrus growers tried to find a way to undo the obviously fatal activities of these moneylenders. They had to sell their produce by any and every means. In addition there was the bothering problem of how to keep their now unprofitable citrus groves going and themselves from starving. Consequently they applied to the Government, requesting it to declare a moratorium which would render it impossible for their creditors to deprive them of their possessions on account of their debts. They further asked to be granted an annual subsidy for the duration of the war in the form of a loan, which would enable them to finance the upkeep of their plantations and sustain, at least to a certain extent, the growers and their families during the period of crisis. Another request was that they should be enabled to sell at least a portion of their produce to the Army, to neighbouring countries and to local consumers, the latter mostly consisting of local fruit juice and marmalade manufacturers.

The first request was rejected by the Government. Many growers who had taken loans before the war during the period of prosperity were now at the mercy of their creditors. These insisted on immediate repayment and many citrus growers lost their hardgained property, which was sold by public auction at extremely low prices. The equipment of most of the citrus groves and cooperative societies met with a similar fate.

The second request to Government was met halfway. Although Government refused outright to grant the modest request for a loan of LP.1 for each dunam of citrus cultivation, which was to provide for the sustenance of the growers' families, Government yet agreed to grant the growers limited loans for the upkeep of their groves. The Control Board was entrusted with the task of super-

At the outbreak of war the complete area of Palestine's citrus groves was 299,500 dunams. Of these many groves had only recently been planted and had not yielded any fruit at all. These groves were excluded from the Government loan. The Government furthermore excluded all citrus groves that were in a state of neglect or dilapidation. Also there were well-to-do citrus growers who did not apply to Government for any loan at all. The area benefiting from the Government loan was thus reduced to about 177,000 dunams, and this was the area which it rescued. Another 50,000 dunams were lost during the war because the Government had excluded them from the category of beneficiaries.

The following table shows the Government loans granted to the united Jewish-Arab citrus growers during and after the war:

Year	Area in Dunams	Amount
1941	167,000	LP. 436,000
1942	175,000	537,000
1943	177,000	637,000
1944	154,000	770,000
1945	148,000	740,000
1946	148,000	650,000

Altogether LP.3,770,000 was received in loans from the Palestine Government.

The Government loans served the citrus growers as a life-buoy at a time of utter despair, when the great benefit which citrus cultivation had brought to the Yishuv and the country as a whole had been entirely forgotten and when the striving growers of Palestine had been deserted by one and all.

The third activity of the united citrus growers was an attempt to organise as far as possible the marketing of their produce, and this was successful. In the first two years after Italy's entry into the war, all sea communications in the Mediterranean had been blocked to British sea traffic, and during the years 1940 and 1941 the produce of Palestine's citrus groves was literally turned into manure. The greater part of the fruit was picked, some fell off the branches by itself, and all this produce was buried in ditches where it decayed and was converted into dung. The limited quantities supplied to the Army, to local manufacturers and local consumers, sold at extremely low prices, at next to nothing. The charge for a ton of oranges, for instance, was between 500 Mils and LP.1. At the same price fruit was also sold to local speculators, who transported it to neighbouring countries where better prices could be had.

From 1942 onwards the Marketing Board founded alongside the Citrus Control Board became firmly established. Gradually all sales were effected through this body. All transactions with the Army, with neighbouring countries and finally also with local consumers, were conducted through the Control Board and its subcommittee, and the price was gradually increased from next to nothing to as much as LP.4 and LP.6 per ton. But even this improved price could not cover the expenses involved, much less yield profits for the sustenance of the growers and their families. The situation had, however, by now passed the stage of chaos.

In view of the destruction of a considerable portion of Palestine's citrus groves (about 15%), the inadequate care that had been given to the existing plantations by reason of the very limited financial means at the growers' disposal, and the shortage in artificial fertilisers which caused a great reduction in the fertility of the tree, Palestine's citrus groves, instead of yielding 15,000,000 boxes as before, produced only a third of this quantity. Even this limited amount exceeded the demand of the markets, and the prices could not be increased sufficiently to make citrus cultivation a self-supporting concern.

In 1944 a tiny door of hope was at last opened to the growers for they were able to export a small quantity of Palestinian oranges, grapefruits and lemons to the British market. In 1945 prospects improved when our produce penetrated into the Scandinavian countries and was marketed to the European continent. This year we face a further considerable increase in citrus exports.

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The advantages of union between Jewish and Arab citrus growers became more than ever apparent in 1945, when the union proved its strength in the face of severe trials. In that year important issues were at stake. Following upon the surrender of the enemies of humanity, it seemed that all markets would be throwing open their doors to Palestine citrus produce. Speculation raised its ugly head attentively and the local citrus traders and brokers came to regard the Control Board as a body hostile to their interests. They incited the citrus growers to free themselves from the 'yoke' of this control.

The citrus groves, for the greater part, were in a state of considerable dilapidation. Their owners were heavily indebted to Government and yet further investments were necessary if the orchards were to regain their former productivity.

A further obstacle in the way of marketing the produce had become evident: shortage of packing materials. Most of Palestine's considerable stocks of this had been sold by the creditors, and new materials were not yet arriving from Europe. And finally, mention must be made of the incessant political smear campaign against union, initiated by Palestinian 'political' agitators who were eager to sow the seeds of discord, for how could they witness a state of cooperation between Jews and Arabs and remain silent?

In defiance of all these deterrents the united Jewish and Arab citrus growers made a common effort to overcome all obstacles. In spite of the sinister aims of the fiend of discord, a common Jewish-Arab delegation left Palestine for London and the European continent early in September 1945. The delegation had drawn up the following programme: 1. to sell a certain quantity of Palestinian citrus produce. 2. To purchase packing materials. 3. To negotiate with the British Government concerning the debt of Palestine's citrus growers to the local administration, with a view to reaching an agreement which would enable them to use the payments due to the Palestine Government for rehabilitation purposes in the dilapidated citrus groves.

The tasks of the delegation were not easy ones. It encountered many obstacles, some unforeseen. Europe was in greater distress than could have been visualised far from the spot. In England, too, the traces of the war were obvious everywhere. But the delegation discharged its duties in a spirit of perfect cooperation between its Jewish and Arab members, by mutual agreement and goodwill, and above all, by an interior discipline.

Under the prevailing circumstances the delegation, it must be recorded, succeeded in serving its purpose.

For the first time in five years, 4,598,079 boxes of citrus produce of all sorts were sold in England and the European markets. But for the shortage in packing materials a far greater amount could have been placed. The delegation succeeded in acquiring all the vast stocks of packing materials available in Portugal and Sweden, and bought them up to the last box, but even all this was insufficient. The prices obtained in England and Europe could generally be considered satisfactory in view of conditions prevailing in all markets during this first postwar period, and taking into particular account the existing foreign exchange restrictions. Nevertheless, even these prices were not yet high enough to cover the growers' expenditure.

The Control Board also sold 1,125,000 boxes of citrus produce to the Army and the local manufacturers of juices and marmalades. Only in regard to the neighbouring countries did the Control Board fail to serve its purpose. Its failure was not, however, the result of a shortcoming or of the impracticability of the idea in general, but was mostly due to the undermining activities of the fiend of discord. The neighbouring Arab countries boycotted the produce of Jewish Palestine and extended their boycott to that of the united Jewish-Arab citrus trade. As a result of this boycott the export of citrus fruits was reduced by half a million boxes which had hitherto been placed on Arab foreign markets.

The Foreign Office in London accorded the common delegation of Jewish and Arab citrus growers a most hearty reception. It was very helpful in advising the delegation as to possible sources of packing materials, and assisted them to conclude deals with the British

market. In regard to the delegation's request concerning the repayment of the loans which the Palestine Government had granted to the growers, the Foreign Office was very sympathetic and accepted in principle the submitted suggestions. The main points of the provisional agreement reached were as follows:

The growers were to repay their debts in 30 years, with an addition of 3% annual interest. The instalments of the debts were to be paid into a special account which was to become, in the course of time, a permanent loan fund, issuing loans to growers wishing to readjust and rehabilitate their devastated citrus groves. Until the contemplated permanent loan fund was strong enough to issue such loans, i.e. until substantial amounts had accumulated from instalments paid in, the Government was to support the fund by loans which would thus cover the deficit and in time make effective working of the fund possible.

Unfortunately this laudable idea has not yet been realised, but doubtless it will be in due course.

Today the new citrus harvest of 1947 is imminent. Once more a common Jewish-Arab delegation of citrus growers has left these shores for England and the European continent for the purpose of placing our produce on the overseas markets. It is expected that the delegation will succeed in its mission now that the shortage of packing materials has become a little less acute. It is to be hoped, too, that thanks to the common effort, Palestine's citrus growers will be able this year to market nearly 8,000,000 boxes, and that Palestine's citrus trade will at last return to normal.¹

'Politics' still continue to sow their seeds of discord in our country. But the creative elements, the producers, try to find a way to restore peace and progress by means of *union*.

July, 1946.

About 9 million cases of citrus fruit have been sold beforehand, for the season of 1946/47, both abroad and to the forces. The rest of the fruit will be sold at reasonable prices to customers in Palestine — to the regular local market and the juice and jam factories. Several citrus growers, distrustful of the Marketing Board and reluctant to await the outcome of its negotiations, sold their fruit to brokers at low rates. They now find that they suffered heavy losses; and the brokers have made a good deal at their expense. Those growers who do their own marketing or do it cooperatively. Will make good business this year, and will be able to pay off part of their war-time debts.

1 C. S.

Some 15 years ago, the Jewish community in Haifa was represented by 2 members on the local Municipality of 10. Even then, they did not feel in the minority. Now, the Municipal Council comprises 6 Arabs (Moslems and Christians) and 4 Jews. Certainly, this does not constitute an adequate representation for the Haifa Jewish Community, and it is hoped that the coming elections (the first in ten years) will establish full equality.

Leaving numerical representation aside for the moment, the following incident gives evident proof that some feeling of "belonging together" does exist. When David Hacohen, Jewish Town Councillor for some 20 years, and leading member of the Histadrut, was recently detained in Latrun Camp, his family received the visit of some fellow Arab Councillors on the occasion of the Jewish New Year. The Arab colleagues conveyed the seasonal greetings of their families and sincere wishes for a speedy release.

The Anglo-American Committee of Inquriy, too, expressed its appreciation of Jewish-Arab relations in Haifa. The Government is helpful. A loan granted the Municipality some years ago made possible the erection of a fine Municipality building. Government lands have been allotted for the carrying out of an ex-soldiers housing scheme—this being executed by the Municipality for the benefit of Jews and Arabs alike.

When Jewish immigrants from Germany settled in a newly-founded suburb, in the Haifa Bay, some ten years ago, the late Arab Mayor, Hassan Shukri Bey, went out to welcome them. Today, Arabs feel no hesitation in bringing up the particular problems of their quarters for discussion and advice to the Jewish Mayor, Mr. Shabatai Levy.

The Jewish quarters of Haifa, the most important being Hadar Hacarmel, with its 40,000 inhabitants, may be considered as representing municipalities in themselves. Though they have no legal status, they are highly organised and meet the special needs of their inhabitants. Mutual understanding and co-operation are not wanting between the Municipality and the Jewish quarters, the activities of which, particularly the excellent town-planning work of the Hadar Hacarmel Committee, have met with the warm appreciation of the British City Engineer.

Lying at the bottom of this co-operation is the principle that none of the two communities seeks to dominate the other. Whatever justified political aims and aspirations Palestine Jewry cherishes have been deliberately excluded from the agenda of the Municipal Council, thus removing the possibility of it ever becoming the scene of political discussions.

The work of the Haifa Municipality rests on the fundamental presupposition that neither section of the population should be allowed to dominate the other. The term "pre-supposition" has been chosen expressly, for from the very outset, it has been the basis of every approach to municipal affairs. This approach may appear somewhat strange when we consider that three of the four Jewish Councillors are members of parties pledged to the Biltmore Programme. One of the staunchest upholders of this policy is reported to have said that whoever dominates Haifa, dominates the entire country: the attitude of both Jewish and Arab members of the Municipality, however, represents an unequivocal renunciation of any such domination

It is in the nature of domination to arouse fear and natural resistance in those thus threatened. A striving for co-operation, on the other hand, results in actual co-operation. In the town of Haifa as in the Municipality, either section of the population—be it Jewish or Arab—can paralyse normal life or at least cause great difficulties, if it so desires, regardless of which constitutes the majority. It is idle, therefore, to argue about numbers, particularly when the numerical difference between the two communities is so insignificant as it is in Haifa. The Jewish members of the Municipality do not consider themselves strangers, but as sharing the work with friends, whose task it is to safeguard and further the well-being of the town as a whole.

At a conference of the Histadrut, in December, 1944, devoted to questions of municipal self-government, David Hacohen said:

"That which, as Jews and Socialists, we do not accept abroad, we must accept and justify here in our work in a mixed municipality... It is our duty to care for the whole town, and not for the Jewish interests alone... but for the interests of the Arab workers, in the same degree, with honesty and without discrimination... It is right that taxes paid by wealthy Jews should benefit poor Arabs living in the same town."

It is not within the compass of this article to enter into a discussion of the formulation of these ideas. At the said conference, the above words gave rise to a certain amount of opposition. Yet, honesty compels us to admit that the allusion to wealthy Jewish tax-payers and poor Arabs may give rise to some mis-understanding. Doubtlessly, the speaker was not unmindful of the fact that the richest men in Haifa are Arabs, who have not yet learned to bear their share of the burden to the same extent as the wealthy Jews, as far as helping the poor is concerned—though even the Jews of means cannot be said to do as much as they should in this direction.

But this has only been mentioned in passing in order to give weight to the fundamental attitude of both Jewish and Arab members of the Haifa Municipality, who serve the interests of both sections of the community, irrespective of person or creed. Many of the tasks confronting the Municipality exclude, by their very nature, the possibility of any discrimination. Sanitation is a good example in point: epidemics affect both communities in equal measure.

The work of the Haifa Municipality and its discussions serve no other purpose than the welfare of the citizens as a whole, extending and improving the municipal services of this biggest modern town in Palestine, the town-planning area of which is twice that of Tel Aviv. The terms "majority" and "minority" simply cannot be applied in Haifa.

In considering our problem, we must not lose sight of the fact that the smaller the circle and the more intimate the negotiations, the easier it is to arrive at an understanding between men of goodwill. The Haifa Municipality meet but very infrequently; but when meetings do take place, they are not public and the press is only presented with an extract of the resolutions, with but few details of the proceedings being made public property. The absence of public criticism naturally entails the absence of radical and destructive criticism. The small group of men who administer the affairs of Haifa, and who have remained in office for several years on end, have become accustomed to quiet preparation of resolutions, which, as far as possible, replaces discussions and voting. The sense of compromise, political tact and conscious waiving of personal ambitions, have made it possible to tread the modest path of Jewish-Arab co-operation in the Haifa Municipality.

This is both gratifying and regrettable. Quarrels are noisy and full of hollow phrases; clashes of nationalism fill the air with their con-

tests and contentions. Peace and co-operation, however, are tender plants threatened by every gust of wind and therefore thrive in the shelter of unobtrusiveness. Co-operation between peoples cannot be proclaimed from the house-tops. It is not something to be displayed in public; it hardly enters consciousness, much less does it command the esteem of the larger public — Jewish or Arab.

We citizens of Haifa can look into the future with the confident hope, that Jews and Arabs can work together. It is our earnest task ir these and coming days to broaden this common understanding.

March, 1946.

CIVIL RIGHTS IN PALESTINE

By M. AVI-SHAUL

THE HEBREW PRESS has recently dealt at length with prison conditions in connection with the treatment meted out to detainees and prisoners by the police, and more especially with the Regulations which empower the civil and military authorities to detain persons, set up special courts to pass judgment on them, and to sentence them to various terms of imprisonment or to deportation from the country. There can be little doubt that the public's objections to all kinds of ordinances and regulations which deprive a defendant of the jurisdiction of ordinary civil courts, and to a police and prison procedure that leaves room for unscrupulous behaviour on the part of the authorities, are justified.

At the same time we have to acknowledge that ordinances and regulations which limit the rights of men and citizens do not exist in a vacuum. They grow out of a certain attitude towards the governed community as a whole. In a mandatory country administered on the strength of an authority given to its Government by a foreign power, without taking into account the wishes of the inhabitants, it is not surprising that the authorities attempt to consolidate their power by any means which serve the administrative purpose. In such a country only a vigilant public opinion can resist encroachments on civil rights and compel the respect of the authorities. Have those who shape public opinion in Palestine actually availed themselves of their power and influence with a view to extending the rights of man? In the opinion of the writer, who has gathered practical experience in this field during ten years of active interest, more particularly in his capacity of Secretary of the League for the Rights of Man in Palestine (which is affiliated to the National Council for Civil Liberties, London), the answer is definitely in the negative. There is no real Public Opinion in Palestine.

The second principle which lends strength to our fight for civil rights and provides it with a constructive character is the recognition of complete equality in this respect towards all sections of the population. One code of laws for all inhabitants, without any discrimination in respect of nationality, race, creed, or religion, is the elementary condition of the success of any demand for the maintenance of our status in face of lack of responsibility on the part of those who wield power.

The practical value of the fight for the rights of man extends over various fields and over many complicated features of our public life, beginning with politics in the most restricted meaning of the term, and ending in the field of social welfare, education and the right of citizens to work and achieve satisfaction from their work.

Apart from obstructions that may be imposed by the Government, there are obstructions which arise from a particular frame of mind that refuses to notice whenever an administrative obstruction is directed against 'others'. The boycott, for instance, on goods manufactured by Jews is an obstruction to the rights of Jews. Similarly, the boycott of the Arab worker is an obstruction to the rights of the Arabs. And it is a waste of moral indignation to complain about the boycott imposed on us, as long as the same moral indignation is not also expressed against the boycott of the Arab labourer. It may seem difficult to tell a Jewish tomato from an Arab one; but those who found the means to make such a distinction should realise that other keen-eyed people may find a way to distinguish between a "Zionist" and an Arab shirt.

The connection between a tomato and a shirt on the one hand, and emergency and defence regulations on the other, is that in an atmosphere of national tension and isolation public opinion is bound to degenerate and to become incapable of a united and sustained struggle against oppression.

TO JUDGE by the reaction of the press, the Emergency Regulations would seem to be a novum in Palestine. But this is not the case. Even leaving out the Prevention of Crimes Ordinance of 1933, which in spirit and effect was based on the same principle as that expressed in the various subsequent defence regulations, there is an entire system of codification in matters of justice, arrest, deportation etc., which has produced a multitude of variations on the same juridical theme—sometimes played by civil and sometimes by military authorities.

The Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, as published in the Supplement to the official 'Palestine Gazette' of 27.9.45, clarify this point. Paragraph 16 of these regulations, inter alia, empowers any police officer in charge of a police station to issue a warrant for the arrest of any person whom he may reasonably suspect of having committed a military court offence. The source of this is the Defence (Military Courts) Regulations, 1937; and it is interesting to note that in accordance with that same paragraph such a warrant of arrest may also empower any private person to carry the arrest into effect.

Para. 21 empowers Military Courts to decide any matter of procedure and adopt such course as appears to the Court best calculated to do justice. Again, the source is the Regulations of 1937.

Para. 33 provides for the whipping of boys under the age of 18, in addition to or without imposing other punishment; source, the Emergency Regulations, 1936. In para. 84 there is a definition of the term 'unlawful association'; among others, this term applies to any body of persons, which in any way brings into hatred or contempt, or ex-

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cites disaffection against, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom or the Government of Palestine or the High Commissioner in his official capacity. Source—Emergency Regulations, 1936. All the paragraphs (for instance 110, 112) which deal with the placing of a person under police supervision, banishment of a person to a certain residence, detention and deportation from the country — have their sources in the Emergency Regulations, 1936, and the Defence Regulations, 1939. And the whole of part IX, dealing with prohibited immigrants, the definition of which term is taken from the Immigration Ordinance, 1941, is but a repetition in spirit or verbatim of previous regulations; and even though later supplements provide severe punishment for those who extend help to such immigrants, or impose collective responsibility on members of groups or associations, these are no nova in subject matter, but rather more precise formulations of an administrative power which had already existed and been used previously.

NUMEROUS memoranda to the Government of Palestine, the British Colonial Office and various British organisations; numerous reports; a few hundred letters concerning the fates of individuals — all these are piled up at the Palestine League for the Rights of Man as evidence of the implications of the various emergency regulations and administrative ordinances for the people of this country, in many instances innocent ones, as well as foreigners — Jews and non-Jews—among them many refugees from Fascism.

In order to penetrate more deeply into this jungle we shall first quote from a letter of 6.10.37 from the late Ronald Kidd, Secretary of the National Council for Civil Liberties, London, to the editor of the 'Manchester Guardian,' in reply to the grievances of the Secretary of the Revisionist Zionist Party in London with regard to prison conditions at Acre:—

"Mr. . . . draws attention to the fact that under the Crimes Prevention Ordinance persons against whom no evidence has been adduced are imprisoned without trial — a procedure contrary to every principle of British law and one which must be repugnant to British sentiment, even though this system exists in Northern Ireland. It appears, moreover, that a considerable number of persons are detained in prison even after their sentences have expired. The fate of deportees seems to be tragic in the extreme, for we are informed on good authority that political refugees are returned to dictatorship countries on the mere allegation of the police that they are undesirable. This procedure appears to be carried out by the police authorities without any judicial decision."

In addition to this letter, a pamphlet, "The Tasks of the League for the Rights of Man," published in Palestine in 1938 in both English and Hebrew, contains the following warning: "Hitherto the Emergency Regulations and the Prevention of Crimes Ordinance

have been invoked mainly against the Arab section and against Communists — with tacit Jewish consent. But already there are signs that they are being turned against sections of the populace which have hitherto approved of them. The imprisonment without trial of workers from Hadera and Karkur; the closing down of newspapers in the case of the slightest expression of opinion unwelcome to the Palestine administration — these signs show that the Jewish community is by no means immune from their action."

Our public opinion did not pay attention to this warning, nor did the Jewish national institutions. And we have to note that the League for the Rights of Man presents one of the few instances where Jews and Arabs worked side by side.

In the memorandum to the Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs, dated 16.9.38, on the denial of asylum to political refugees in Palestine and their deportation back to the countries of their persecution, and on arrest and imprisonment in Palestine without trial, the League for the Rights of Man quoted the statement of Mr. Ormsby Gore in Parliament to the effect that "since the beginning of 1934, 26 German Jews have been deported," with the addition, however, that "in cases where the deportee wished to find asylum in other countries there was no question of deporting him or her to Germany." Yet, this memorandum included instances of deportation also to Germany. In one instance the Arab lawyer of a Jewish defendant tried to impress upon the court that his client be not deported "on the grounds that he was a German Jew." This defendant was eventually released by the Court, but re-arrested immediately by the police authorities (exactly as happened in the case of the captain of the "Enzo Sereni" in Haifa Court on 12.6.46).

In 1937 in his reply to a question put by R. Gibson, M.P., on the Emergency Regulations, the Secretary of State for the Colonies replied that "as these are cases of preventive detention, no question of trial or conviction arises." Their honours Judges Manning and Frumkin, in a verdict rejecting the request for Habeas Corpus, decided as follows: "We are of the opinion that the District Commissioner's powers under the Regulations are absolute and that he is not obliged to give any grounds when he acts under the Regulations."

To an enquiry by the Palestine League for the Rights of Man as to whether two prisoners had appeared before a judge, the Deputy Inspector General of Police in a letter dated 5.3.38 stated "that these persons are detained in Central Prison, Acre, under Sec. 15B of the Emergency Regulations."

The examples could be greatly multiplied.

The captain and sailors of vessels bringing so-called illegal immigrants to the shores of Palestine are liable to trial and punishment; and their ships to confiscation. — This practice of the police of arresting persons acquitted by court immediately after the judge has left the courtroom has become quite usual. All protests have been in vain.

WHO DOES not know that at various periods, even in the past, Jewish illegal immigrants were hunted down! At that time the Jewish newspapers expressed their objection, while the Arabs rejoiced and demanded intensification of these activities. Who does not know that during a certain period collective punishment was meted out to Arab villages! Then the Arabs protested, while the Jews rejoiced and demanded intensification of such punishment. Again, who does not know that Arabs have also been deported! The Jewish press then rejoiced, while to-day this same press protests against "the deportation of Jews from their fatherland." And who does not know that there have been hunger strikes in our prisons, either on account of the intolerable prison conditions or of the unlimited prolongation of detainment on the strength of various regulations! When the strikers were Arabs, the Arabs protested; and when they were Jews, the Jews protested.

In the report of the League for the Rights of Man for the period from 1937 to 1941 some of the League's activities are discussed, in connection with such matters as strikes, prison conditions, capital punishment, terrorism.

In a memorandum to the Government of Palestine, prepared by a sub-committee composed of Jewish and Arab members (submitted through the Commissioner for Reconstruction in September, 1943) the following points were raised: Security of life and property, democratic liberties, administrative activities, deportations, police authority, prison conditions (with detailed proposals for reform), prison visits, judicial flogging, hospitals and lunatic asylums, and compulsory education.

Had reforms on the above lines been jointly demanded by the general Jewish and Arab public, and not by a small group only, we should never have witnessed the promulgation of the latest Defence (Emergency) Regulations.

BEFORE US LIES SUPPLEMENT 2 of the Palestine Gazette Extraordinary No. 1470 of 28.1.46. At the very beginning we find a "Government Notice" explaining the objects and reasons of the new Defence (Emergency) Regulations. This notice stresses that there are no changes or no very substantial changes in the law, and this is true.

The Regulations of 1946 are a consequence of the system to which Government had resorted during two decades in suppressing disturbances in the country, more especially in cases when the public failed to assist Government in discovering and handling over "rioters" to the authorities.

But only people with notoriously short memories can feel bitterness against the appointment of an officer of H.M. Forces as single judge, when according to previous regulations a person could already be held in administrative detention for several years. Such Admin-

istrative Detention could be ordered on the strength of the evidence of a policeman or some secret file, and "the defendant," that is to say, the prisoner, had to prove his innocence of a charge the full extent of which, in many cases, he did not even know. Nor is collective responsibility of a person for crimes committed by other people a novum in Palestinian usage. Paragraph 66 which reads "it is also immaterial that by reason of circumstances not known to the offender it is impossible in fact to commit the offence" — reveals perhaps more than any other example the spirit of our whole legislative and administrative system.

The rights of man can be safeguarded only by the cooperation of the entire population. These rights cannot be limited by racial, religious, national or other considerations. As long as one section of the population is content with the restriction of elementary rights in regard to another section, there is no chance of achieving such elementary rights. But this understanding presupposes an education of the public in a spirit entirely different from that at present prevailing in this country.

There can be no doubt that there are Jews and Arabs in this country who understand the necessity for cooperation against any attempt at transforming Palestine into a prison. In a review of 10 years of activities, submitted by the League for the Rights of Man, Palestine, to the National Council for Civil Liberties, London, in September, 1945, the following summary is given:

"Ten years of experience have taught us that there is no hope for the League's progress and expansion among organisations and individuals, not even for its very existence, as long as there is no solution of the Palestine problem based on Arab-Jewish understanding."

February, 1946.

JEWISH AND ARAB WORKERS — DIVIDED OR UNITED? By GABRIEL BAER

The political conflict about Palestine may have made the impression upon the foreign spectator that the "Land of Promise" has become a scene of permanent clashes between Jews and Arabs and that deep hatred between these two peoples reigns even in everyday life. But, although political tension and national differences play an important part in dividing the inhabitants of this country and confining their cooperation to very narrow limits, neighbourly relations between Jews and Arabs in the towns and between Jewish and Arab villages in the country almost always existed. Moreover, Arab and Jewish workers have more than once cooperated in defending their right to a decent living and, from time to time, they were given opportunity to show a very great extent of solidarity. As recently as in April, 1946, a common strike of all junior Government officials and workers paralysed the communications of the country, railways, post and telegraph, broadcasting and ports, and Jews and Arabs could be seen marching together through the streets of Jerusalem carrying posters on which "Long Live Unity" was written in Arabic, Hebrew and English. Only one who is acquainted with the complicated political situation of Palestine, and who has witnessed the efforts spent to drive a wedge between Jewish and Arab workers, will appreciate the meaning of the greeting which was sent to all striking Government employees by their committee. The greeting, extending "Hearty Wishes to All," was sent to Moslems, Christians and Jews alike, for their respective feasts which occured the same week. It should be mentioned that these feasts, Nebi Musa, Easter and Passover, which usually take place at the same time, have not seldom been the occasion for communal riots.

The common strike of the Government employees last year was not, however, the first expression of solidarity between Arab and Jewish workers in Palestine. In 1931 Arab and Jewish drivers all over the country struck against the high taxes on fuel and cut off all road communications. Workers of all communities employed by the Jerusalem Municipality have for years been conducting a common campaign for raising their standard of life. The most outstanding example of Arab-Jewish workers' solidarity was the stay-in strike of the Railway Workshops in Haifa early in 1944, which lasted for some days and nights. At night the Jewish and Arab workers sat together around fires, telling stories and chanting; the food sent by Arab or Jewish trade-unions was distributed equally among all workers. Although organized in different and even rivalling unions,

Jewish and Arab workers were united until the end. A year later Arab and Jewish civilian workers declared a strike in one of the army camps near Tel-Aviv, organizing a common demonstration through the streets of the city, where the Jewish population cheered and applauded this sign of Arab-Jewish unity. This happened in the very days when news agencies all over the world were reporting "imminent clashes between Jews and Arabs in Palestine."

The Difficulty of Cooperation

All these examples show that cooperation between Jewish and Arab workers in Palestine is possible and has been a fact in many cases. But the necessity for pointing out these examples shows that cooperation has not been easy and, generally, has not even been the rule. Why then, is cooperation so difficult?

First of all, there are in Palestine two national economic units which are more or less secluded from each other. But for a very small number of experts, no Jewish workers are employed in Arab enterprises, and very few Arab workers are employed by Jewish undertakings, except in orange-groves. Thus the only places where Jewish and Arab workers meet are in Government and Army works and, to a certain extent, in the plants of the big companies such as the Iraq Petroleum Co., the Oil Refineries in Haifa, the Potash Co., etc. But in these companies the Jewish workers are generally employed as experts and skilled tradesmen, while the Arabs do unskilled labour. On the whole, the character of the Arab working class is that of a colonial one, whereas the Jews are nearer to European standards. The problems of the Jewish or the Arab worker are more or less alien to his comrade from the other community. Although, during the war, thousands of additional Arab and Jewish workers were employed in Government and Army works and the need for and possibility of cooperation grew, the majority of the Arab and Jewish workers at present still work and live separated.

Moreover, there exists a great difference between their standards of life. In industry the wages of the Jewish workers are, on the average, almost three times those of the Arabs, and even if Jewish and Arab labourers do the same work, the Jew earns more than his Arab colleague. The different standards of life are accompanied by different habits: a common consumers' society of Jewish and Arab Government clerks in Jerusalem had to be separated, some weeks after its establishment, into two shops, one Jewish and one Arab. Even where Arab and Jewish workers are employed by the same employer, generally no common workers' committee exists. This fact, however, has other reasons as well, and its roots lie in the separate organizations of Jewish and Arab workers.

Arab and Jewish Trade Unions

The vast majority of the Jewish workers in Palestine are organ-

The oldest Arab trade union is the "Palestine Arab Workers' Society" founded in 1925 by Arab railway workers in Haifa, who are until to-day the core of the "Society." The development of the "Society" has not been as smooth as that of the "Histadruth"; since 1925 the membership of the "Society" has fluctuated considerably. It reached a high level of activity in 1931, when the first Arab labour congress was held, and again in 1934-36, a period of many strikes. During the disturbances of 1936-39 and until 1942, the "Society" was rather inactive, but thereafter a new period of development began, caused by the growth of the Arab working class and its concentration in Government and Army works. The majority of the members of the "Society" are wage-earners, but recently some cooperatives have been formed. The political outlook of the "Society's" leadership is nationalist, generally following the line of the "Palestine Arab Party," whose Vice-President is Jamal Eff. al-Husseini.

Against this outlook a left opposition had grown inside the "Society" since the early thirties, criticising the "reformist" and "opportunist" tendencies of the "Society" leadership. The development of world events, together with the consolidation of the Arab working class in Palestine, has led to a considerable increase of these leftist elements in the last few years, and they have gained influence in most of the important branches of the "Society." When the "Society" leadership, about a year ago, refused to grant them representation on the delegation to the Paris World-Congress of Trade Unions, these branches broke away from the "Society" and formed the "Arab Labour Congress." The membership of the "Congress" is to-day at least as great as that of the "Society" and its political outlook is leftist, influenced by the Arab communists of the "National Liberation League."

The third trade union organization comprising Arab workers is the "Palestine Labour League," founded in 1927 by the "Histadrut," whose aim was the creation of a common organization of Jewish and Arab workers with the Histadrut as its Jewish section. This object, however, was changed afterwards and the "League" became an organization of Arab workers only, affiliated to the General Federation of Jewish Labour and managed by its department for Arab affairs. For years, political reasons curtailed the activity of the "League," but the new rise of Arab trade unionism since 1942 induced the Histadrut to revive its Arab "League." Nevertheless, up till now it remains the smallest of the trade unions among Arab workers.

The only common organisation of Jewish and Arab employees is the "Palestine Civil Service (Second Division) Association" in which all junior Government clerks are organized. The "Association" was founded during the war and has no connection whatsoever with any of the existing trade unions. Including Arab and Jewish clerks as it does, it carefully avoids getting mixed up in politics. The labourers, however, who are employed by the Government, are organized in the abovementioned Arab and Jewish trade unions.

It is very difficult to give exact numbers of the membership of the Arab trade unions. The figures submitted to the Labour Department by the Arab organisations were a membership of 15,000 in the "Society," 18,000 in the "Congress" and 4,500 in the "League." Even if these figures are taken for granted, it is necessary to consider the special character of these relatively young Arab trade unions, in which they resemble the workers' organisations in all colonial countries. The membership is always fluctuating, the members being connected with their organisation by stronger ties in periods of strikes and activity, and looser ones in calmer times. The Arab working class in Palestine, like the workers of Egypt, India and other colonial countries, has not enjoyed the long period of stabilization and industrial development which was the basis for the consolidation of the European trade unions. Therefore, Arab trade unions cannot be compared with European or American ones. Neither is it possible to compare them with the "Histadrut," which is founded on the European level of the Jewish worker.

The Trade Unions and Cooperation

The existence of two more or less exclusive economic units in Palestine and the difference between the living standards of the Jewish and Arab workers have indeed been important reasons for the development of separate trade unions. But there has been another reason too. The Jews come to Palestine to build the National Home, which, according to the present official Zionist leadership, means the establishment of a Jewish State. Organized Jewish labour plays an important part in these efforts. The Arabs on the other hand, the Arab labour movement not excluded, strive for independence from foreign rule and are fervently opposed to Zionism. The right wing of the Arab trade unions is strongly influenced by the present

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leadership of the Arab national movement, which stresses its struggle against the Jews more than opposition to foreign rule.

This political antagonism has led to sharp conflicts between the Jewish and Arab trade unions. Arab labour leaders describe the Histadrut as "one of the most dangerous opponents of the Arab worker" because it "always demands the maintaining of a difference between the Arab and the Jewish worker. Therefore it is far from democracy and near to fascism...". Especially fierce are the attacks of the "Society" and the "Congress" on the "Palestine Labour League," the union of Arab workers established by the Histadrut. According to their opinion the "League" was created "with the help of Zionist money in order to divide the Arab labour movement and to serve Zionist propaganda, which tries to deceive the international labour movement." The Arab members of the "League" are considered as "traitors to the Arab unions refused to negotiate with the Histadrut if delegates of the "League" were to take part in the negotiations.

The attitude of the Histadrut towards the Arab trade unions is also very hostile. The Arab unions are defined by the leaders of the Histadrut as having a "feudal character." On several occasions leaders of the Histadrut declared that if negotiations with the Arab unions should become necessary, they should serve as means te discredit their leadership.

At the same time it is significant that both the Histadrut and the Arab unions have more than once declared and keep on declaring on solemn occasions that cooperation between Arab and Jewish workers is necessary and desirable. In speeches at Arab labour congresses it has been possible to hear the following words: "Even if the workers are divided by religion and race, the right of work and the struggle for improving their conditions unite them... we want real fraternity with the Jewish workers." Likewise, one of the leaders of the Histadrut wrote in a recently published pamphlet that "the human necessity for fraternal relations with the Arab worker and fellah, the consciousness of the inevitability of these relations... have been present in the mind of the Jewish worker ever since he came to Palestine...". We shall see that in reality these solemn pledges have frequently not been kept. Nevertheless, to a certain degree they indicate the mood of the Arab and Jewish workers and reflect upon situations in which fraternity has been a fact.

On the other hand, one cannot deny that other voices have been heard. A delegate to a conference of agricultural workers, held by the Histadrut, announced that the raising of the Arab fellah's standard of life did not interest the Jewish worker at all and he even used very strange expressions when referring to the Arabs. Although he met with opposition from the left wing of the Histadrut ("Hashomer Hatzair"), the motion of the latter to deal with the problems of the Arab village in a later session was rejected by the

majority. On the other hand, some of the leaders of the Arab "Society" went so far as to declare that "if the Jews had human feelings, they would not have been expelled from all countries." But such racial theories are severely condemned by the Arab leftists organized in the "Congress."

How Politics Sow Discord

Unfortunately, reality has proved in many cases that the will of the Arab and Jewish trade unions' leadership to create this fraternity about which they spoke has not been too strong. The narrow-mindedness which found its expression in the abovementioned resolution of the Histadrut and in the anti-Jewish slanders of the "Society," has guided their action on more than one occasion. It is self-evident that the struggle for the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine (which, of course, cannot have any other real meaning than partition) conducted by the present majority of the Histadrut, has not greatly encouraged them to work for fraternity between Jewish and Arab workers. In the same way, cooperation between Arab and Jewish workers has been discouraged by the strong anti-Jewish tendency of the Arab leadership. If, notwithstanding this political antagonism, Jewish and Arab workers have cooperated, it only shows how strong the necessity of cooperation was.

To give an idea how the machinery of sowing discord works, it will be useful to cite some typical examples. Some years ago, it was planned to conduct a campaign to improve the conditions of the workers employed by the Army. The leadership of the "Society" refused to cooperate, claiming that the campaign was a political action of the Histadrut. Then even the Arab leftists supported this view. In a similar way, some leaders of the Histadrut declared the strike in the Railway Workshops to be a political Arab strike against Jewish immigration; the Jewish workers, however, remained steadfast.

The most outstanding example was the recent common strike of the Government employees, which had the support of the whole Araband Jewish population. In this case too, efforts were made to sow discord on political issues. Some of the Arabic newspapers wrote that the Zionists and the Histadrut had paved the way for this strike to show the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry that Jews and Arabs in Palestine cooperated and that, therefore, the Arabs did not fear Zionism. The Emir (now King) Abdullah of Transjordan requested the Arab employees to return to work in order not to spoil the "favourable political prospects" of the Arabs. (It is worthwhile mentioning that the strike had already spread to Transjordan, where railway workers came out in support of their Palestinian comrades.) One of the Jewish newspapers, on the other hand, told its readers that the strike had been organized by the Arab League! Some foreign news agencies claimed that the strike was against Jewish im-

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migration, others that it was organized in support of a refugee ship trying to reach Palestine at the time. A much read Jewish evening paper announced one day that the strike prevented the Government from dealing with Jewish immigration. A few days later, however, the journalists of this paper were not afraid to contradict themselves by stating that a high Government official had declared that this time even the Arabs had helped immigration by the common strike. The same paper published a malicious article trying to convince its readers that the strike was not in the interests of the Jews, because they would have to pay the taxes in order to feed the satiated Arab Government employees... Only a few sharp statements were published in the Palestinian press condemning this baiting campaign (e.g. in the Arabic "Al-Ittihad" of the leftist "National Liberation League," in the Hebrew "Mishmar" of the "Hashomer Hatzair" and in "Ba'ayot," organ of "Ihud"). Nevertheless, the unity of the striking employees was not disturbed, and they were granted a considerable part of their demands.

Exclusivism or Cooperation?

Much of the future of Palestine, as of the whole world, will depend on which of the two ways will be chosen: the way of exclusiveness which must lead to bloodshed and suffering, or the way of cooperation and solidarity which can lead to peace. We have cited many examples of Jewish and Arab workers in Palestine trying to take the second way; but, for years, they have been driven in the other direction by strong forces which are still continuing and even increasing their efforts. Only recently the League of Arab States has declared a boycott against the Palestinian Jews, and although the left wing of the Arab labour movement did not agree with this step, and generally the Arab population was not too enthusiastic about it, the boycott has already done its share in poisoning the relations between Arab and Jewish workers. Organized Jewish labour has maintained its slogan, "Avodah Ivrit" (Jewish Work), i.e. that only Jewish workers must be employed by Jewish employers. In the years before the war pickets were organized against the employment of Arab workers in Jewish industry and orange-groves, but the shortage of labourers during the war made this impracticable. Recently, however, the danger of unemployment has begun to grow again and there are already the first signs of the old slogan's revival. Nothing has aggravated the relations between Arab and Jewish workers more than these slogans, by which cooperation with Arab workers employed by Jews was excluded and suspicion and distrust spread among the Arab workers in general. In Government works such slogans were skilfully exploited in order to divide Arab and Jewish workers by dismissing Arabs and employing Jews, dismissing Jews and employing Arabs and so on. There is no doubt that this fact has been an important reason for the low standard of life of the

Palestinian Government employees; exclusivism not only fosters the political dangers of mutual slaughter and delay of the liberation of both Arabs and Jews, but also has a bad influence on the social conditions of the workers. It seems that the Government of Palestine is aware of the political and social consequences of discord: asked at a press conference in Jerusalem, held in June, 1946, what Government was doing to encourage Arab-Jewish labour cooperation, Mr. Graves, then Director of the Department of Labour, said he did not see what Government should do about it ...

In the economic field Jewish and Arab workers have understood their need for unity on several occasions, but politically their aims are still opposed. The question whether, in the future, they will find their way to political cooperation depends not only on the changes in the situation in Palestine and the Middle East, but also upon the way the world in general will choose.

August, 1946.

THE CHOICE BEFORE JEWISH YOUTH By ERNST SIMON

1.

In revolutionary times, youth acquires an added significance. In normal times it may be content to pick up the inheritance which has dropped from the nerveless hands of the preceding generation, and to make some minor changes; whereas in times of emergency matters are very different. For then struggling society — whether it be a state, a class or a federation of states covering half the globe stands in urgent need of that surplus of strength which youth possesses, for good or evil, as a blessing or as a curse. This surplus is among the distinctive features of mankind. Good youth is always ready to sacrifice its life on the altar of some great cause, and it is this readiness for sacrifice which has been youth's distinctive contribution to human history since the dawn of civilisation. Without this special quality, "sacrifice of life" would not have been a living concept of ever-recurring historical reality. Naturally this spirit of sacrifice is not to be found among all young people, not even among a majority; but among that active minority who in periods of stormy transition are the makers of history: the minority who devote themselves to wars and revolutions, discoveries and inventions, adventures and persecutions, in short to all that is wild and noble.

Within Zionism, the 'Halutz' (pioneer) movement, the youth movement par excellence, has succeeded in directing the surplus energies of youth into the constructive channels of life and work. The warlike spirit which is simultaneously being aroused by these surplus energies, was turned not against other human beings, whether individuals or whole peoples, but against the resisting forces of nature: swamps and barren desolation, rocks and sand dunes, deserts and steppes. The urge to conquer inherent in this spirit was not at first directed towards the conquest of work rightfully belonging to others, but towards the reconquest of work for a people that had been torn from the soil and become alienated from manual labour. The spirit of adventure found an ample outlet in the colonisation of a soil which even the Bedouin had scorned, on the scorching shores of the Dead Sea and in the stifling heat of the Jordan Valley. So the revolutionary will was occupied not with the destruction of an antiquated society, but with the laying of the foundations of a new and better world.

All this is well known; but it is perhaps a little too well known, and that is why I must repeat it. The torrent of propaganda which was showered on the Halutz venture for financial and political reasons, gradually made us lose sight of what is great and real in this

work of upbuilding. Though its greatness is proclaimed from the housetops, though it is put in a veritable pillory of glory, yet its true greatness remains unimpaired and its foundations are sound and solid. Nor has it lost its power of attraction over the best part of our youth in the country and in the towns.

2.

It is not to be denied, however, that this power of attraction may yet find a dangerous rival. I am referring, of course, to those youths who engage in terroristic acts of various kinds. They are organised in two movements which, while they differ in tactical details, are agreed as to means and ends. The means are those of immediate violence, and the end is the immediate establishment of a Jewish State. It may be assumed that psychologically speaking these movements of destruction attract the same type of youth who in different circumstances would be found among the pioneers of constructive work. Moreover, the number of those engaged in carrying out terroristic acts is very much smaller than the number of their sympathisers, both open and secret. And it is incumbent upon even those who exhibit the Halutz spirit at its best, daily to search their hearts and ask themselves whether there is not in them some hidden spark of that disquieting sympathy for the way of destruction.

Why is it that this has come to pass?

It is because the Halutz element within the active and decisive minority of our youth, while condemning the methods and tactics employed by the terrorist elements, i.e. the immediate use of violence, are often in agreement with them as regards their object, which is the immediate establishment of a Jewish State. That is why their resistance has neither power of conviction nor power of attraction. A discussion on methods may convince adults; it can never inspire the young.

About three years ago, David Ben-Gurion gave the message of his new Zionism to a conference of the Organisation of Hebrew Teachers. It was then that I warned my colleagues against "short-winded Zionism", a warning which was as necessary as it was unsuccessful. For short-windedness must lead to despair and despair in its turn must lead to desperate acts, in spite of all efforts to prevent them, and that precisely among the potentially good and idealistic elements of our youth. For only he who has been strong in an ideal can be strong in despair. And that is why so great a responsibility rests on those leaders whose powers of vision and whose powers of speech can sway this youth — that part of youth which is historically creative — and control alike its ideals and its despair.

3.

Into what channels will the surplus energies of Jewish youth, which may well decide the character and fate of our work of upbuild-

ing, flow in the months and years ahead? Here is the choice Jewish youth is confronted with to-day. But the decision does not lie with youth any more; it lies with Zionist policy. Will this policy continue to identify itself with the aims of the terrorists, will it remain a policy of "immediate" solutions, a policy of "now or never"? If so, their honest struggle against the method of direct action will be utterly in vain. Nothing but a change of Zionist aims, or rather a return to the sources of that Zionism which was and is, in the words of Kurt Blumenfeld, a "long-winded revolution", can bring about a change of method and a victory of the forces of the halutz over those of terrorism in the sphere of youth in general and in each individual heart in particular.

In my view, the choice now confronting Palestine policy is as follows: splitting the country into two small and mutually hostile states, or development of the country as a whole in accordance with the grandiose plans of development which have recently been submitted to public criticism, mostly by American experts, but also by a Palestinian scholar, Dr. A. Bonné. All these various plans have one feature in common: they presuppose large closed areas with a population ready for honest and lasting co-operation. The integral unity of the country and a steady and long-drawn-out process of upbuilding are the distinctive elements of all these plans which provide us with an alternative to an *immediate* solution, which could only be partition.

4.

The best part of our youth will not return to a purely urban and spiritual individual life. Such a return is neither necessary nor desirable, except in the case of a few chosen individuals, those with special gifts whom we cannot by any means blame for so returning. Youth's profound experience of collective work and collective life has become one of the foundations of its existence and there is no reason why it should not remain so. On the contrary: judged by its psychical qualities, our youth is certainly among the best now on earth and among the best in the long history of Israel. This youth, in its working and fighting sections, is pure and idealistic, ready to sacrifice itself for whatever it believes to be great. It is an excellent youth, of which we have every right to be proud, but it is partly misled. We adults, parents, teachers and leaders, have led them astray and go on doing so, thus increasing our guilt day by day. Therefore a change of heart is called for in the whole Jewish camp and in each of the various camps within Jewry, in the Zionist movement and in all its youth organisations, in our central security organisation and in all the groups acting under it. We must concentrate the ample energies of our youth and its wonderful readiness for sacrifice on a constructive aim instead of on the aims leading down the slope of destruction. For, this Palestine in process of upbuilding

leaves room for all the qualities of a true man—among which we must make a point of including civic courage; there are swamps to be drained, rocks to be levelled, fallow fields to be cultivated. Such was the work of our fellows who chose the path of realisation and persisted in it till the dark hour which is now upon us, and whose hands remain at their work even yet. This is the path we have to pursue if we are ever to succeed in dispelling the dark clouds which have gathered ominously over the Land of Israel.

But there is a yet greater task confronting us, calling for even greater sacrifice than that of the soldier who risks his life on the field of battle. On this generation or the next devolves the task of restoring peace between our work of upbuilding and the Arab people, of achieving a genuine rapprochement between our two communities and weaving our Arab neighbours, with all their social and political aspirations, and their physical and spiritual gifts, into the texture of that great and growing work as an equal partner; more than this, we have to weave our work into the larger process of growth and concentration of the whole Middle East, as an active and activating factor. It is not, as slander has it, a task of renunciation, but the task of a great work of upbuilding, capable of giving meaning and purpose to the lives of our young people and of kindling an ardent flame in their breasts which is not the flame of death. This part of the world cannot remain in its present social and cultural state much longer. Our world is a world of conflict, of clashes between opposing forces, the forces of progress on the one hand and those of stagnation and retrogression on the other. Conflict in this country will strengthen the forces of reaction, whereas peace will strengthen the forces of progress. This is the new pedagogic aim that can and must be set for our good youth, and if they march towards it with firm tread, they will reach it and thereby succeed in opening the doors wide to our brethren in exile, those who are suffering and also those whose exile is comfortable and who will then be attracted by the new-old light radiating from the Holy Land, the land of peace and creative work.

October, 1944.

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REFLECTIONS OF A GUEST ON VIOLENCE By HELMUT VON DEN STEINEN

I.

AT THIS stormy moment even courageous people feel that Israel's constructive work in its old country seems to be hardly less endangered than in the period of the Nazi hordes' knocking at the gates of Alexandria only four years ago. The more courageous such Jewish self-observers are, the more they grieve to find dangers by no means arising only from one of the camps concerned, nor yet from only two... No reasonable evaluation of the political facts could give them any hope that this sombre situation will soon clear up. From the muddle of antagonistic tendencies not a single imaginative programme arises to deprive the present difficulties of their cruelty by indicating a concrete way to attractive aims. Still less are any personalities visible who could rally youthful forces round them for hard fights which would yet promise the final display of victorious human values. To expect an encouraging lead from the outside world would seem almost preposterous in a time of daily worsening international discomfiture. In this respect Palestine has the doubtful privilege of demonstrating within its nutshell, with scientific nicety, the chaotic cramps of the whole human body.

So the most important device for anyone to apply to his mental apparatus nowadays is a little telescope, installed on some lookout tower of his brain. The tower should not be built of ivory, the oldfashioned escapology material, but of atom bomb-proof soulsteel, purified in many intellectual furnaces. The lenses of the telescope should be polished according to the formulae which are determined by incessant historical observation. Then the pessimism of the present outlook on the Zionist venture will give way to sounder judgment. Not the shadows of transient party struggles, but the substance of durable communal labours, must be considered in order to produce rational prognostics. Here the record remains thoroughly edifying: though limited to a few hundred thousands of busy workers, the founding of a prosperous Jewish economy in the Ottoman desert belongs to the great achievements of our time. We do not need to illustrate this basic sentence with figures or details. We only want to stress one point for our present purpose: this economy is not merely a material improvisation, like a gold-diggers' town whose ghastly ruins remain deserted after the sweat-paying mine has been exhausted. It is a living organism with a living soul. The genuine progressive trend of its labour, the greyly shimmering glory of its boy and girl agriculturists, pioneers not only of Israel's, but of the world's socialism; the happy remoulding of a hieratic idiom to the organ of a new life's poetry and a new poetry's life, the return (begun, of course, not ended yet) of feverishly wakeful ghetto fragments to a healthily dreaming entirety—these are the main features of an expanding achievement of a type which history (so the telescope tells us) never allows to be choked by exterior enemies.

All this has been done in two or three decades. Why, then, be overfrightened by visiting storms? Why press for a definite solution of problems which are less urgent in themselves than in the sensibility with which they are felt or exploited in the political battle? A platform cry of incomprehensible folly shouts: Now or never! If we do not once for all arrive at a legalised regulation of our future plans, our future is lost. Certainly there is no such 'once for all'. It is a paradox to hear this impatient slogan from the representatives of a nation which has a much greater independence of time than any European one, always finding, through the darkest tragedies, a new way to its own regeneration. Their main resource in never submitting to the fists of their crudest adversaries was their ceaseless selfcriticism. By voluntary admission of their own weakness or, speaking in religious symbols, of their own faithlessness towards their superhuman conscience, they renewed their human conscience, and with it their courage and mastery over life. Is not this moment rather convenient for self-criticism of such a kind? The religious symbols are a matter of strictly personal concern. But for any kind of religion, Jewish, Christian or Moslem, or for any irreligious belief in the omnipotence of an asymbolic nature, the Jewish conscience is sure to be a very real and a very powerful agent. If people saw the Jews seriously criticising themselves they would be deeply impressed and the better among them, who after all do exist in many camps, would feel some shame at participating in the horrors of an antisemitic revival, and would be ready to help Israel in fructifying the results of its self-examination through concrete actions.

A foreign wanderer in this Hebrew landscape, who owes it a good rumber of unforgettable impressions, is certainly not the right man publicly to discuss any mistakes which, in his opinion, have been made by its spirited settlers. He does not wish to point out single persons, deeds or plans. But perhaps he could show his gratitude by throwing some more light on a general tendency which, in this critical period, obviously acts as a factor of enormous harm to Jewish moral interests. It is nothing new, but it is not always seen in its right importance. Moreover, it is a psychological aberration whose healing lies entirely within the intimate scope of pure Zionism. If this movement aims to make of the Jewish nation a community among other communities, redeemed from the isolation of the ghetto and the fallacious assimilation of the Diaspora, no impulse in the heart of its people could be more offensive to its aim than the self-isolation evident in terroristic and kindred fanaticisms. It creates

a ghetto of the soul by assimilating itself to the disastrous power slogans of the most heathenish Gentiles: a double stroke at true national dignity. To this uncouth phenomenon of modern Jewish fanaticism a gentle onlooker, an unreserved sympathiser with the Jewish cause, would like to contribute some analytical conclusions derived in part from his experience of other varieties of national fanaticism.

II.

NO MOMENT appears more improper, and is in fact more proper for this kind of reflection than the present time of the nation's fight for its vital right. In quiet times fanaticism is but an immoral luxury, but in trouble and tension it is a deleterious poison. It provokes enemies where there were none before, and it strengthens those it attacks. The belief in its realistic usefulness is on the intellectual level of a man who, in a fit of hysterical obstinacy, throws himself from the top window of a sky-scraper and exclaims, while triumphantly enjoying the fresh air, 'Isn't this fine?'. 'Provided it lasts', added Napoleon's cautious mother during the glamorous rush of her family through similar suicidal glory. The Germans must have felt like that from the burning of the Reichstag down to their attack on Stalingrad. Fanaticism with its inmost cramp is not interested in success, it is interested in only one thing: itself. Its Latin name is 'solipsism', its chief moral feature—radical absence of responsibility.

The bomb-thrower is perhaps not personally cruel, but in his crazy satisfaction at 'being able to do something' he simply does not see that there are lives besides his own which he has not the right to endanger. The pretension of being at war most clearly reveals the illusory character of the fanatics; they have an ugly blindness for the fact that their victims are not their fighting opponents, but harmless and incidentally involved people. Instead of bombs, other supporters of fanaticism throw slogans and kill the intelligence, not in real children, but in child-like adherents of every age and sex. The commonest fanaticism is simply a readiness to be led by the fanatic, to believe in one's right to irresponsible luck and to accept around oneself with gusto a ring of hated prosecutors.

The abyss between the devoted follower of his cause and the fanatical admirer of his own zeal can be made clear in a moment. The real hero knows his limits and acknowledges the existence of other rights besides his own. In the heat of the struggle and by the slander of his enemies he might be confused with his fanatical caricature. In single instances there may be practical doubts how to judge a courageous action. But in the present situation in Palestine these individual misunderstandings are of slight relevance. What matters is a general and open display of fanatical principles and actions stubbornly pretending that they constitute a telling expression of Israel's newest awakening to collective realism. Certain antisemites would say that they constitute an expression of Israel's con-

tinuation of its most ancient sleep-walking in collective illusion. This point must be considered with the utmost delicacy. From the beginning the religious life of the Jews certainly had an ingredient of very strong self-isolation in which the present fanaticism may possibly have a traditional root. Are the two things really the same? Is this political blindness a modern variation of ancient religious isolationism? Did some Roman proconsul previously give his tough legionaries the same advice of injured haugthiness against it as has now been given by some British general to his bashful conscripts?

The Roman disdain, and sometimes hatred, of the Jews was in its core certainly religious; it came from the uneasiness felt by the broad-minded idoliser of many superhuman powers towards the austere worshipper of the one Deity, whose moral zeal condemned to nothingness the playful splendour of his heathenish competitors. If in our times polytheism were a living system, we could not deny its adherents the right to criticise monotheism as the Hellenes criticised it. But polytheism is not living; and we most categorically deny the bookish survivalists of pagan metaphysics the right to minimise, with merely imitative aestheticism, the wonderful exploit of the Hebrew prophets. It embodied the idea of the one Man in the sacred gesture of a nation fervidly concentrated in its devotion to the one God. Self-isolation in this unique case was only an unavoidable means of self-preservation. Fanaticism, by making safe this sublime idolatry of the idolless potence, though it was never a pleasant show, did at least remain purely passive and trespassed upon no foreign rights. Also, when Christianity and Islam took to themselves the privilege of the monotheistic faith, the Jews' 'gran rifiuto' to abandon to either their primogeniture for savoury lentils was an act of flourishing vigour, not of degenerate inflexibility. The three tests of this are: the inexhaustible treasure of religious culture in holy actions, thoughts, legends, poems and so on, heaped up by the scattered Israelitic communities through so many centuries: their rare efficiency in bringing Eastern wisdom to the barbaric West during the whole period of Europe's formation: and last but not least, their present donation of surviving oriental inheritance to the dissolving mental household of the white man—who greatly needs it.

In modern times, however, this astounding creativeness, which was by its own intention strictly confined to religious values, suffered decay within the general European and Hither-Asiatic decomposition of the monotheistic spirit. Man turned to nature, to free reason and creative art. So Jewish life became sterile in its core and sombrely fanatical (though always, of course, in the passive sense) on its surface. Israel's best children craved a renascence which was only made possible by their joining the progressive vogue of European civilisation. The legendary inaugurator of this new movement was Spinoza, and the European country where his voice was first heard by the greatest genii as a revelation was also the stage of the most

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fruitful Jewish endeavour along this assimilative line. As everyone knows, the debt of intellectually working and playing Germany to its biblical adepts, men and women, from Kant's critical apostle Marcus Herz to George's mystical apostle Friedrich Gundolf, from Rahel Levin to Margarete Susmann, is enormous. Nor could any other European nation complain of lacking rich contributions from its oriental members to the highest civilised spirit of Europe.

Towards the end of the 19th century the first signs of imminent catastrophe appeared before the public eye in Central Europe. An atmosphere of fin-de-siècle agitation spread, and provoked varying excitements of 'sky-high jubilation' and 'death-deep sorrow'. Subtly organised brains observed the lack of common forces amongst all the glories of individual success. New forms of community, political and economic, nationalist and socialist, were hotly discussed. From these moods arose, characteristically in the Austrian, that is, the European-minded German capital, the Jewish movement which raised the thrilling aim of forming such a desirable community in the old Falestine. Every excitement, when compressed into slogans, is justified by nothing but the fertile impulses it attracts, condenses and leads to creative work. Thus the Zionist excitement justified itself by the creation, in less than half a century, of the living Zion which is here.

TIT.

IN THE MEANTIME, however, the dreaded cataclysm had descended. Germany became the centre of two global concussions by emitting ever more brownish floods of subhuman alluvium. The universal motive of the Teutonic excesses was fear, hysterical terror in face of threatening chaos, and secretly craved annihilation. The great antidote to the passive nihil was the active nihil, the negation of humanity for negation's sake, the totalitarian cramp of soulless power, whirling shapeless masses round a void gravitation centre called the 'führer'. The fundamental quality needed for the fixation of this sort of hysterical mass devotion in every single wretch's mind is, of course, fanaticism — superstitious belief in the central fetish's power, blind self-immersion in the whirling mass, venomous ignorance of the enemy. The enemy as a reality of its own does not exist, and if he existed, he would not be perceived. His substance must be pure fancy in order to excite the antagonistic instincts of the reluctantly hating mass creature. The only responsibility towards him is to misunderstand him; the only satisfaction, to be feared, or at least hated, by him. This disastrous parody of the most elementary values had attractive charms for uprooted and scared masses over many continents and, alas, its infection found an easy way into the heart of the imagined enemy himself, who had become in reality a millionfold victim of the nihilist's murderous frenzy.

At every moment and in every place where real work was possible, fanaticism was absent from the Zionists' life. What cut of desert was

changed into a garden except by common skill and positive enthusiasm? What house was built, what book was printed, even what fight against bandits was put up, except by common efficiency and courage? What would irresponsible self-isolation have meant in all these? It came in only in the sphere of unreal struggle towards unreal or unreally conceived aims. To avoid misunderstandings: the fatal situation which was the base of the sad distortion of Jewish fighting power into reckless fanaticism would be ascribed by no objective observer to the fault of the Zionists. If there had been honest energy, progressive efficiency and 'the wood from which kings are carved' -real, not only pretentious, superiority-at the disposal of the Mandatory Power, the problem of Palestine as a vicious entanglement would not exist. When we think it necessary to discuss Jewish fanaticism, it is not with regard to the past, but to the future. It is not a question either of excusing the Teutonic infection. It is excused a thousand times. Nevertheless, one's appreciation of the rich resources in the Jewish soul would lead one to expect that, in spite of its tragic bereavements, it will in the long run be superior to these weaknesses which are so sympathetically understood.

Jewish fanaticism is by no means a simple imitation of Nazidom. In one aspect it is worse—not as a murderous threat, but as a disheartening abuse of finer mental gifts. The Germans, after all, are sick. They inherit the dangerous reserves of half-barbaric crudity, never, especially in the northern and eastern parts, having fully assimilated the wisdom of Christianity. But their fanaticism is based on no intellectual energy; it is a beastly cramp, an hysterical aberration. The scared masses enjoyed obeying, the leaders in themselves were nothing, they were just hollow masks of commanders who were there to be obeyed. All their brain equipment was mere mud. The ugly mess remains, so to speak, in the sphere of bodily indecency. So a blowing up of the spook is imaginable at any time. But for the brainy Jews the brutish German emotionalism was the catalytic agent of a far more refined decomposition. The old religious motives of self-isolation reappeared in pseudo-religious arrogance. What was the faith in a power which had chosen its own people, but punished it severely for all its irresponsible lapses from its duty, now became simply the faith in one's own superior right, without the shadow of a feeling that the 'elected' might sin and be tried and punished for it. This kind of moral pretension without moral effort most naturally embitters the despised but stronger antagonist. Display of intellectual superiority always hurts. But if it is supported by moral cynicism, based upon moral exclusivity, it may provoke cold fury. Offensive manners may complete the catastrophe. We must not forget that in some parts of Palestine the former ghetto of Eastern Europe is still existing and conserves a state of paralysed monotheistic rigidity from which the happier Jews of Central and Western Europe had fled to more humane, if not yet perfect, freedom.

On the surface, the poverty and lower class frustration in those parts produced manners and gestures which were only fleeting episodes in the long epic of Jewish history, and which, in the fresh air of the Palestinian village, tend to evaporate, but still can lend, in the eyes of a malevolent antagonist, a more repulsive appearance to the repellence of aberring aims.

To conclude these pathetic reflections: the Nazi folly pendulated between the great miracle and the great nihil. Reason, always a sore point in German psychology, was suppressed. In Jewish fanaticism it is by no means suppressed, and gives method to its folly. The mad alternatives of a common burning scene, surpassing the Nibelungen despairs with sombre historical records, on the one hand, and on the other incredible luck, not arrived at by meritorious actions, but magically induced by stubborn belief in an absurdity—when will they stop provoking subtle argumentation and logical casuistry? The past offers not a single instance of the total collapse of a sound working group, and it gives many instances of what we may call a miracle: that a group in its hard fight, when inspired by a revival of its deepest moral forces, throws away the poisoned arms which were smuggled into its hands by hostile deceit, and finds in the lifting storm a way of strengthening the peaceful and prosperous community with the addition of its former adversaries. One thing is certain: the world wants, and still more, needs, peaceful collaboration, and the example of the Jews would give it immense hope which in its turn would reflect like a warming beam on its authors. The fight against the Nazi infection is still the world theme. Any Jewish advance along this steep road would bring them as allies those who find the courage to make similar progress. These results, of course, must ripen slowly. 'Now or never' cannot help. But the tenacious and sober belief in the future seems a better solace, even in the darkest hour, than the Teuton-like but sophisticated dice-casting at the banks of imaginary Rubicons.

IV.

A FULL RESTITUTION of the genuinely Jewish fighting style (which even at this moment is by no means corrupted, but only confused) would not limit its field of action to this tiny margin between desert and sea salt. Zionism was begotten in the pulsing heart of international Jewry. All its evolutions have an immediate effect on the great community which is global today. But what does dispersion on the earth's surface mean in our time of air-conditioned traffic and ether-conditioned talk? When Croydon is nearer to Jerusalem for Weizmann than Jerusalem was to Jaffa for Herzl, and when the speeches of a Zionist Congress in Switzerland are being caught sooner by every kibbutz radio listener than by the back-bencher in the meeting hall, the sharp division between Yishuv and Diaspora has vanished. The steadily closer interwoven world problems at all points

on the planet make the union of national groups unshakable, wherever their single representatives settle. Thus, on the one hand, the tension of Palestine settlement is greatly reduced. The Yishuv does not need certain iron walls of independence, which in earlier decades were deemed both decorative and protective. But on the other hand, the Yishuv's responsibility towards its Jewish brethren who are living in close contact with the other nations has become more urgent. Total assimilation is dated by the bourgeois 19th century, which seems more antiquated, as far as Israel is concerned, than the epoch of the Persian kings. So the Jews' reinforced international community finds one, if not the only, moral centre in the old country, whose inhabitants become pioneers not for thousands, but for millions. From this point of view, too, iron walls are a nuisance. In other words, the horrid fetish 'state' has lost the last vestige of its vampirish right. It is not necessary to go into this problem in further detail. Whatever ineffective innocence was shown in face of its venomous nature fifty years ago could be pardoned—but today it is the all-round symbol of everything negative in social development. Its sorcerer-devotees' only interior power, humming in empty brain spaces all around the globe, is, of course, the same fanaticism which we observe distorting the fine features of regenerating Judah.

We do not want to close this criticism without putting it in its right perspective. The participation of the two other peoples concerned in the Palestine muddle must be evaluated in a few words as far as they are co-agents or co-sufferers in the fanatical tension. We have already hinted at the British ruler's factual responsibility for the present situation. Without embarking on political excursions, the meteorologist who is interested in the moral weather changes must fall into deep sorrow, the more so as he is convinced that the last substantial reserves of European humanity have been entrusted to the English nation. When, into the bargain, he has experienced the long process of Nazification in Germany, he cannot help stating with horror some familiar symptoms of the ugly invading disease. The central point is the reckless tapping of the anti-Jewish underworld mud when it is considered useful for the daily conflict. Or in fact it is not a question of use, but of obsession. One fears that the same leaders, though inflicting cruel pain on their victims, really believe themselves to be the victims. The material symbol of this kind of prosecution mania is the barbed wire. It spreads over the whole surface of Jewish Palestine like a vicious rash on human skin. Every private British soldier trips about as if wearing a personal barbed wire crinoline, while the officers and leading officials keep the barbed wire expression between their eyes and on their lips. It seems the Second World War has been won only as far as tanks and bombs could go. We should like to think ourselves over-sensitive to these symptoms, and hope to be refuted by healthy deeds. Do people in England clearly see the very danger for England? It would not be

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the first time that the decisive virus of decomposition penetrated from Imperial rotting limbs to the heart of the Mother Country.

For the Jews, anyhow, there is no choice. As long as the British Empire exists they have got to appeal to its progressive forces in order to unite in a common effort against the common Nazi enemy, who in varying masquerade skims over both partners' faces grinning wickedly.

The Jewish responsibility towards the Arabs is very simply defined. It is not only a question of politics, but it deals with permanent and vital values. Zionism decided to settle among the Arabs. As these old owners of the country had lived for many centuries under an incredibly corrupt foreign rule and as nothing had been done to preserve Palestine right and left of the Jordan from falling into full desert abjection the Zionist enterprise was justified by all humane principles. But it included, of course, from the beginning the strict duty not only not to interfere with the rights of the neglected Palestinians, but to make the new settlement a centre of progressive civilisation, contributing to the rescue of the Middle East from Ottoman dissolution. Here interfered, tragically for the sincerest Jewish endeavour, the maddening ambiguity of British Colonial Policy which did everything to separate the despised 'natives' from the intruding European 'Boers'. Nevertheless the raising of the Arab level, though quite insufficient, since the separation from Turkey, became an undoubted accessory to the Jewish settlement. So the base of future mutual understanding between the two Semitic groups is not damaged by facts. The picturesque ruins of oriental feudalism have been so far strong enough to bar an upheaval of the toiling masses who greatly need it. It will come however, and the Jews are responsible for being useful in a brotherly function to the right side. No less urgent seems the intellectual adaptation of the Arab minds to the inevitable problems of modern humanity. Certainly they bring to it noble gifts dreamingly rooted in the magic soil of our most venerable ancient culture. For a superficially modernised petty bourgeois intelligentsia the nationalist appeal is necessarily of dangerous charm, and Jewish fanaticism would only serve to encourage its fusion in primitive savagery with Nazi technique. We must be satisfied to know that in both the social and the spiritual aspect the most enlightened socialists and the most experienced intellectuals on the Jewish side clearly see the way they have to go. Hashomer Hatzair and Ihud are living testimonies to this positive fact. They are small minorities. But hopes raised on easily accepted popular slogans would be no hopes in a tempestuous period like ours. The fate of the Palestinian Jews and of the Jews in general is but quite superficially distinct from the fate of any human group on our planet. All is change and danger and hope. By their unique gift of expression the Jews are only privileged in that they may more easily set a great example. September, 1946.

PAST PROGNOSES — RIGHT AND WRONG

FORECASTS AND WHAT THEY ARE WORTH

October, 1944

It appears to me that the time has now come for drawing up the balance. At any rate, the time is very near at hand. He who inclines his ear and listens to what is and what is not being said, and how it is said or left unsaid, must needs perceive the first signs of disenchantment. For the present the voice of disenchantment is still stifled and suppressed, and an appearance of normality is being strenuously kept up. There is yet no frank confession of the sins committed and the mistakes made. But that is a very human and natural attitude to adopt during the first hours of disenchantment, and we cannot reasonably complain of it. The process of change is slow, halting, quiet and, as it were, a little ashamed of itself; or, to use another figure of speech, it walks on tiptoe. And those who beat a retreat are in the habit of hiding their discomfiture behind a show of noisy arrogance. However, let us refrain from jeering at such changes; for by jeering and scoffing, we should only strengthen the obstinacy of those erring souls and retard the return to reality which we desire. Although it is our duty to assist in this process of disenchantment as much as possible, truth is in any case bound to emerge sooner or later, victorious over the obstacles it meets.

What then are the signs of this hour of political disenchantment? There are four of them: a) the discountenancing of decayed slogans b) their disappearance c) a shifting of emphasis d) a gradual and stealthy return to slogans formerly despised. These four signs are all to be seen in the camp of the Zionist majority, who for five whole years has refused to listen to us. At times we are astounded at the unerring way in which our own views and opinions have stood the test of time. For our forecasts, the doubts we voiced, the warnings we gave, the political means we recognised as false, — how much of this has even now been tragically vindicated by events! And that the rest will also come true — and in precisely the manner we predicted — is by now only too obvious to all those who look reality in the face.

Can it be that we were so much wiser than the others? Nothing could be more foolish than an attempt to explain the rightness of our predictions in terms of personal superiority. Our superior wisdom is capable of one explanation, and one only: the course we followed was the course of true Zionism. Hence our path was the right path. In this case, as in others, the Lord of Hosts was not in the earthquake, but in the still, small voice..... S. Zemah

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The comprehensive report just published by the General Council of the British Labour Party includes a proposal concerning the future of Palestine. There can really be no doubt that the intentions of the authors of this proposal are disinterested and sympathetic. Nor can one doubt their sincere desire to help the cause of the Jewish people and its revival in Zion. We ought indeed to be glad that, even in these troubled days, new friends of the unfortunate Jewish people stand up, courageous enough to voice from the platforms of world politics an emphatic demand that our people shall have justice.

However, this is the very reason why, bitter though it may appear, we are bound to say that the scheme as it stands does not advance the realisation of the aims of the Zionist cause. On the contrary, its effect may well be to delay and imperil it. The fact is that the just demand for the abolition of the arbitrary restrictions imposed by the White Paper on Jewish immigration and Jewish settlement in Palestine has been linked with a recommendation for the transfer of the Arab 'minority' from Palestine. Years ago, for the first time, a similar proposal came from the Royal Commission, and in our view it then caused, both in Palestine and in neighbouring Arab countries, more empoisoning of the atmosphere than even the proposed partition which was the main recommendation of the Commission's scheme.

The idea of 'transfer' is regarded by all of us as most strange indeed.

Just as we shall never give up our right to return to our homeland, so there is no doubt that the Arabs. too, will never give up their right to continue to live in this part of their homeland. And just as we shall never, of our own accord. leave the fields and vineyards we have cultivated and planted and the holy places that are dear to us. even if we are offered the most generous compensation, so, it may safely be assumed, would it be the case with the Arabs. 'What is loathsome to yourself, do not do unto your neighbour'. Zionism can derive no benefit whatever from such a proposal.

The Zionist movement has again and again declared with justice that its goal can be fully achieved without a single Arab being ousted from his lands. Repeatedly we have drawn attention to the fact that the Zionist enterprise, so far from having ever harmed Arab interests in any way, has bestowed economic advantages on them. The fact is that the numbers of Palestine Arabs have grown considerably during the last 28 years. Significantly enough, the authors of the 'Biltmore' programme (which we do not support) have recently shown an appreciable measure of understanding for the dangerous implications of the 'transfer' idea, realising that it would threaten both our moral and our political foundation. Shall we be able to hold our own in face of the misguided advice of friends as vigorously and with the same determination as we did when confronted with the evil schemes of our enemies?

$A \quad NEW \quad PROSPECT$

August, 1945.

The victory of the Labour Party in Britain is a big event, revealing the moral greatness of the British and proving their political maturity. They are now really and truly out for the establishment of a new Britain. Seeing that they can no longer rely on the Conservatives, they have decided to give the historic chance to others, this time to Labour.

Doubtless an attempt will soon be made to establish British industry on new foundations, as otherwise it will hardly be possible successfully to compete with the United States and with Russia, or avoid the risk of becoming a second class power. Now the people of Britain has a free hand to carry out housing and general insurance schemes, and to develop public medical services and work towards full employment.

In European countries such as Greece, Italy, Yugoslavia and Austria, Fascist or semi-Fascist groups will be allowed to rise to power no more; instead, liberal and socialist elements will receive encouragement. By this means Russia, too, will be made aware of the birth of fresh prospects for the building of a new world based on juster social foundations than we used to know. It will be of interest to see to what extent the results of the British elections will influence American public opinion. They would probably have been a source of strength to the late Mr. Roosevelt. Now they will occupy the uncertain vacuum created by his death.

The British Empire will not pass into a state of liquidation; it will only become more liberal and less reactionary. The British policy for India will now receive a fresh impetus which may lead to success. Also the Arab world and the Middle East generally will probably secure a wider measure of political freedom and new opportunities for social and economic development.

For us in Palestine, the British elections constitute a new turning

point. The situation cannot remain as it is. The Labour Government will surely look for a way out of the present political tangle, taking full account of the rights of both peoples, Arabs and Jews alike. Particularly will they endeavour whole-heartedly to encourage Jewish immigration into Palestine. The previous declarations of the Labour Party cannot have been only lipservice.

But when yesterday's opposition leaders seek at once to put into full effect their own political declarations on Palestine, they will find that everything is not as smooth as it looks. It is to be feared that they will encounter fierce opposition if they revert to the partition scheme. Mr. Churchill's Government is said to have been inclined to accept * such a solution. Let us hope that the Labour Government will make no attempt further to reduce the area of Palestine, as this would infuriate large sections of both communities.

There is also another course, which has never been embarked upon by any Government: for almost the space of a generation the policy of encouraging rapprochement and comradeship between the two peoples has been altogether ignored. Now the time has arrived for an attempt to advance in another direction, following the path of Jewish-Arab-British cooperation. Let us hope that the Labour Government will go into the matter thoroughly and come to the conclusion that this is the only possible course in line with true British tradition, and the only one beneficial to all concerned.

This course will not by any means be easy, nor will it be a short cut. It will take time and really great efforts, continuous and methodical, will have to be made. However, at its end stands success.

It is to be hoped that one of the first things decided will be the admission to Palestine of thousands

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of Jewish refugees, Jews whose hearts are in Palestine. A statement from the Labour Government on the necessity for Jewish-Arab cooperation would be a first step towards the opening of the country to all the homeless fugitives who are at present distributed in provisional shelters, and who keep knocking at the gates of Palestine.

The hour has struck. We may now start once more to breathe the air of friendly cooperation with

AZZAM BEY'S STATEMENT

October, 1945.

Even now there are Arabs still holding out a hand to us and the British Government in order to help the Palestine problem to a peaceful solution in which the needs of the Jewish people would be taken into account. Azzam Bey, the Secretary of the Arab League, has recently stated that "the Arabs are prepared to make far-reaching concessions towards the gratification of the Jewish desire to see Palestine established as a spiritual or even as " a material home." (Haaretz, 24.10) When he said that, he was perhaps, as some people are inclined to assume, thinking of a partition of the country; as a matter of fact some time ago he stated that the Arabs were prepared to consider a suitable scheme; "No Arab body has recanted what he then stated" (Haaretz, 24.10). But is it really certain that Azzam Bey only thought of partition? Or should we see in his words an expression of general preparedness to find a compromise solution? This is how Azzam Bey

motivated his readiness to consider a partition scheme:

"If you could assure me that the handing of Palestine to the Jews would mean peace everywhere, I should give them all of it. However, such a solution would involve constant conflicts like those which developed in Ireland. But if a partition of the country is likely to effect a solution and put an end to the present disturbed situation, let us study such a possibility most carefully" (Le Progrès Egyptien, 5.10. **1945**).

It would appear that it is not the manner of solution that matters most, but the ultimate goal; not just a partition scheme, but a solution which would guarantee peace in this country. If we were able to bring up for international and Arab-Jewdiscussion another solution scheme, under which the country would not have to be carved up. who knows whether we should not even now find a way out of the impasse? 1

ANTI-ZIONIST DECLARATIONS BY JEWS IN ARAB COUNTRIES

October, 1945.

Our press publishes a great deal of scornful, and at the same time. pitying comment on those Jews of Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut and other places who have recently declared their loyalty to the anti-

Zionist policy of their respective Governments. Mostly, this comment stresses that the statements made by those Jews do not reflect the real views of Jewry in the Arab countries, but that in truth Iraqi,

¹ In a press conference on July 8, 1946, Azzam Pasha said: "The Arabs and the Jews are not really opposed to each other. There is no reason why with patience, negotiations, time and the pacification of spirits we cannot find a way out of this thorny problem."

Syrian and Lebanese Jews, who have never put up either with their surroundings or with their dispersion generally, are yearning for a chance of speedy immigration into Palestine, and of complete redemption in the homeland. It is also said in the press comment published in the Hebrew papers that the authors of these declarations are well-to-do Jews who are only loosely connected with their community, and that they are more concerned for their own welfare than that of their people. Furthermore it is explained that even these people have not delivered their declarations of their own accord and in conformity with their real opinions, but under duress, as they had to yield to the despotic authorities of the Arab

states. It may safely be assumed that most of the above press comment is essentially correct. The desire for immigration into Palestine is rather strong in the Arab countries, though there are certain differences and nuances in it: the desire to emigrate is, for instance, stronger in the Yemen than in Syria, and stronger in the latter country than in Egypt. It is true, of course, that "notables" are always bound to submit to the pressure of the authorities to a greater extent, and that it often becomes difficult for them to distinguish their own private interests from those of their community. But not all of them act under duress. There are some deliberate assimilators among them who, like certain Jews of similar standing in Europe or America, have never re- arbitrary attitude of the latter ceived any kind of national or Zionist education.

From this point on, however, things become rather conjectural. There are certain aspects of the problem which, as far as can be seen, have never been covered in the Hebrew press. What, in fact, are the genuine interests of the Jewish minorities in the Arab countries? They are twofold: On one hand, political and economic equality of rights, both in theory and in practice; and on the other, freedom to maintain contacts with Palestine and the

Zionist movement and to start local Zionist organisations, as well as to have a free hand in the fields of Zionist and Hebrew education and pioneer training for future agricultural work in the upbuilding of Palestine. The Jewish minorities living in Arab countries need all that no less than the rest of Jewry. They must also be intent on preserving their right to emigrate from their countries to Palestine, taking their fortunes with them.

The conditions in which Jews are living under Arab rule are far from satisfactory. They vary somewhat from country to country. In the matter of equality of rights, Jews are particularly badly served in the Yemen. This is clearly reflected in the extent of Jewish immigration into Palestine from that country. The number of Yemenite immigrants, in fact, exceeds the total from all other Arab countries. In Egypt, by contrast, the situation of Jewry is relatively good. Accordingly, the extent of emigration of Egyptian Jews into Palestine at the moment is almost negligible. In the Lebanon and in Syria, conditions up to a short time ago resembled those prevailing in Egypt. Recently, however, the feeling of security among Syrian Jews has been shaken, and there has been a turn for the worse in their legal and juridical status.

In so far as the anti-Zionist statements delivered by Jews residing in Arab countries are really the result of pressure exerted upon them by the local authorities, the should be strongly blamed. Such dealing does not harmonise with the Arab national liberation movement, which might have been expected to show an inkling of understanding for the Jewish national liberation movement; and it constitutes no proper course for countries claiming membership in the family of democratic nations. It should be stressed that in Egypt the situation is more satisfactory than in the other Arab countries, despite the fact that for several generations a large part of Egypt6194

While the establishment of a local Zionist Organisation and the pursuit of Zionist activities are legal in Egypt, things are quite different in the Yemen and Syria. There they are banned altogether. In the Lebanon, the situation in this respect is rapidly deteriorating. Immigration into Palestine from the Lebanon has now been completely prohibited.

This is the situation of Jewry in the Arab countries at present, according to the scanty reports that reach us. The Zionist policy is, therefore, confronted with the double problem: What can be done to improve the situation, both as regards general security and equality of rights for Jews in Arab countries, and as regards their freedom to maintain contacts with the Zionist Movement and with Palestine?

It is certainly easier to answer this extremely serious question negatively rather than positively and to say what the Zionist movement must not do, for fear of worsening the position of Jewry in these countries. It is quite clear that any step which might harm Arab-Jewish relations in Palestine would react adversely on these Jews in neighbouring territories. Our leaders must be fully conscious of this interconnection when adopting important political decisions or before issuing important statements. While this consideration cannot, of course, be the only decisive factor, it must never be overlooked, as it concerns the well-being of one of the largest groups of our people. (The estimated number of Jews in Eastern countries is 750,000). It must be borne in mind that Eastern Jewry constitutes one of the most important reserves for the upbuilding of our homeland.

It is far more difficult to give a positive reply to the above question.

Not every improvement in Arab-Jewish relations in Palestine will automatically produce an improvement in the conditions of Jewry in the Arab countries. It may be assumed that such a change for the better in Palestine might improve their civic status and give them an increased sense of security, but on the other hand, just this very amelioration might weaken their desire to emigrate to Palestine.

Such is the dilemma in which our brethren living in the Arab countries find themselves. Our journalists, however, whose comment on them is published in the Hebrew press, live in far less complicated conditions. We must beware of adding to the difficulties of Iraqi, Syrian and Lebanese Jews by worsening unnecessarily our relations with the Palestine Arabs. Even if we could rescue European Jewry by such a policy, at the expense of our brethren in the Arab countries, it would be an extremely grave and bitter responsibility to undertake. However, this alternative does not exist and the situation is that the same difficulties which obstruct the realization of Zionism in Palestine also encumber Jewish life in the Arab countries. By removing these difficulties in Palestine, we shall certainly not aggravate the problems in Arab countries. On the contrary, in the long run, it would make life easier for Jews under Arab rule.

I should not like to be a prophet of doom, but I regard it as my duty to say that the contrary way, leading to constant strife between the two communities in this country, would probably convert these Jews into anti-Zionists in time; anti-Zionism would then appear not only in the statements of their spokesmen, but what would be far worse, it would come from the hearts of these Jewish masses!... Let us hope that Eastern Jews will never fall victims either to the pressure of the despots of the Arab world under whose rule some of them are now living or to the political blunders of the Jewish leaders in this country. E. Simon

INNOCENT VICTIMS

November 25, 1945.

When the British Labour Party assumed power, a change of policy was expected by all Jews of Palestine. When this failed to come into being, patience which had indeed been sorely tried, translated itself into over-growing tension. On the night of November 2, 1945, acts of sabotage were carried out on railway stretches throughout Palestine, apparently intending this to serve as a warning that Jews are capable of rendering Palestine useless for Imperial communications, should their demands not be met. During the ensuing curfew and searches and in the course of demonstrations against both these punitive measures as well as against the policy of deliberate procrastination, there were casualties in Tel Aviv, several children included.

"Davar" has been suspended for a week. We protest against this ruling, as we do in all cases of restriction of the freedom of speech, and of the freedom of press. We do hope that by the time these lines appear in print, the newspaper of the Jewish Labour Federation (or rather, of its majority) will again be reaching its scores of thousands of readers. Then "Davar" will be able to reply to our criticism, which we make, not because of the provisional ban imposed on the paper, but in spite of it. We are tackling an important problem here, and not even the ban imposed on "Davar" by the authorities should be allowed to silence the voice calling for a domestic clarification.

In the last number of "Davar," just before the suspension of the paper, a cartoon appeared, showing young children of 6 or 7 who were wounded in the streets of Tel Aviv during the recent events. The legend read: . problem and the deep roots of our "Excellent snipers they are. They have not missed their targets, small though they were." The cartoon and the caption are intended fo make a twofold impression: a) The children were roaming the streets of Tel Aviv "innocently" during the curfew hours, and in this adults bore no responsibility whatsoever. b) The British soldiers fired on these children intentionally. Both these assumptions are incorrect, the second of them even more so than the first.

It cannot be assumed that the children were in the streets, during

the curfew hours, simply out of curiosity. The fact is that during the last few years an ugly habit has spread among us of sending children to participate in all kinds of political demonstrations, and even in rioting. Those of our teachers and educators who wholeheartedly oppose this ugly practice have no influence whatever on their "patriotic" colleagues, and the vociferations of demagogues have succeeded in silencing the consciences of many parents. If there is any need for demonstrations, let the leaders march in the front ranks, but leave young children in peace!

The second assumption is even less true. We are now conducting a bitter struggle against England. Mr. Bevin's statement has given rise to much disappointment among Britain's friends in the Zionist movement, because it entirely disregarded the national character of our movement, and utterly ignored the most vital needs of our people. The opportunities offered by Mr. Bevin for the abolition of the White Paper — opportunities which require all our attention and all our sense of responsibility — cannot make up for the fact that his statement has entirely ignored our vital national needs. It has aroused the anger not only of "Davar" and of its cartoonist. But we must not allow our mental equilibrium to be disturbed by Mr. Bevin's statement. Surely, even now, we can say: The British soldier in Palestine is, gen-

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issued at that time. Now, however, it would seem that that order has been revoked. Now they open fire, if need be, and sometimes blood flows; blood of adults and children alike. It is quite terrible, and there are people responsible for that blood, both among the British and in our own camp. But the British soldier who shoots on receiving an order to do so, and who formerly restrained himself, also acting upon instructions, is to be blamed least of all. The British soldier, too, is a victim of the foolish and inhuman policy carried out by both, or even by all three. parties concerned in the political struggle. Our children, in particular,

are the victims of this policy, whether they are hit by bullets or "only" injured to the depth of their souls.

Difficile est satiram non scribere, and possibly it is also hard to avoid drawing a cartoon, a cartoon about those politics that have brought us so far, about those politics which have united against us the two other factors in this country, and which keep wasting, to no purpose at all, the constructive energies and goodwill of our youths, directing them to "wage war" against Britain, instead of rallying them round building and creative tasks in towns and villages, in the domain of immigration and settlement, and also in that kind of defence which never exceeds its predetermined duty. How sad that the spirit of the Irgun Zevai Leumi has started to reign supreme in the camp of selfdefence, even at the time when Revisionist politics have got the upper hand in the political sphere. It is this terrifying consistency that is mocked by the humorist and caricatured by the cartoonist; but he who deplores it can contemplate it only with tears in his eyes.

E. Simon

FAILURE AND PROGRESS

November, 1945.

Mr. Bevin's long-awaited statement of November 13, 1945, which all Zionists had expected would open up at least some vista of attempts in the future at a satisfactory solution of the Palestine problem and would rescind at least the most cruel restrictions on Jewish immigration and land sales, imposed by the White Paper of 1939, came as a bitter blow to all. Instead of trying to find some means of satisfying the acknowledged and just national demands of both the Jewish and Arab peoples, the statement only dealt with the refugee problem, which, it alleged, could not be solved by Palestine alone. It provided for an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry to be sent out, with orders to submit its findings within 120 days. This delay meant yet another winter for homeless Jews in Europe — alas, not the last one...

The official Zionist policy has failed, and the Zionist movement has suffered a heavy blow. While

could have been achieved by our following another political course, we were always perfectly sure that we cannot assert that better results the official Biltmore policy would

This is, alas, no longer absolutely true; the attitude of the "average British soldier" has changed for the worse.

fail in the end, and that that failure would entail grave results for the entire movement.

The official Zionist policy has actually failed. This was declared by some of its own supporters, as early as a few weeks ago. They themselves asked that the course should be altered. They did not call for a change of the Zionist goal, but for a change of methods. They asked that the traditional methods of the Zionist movement—propaganda, information, negotiations—should be abandoned and replaced by political methods which we had always de-

nounced and utterly despised. The official claim for the conversion of Palestine in its entirety into a Jewish state, has been rejected by the British Labour Government, by the same circles who, a few months before, had adopted the official Zionist policy, the Biltmore programme. The British Labour Party accepted at the time not only 100%, but 120% of "Biltmore" by deciding on two additions to that programme: The extension of the boundaries of Palestine, and the transfer of the Arab population by their own consent. And we still remember: When the Labour Government came to power in Britain, the Jewish inhabitants of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv went about with jubilation in their eyes in the streets of their cities, holding in their hands the list of members of the new Cabinet, and proclaiming that there was a Zionist majority in the British cabinet. And these very people have now issued a statement showing that they have not the least idea of what Zionism is, and of what the Jewish problem is. The fact is that, in the whole new document, not the slightest reference to the Jewish people will be found. They only speak of a "Jewish community". They recognize a Jewish Home, but the word "national" has been dropped! They have not a single word to say about Zionist enterprise in this country, that enterprise which had been highly praised in the White Paper, not to mention the Royal Commission Report. Twice in the new

document it is stated that the problem of the Jewish Community has arisen as a result of Nazi persecutions. We have before us not only a mixture of ignorance and lack of appreciation, but in addition we find a further echo of that official Zionist argument, which during the last few years used to guide us to base our political demands on the present plight of Jewry, and especially on the refugee problem.

Mr. Bevin's statement was welcomed by the world press and by the non-Jewish public in Britain, but hardly in the United States of America. However, in my view this document has by no means been compiled by a statesman who knows his job. It does not compare in any way with the Royal Commission Report, nor with Mr. Churchill's White Paper of 1922. There was a fine chance to make a new approach to the Palestine policy, if the authors of the document had tackled the problem with courage, and if they had let themselves be guided by the principles preached both by the Labour party and by the Labour Government, as far as general political problems are concerned. Mr. Bevin's statement does not reflect any confidence in the possibility of reshaping the political world, nor does it betray the least desire to carry out any big reform in this country, which is a Holy Land to three great religions. True, it is difficult to bridge the differences of religion and language, of cultural and social life, and of ways of thought and conduct. But woe to the leaders of the Labour Party if they recoil before such difficulties, since they will encounter no less difficult problems in other parts of the Empire as well. Such problems can only be solved by constructive ideas. In Mr. Bevin's statement no strong revolutionary inclination manifests itself, marching forward, impelled by a hearty desire to remove all obstacles in the way of reconstruction in this destroyed world of ours. From this point of view, Mr. Bevin's statement is a sinister warning to the entire world, which has been waiting for wise reforms.

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Instead of the new motto for which we had been waiting, Mr. Bevin not only describes, almost with pleasure, the difficulties arising from the differences dividing the two peoples, but also maintains that "the Government has always endeavoured to find some settlement under which both Jews and Arabs would be able to live side by side in peace and co-operate for the benefit of the country as a whole, but all those endeavours have been in vain". We have heard a great deal about the continuity in British Government policy. We know that succeeding Governments fully honour the undertakings of their predecessors; therefore, no doubt, we should show some understanding for the fact that the Labour Government has not been courageous enough to cancel, in one sweep, the White Paper which is part of the heritage of the Chamberlain period. But we fail to grasp why the Labour Government have deemed it necessary to identify themselves with their predecessors' policy of inaction, and have even ventured to say that his Majesty's Government has never shrunk from any effort to bring about peaceful relations between the two peoples. To this last statement we can only say: "No, gentlemen". Both peoples, whatever differences divide them, are of the opinion that His Majesty's Government has done nothing, or very little indeed, towards the bridging of the gap between them, and that it has not made any effort to find a constructive solution which would enable both peoples to live peacefully together. We have become used to the argument that they "have made every effort" from Jewish official quarters, too. But, surely, had both the Government and the Jews really been making such efforts to create conditions in which Arab-Jewish co-operation would be possible, there would have been no need either for the new Inquiry Committee, or for the new statement delivered by the Government. It is these very general phrases, the wording and composition of the

rise to bitter disappointment, even in circles that were ready to understand the difficulties in which the Labour Government found themselves, and were ready to wait with confidence and patience for a new statement from the Labour Government on British policy in Palestine.

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Moreover, the fierce pain we suffered in the past, because no effective action was taken to rescue the remnant of our homeless refugees, should not be overlooked. True, we know that the Labour Government acts with the utmost caution in other political fields as well, but its conduct over the question of certificates really exceeds all limits of reasonable caution, and shows a measure of timidity which does not add in any way to the honour of the Government of a great power. In all statements that preceded Mr. Bevin's, the monthly quota of 1500 certificates was mentioned as a minimum proportion of what was really required. Yet in spite of this, neither President Truman's intervention—though the political weight of the President of the USA can hardly be exaggerated—nor the efforts made by the Labour Party, nor the pressure of public opinion throughout the world, have succeeded in adding to that shamefully small minimum even a single certificate.

The Yishuv and the entire Jewish people expected some kind of liberal gesture in the matter of certificates. The immediate grant of say 30,000 certificates as a contribution towards easing the desperate situation of the refugees would not have driven the Arab world to revolt, and it would have considerably lessened the resentment roused by the contents of Mr. Bevin's utterly depressing statement.

been making such efforts to create conditions in which Arab-Jewish co-operation would be possible, there would have been no need either for the new Inquiry Committee, or for the new statement delivered by the Government. It is these very general phrases, the wording and composition of the wording and composition of the mew document, which have given

But we should not be blind to the fact that this document contains positive points, too—rays of light, as it were. First of all, we must stress that in Mr. Bevin's statement no confirmation whatsoever can be found of the White Paper of 1939.

Mr. Bevin adduces a great number of statements of policy issued by His Majesty's Government during

the last few years, but it is quite possible that that very accumulation of quotations was intended to reduce the importance of each statement. Moreover, the fact remains that Mr. Bevin's statement has reopened the discussion of the Palestine problem, and has made possible the revision of that White Paper which has now ceased to be the last word in Britain's policy in Palestine.

A committee consisting of British and American representatives has been set up. They are to investigate the Palestine problem all over again, and to submit their recommendations to the Governments of both Great Britain and the United States of America, both those intended to relieve the needs of the hour, and those pertaining to a permanent solution. A further point in Mr. Bevin's statement was that, while His Majesty's Government would take, on their own initiative, the decision with regard to the temporary arrangements to be made, the decision concerning a final solution would rest with the United Nations.

It is true that the investigations of such a committee must proceed at a slow pace, and also that the need to have the recommendations approved by the United Nations will slow up the actual implementing of any recommendation; and true too that delays may bring further disasters upon the remnants of Jewry in Europe. However, on the other hand, there can hardly be any doubt that the frame of the White Paper policy has been broken up. The procedure of speeding up the destruction of that frame must now be accelerated, and we should regard it as our foremost concern to see that important amendments are incorporated in the provisional arrangements that will undoubtedly be made on the basis of the interim recommendations, not only as regards the immigration quotas, but also as regards the Land Transfer Regulations. First of all, it may be hoped that the members of the Inquiry Committee will succeed in finding a construct-

ive political formula of compromise which will meet the vital needs of both peoples.

A new chapter has opened in the history of the development of the Zionist movement. We are bound to have to start our work all over again, but we can say that we are in a position to do that. A good chance has been offered us by the establishment of a joint Anglo-American Committee, and we should gain whatever advantage we can from the new situation. What is made of the new chance will depend on us, too, when we make our appearance before the Committee. Recently voices have been heard suggesting that we should boycott the Committee, and that we should influence the course of events by other lines of action.

It will be the Executive of the Jewish Agency that will determine the official political course. It will be a decision fraught with destiny. We must choose between a campaign of enlightenment and a militant struggle. There is no way of combining both courses of action, neither can we remain in a state of constant hesitation. A decision will also have to be taken on whether we are to stick to the "Biltmore" programme or to start preparing a compromise solution.

compromise solution. In fact it makes no great difference whether we fail to appear before the Inquiry Committee or whether we choose to do so on the basis of the "Biltmore" programme. The "Biltmore" platform has been rejected, and there is no chance that the Anglo-American Committee or the United Nations will be prepared to accept it. Eventually, our central institutions must realize that we shall have to put up with a compromise solution in Palestine. Our utmost concern is that that compromise solution should enable us to continue the development of our National Home on a large scale. The failure of the "Biltmore" policy has shown that putting up extremist demands does not by any means ensure an advantageous compromise solution. We must start preparing for such a solution.

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Here I should like to repeat every single word that I wrote in my article "Imperative Need of the Hour—Preparing a Compromise Solution" (Ba'ayoth, Vol. 1, No. 3, June, 1944). We must ask ourselves what kind of solution will meet our needs best. Will it be a solution which will be arrived at without Jewish participation in its preparation, a solution to which we should only contribute by voicing extremist demands, or will it be one in whose preparation we should be able to influence the determining factors? This question is at the moment of particular urgency. Today the reply to it is even clearer than it was over six months ago.

Mr. Bevin's statement shows a considerable lack of understanding, lack of appreciation and distortion of facts. Nonetheless it reflects the Palestine reality in such a way that it is apt to rouse the anger of both Jews and Arabs. The document published shows that there is no hope whatever for considerable progress towards the realization of both Arab and Jewish national ambitions, as long as the Government are able to say that any solution acceptable to one of the parties is rejected by the other.

Will the wiser elements among the two communities learn a lesson from Mr. Bevin's statement? Our dependence on the Arabs is represented there in a most annoying way, but the Arabs also can see from that statement that no progress towards self-government is possible for them as long as they do not make peace with the Jews.

According to Mr. Bevin's statement His Majesty's Government has promised that it will seek a permanent solution for bringing before the United Nations. This undertaking imposes both on the Government and on the joint Inquiry Committee the duty of making a serious attempt to induce both communities to accept compromises. The success of such an attempt will depend on the extent to which both Britain and the United States are prepared to contribute their share towards the solution of the problem by active assistance in a large scale development of the country, which would adapt it for the absorption of hundreds of thousands of new Jewish immigrants, at the same time bringing about a rise in the living standard of the Arabs.

S. Hirsch

WHO WILL GIVE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY?

February, 1946.

who appear before it belong to two Zionist body stands behind them. categories: They are either Zionists and pro-Zionists who support the "Biltmore" programme, or anti-Zionists of different shades. Zionists opposed to the "Biltmore" programme are almost entirely absent, Zionists who would rather submit alternative constructive solutions like those hinted at by Professor Einstein in America, and by Lord Samuel in England. Though these two men are very distinguished personalities, and certainly faithful friends of the Zionist enterprise in

The Anglo-American Inquiry Com- this country, they could only voice mittee works at full speed. Jews their individual opinions, as no

As soon as the Anglo-American Inquiry Committee reaches Palestine, the present position may change, and this would be very desirable indeed. It would be a distorted representation of the true state of affairs among Jews, if no more than a single Zionist opinion were voiced. The Zionist opposition, which has never given its consent to "Biltmore" and which has persisted both in opposing it, despite officially instigated campaigns conducted against it, and in backing

has a moral and political right to appear before the Committee. That Zionist opposition consists of "Hashomer Hatzair", "Aliya Hadasha", "Ihud" and the "League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement". To silence the voice of that opposition -should anybody attempt it, and should such an attempt prove successful-would greatly harm our Zionist cause. The members of the Committee at any rate know about the differences of opinion prevailing in our camp (though it may be assumed that they knew nothing about them before approaching the study of the Palestine problem). If

the opposition were precluded from

giving evidence to the Committee

and from voicing openly the views

of the minority existing in the

Zionist camp, it would corroborate

the opinion of those who regard us

as a political factor which has lost

an alternative scheme of its own,

a main character of progress and democracy — tolerance.

And now another point: If the spokesmen of the "Biltmore" policy have no courage to admit their failure or do not perceive it, we can say that we anticipated that they would fail. We think we can suggest other solutions, better than "Biltmore," which our leaders have never seriously tried, and which have never been brought into the limelight of international discussion. If our leaders cannot say or refuse to say anything else beyond what they have kept on saying all the time, their policy having actually failed, they should let others come to the fore and have a try. The programme of the opposition may—who knows? —turn out to be the good fortune of the whole Zionist movement and constitute a new hope for the upbuilding of this country in entirely new conditions.

WHY HAS IHUD GIVEN EVIDENCE?

April, 1946.

The appearance of IHUD representatives (Dr. J. L. Magnes, Professor M. Buber, and Mr. M. Smelansky) before the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, constituted one of the high-lights of its activities. Almost for the first time during the sessions of this Body could its members listen to a counsel of peace and practicable plans of co-operation between Jews and Arabs. The official leadership of the Zionist Movement had forbidden the appearance of any private witnesses, whether individuals or organisations. unless approval had been formerly obtained. IHUD, however, did appear, thus reaching for the first time a wider audience among Jews and Arabs, as well as abroad. A special number of the Hebrew BA'AYOTH comprised the full text of all parts of the evidence. It was prefaced by the following article, which sets out the reasons for IHUD's appearance. The text of the evidence, both oral and written, has also been published in English, in a printed booklet issued in America in August 1946, called "Palestine -A Bi-National State", and is also being published in England by Gollancz.

The supreme institutions of the Zionist Organisation have decided to prohibit the appearance before the Committee of any public bodies or personalities who would voice opinions which could not be fitted into the Official Zionist scheme. This decision is likely to cause the Zionist opposition a serious internal conflict; it will be the case particularly with the men of IHUD who since

the very start of the "Biltmore" policy, have been of the opinion that that scheme will never bring us nearer to our goal.

Let there be no misunderstanding: We have never denied the exclusive right of the Executive of the Jewish Agency to speak in the name of the Zionist Organisation, and to appear as the only representation of the organised masses of the Jewish

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The main motive was that factor which today is urging forward Zionist politics generally. I mean the tragic situation of Jewry as a homeless people, in desperate need of a home, of a National Home. Now more than ever, after twelve years of persecution at the hands of the Nazis, at a time when the defeated Nazis are still the conquerors of the Jewish people, hundreds of thousands of whose sons are still roaming among the ruins of Europe, while the gates of the National Home remain locked in front of them—at such a time, there can only be one political goal for both the Executive of the Jewish Agency and the Opposition: the abolition of the White Paper and the opening of the gates of Palestine to a Jewish mass immigration. All political schemes can only be means devised to bring about these ends.

The Executive of the Jewish Agency has a programme of its own, a scheme twice approved by the competent institutions, a scheme in which the demand is voiced for the establishment of a Jewish State. The Biltmore programme has, in fact, been brought before the Committee, and I am not going to reiterate the old discussion on the foundations of the "Biltmore" platform. But whoever is courageous enough to face the facts, will admit that in the present international situation, and in the political conditions pre-

vailing in the Middle East, there are practically no prospects whatsoever for the acceptance of the official Zionist scheme. One does not have to be a prophet to predict that the Committee will never submit to their respective Governments any recommendations based on the official Zionist policy, and that they will never recommend that full power in the spheres of immigration and development of the country be handed over to the Jewish Agency.

The opposition, therefore, is confronted with a dilemma. They must ask themselves whether it is not necessary to place before the Anglo-American Committee an alternative scheme. There are people who say that we should concentrate on the main official scheme, and that it is up to the Inquiry Committee to try to find an alternative solution. But despite all the respect we feel towards the members of the Committee, and despite our fullest appreciation of their wisdom and of the wide scope of their expert judgment, which can be gathered from their questions, we must consider the intricacy of the problem and the acute danger that the members of the Committee may not be able to find a way out of the tangle without our assistance. There is a danger even that they may come to the conclusion that the problem is altogether insoluble. We have had some bitter experience in the past. If we were unable to put up with the ban imposed by our institutions. it was because we had a feeling that the Committee might reject the official scheme without finding an alternative scheme which could create another possibility for the continuance of the building of our National Home.

It would be extremely unwise not to attach the fullest importance to the Inquiry Committee and to its proposals. The political struggle before it is very likely to be a matter of decisive importance. It is now becoming increasingly clear that the Governments which have appointed the Inquiry Committee will pay attention to its recommendations, and that its verdict will

determine the fate of our people for years to come. How can it be expected that at such a time the opposition will remain silent, when they are convinced that the acceptance of the official Zionist scheme by the Inquiry Committee is entirely out of the question?

And another point: There is not the least doubt that the members of the Committee know about the existence of an opposition in the Zionist camp. It will be extremely useful if they hear the views of that opposition at first hand, so as to satisfy themselves that the opposition, too, will not accept just any offer, and to learn that there are claims in which the whole Jewish people and the entire Yishuv are perfectly united, regardless of political divergences. We think that from this point of view our official institutions should be interested in the appearance of an opposition which would stress the demands in the voicing of which we are not at variance with the rest of the

Yishuv: abolition of the White Paper; large scale immigration; immediate admission of the hundred thousand; development of the country; wide range of settlement.

However, our institutions have been unwise enough to reach a decision to the contrary, and have imposed their ban. Observing discipline towards our central institutions is a very good thing indeed, especially in our case, since our national authorities have no means of compulsion at their disposal. But the demand for discipline must not go beyond a certain limit. In this case, the permissible limit has been exceeded. It sometimes happens that a man who feels a private sense of responsibility towards the future of his people, is obliged to listen to the voice of his conscience, even if it is contrary to the decisions of any central national institution. History alone will one day pass its verdict on him, either approving his conduct or condemning it.

S. Hirsc

DECLARATION

OF THE COUNCIL OF THE IHUD (Union) ASSOCIATION

May 1, 1946

The report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, published in outline on May 1, 1946, was, on the whole, a positive step forward. The following three articles set out both our satisfaction with some of the recommendations and our criticism of others. It should be remembered that Mr. Attlee's statement in the House of Commons on the very day of the report's being made public, making the implementation of the report dependent on the complete disbanding and disarming of all "private armies" in Palestine, robbed the report of most of its practical value, since past experience has shown that the Jews in Palestine cannot, in the present conditions, forego their right to retain arms for their legitimate self-defence.

The Council of the IHUD Association welcomes the proposals of the Anglo-American Inquiry Committee. It hopes that the Mandatory Government will proceed to their implementation without delay. Both the Jews and the Arabs should see in this Report a chance of a new beginning in their relationship. The way is open for Jewish-Arab cooperation in a bi-national Palestine.

The Council sends its greetings to the 100,000 refugees to come here. Their coming will place a heavy burden on the Jewish community. This will require a concentration of all the forces of the Jewish people.

It is welcomed that the artificial land restrictions are to be removed. They interfered with the settlement of Jews without bene-

1 The course of events during 1946 has proved this belief to be mistaken.

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fitting the Arab peasant, and they tended to keep Jews and Arabs apart. What is now required is a large development plan for the benefit of all the inhabitants.

We ask for the reform of the Administration of the country, especially the appointment of Jews and Arabs in positions of Government authority, even during the

transition period of the Mandate.

We hope that the terms of the trusteeship agreement will be worked out without delay, and that a very full and immediate measure of self-government will be provided for in that agreement.

Now it is the time for all Jews and Arabs of good will to get together.

$A \quad N E W \quad S T A R T$

May 2, 1946.

The report of the Anglo-American Inquiry Committee is likely to bring about a turn for the better in British policy in Palestine.

It can now be seen that those who were opposed to the appearance of representatives of the Zionist Organization before the Committee were wrong. Despite all their baseless apprehensions, the fact is that the Committee conducted their work loyally and with a full measure of independence; they reached conclusions which pave the way for a new start.

It has also become clear by now that those who deprived the Zionist opposition of the right to appear before the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, as well as those sections of the opposition which, in compliance with that decision, actually refrained from placing their views before the Committee, were altogether wrong. It turns out that the course adopted by IHUD was in fact perfectly justified, when it chose the direct line of action, and submitted its constructive proposals in the true spirit of original Zionism, by which, there can hardly be any doubt, the members of that Committee were greatly impressed.

IHUD stressed the principle that neither of the communities should be allowed to dominate the other. the motto being: "Neither a Jewish nor an Arab State".

The Commission underlined the importance of Arab-Jewish cooperation. It recommended the immediate admission to Palestine of the

inmates of the refugee camps, and declared itself in favour of the continuance of Jewish immigration after their admission, too, so that the further development of the National Home might be ensured.

The same spirit was shown by the representatives of IHUD when they were expounding the reasons for the necessity of abolishing the Land Transfer Regulations, and when they were dwelling on comprehensive development schemes.

The details of the scheme certainly deserve a further analysis, in which the aspects omitted in it, and particularly the politically constructive aspect, will be elucidated.

But it is obvious that the practical value of all these proposals will entirely depend on whether the British Government in London and the local administration in this country decide faithfully to put them into effect. Mr. Attlee's statement is not, unfortunately, very encouraging; it rather seems to forbode ill in this respect.

Everybody knows that we are definitely opposed to all terrorism and to any use of arms except for the purpose of the barest self-defence. But not in the space of one day, or two, can the poisoned atmosphere and its wicked manifestations of violence in this country be removed. The stoppage of all that can never be stipulated as a condition for giving assistance in rescuing all those suffering innocent people who are yearning for safety and peace.

But even after the central Govern-

ment and the local administration come to a decision to discard their hesitations, as we hope they will, we shall still be confronted with big tasks. It will not be easy, for many Jews and Arabs alike, to overcome the disappointment of their excessive hopes. But all of us must understand that the destinies of both peoples are inseparably linked, and

that only by co-operation and mutual understanding can the true national interests of both Jews and Arabs be realized. Only by a joint effort shall we be able to repair the shortcomings of the new scheme, and only by a joint effort shall we be able to give the new framework a substance capable of real life.

WHAT IS MISSING IN THE RECOMMENDATIONS

· The Editor of the London Times.1

May 5, 1946.

May I tell you how deeply thankful large numbers of the Jews of Palestine are for the recommendations of the Anglo-American Inquiry

Committee? The prospect of giving a home to 100,000 refugees has filled us with renewed hope, and is testimony to the existence of a conscience in the world. Too many of our people had lost faith in this.

Many of those whose sole concern had been a Jewish State are now confronted with this tremendous practical task, and it can safely be assumed that much of the propaganda for a Jewish State will give way to the need for uniting the forces of the whole Jewish world, in order that the 100,000 may be absorbed in the briefest possible time. This will require of the Jewish Agency the setting up of a great organization with the participation, it may be hoped, of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee and other Jewish bodies. The implementation of this great programme requires the aid also of international bodies such as UNRRA, the Inter-Governmental Committee, the Displaced Persons Committee of UNO and other bodies.

The Report stresses the urgency of carrying out this humane project during 1946, if in any way possible. It is therefore of importance that the British and American Governments adopt the Report as their official policy promptly, and let nothing whatever stand in the way of carrying this policy out.

Nothing but good can be said of the Report on this side of its find-

But may I point out what seems to me to be its great defect?

We accept the principle "that Palestine shall be neither an Arab nor a Jewish State," but we do not accept the principle that "setting up of self-governing institutions is dependent on the will to work together on the part of the two peoples." On the contrary, this will to work together can be furthered best by setting up self-governing institutions. It is fatuous to think that good will can be engendered through abstract formulas. Good will can come through life, through the creation of common interests vital to both peoples. Active, responsible participation in Government is perhaps the most important of these common vital interests. Both peoples want this. Why not proceed with it, beginning now during the period of the Mandate, and not waiting until the Trusteeship Agreement is worked out?

The Report says, that "British officials hold all the important positions. They exercise as much authority as in a country where the mass of the inhabitants are in a primitive stage of civilisation." Why not show a bit of faith in the two peoples and begin with appointing a few Jews

1 This letter was printed in the New York Times on June 3rd, 1946.

Moreover we must take exception to the proposition that, "once the will to work together appears, representatives of both sides will be of help in framing a constitution; until that happens no step can be taken". On the contrary, the will to work together will appear only if the opportunity to work together is given or created by Government. Charge representatives of the two peoples with the task of helping to frame a constitution and the will to work together will thus appear.

This is true not only of working together in government, but in all walks of life. It is the function of those in authority to seek out the vital interests common to both peoples and to set them to work at

Proposing that good will first appear and that only then the two peoples can come together, is putting the cart before the horse. The dangers of this vicious circle ought to be avoided by concrete action, by listing the large numbers of practical interests common to both peoples and making them responsible for day by day work in meeting these problems. There is no time to wait until some abstract good will puts in an appearance. Let a large measure of self-government begin now.

I am, ... J. L. MAGNES Chairman, IHUD (Union) Association Jerusalem, May 5, 1946.

FEDERALIZATION AND BI-NATIONALISM

The recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry were shelved, despite the fact that Mr. Bevin is reported to have pledged himself to see them through, if the report were unanimous. Instead, a new scheme was proposed, which had been prepared even before the said Committee had set out on its inquiry. The new scheme was vigorously opposed by both Palestinian Arabs and Jews. The fact that the British Government insisted on its being taken as a basis of discussion at the Conference which it convened in London in September, 1946, was one of the main reasons why the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Executive refused to participate.

The federalization scheme presented by Mr. Morrison to the House of Commons needs a more and Arabs, and that there be comdetailed study than it has been so munal registers such as in India. far possible to devote to it. It con- To most of us this has not appealed, tains various elements, it has advantages and drawbacks, and it is not clear enough in all its parts. Rut a few words may be said by way of analysis, though they can be no more than first impressions.

The proposal is far from what we have wanted and what we are striving for. But it is a kind of bi-national approach, or, at least, it can be implemented in this spirit; and that is why it should not be rejected out of hand.

In discussing the bi-national Palestine, there have been two general least the outline of a bi-national

points of view; the one that it be based on the two communities, Jews and the example of India has shown that this communal basis is one of the banes of India's political life.

The other approach has been territorial. We have thought that Palestine should be divided into counties or cantons, some all-Jewish, some all-Arab, and some mixed. We have tried to effect a kind of synthesis between the territorial and the communal approach. That was the basis of our constitutional proposals.

The new plan provides for at

Palestine. But this bi-national Palestine is altogether too restricted.

The territory which the Jewish Province is to have is much too small. Nothing is said about the possibilities of the Negev for Jewish development either through a Jordan Valley Authority or some other scheme. That part of the Negev which is cultivable and fit for settlement seems to be included in the Arab Province, and not in the "Reserve"; for the boundaries of the Negev District have been fixed as "beyond the limits of present cultivation." In the Commons it was stated that after the 100,000 refugees were brought in there would be continuing immigration thereafter. We wonder how many additional immigrants the experts think can be introduced into the 1,500 square miles called the Jewish Province. We have stood out for the possibility of numerical equality with the Arabs as well as political equality; will this small Jewish Province give us this possibility?

The political rights of the Jewish Province and of the Arab Province would seem to be the same, and one might thus say that there was an equality of political rights as between the Jews and the Arabs. But it might be possible to characterize the situation more truly as an equality of but very few political rights for Jews and Arabs. Apart from the very wide powers granted to the High Commissioner to control and to interfere with the legislative processes of both Provinces, the most glaring fault, it would seem, is that Jews and Arabs are to be excluded from really active participation in the central government. If we accept this scheme as a "basis for negotiations" (Mr. Morrison called it that) we must take a very strong stand on two points: one, that at least one Jew and one Arab be made members of the High Commissioner's Executive Council, and that some Jews and some Arabs be made heads of central government departments; and, two, that there be formed some kind of central federated council having representatives of the Jewish Province, the Arab Province, the Jerusalem Dis-

trict and the Negev District, as well as representatives of the Central Government. This Council would be kept informed of the state of affairs in the whole country; among its functions would be that of smoothing out possible differences; and it would be privileged to make proposals to the High Commissioner and his Executive for legislation, nominations, and the like.

In proposing the enormous sum of \$300,000,000 for development in the Arab world we miss any reference to one of the primary and most important items — the development of Palestine itself, for the benefit of all its inhabitants. That this should be left out seems incredible; and it is to be insisted that the ommission be rectified by all means, perhaps in the spirit of the recommendations of the Committee of Inquiry.

In general, what is proposed is a kind of spoon-fed self-government, whereas what we should insist upon is a very large measure of self-government, for the appetite of both

peoples for this is big and healthy. It is a very great disappointment that after all these years the British Government has not yet been able to take its courage in both hands and to propose constitutional measures that are worthy of adults, and that are not, as the present proposals would seem to be, intended for infants. It is all right to promise that there will be more self-government in the future, but unfortunately such promises cannot be accepted at their face value. Mr. Gladstone promised, for example, in 1882 that the British would leave Egypt, but it is only today that the halting, difficult negotiations for the British evacuation from Egypt are going on seriously; even now things are not smooth and easy and it may well be that the negotiations will fail altogether. This brings us to say that, so it would appear, the Negev is probably being held as a possible military base when and if the British do leave the Canal Zone.

The great thing about the proposition is that we are to get the 100,000 refugees, and then more; everything else seems to us at the moment to take secondary place.

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Some other points of the scheme, for instance the proposed Development and Planning Board consisting of representatives of the two Provinces, leave the door open for the two peoples to cooperate.

The Jewish Province and the Arab Province — is there not a chance that they might become good neighbours? Is there not the chance that together we might suc-

cessfully insist upon a much larger measure of self-government? Is there not the chance also that a plan of the sort—with all the many necessary improvements and amendments — would give some stability to our life and thereby help put an end to the present terror and anarchy, putting us back once more on the path which leads to a peaceful and constructive solution?

FUNCTIONS OF THE MANDATORY GOVERNMENT

August, 1946.

On June 29, 1946, there was a surprise search in the Jewish Agency building, Jerusalem, and in numerous agricultural settlements the country over. Several Jewish leaders and some 3,000 citizens were arrested and transported to specially constructed detention camps, where many of them are still being detained without trial or charge. In a Government White Paper, the Jewish Agency was accused of direct connection with acts of violence. In an interview with Prof. Chaim Weizmann, the High Commissioner suggested a re-casting of the Jewish Agency, and mentioned the names of two leading figures, known to be opposed to the official policy of the Zionist Institutions. A loud cry of "quislings" was immediately unleashed. Spirits soared ever higher and acts of violence increased in frequency and fury, culminating in the foul attack on the King David Hotel, Jerusalem, on July 22. The military authorities proceeded to erect "fortresses" in Jerusalem and Haifa, and continued their searches of towns and settlements; the behaviour of the soldiers during these operations was not always beyond reproach.

What are, and what are not, the duties and functions of the British Mandatory Government in Palestine?

It is not their duty to suggest to us — or, for that matter, to the Arabs — candidates for the management of our national affairs. That is our own business, and ours only, as it is the business of any self-respecting nation and community. We have no less self-respect than the English, and no less good reasons for it.

Such talk might paralyse and atrophy the life of the Zionist Movement and subject it to still worse anarchy. For it makes saints of those leaders who go astray and lead their followers astray, some of whom are now in detention or in semi-voluntary exile. Those other forces, which could and ought to direct Zionist politics on to a new, more fruitful path, are apt to be

discredited by such talk beforehand in the eyes of a public which will easily seek and find wrong historical analogies.

It is not the function of the Mandatory Government to keep in detention the chosen leaders of the organised Yishuv and the Zionist Movement. They should be set free immediately so that they may be taken to task by their electors over their policy which has led to failure. If the Government has any charge against them, they should be given a fair and full trial, so that they may defend themselves, in accordance with one of the noblest aspects of British tradition. Their continued detention is not only a piece of injustice and affront but also rallies those of their followers who had already begun to awake from their illusions and reflect upon the political course of their leaders. It thus achieves exactly the opposite

of the desirable, just in the same way as happened some years ago amongst the Arabs.

It is not the function of the Mandatory Government to provide the terrorist organizations with leaders, or to aid them to return. But this is what the London Times tells us: "The present leader of the Irgun Zevai Leumi (Etzel), Menahem Beigin, served as corporal in the Polish Army. In 1941, David Raziel, the leader of the Etzel, went to do espionage work for the Allies in Iraq during the rebellion there. When he died in action, the "New Zionist Organization" requested that Beigin be released from the Army to do "political work." The request was granted. Today, two thousand pounds are promised any person assisting in the capture of Menahem Beigin." (retranslated, quoted from "Yediot Aliyah Hadashah," Aug. 2, 1946).

It is not the function of the Mandatory Government to evict a whole business quarter in Jerusalem and put an end to its economic activities. It has already been remarked in the daily press that it would have been much more logical to move the few Government Departments from that neighbourhood, as was once done in similar cirmustances during the Arab disturbances. This measure is not even a "collective punishment": for it affects a number of firms chosen at random; although the whole economic life of the town will suffer from the evictions, they cause particular hardship to the evicted, who bear no special responsibility for any offence.

Moreover, this wholesale ousting of offices, shops and tenants which is bad enough as it causes immeasurable economic loss and unjustified personal affront to the evicted, also adds to the artificial distance between the Jewish and the Arab economic sections. It creates a kind of wedge between Jewish Jerusalem and Arab Jerusalem. Surely it is not the duty of the British Mandatory Government to widen the rift between the two peoples of this country, which was entrusted to it so that its people might be educated towards independence.

It is one of the duties of the Mandatory Government in this country to maintain law and order for the peace of its inhabitants. But this will only be achieved through constructive measures leading to a solution. Vast and systematic searches, such as that of Tel Aviv some time ago, will not ensure law and order. They cause inconvenience, losses and insults, but they do not yield any positive find worthy of mention. When similar searches were carried out some years ago in Jaffa and Nablus, their result was the same: practically nothing. We have been insisting in these columns that the Palestine problem cannot be solved by violence, whether Jewish or Arab. Neither can it be "solved" by British violence.

It is not the function of the Mandatory Government or its military representatives to be swept along by antisemitic moods or expressions, such as have, it would seem, caused the now notorious order of General Barker. It should be noted and remembered that during the whole two-day debate on Palestine in the House of Commons (July 31—August 1st) not a single antisemitic remark was heard, despite the justified bitterness after the mass murder in the King David Hotel. Mr. Morrison deemed it necessary to dissociate the Government from the tone of General Barker's order. He also explained that the Jews of Europe are the victims of Nazism in two ways: most of them have been murdered, and some of the survivors have contracted the spiritual poison of their murderers. It may be that there are some who have suffered that way; but the poison of racial natred seems to have penetrated into other quarters too, which the Lord President forgot to mention, even after his dissociating remark...

But it is the duty and function of the Mandatory Government to help spread a spirit of understanding and sympathy for our tortured and suffering people. It should understand that it too is not devoid of guilt in this torture and suffering—a guilt mostly indirect, but also partly direct. We know that we too bear part of the responsibility for

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what has happened, that "our hands, too, have spilt blood." It is high time that some Englishmen, be they even few, take the courage to declare the same, and to admit their part of the responsibility for what has happened. If those Jews and

Britishers who look things in the face will help each other, if they will try to influence their respective leaders in this spirit—a way out of the impasse, a common acceptable solution may still be found for this country.

LIVES IN THE BALANCE

September, 1946.

On one and the same day, two striking news items appeared in the local press. The first reported the British Labour Government's decision to suspend the death penalty for a trial period of five years. The second recorded the sentence passed by the British Military Court in Palestine on twenty-two young persons (eighteen lads being sentenced to death and four girls to life imprisonment) who had taken part in the blowing up of the Haifa Railway Workshops, on the very night that the bridges surrounding Palestine were burnt.

Well for the British people, who have lived to witness such a humane and encouraging step taken by their Government, particularly at a time when a wave of crime is sweeping over England, too, on the heels of the long and bloody war. But woe to the British people since in the country which has been entrusted into its care, terrorism not only continues but is being aggravated.

Woe, too, to our people and our country, whose sons that were destined to be its builders, have, under the influence of a senseless situation and an insane ideology, become its destroyers and frustrators. And the song of hope—the "Hatikva"—on their lips, has been converted into one of blood and fire, of dis-illusionment and death.

From the very outset, we did not conceal our opposition to the Emergency Regulations, imposed on Palestine during the period of the last Arab disturbances. These were extended with the intensification of Jewish terror in recent years.

On various occasions, we appeal-

ed for mercy both for Jews and Arabs, and the stand we adopted met with mis-understanding and scorn on the part of Jews, who did not wish to see that wantonness knows no limits and that our turn, too, would come.

And now, the Arab press gives evidence of the same amount of stubborn dumbness, in its demand for a "firm hand" against the terrorists, who are this time Jews.

Our approach to the situation is conditioned, first and foremost, by moral and legal principles; by a feeling of respect for the elementary rights of the human being and the citizen. And we are not prepared to exchange these principles for "false prophecies" along the lines of—"Right or wrong, my people".

This is also our stand with regard to similar matters within the Yishuv itself, such as "kidnapping" or "clandestine courts", terrorists or informers.

Even from a practical point of view, it is our earnest conviction that such death sentences defeat their own purpose. Certainly, both Government and the public have to take all precautionary and security measures to safeguard life and property. But, if you would allow a variation of the age-old proverb, I should say — fiat justitia NE pereat mundus.

We were greatly relieved when we heard that the efforts made to commute the sentence did not prove vain and that human feelings had gained the upper hand over lust for revenge. But, one must not reconcile oneself with the Damocles sword of murderous emergency laws and we must persist in the demand that the accused should no longer be delivered over to the mercy of flesh and blood.

The Arabs of Palestine, too, are now urging the release of the remaining prisoners and exiles, sent-enced in connection with the Arab disturbances of 1936/39. These have been serving long terms of imprisonment. It is our sincere hope that towards them, as towards the Jewish prisoners, detainees and deportees, an amnesty will be extended, which will not be prompted by calculations of prestige and equilibrium, so that they return to the family-fold, if not today, at least in the near future.

In the case of many of these Arab prisoners, it was just a question of mere chance that they were not sentenced to death at the time, as was the case with many of their

comrades, who were sent to their doom on the strength of the same crimes and the same rulings. As far as they are concerned, there is no commutement of their lot, neither today nor in time to come, and their families can no longer cherish the hope of seeing them again. Let this sad thought serve as a warning to law-makers and judges.

Let us admit quite frankly that the hope which brought us to this country has not died in our hearts—the hope that we shall continue to develop the country and our people; that the two peoples of this land will choose the path of peace and life together with those who are now passing through the valley of the shadow of death.

In this way alone can we achieve our freedom; only thus will crimes be obliterated from this country.

Gavriel Stern

MORDECHAY AVI-SHAUL

(p. 70) was a teacher and youth leader in Hungary, later organizer of "Palestine Offices" in Yugoslavia, and editor of an Hungarian Zionist weekly. In Palestine for 25 years. At present librarian of the Jewish Junior and Children's Farm Ben Shemen. Besides literary work, he has taken active interest in public life, being a co-founder and active member of various organizations: "Brith Shalom" (Union for Arab-Jewish Conciliation); The League for Arab-Jewish Rapprochement and Cooperation; "V-League" for Friendship with Russia; the Palestine League for the Rights of Man (affiliated to the National Council for Civil Liberties, London).

GABRIEL BAER (p.76)

born in Berlin 1919, in Palestine since 1933. A graduate of the 'Haifa Hebrew Secondary School', he studied at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, and the American University of Beirut, specializing in modern Arabic language and literature. A teacher of Arabic, he now devotes himself to journalism, contributing to BA'AYOTH, "Haaretz" and "Mishmar." His publications deal with the economic, social and cultural problems of the Arabs in Palestine and the Middle East and especially with the Arab Workers' Movement.

MARTIN BUBER (pp. 7, 33)was born in Vienna in 1878. Was Professor of the Science of Religion at the University of Frankfort - on - Main (1923-33) and in 1934 became Principal of the 'Freies Jüdisches Lehrhaus' there. Since 1938 he is Professor of Social Philosophy at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem. This is not the place to evaluate the entire scope of Prof. Buber's many-sided activities as historian and philosopher of Judaism, as expounder of Hassidism, and as spiritual leader of two generations of German Jewry. He has been connected with the Zionist Movement since Herzl's days as editor of 'Die Welt' (1901) and as one of the leaders, together with Chaim Weizmann and the late B. Feiwel, of the 'Democratic Faction'. He founded and edited 'Der Jude', the leading periodical of German-speaking Jews, 1916-24. As early as 1921, at the 12th Zionist Congress (the so-called 'Carlsbad Congress'), he advocated a Zionist policy of reconciliation with the Arab people. Publisher of BA'AYOTH, member of the Presidential Board of IHUD and of the Central Committee of the League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and Cooperation.

(pp. 104, 109) SALLI HIRSCH now aged 61, is a lawyer taking active interest in Zionist politics. He has been a Zionist since 1904, and was a member of the governing bodies of the Zionist Organization in Germany from 1913 to 1935. He then came to Palestine and has since been an active member of the Inner Zionist Council, and a member of the Executive Committee of the Aliya Hadasha. In 1929 he became a co-founder of the "Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Realpolitik" in Berlin, a society aiming at Jewish-Arab understanding. He is a member of the secretariat of the League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and Cooperation and of the Council of IHUD.

NATHAN HOFSHI (p.37)the son of a 'hassid' and pupil of a traditional 'heder' in a small city of Poland, joined the Zionist Movement very early in his life. After coming to Palestine in 1919, he was one of the founders of the Agricultural Workers' Organization and of the Histadruth, as well as an active member of the Hapoel Hatzair party, which he left when it became too politically minded. He was one of the founders of Nahalal, the first communal village in Palestine, which celebrated its 25th anniversary this year. A pacifist and vegetarian, Mr. Hofshi is the President of the Palestine branch of the War Resisters' International. Like his comrades in this movement, he regards the policy of union and

cooperation advocated by IHUD as the only way to secure the continued upbuilding of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, and is an active member of the League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and Cooperation.

GERDA LUFT (p. 22)

was active in the Zionist Labour Movement, the Vaad Eretz Israel Haovedet, and the Keren Hayesod while still in Germany. She was the wife of Hayim Arlosoroff, the late head of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency, who was murdered in 1933. In Palestine since 1924, she was the representative and correspondent of the "Jüdische Rundschau," up to its suspension in 1938, and is a correspondent of Jewish papers in England, France and elsewhere. She contributes to several Palestinian Hebrew newspapers, particularly to "Amudim", the weekly of the Aliya Hadasha. Up to 1930 Mrs. Luft was a member of the World Executive of WIZO. At present she is a member of Assefat Hanivharim and of the Executive of the Aliya Hadasha.

was an ardent Zionist from his teens and studied agriculture at the University of Montpellier, France. In 1895 he came to Palestine where he served as administrator of PICA settlements for over twenty years, striving for the expansion of PICA's colonization work and insisting on the farmers doing

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the work themselves. He founded the colonies of Kfar Tabor. Yavneel and Menahemia, as well as the first communal settlements on PICA land, Deganiah and Kinneret, and later Kfar Gileadi, Tel-Hai and Mahanayim. He was one of the ten members of the Advisory Council in the early twenties, the only semiparliamentarian institution ever set up under British mandatory rule. From 1923 to 1927 he served the Zionist Institutions as expert on Arab affairs; but his objection to the political line prevailing even then made it impossible for him to continue.

For Kalvaryski had very early come to understand that the realization of Zionism is impossible without peace and cooperation with the Arabs of Palestine and the neighbouring countries. As early as in 1919 he met King Feisal and the Pan-Syrian Congress and at their request prepared a draft constitution for a bi-national Palestine. Up to 1943, he repeatedly passed Arab offers of conciliation on to the Jewish Agency. But his efforts failed, among other reasons because Zionists failed to grasp the necessity of a policy of cooperation with the Arabs. He was President and the leading spirit of the League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and Cooperation, and a member of the Presidential Board of IHUD, until his death on 19.I.1947.

RICHARD KOEBNER (p. 41)
was Professor of Medieval and
Modern History at the University of Breslau from 1924 to

1933, when he was dismissed; since 1934 he is Professor of Modern History at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem. His publications deal with medieval culture, the social and economic history of the Middle Ages, the development of historical and political thought and the principles of scientific historiography. He contributed the chapter on 'The Settlement and Colonization of Europe' to the "Cambridge Economic History" Vol. I., and edited the Hebrew translation of H. A. L. Fisher's 'History of Europe.'

JUDAH L. MAGNES (p. 14)President of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and Chairman of the Hadassah Council in Palestine, Chairman of the Middle East Committee of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, Chairman of the IHUD (Union) Association. b. San Francisco, 1877. Rabbinical degree, Hebrew Union College, Ph.D., Heidelberg. Rabbi at Temple Israel and at Temple Emanu-El. Secretary of the Federation of American Zionists, 1905-08. Organizer of protest movement against the Kishinev pogroms, 1903. Founder and Chairman of the New York Kehillah, 1909-1922. During the first World War he aroused a great deal of opposition and criticism because of his pacifist views. One of the prime movers in establishing the J.D.C. and head of the first mission that went to Europe to arrange for the distribution of American Jewish relief funds.

In Palestine since 1922, when he began to organize the Hebrew University. Chancellor, 1925-35, since then President. Advocated his bi-national ideas, as opposed to official Zionist policy, ever since the disturbances of 1929. Founded the IHUD Association in 1942.

DAVID WERNER SENATOR

(p. 51)

wrote his Ph.D. thesis in economics on the subject of Jewish land policy in Palestine; he worked in the "Arbeitsfürsorgeamt" in Berlin, the central Jewish organization for the care and rehabilitation of refugees from Eastern Europe; and as Secretary General of the Joint Distribution Committee's European headquarters in Berlin. He joined the Zionist Organization in 1913 and first came to Palestine for a year in 1924. He settled in Jerusalem in 1930, when he was elected a member of the Jewish Agency Executive, which he served in various responsible posts. Since 1937 he has been the Administrator of the Hebrew University and has taken a leading part in planning its expansion. He is also President of the Board of Directors of the Junior and Children's Farm Ben-Shemen. Keenly interested for many years in Jewish-Arab cooperation, he is a member of the IHUD Council.

ernst simon (pp.84,100,103) was active in the 'Freies Jüdisches Lehrhaus' in Frankfort, founded by Franz Rosenzweig. Together with Martin Buber, he

edited the monthly, "Der Jude". He came to Palestine in 1928, and taught history in secondary schools and teachers' seminaries; he is now lecturer in the Principles of Education at the Hebrew University. Besides, he has been educational adviser to the Youth Aliya, and frequently is guest lecturer at courses for teachers and youth leaders. Politically active in IHUD and Aliya Hadasha; Honorary Editor of BA'AYOTH; the author of most of the unsigned short editorials in this booklet.

MOSHE SMELANSKY (p. 57) is one of the most honoured veteran settlers and agriculturists of Palestine. He was born in 1874 in the Ukraine and came to Palestine in 1890. He was a pioneer farmer at Rishon le-Zion and Hadera and one of the founders of Rehovoth. In 1900 he founded the Union of Colonies, and later the Farmers' Association, of which he was President for 16 years. In the first World War he volunteered to the Jewish Legion, and helped found the Hagana, which he did not leave until he was 60 years old.

Mr. Smelansky is also a journalist and writer. He has contributed to most of the important Hebrew newspapers, and for some years was the editor of the farmers' weekly, 'Bustenai.' In recent years, his political articles have appeared in 'Haaretz,' BA'AYOTH and the American 'Commentary.' His books include an autobiography, a history of Jewish settlement

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in Palestine, and many stories on Arab peasant life. He is regarded as one of the foremost experts on Palestinian agriculture and more especially on the possibilities of developing the Negev. He gave evidence before the Shaw Commission (1930), the Royal Commission (1937) and the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry (March, 1946), where he, together with Dr. J. L. Magnes and Prof. M. Buber, represented IHUD.

HELMUT v. d. STEINEN (p. 88) is the son of the German ethnologist, Karl v. d. Steinen. He studied at Heidelberg and was assistant in the Institute of Cultural Morphology of Frankfort. He left Germany in 1934, settling in Greece, where he concerned himself with problems of Classical Philosophy and Literature. In April, 1941, he left Athens, so as not to fall into the hands of the Nazis. In spite of his being a notorious anti-Nazi, he was interned first in Uganda and later in Palestine, where he was released in the summer of 1944. His chief conviction is Philhellenism.

GAVRIEL STERN (p. 118)was born in Germany in 1913. In Palestine since 1936. He is Assistant Editor of BA'AYOTH and Joint Secretary of the League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and Cooperation. He studied at the School of Oriental Studies of the Hebrew University and contributes to various journals, dealing particularly with Arab and Oriental current affairs.

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HENRIETTA SZOLD (p. 1)began her long life of service as a teacher in her home town, Baltimore. For over 20 years she worked as a writer, editor, compiler and translator for the Jewish Publication Society of America, being also very active all the time in the Zionist movement in its earliest days. She first visited Palestine in 1909, and in 1912 founded the Hadassah Women's Zionist Organization of America, which today maintains a great network of medical, social and educational services in Palestine. In 1927 she settled in Jerusalem, and was a member of the Zionist Executive up to 1931, holding the portfolios of education and health. In 1931 she became a member of the Va'ad Leumi, taking charge of and organizing the department of social welfare. When she was 73 years old, Youth Aliyah summoned her, and for the rest of her life she devoted all her energy, wisdom and initiative to the rehabilitation, education and settlement of thousands of young people from Europe, and later from the slums of Palestinian cities. Throughout her Zionist history, Miss Szold was deeply conscious of the problems and obligations involved in Arab-Jewish relations in Palestine. She was one of the founders of IHUD and a member of its Presidential Board until her death on February 13, 1945.



OUT FILE

FOREIGN OFFICE, 8.W.1.

July 11th, 1947.

E 5987/5987/31.

My dear Mathieson,

Thank you for your letter of the 5th July, enclosing a copy of a letter from Mr. Magnes to Sir Henry Gurney, and a copy of the evidence which I chud have submitted to the United Nations Committee.

I have read the documents specially written for the U.N. Committee, and it seems to me that Dr. Magnes and his friends, although their intentions are for the best, are still living in a dream world.

They advocate a bi-national State, by which they mean a State in which the equality of the Arab and Jewish peoples in Palestine would be ensured by such devices as exact parity in numbers in the Legislative Assembly. It is not the case, as they assert it to be, that majority rule is similarly avoided in multinational democracies such as Belgium, Canada and Switzerland. There is very little reason to suppose that bi-nationalism of this rigid kind would work in Palestine.

It is to be noted, indeed, that I chud do not trust their own proposed system of government when they come to the vital question of immigration.

Under their proposals, the legislature would have no power to control immigration until the Jewish population had risen to numerical equality with the Arab population In other words the Arabs would be asked to co-operate in a system of political parity, while, at the same time, 600,000 Jews were entering the country under regulations totally/

W.A.V. Mathieson, Esq. Colonial Office.

RECORD OFFICE, 61940

totally exempt from the operation of this system.
And it is suggested that this fantastic proposal should be put into effect under British trusteeship.

(Signed) H. Beeley.

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PALESTINE

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FROM

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Your Reference

Colonial Office, Church House, Great Smith Street, London, S.W. 1.

September 26, 1947

E 9003

My dear Beith

roduced in Palestine by Dr Magnes and his colleagues, which Dr Magnes asked to pass to the Foreign Office. This booklet contains the oral evidence given by Dr Magnes to UNSCOP, with the questions and answers which followed, some of which are of interest.

Jours eve, Little Cathering

(W.A.C. Mathieson)

J.G.S. BEITH, ESQ.

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PALESTINE DIVIDED OR UNITED ?

THE CASE FOR A BI-NATIONAL PALESTINE BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS

J.L. MAGNES
M. REINER
LORD SAMUEL
E. SIMON
M. SMILANSKY

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This book, which will appear shortly, comprises the Evidence of M. Buber, J. L. Magnes, M. Reiner, E. Simon, and M. Smilansky before the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry and the U.N. Special Committee on Palestine.

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PALESTINE DIVIDED OR UNITED ?

THE CASE FOR A BI-NATIONAL PALESTINE BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS

J.L. MAGNES
M. REINER
LORD SAMUEL
E. SIMON
M. SMILANSKY

IHUD (UNION) ASSOCIATION / JERUSALEM 1947

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

This is the second booklet published in 1947 by the IHUD (Union) Association. It contains the full text of the IHUD's evidence, both written and oral, before the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, as well as other material relevant to the problem.

Some passages of the IHUD's evidence before the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry (March 1946) to which reference is made, have been reprinted on pp. 22-30. The text of this evidence has been published in England by Messrs. Victor Gollancz Ltd. under the title "Arab-Jewish Unity", and in the USA by the IHUD (Union) Association under the title of "Palestine — A Bi-National State." Other documents referred to will be found in the Appendix.

To fill out the picture of the bi-national case, we have added the address delivered before UNSCOP by Dr. Ernst Simon, a leading member of the IHUD, on behalf of the League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and Cooperation. The IHUD Association is a constituent member of the League. A similar attitude towards the Palestine problem and its solution is expressed in the speech by Viscount Samuel in a debate in the House of Lords, which we reprint here with his kind permission. Dr. Magnes's paper "The Case against Partition" (p. 74) is to appear in the Autumn 1947 number of The Menorah Journal, New York.

Jerusalem, September 1, 1947.

*The first publication was: Towards Union in Palestine — Essays on Zionism and Jewish-Arab Cooperation — edited by M. Buber, J. L. Magnes, E. Simon.

61940

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ERRATA

p. 24, l. 12 — read: enjoying; p. 28 — the first line should be read after the end of the first paragraph, before the next question; p. 29, l. 39 — read: said; p. 30, l. 11 — read: acquiesce; p. 51, note: to be deleted; p. 66, l. 20 — read: partition.

WRITTEN STATEMENT

to the

UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMITTEE

ON PALESTINE

submitted by

THE IHUD (UNION) ASSOCIATION OF PALESTINE

Jerusalem, June 1947

On behalf of the *Ihud* (Union) Association of Palestine we have the honour of handing you the following Statement, together with copies of the Statement submitted to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on March 5th, 1946, as also of the Testimony before that Committee on March 14th, 1946. Our present Statement to the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine is inseparable from the material presented to the Anglo-American Committee, and we would ask that they be read together. ¹ The present Statement takes into account the developments of the past year.

We are handing you also a booklet entitled "Towards Union in Palestine", which we published in February, 1947.

1 The material referred to has been published in England by Victor Gollancz Ltd., under the title 'Arab-Jewish Unity' (1946, 5/-). Some extracts to which special reference is made in the present Statement have been reproduced for the reader's convenience on pp. 22—30.

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| 1 2 3 4 5 6 Reference:- FO 371 61940

THE IHUD'S PROPOSALS

From this material it will be seen that the Ihud (Union) Association advocates the following program:

I. POLITICAL

- 1. An undivided bi-national Palestine composed of two equal nationalities, Jews and Arabs.
- 2. The transfer of Palestine, for an agreed transitional period, to the Trusteeship System of the United Nations, under which a large measure of self-government under one Administrative Authority is to be instituted from the very start and under which this self-government is to be developed increasingly.
- 3. After this agreed transitional period, the bi-national Palestine of two equal nationalities is to become an independent constitutional state.
- 4. Close cooperation between the independent bi-national Palestine and the neighbouring countries of the Middle East within the framework of the U.N.

II. IMMIGRATION

- 5. The speediest possible immigration of 100,000 Jewish Displaced
- 6. During the period of trusteeship, Jewish immigration in accordance with the economic absorptive capacity of the country, the Jews being free to reach numerical parity with the Arabs.
- 7. Thereafter, immigration to be agreed upon between Jews and Arabs under the bi-national constitution.

III. LAND

8. Legislation for land reform, removing all discriminatory restrictions, and providing adequate protection for small land owners and tenant

IV. DEVELOPMENT

9. A plan for the development of the economic potentialities of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants.

V. COOPERATION

10. Cooperation between Jews and Arabs in Palestine and elsewhere in all walks of life — political, agricultural, industrial, social, scientific, cultural.

I. POLITICAL

1. An undivided bi-national Palestine composed of two equal nationalities, Jews and Arabs.

Neither a Jewish nor an Arab State

We are in full accord with Recommendation No. 3 of the Report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, "that Palestine shall be neither a Jewish state nor an Arab state", but "a country in which the legitimate national aspirations of both Jews and Arabs can be reconciled, without either side fearing the ascendency of the other. In our view this cannot be done under any form of constitution in which a mere numerical majority is decisive, since it is precisely the struggle for a numerical majority which bedevils Arab-Jewish relations. To ensure genuine self-government for both the Arab and the Jewish Communities this struggle must be made purposeless by the constitution itself."

Equality irrespective of majority and minority

The only fair interpretation of this is that the constitution provide for a bi-national Palestine of two politically equal nationalities, irrespective of who is the majority or the minority.

This principle of the political equality of the nationalities in a multi-national country cannot be emphasized too strongly. If this principle of national equality be borne in mind and adopted, it would give many a proposal for a Palestine settlement a more equitable aspect. Take for example paragraph 4 of the British Proposals of February 7th, 1947. If majority rule is to be applied invariably and under all circumstances, the independent Palestine envisaged in the British proposals would be an Arab state. How then could the Jews be expected to agree? If, however, Jews and Arabs are to be two equal nationalities in the bi-national Palestine, the Jews could accept the independent Palestine without fear that the Arabs would always be outvoting them.

On the other hand, one of the main causes of Arab opposition to Jewish immigration is the fear of being swamped and dominated by a Jewish majority. If, however, Jews and Arabs are to be equal nationalities in the bi-national Palestine irrespective of who is the majority or the minority, the question of immigration would lose its political sting and could be regulated by social and economic considerations.

Majority rule is the accepted working rule in democratic countries which are uni-national. But it is not the universal rule in democratic countries which are multi-national, such as Belgium, Canada, Czecho-slovakia, Soviet Russia, Switzerland and Yugoslavia. In such multi-

national countries, the equality of basic national rights of the different nationalities is protected against majority rule. Where this is not the case, there is a dominant nationality and a dominated nationality, and this is not what we mean when we speak of a bi-national, or a multinational country.

We have dealt with this problem at length in our Statement to the Anglo-American Committee.

Deadlock

The disadvantage of this equality of national rights in a bi-national or multi-national country is the danger of a deadlock. As a matter of fact, constitutional parity is only an expression of the necessity of compromise. It is reasonable to assume that interests other than national, as for example economic and social interests, would cause some Jews and Arabs to vote together against other Jews and Arabs, as actually occurs in mixed municipalities and in other joint boards. Once cooperation was earnestly put into practice and the basic national problems were met according to our proposals, it may be expected that deadlocks, due to purely national interests, would become rare; nevertheless, the Constitution of the bi-national Palestine would have to provide for this, e.g. by a tribunal of arbitration to be appointed by U.N.

2. The transfer of Palestine, for an agreed transitional period, to the Trusteeship System of U.N., under which a large measure of self-government under one Administrative Authority is to be instituted from the very start and under which this self-government is to be developed increasingly.

We ourselves have prepared an outline of the political structure of a self-governing Palestine (in the Statement submitted to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry²). We think that the absence of concrete proposals for self-government is the chief weakness of the otherwise excellent recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. The Morrison-Grady Report was an attempt to supply this deficiency on a federal basis, and we regret that the full text of the Morrison-Grady Report has not been published. An examination of the full text would reveal that a bi-national solution was taken very seriously by the committee of experts which drew up the Morrison-Grady Report. We have commented on both of these reports in greater detail in our booklet "Towards Union in Palestine" (pp. 111-116).

Meanwhile, advanced British proposals in regard to self-government were made on February 7th, 1947 (Cmd. 7044). We wish to comment

2 See the extract on Self-Government on pp. 22-24.

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on these self-government proposals (paragraphs 6—173), and it will be seen that we can accommodate ourselves to many of them. Yet we are not in accord with others.

Administering Authority

The British Proposals of February, 7th, 1947, contain the essential features of a proposed Trusteeship Agreement. In accordance with the U.N. Charter (Chapter XII) in order that a Mandated Territory may become a Trustee Territory, an agreement has to be entered into between the Trusteeship Council and the Mandatory Government, in this instance Great Britain. The Trusteeship Agreement is to provide for an Administering Authority. Most probably Great Britain would be this Administering Authority. Despite very serious disappointments with Great Britain as a Mandatory, we wish to believe that she is capable of applying her experience of a generation here to the benefit of Palestine. We assume, of course, that the Trusteeship Council is to have much more authority and power than the powerless Mandates Commission of the old League of Nations, and that the Administering Authority will be subject to real control of the Trusteeship Council. Any such Agreement should include provisions for progressive self-government and for the safeguarding of the essential civil rights; for Jewish-Arab cooperation as the chief objective of major policy; and for a constructive social, financial and economic policy for the benefit of all of Palestine.

Local Government

We favour the wide range of powers contained in paragraph 7 and 8 of the British Proposals for the local administration of the unitary Palestine and we agree that not all the Arab and all the Jewish areas need be contiguous. Some of these local districts or counties would be mixed, in order to avoid artificial administrative boundaries. We also attach great importance to the development of municipal self-government both in uni-national and bi-national towns as a school of genuine democracy and cooperation.

Central Government

We have gone into this question in considerable detail (in our Statement to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry) and we shall therefore confine our comment to such questions as arise from paragraphs 12—17 in the British Proposals of February 7th, 1947.

The High Commissioner, who would during the Trusteeship period or until the elections of the Legislative Assembly continue to exercise supreme authority, would form a Consultative (rather than merely an Advisory) Body composed equally of Jews and Arabs. In selecting these

3 These have also been reprinted in the present publication.

members he would include representatives, not only of the Arab and Jewish Local Administrations, but also of labour and other organized interests. This Consultative Body would be supplanted as early as possible by an elected Legislative Assembly composed equally of Jews and Arabs.

Jews and Arabs in Central Government Organs

We urge that the High Commissioner introduce Palestinians — an equal number of Jews and Arabs — into his Executive Council without further delay, and that he progressively increase the proportion of Palestinian members.

We urge also that the High Commissioner appoint, without further delay, Jews and Arabs in equal numbers to the Secretariat, and as heads of certain Government Departments, and as Presidents of Courts, and as District Commissioners. With the exception of a few minor officials in the Secretariat, there are no Jews or Arabs in any of these key central positions.

Constitution

One of the first tasks of the High Commissioner under Trusteeship would be the appointment of a Commission to draft the text of a Constitution. This Commission would contain, among others, an equal number of Jews and Arabs. The Commission would receive directives from the U.N., the main directive being the necessity of Jewish-Arab Cooperation in all spheres in a bi-national Palestine of two equal nationalities.

At the end of a stated period a Constituent Assembly would be elected with equal Arab-Jewish representation, and it might be hoped that through clarification, open debates, give and take, a majority of the Jewish representatives and a majority of the Arab representatives might produce an agreed constitution.

The Constitution would contain a Bill of Rights guaranteeing the equality of the two nationalities, as also religious, educational and economic freedom to all the inhabitants of the country.

The Constitution would be confirmed by the U.N. which would also safeguard its execution.

In the event that in the Constituent Assembly no agreed Constitution resulted, the various drafts prepared for its consideration and the record of its debates would be submitted to the Trusteeship Council which would be asked to advise upon future procedure.

Transition to Independence

We believe the Constituent Assembly, and the Constitution and the Legislative Assembly and other fundamental points, should not wait, as the British Proposals would have it, until the time that Palestine is to become an independent State. It is our view that the serious attempt should be made to establish these institutions as early as possible during the Trusteeship period. This would have the double advantage of training the population in self-government and of making that much easier the transition to independence.

We are convinced that the five year Trusteeship period suggested in the British Proposals is not sufficient, in order to get an agreed solution. The chief reason for this is that after these 25 years of misunderstanding and struggle, time should be given to the two peoples to settle down together and work together, as we know they can and as we are sure they will.

If it be found that the bi-national arrangement succeeded more quickly than we dare to anticipate now the interim Trusteeship period could be shortened. If, on the other hand, these bi-national arrangements would not work as smoothly as we anticipate the advice of the U.N. would be sought.

3. After this agreed transitional period, the bi-national Palestine of two equal nationalities is to become an independent constitutional state.

Meaning of Independence

The question has been asked if a bi-national state and independence are compatible. The present-day independence of multi-national states would seem to give an affirmative answer. The fact is, however, that to-day all independence is relative. Even the super-powerful states are unable just to do as they please. The existence of U.N. is proof of that. Any Union or Federation of States limits the independence of its constituent bodies. We have admitted that in case of a deadlock in the bi-national Palestine recourse may have to be had to U.N., which also should guarantee the Constitution. These are not crippling limitations. More powerful states are appealing to U.N. or the International Court of Justice for a political or judicial but in any event a peaceful settlement of their disputes. It will be no disgrace if the bi-national Palestine, which is a union of two peoples, will be obliged to submit—basic internal disputes to the same authoritative bodies.

What we mean by independence for Palestine is that it be a state standing on its own feet, not dependent — except as outlined above — upon the decision of others, a Palestine that will be free to work out its own form of life and government in accordance with the specific genius of its constituent peoples.

4. Ulose cooperation between the independent bi-national Palestine and the neighbouring countries of the Middle East within the framework of the U.N.

Foreign Relations

The independent bi-national Palestine would be responsible for its foreign relations. It would, of course, join the U.N.

The independent bi-national Palestine, in the framework of the U.N. Charter, would be free to enter treaty relations with the British Commonwealth or other countries.

Jewish Representation in U.N.

We have pointed out at the time that the non-establishment of a Jewish State would deprive the Jewish people of their chance to be represented directly in the U.N. The Constitution of the bi-national Palestine might meet this difficulty by providing for equal representation of Jews and Arabs at U.N. The Jewish representatives would be looked to, to speak in Jewish matters.

Jewish Agency

The British Proposals provide that "on the conclusion of (i.e. during) the Trusteeship Agreement, the Jewish members of the Advisory Council would supersede the Jewish Agency for Palestine as the official Channel of communication between the Jewish community and the High Commissioner." We can agree with this provision, if it means no more than it says. But we cannot agree if it means the dissolution of the Jewish Agency. We think that the Jewish Agency has a most important function, that of representing the Jews of the Diaspora in their relation to the Holy Land, the Land of the Jewish National Home. Palestine is the concern of millions of Jews, Christians and Moslems throughout the world, and it is for this reason that it is appropriate that the U.N., representing the international conscience, should give its attention to the problem. We regard the Jewish Agency, particularly if constituted upon a broad basis, as representing the concern of world Jewry with Palestine. We tried to bring this out in our evidence before the Anglo-American Committee 4. There we have also made suggestions for safeguarding the legitimate interests of the Christian and the Arab Moslem World in the Holy Land.

Ri-national Palestine in the Semitic East

We look forward to close cooperation between Palestine and the neighbouring countries of the Middle East. The details of this cooperation, economic, political and cultural, would be decided by the Legislature. Probably the bi-national Palestine would join the League of Arab States or some other form of regional federation. In any event we are strong believers in the mission of an independent bi-national Palestine to help

4 Cf. extracts from the Oral Testimony, pp. 25-26. See also pp. 54f.

develop the Semitic Middle East and to deepen the spiritual powers of those people who are the descendants of the great Semitic people of the past.

II. IMMIGRATION

5. The speediest possible immigration of 100,000 Jewish Displaced Persons.

We are in full accord with Recommendation No. 2 of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry that 100,000 certificates be authorized immediately for the admission into Palestine of Jews who have been victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution, and that actual immigration be pushed forwards as rapidly as conditions will permit.

In our evidence before the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry⁵, we called this 'compassionate immigration'. It becomes this more and more with every day that goes by. How can there be any doubt about this?

The British Proposals of February, 7th, 1947, provide that these 100,000 Jewish immigrants be admitted in Palestine in the course of two years, at the rate of 4000 monthly. This is, of course, a great improvement over the 1500 now admitted. But we submit that, in view of the urgency of this initial compassionate immigration, the tempo be made as rapid as possible and that this tempo be fixed after consultation with those bodies as may be responsible for the financing, the planning and the implementation of this large program. Palestine is a small land, and its economy must be safeguarded; yet the Jews of Palestine as well as the Jews of the world are capable of great sacrifices, and after all that European Jewry has suffered in those terrible years, their remnants should be entitled to look forward to help and assistance from the world at large, in order to begin a new life in their ancient homeland.

6. During the period of trusteeship, Jewish immigration in accordance with the economic absorptive capacity of the country, the Jews being free to reach numerical parity with the Arabs.

Further immigration is to be determined by the principle laid down in the Churchill-Samuel White Paper of 1922 of "the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals."

For increasing and not restricting immigration

But much depends on how this economic absorptive capacity is to be determined. We propose that among the directives to be given by U.N. for the Trusteeship Agreement it may be laid down that this economic absorptive capacity is to be enlarged in every way. We shall

5 Cf. extracts from the Oral Testimony, pp. 27-30.

deal later on with this question in connection with land reform and development (page 17). Thus the principle of absorptive capacity would not mean restricting immigration, but rather increasing economic opportunities, both for the present inhabitants and for new immigrants.

Under such circumstances, the formula of the British Proposals (paragraph 10) could be amended to read that the continuance of immigration and the rate of entry would be determined, primarily in accordance with the principle of economic absorptive capacity, by the High Commissioner in consultation with his consultative body; and in the event of disagreement the final decision would rest with an arbitration tribunal appointed by the U.N. and on which among others the Jewish Agency and the League of Arab States should be represented.

Numerical Parity

We have urged in our Statement to the A.A.C. of I., that the Jews should be free to reach numerical parity with the Arabs during the transition period. There may be found also details as to the demographical side of the question. This would mean that the Jews would have the right of bringing into the country another 600,000 and more Jews. With the annihilation of 6,000,000 by the Hitler bestiality, forty percent of the whole Jewish people has been destroyed. The number of Jewish Displaced Persons does not make up even half of these 600,000. Yet there are hundreds of thousands of Jews in various countries poverty-stricken and unhappy and oppressed. Besides, there are thousands of Jews, especially young people, living under happier conditions who wish to come to Palestine not out of need or pressure but inspired by the ideal of the Jewish National Home, and they also should be free to devote themselves to the upbuilding of Palestine.

7. Thereafter, immigration to be agreed upon between Jews and Arabs under the bi-national constitution.

But whatever be the practical possibilities we think it important to emphasize this principle of numerical parity. When and if parity is reached, the Legislature of the independent bi-national Palestine may review the immigration situation, and further immigration (beyond the difference in natural increase) is to be encouraged, if agreement can be reached between the Jews and the Arabs. This would mean that Jewish immigration beyond parity would be dependent upon whether the two peoples had found the way of peace and understanding together.

6 Cf. p. 26.

Mr. Moshe Smilansky, member of the Board of our Association, veteran farmer and during many years the Chairman of the Jewish Farmers' Association, has prepared a special Note on some aspects of this question which you will find attached to this Statement.

IV. DEVELOPMENT

9. A plan for the development of the economic potentialities of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants.

The main way of increasing the economic absorptive capacity of the country is through a Development Plan which would exploit much more fully than up to the present the agricultural and industrial potentialities of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants. It has been said on several occasions that the U.S.A. Government might help finance such a Development Plan. We propose that a Development Commission be appointed at once by the appropriate agency of the U.N. to prepare such a plan, and that then a Central Development Board be set up charged with carrying out this Development Plan. Jews and Arabs should participate equally in this vital constructive work.

V. COOPERATION

10. Cooperation between Jews and Arabs in Palestine and elsewhere in all walks of life — political, agricultural, industrial, social, scientific, cultural.

We accept Recommendations 5 and 9 of the A.A.C. of I., looking towards an equality of standards in social services, in education and in other spheres of life for Jews and Arabs alike; and we accept the principle that nothing be done to reduce Jewish standards but that Arab standards be raised in every possible way. This aim can be reached only by fostering economic and cultural intercourse and cooperation between the two peoples and not by segregation.

NOTES ON SOME ASPECTS OF THE LAND QUESTION

by Mr. M. Smilansky

1. Area of Palestine

The area of Palestine is about 27,000,000 dunams 1, of which about 700,000 dunams are lakes and rivers. The remaining 26,300,000 are composed of four parts:

The Negev	12,250,000	dunan
the hills	9,600,000	"
the coastal plain	3,150,000	"
the valleys 2	1,300,000	,,

2. Present Cultivation

Out of the above lands, the following areas are under cultivation, mostly very extensive cultivation:

In the Negev	1,500,000	dunams
in the hills	4,000,000	,,
in the coastal plain	2,250,000	,,
in the valleys	900,000	,,
Total	8,650,000	dunams

3. Potential Cultivation

It is our considered opinion that there are in Palestine at the very least 13,150,000 dunams of lands cultivable after suitable preparation. This means that 4,500,000 dunams which are not cultivated at present are suitable for agriculture. We think that the following areas in addition to the areas cultivated at present can be prepared for cultivation:

In the Negev in the hills	1,500,000 2,000,000	dunams	(incl. leachable salty land) (by terracing and removing of stones)
in the coastal plain in the valleys	750,000 250,000	" }	(by draining the swamps and levelling the dunes)
Total	4.500,000	dunams	

4. Irrigation

To give an idea of the present primitive state of Palestine agriculture, it is noteworthy that the area of irrigated lands in Palestine is at present 500,000 dunams, while the irrigable lands are about 5,500,000 dunams. The following is a fair estimate of the distribution of irrigable lands:

- (1) 1 dunam = 0.23 acres = 1000 square metres.
- (2) mainly the valleys of Esdraelon and of the Jordan River.

In the Negev	2,000,000	dunams
in the hills	500,000	"
in the coastal plain	2,250,000	,,
in the valleys	850,000	"

5. Water Resources

Experience has taught that Palestine which had been considered a barren country has rich resources of water. These resources are to be found both on the surface and underground. In almost every part of the country deep wells have been dug, and hundreds of cubic metres per hour of water found.

Torrential rains fall during the winter months, and most of these which fall in the hills are not absorbed by the soil but flow into the sea, to the amount of milliards of cubic metres every season. If reservoirs were built in the hills, and dams where the hills lead into the plains, a substantial part of this water could be utilized.

Palestine's lakes and rivers are huge water resources. The rivers flow into the sea and the lakes are exposed to evaporation by sun and wind. A large part of these water resources could be made available for irrigating our lands.

There are in Palestine many sweet water and salt water springs. Up to now, not much has been done in the way of developing the existing springs, or of searching for those underground. Salt water could also be exploited for agriculture by mixing the salt water with sweet water.

According to experts Palestine has water resources sufficient to irrigate about 4,000,000 dunams. These resources may increase in the future, as we learn to use them more rationally, so that we may be able eventually to irrigate the whole of the 5,500,000 dunams of our irrigable lands.

6. Conditions for Development

The earth of Palestine can bring forth abundance, if the following five are combined: Sun, water, fertilizers, science, and money. We have sun almost all the year long. Resources of water exist, as we have shown, and it is but necessary to find and exploit them. Fertilizers will be provided by agricultural development itself and with the help of science. Science will also teach us the way to get cheap electricity, so that we shall be able to obtain nitrogene from the air with the help of electric power. This is, of course, only one example of the application of science for agricultural development. It goes without saying that large-scale plans of this kind cannot be realized without the necessary financial means, as indicated in Chapter IV. (Development) of this Statement.

7. Present Agricultural Population

The agricultural population of the Arab villages and the Jewish settlements of Palestine is made up as follows:

	Arabs	$oldsymbol{Jews}$	Total
In the Negev	60,000	1,000	61,000
in the hills	500,000	10,000	510,000
in the coastal plain	150,000	50,000	200,000
in the valleys	30,000	25,000	55,000
Total	740,000	86,000	826,000

There are also 70,000 Arabs and 70,000 Jews in the countryside who are not occupied in agriculture.

8. Potential Agricultural Population

Experience proves that an area of 25 dunams of irrigated land will support a family. An area of 50 dunams of unirrigated level country, when cultivated rationally, will also support a family (five persons in the average). In the hills, an area of 100 dunams would be required for the same purpose. The irrigable 4,000,000 dunams could therefore support 800,000 souls. The rest of the cultivable lands includes 4,000,000 dunams of level, non-irrigated lands — for in the hills, too, there is more than a million dunams of level land or gentle slopes — and these lands could support 400,000 people. Another 5,000,000 dunams of hill country, which are included in the area of cultivable lands, can support 250,000 people.

The cultivable lands of this country could, therefore, support 1,450,000 people, instead of the present 826,000. We may assume that the rural population not occupied in agriculture will increase proportionally; that means there could be 260,000 such people instead of the present 140,000. Thus there is room for an additional 750,000 people in connection with agriculture alone, apart from the growth of the cities which will come in the wake of the increase of the rural population.

9. Protection of Smallholders and Tenants

It is our considered opinion that the new settlers will not have to displace one single Arab fellah from his land, for there is enough room for both the old and the new settlers in our country. Yet at the same time a land law ought to be promulgated forbidding a fellah to sell his last 25 dunams of irrigated land, his last 50 dunams of non-irrigable land, or his last 100 dunams of land in the hill region. Also, leaseholders should be protected against their lease being taken from them.

10. "Uncultivable" lands

In this small country of ours, about half the lands — ca. 13,150,000 dunams — are considered non-cultivable at present. But science will find new ways, and what is considered impossible today may well be possible in the next generation. Coming generations will profit from that.

A large part of these lands will have to be afforested; part has already become woodland by the efforts of the Government and of Jewish settlement. Afforestation, too, is a branch of agriculture which can support many thousands of families and workers.



EXTRACTS FROM THE

IHUD'S TESTIMONY

before the

ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY (1946)

SELF-GOVERNMENT

First period: Self-government during Mandate

During the transitional period of the Mandate, i.e., up to the time when Palestine becomes a Trustee Territory, immediate steps should be taken by the Mandatory Power to institute a larger measure of self-government. Towards this end we would make two interim ad hoc recommendations:

- (a) The appointment of Jews and Arabs in equal numbers to the Executive Council of Government, to the Secretariat, as Heads of certain Government Departments, and as District Commissioners in appropriate places.
- (b) The appointment of a Consultative Body of equal numbers of Jews and Arabs. The High Commissioner would act as Chairman, and he would bring before this body such matters as he wished to communicate to the public and as he wished to have an expression of opinion on. The Consultative Body would have no legislative or executive functions.

Second period: Trusteeship

- (a) We favour the transfer of Palestine to the Trusteeship System of the UNO.
- (b) We favour the setting up of a Regional Trusteeship Body for Palestine which is to be composed of representatives of the Administering Authority, the Jewish Agency and the Arab League. The Administering Authority will be a Christian power, doubtless Britain, and will thus be representative of the Christian world. The deep interest of the Christian world in the Holy Land is not to be minimized. The Jewish Agency is representative of the Jewish world in matters affecting Palestine. The Arab League represents the various Arab states, which are for the most part overwhelmingly Moslem, and all of them are concerned with the fate of Palestine.
- (c) We favour making the Immigration Board and the Development Board mentioned above responsible in the first instance to the Regional Trusteeship Body.

Constitution

(a) The working out of the first draft of a basic constitution for a bi-national Palestine would be entrusted to a special Commission on which, among others, the Jewish Agency and the Arab League would be represented and which would in the first instance be responsible to the Regional Trusteeship Body. This Draft Constitution Com-

- mission would receive directives from the UNO, the main directive being the necessity of Jewish-Arab cooperation in all spheres in a binational Palestine based on the parity of the two peoples. The Draft Constitution Commission would have to secure the aid of competent experts, especially from the successful multi-national countries.
- (b) The draft Constitution thus worked out would be presented to a Constituent Assembly of Jews and Arabs equally represented, in the hope that through clarification, open debate, give and take, an agreed constitution might result. In case no agreed constitution resulted, the matter would be referred for decision to the Trusteeship Council of the UNO, both the Jewish Agency and the Arab League being invited to participate in the discussion before the Trusteeship Council.
- (c) The Constitution would contain, among other things, a Bill of Rights guaranteeing religious, educational, economic and national freedom to all the inhabitants as individuals, and to the national communities and the religious bodies.

ORGANS OF GOVERNMENT

A. Federal Executive

(a) Head of the State

He is to be appointed by the UNO, if possible upon nomination by the Palestine Legislature. His term of office is to be four years, and he is to be eligible for re-election.

- (b) His functions are to be:
 - 1. To preside over the Legislature.
 - 2. To cast the decisive vote in case of a tie.
- 3. To appoint, with the concurrence of the Legislature, the Heads of Central Government Departments (Federal Administration).
- 4. To preside over the Federal Executive Council which is to consist of the heads of a given number of Government Departments (Federal Executive Council).

B. Federal Legislature

- (a) A Legislature is to be elected democratically.
- (b) The country is to be divided into a number of districts (cantons or counties). Some of these districts will be mainly Jewish, some mainly Arab, and some mixed. In some districts, such as Nazareth and Bethlehem, the Christian Arabs would be the important part of the population. The Legislature is to consist of an equal number of Jews and Arabs.

We prefer election by geographical districts rather than election on a communal basis. Regional patriotism is highly developed in some parts of Palestine. The difficulties of communal elections are apparent in India. Election by districts has the advantage: 1. of giving increased importance to local bodies, which is desirable generally; 2. of enabling Jews and Arabs in mixed districts to vote for members of both communities. In general, we assume that, "in vital matters some Jews and some Arabs will vote together" (Royal Commission, page 360). This would mean that separate national interests would not dominate every situation. There are economic interests, social security,

standards of life, trade, agriculture, industry, labour, commerce abroad and other factors which will draw some Jews and some Arabs together.

(c) The Legislature is to have the normal functions of a Federal

Legislative Body, including the passing of the budget.

(d) In case of a tie, the Head of the State is to have the casting vote.

C. Local Districts (Cantons, Counties) including Municipalities

These are to have wide autonomy, including the right of taxation. As to the Swiss cantons and their relation to the Federal Government, Professor Janowsky says ("Nationalism and Nationalities", pp. 37, 38, 42, 44, 45):

"The Swiss State is a confederation of 22 cantons each enjoing broad powers of self government... Within 14 of her 22 cantons German is spoken by over 90% of the people; one canton is overwhelmingly Italian in speech and three French. The four remaining are linguistically mixed... The people are further divided by 'confessional' differences, 57% being Protestant and 41% Catholic. However, the religious and linguistic groupings do not coincide... German, French and Italian are all recognized as official languages in relation to the Central Government. The individual cantons, too, where the population is sufficiently composite, have assured equality of language... The peoples of the particular cantons also possess organic unity: a Swiss nation, yet a Bernese and a Genevese people... Swiss Federalism rests solidly on the decentralization of governmental functions and on respect for local sentiment. Cantonal and communal institutions are zealously guarded by the population... Clinging to their ancient usages, local and cantonal communities preserve the character of nationalities... Federalism has left the cantons some of the most essential functions of Government law and order, education and direct taxation... To be sure, the development of commerce and industry has led to a strengthening of the Central Government. But its sphere of activity has been mainly economic and social - railroads, factory legislation, insurance, contracts, sanitary precautions. Educational and cultural affairs remain predominantly the province of local bodies... It is the multi-national state which has rendered possible both political unity and cultural freedom."

D. National Communities

- (a) In the bi-national Palestine there would be two National Communities, the Jewish National Council and the Arab National Council, with powers of taxation. Their practical province would be cultural.
- (b) On the other hand there would be a Joint Commission of these National Councils for the purpose of devising ways and means of familiarizing the one people with the culture of the other.
- (c) Members of the Civil Service down to the lowest grades would have to be bi-lingual. This is not difficult to achieve, as the experience of the past twenty years has shown.

E. The Central Religious Bodies

The Central Religious Bodies are to have recognized judicial functions in questions of personal status, such as marriage and divorce (Mandate for Palestine, Article 9).

A REGIONAL TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL

JEWISH AGENCY / ARAB LEAGUE / ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY

There are organizations representing the Jews and the Arabs on the outside. There is the Jewish Agency. That has been the great instrument for the building up of this country. You go around this country and most of what you will see is due to the efforts of the Jewish Agency. The Arab League is but a young creation. It has not had the opportunity, let us say, of doing anything at all comparable to what the Jewish Agency has been able to do for Palestine, but it is the only body that we know of representing the Arabs and the Moslems on the outside; and this Jewish Agency is recognized by the Vaad Leumi here and this Arab League is recognized by the Arab Higher Committee, accepting them for the moment as the counterpart of the Vaad Leumi. For that reason, because of the international character of Palestine, because of its inter-religious character, we talk about this Regional Trusteeship Council which is to include also a representative of the Mandatory or of the Administering Authority, Great Britain, which is also interested in this country, not because the British live here, not because their officials are here, but because this is the Holy Land of Christianity. This is where Christianity had its origin, where it had its great decisive historic experiences. It was peopled by the Jews at the time; and Great Britain is interested and the rest of the Christian world is interested because of that. Therefore we say, it is not sufficient to have a local Government, although, as you see, we propose local self-government. But on certain of these basic problems we propose, at first at any rate, that this international force, represented through the Administering Authority, the Jewish Agency and the Arab League, should come together and try to work out a number of these things such as we propose.

Mr. Buxton: I dare say you are right, but what you say seems a little paradoxical to me. A few minutes ago, you were stressing the value of allowing native Arabs and native Jews to assume active management of their own affairs. On the other hand, you say let us bring together two international groups to manage their affairs for them. Will you not reconcile those two points of view for me, please?

A. It is a perfectly legitimate question, yes. The objective is to have the local Jews and the local Arabs conduct their own affairs, conduct their own government. How are we going to bring that about? That is our whole argument. We are going to bring it about, so we think, by steps something like those we have proposed. We do not go at once to the Vaad Leumi and the Arab Higher Committee for that, because we feel that the problem of immigration, taking that in the first place, is something that goes beyond the borders, beyond the confines and the ability of just local groups. Immigration concerns the rest of the world. One of the sources of the Jewish immigration is the rest of the world; it is the source of Jewish immigration, and it is the Jewish Agency, which is an international body, that has thus far been dealing with immigration. All of the Jews are interested in that, just as all the Arabs throughout the world are interested in that. Therefore as a first step we say, in order to help bring this about, do not

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go to the local people; local people are fighting around too much; go to the international authority, go to the wider background. It is our conviction, at least our hope, that the Arab League is going to be much more moderate than any local Arab body in any country. I think the Arab League has thus far given evidence of that in its constituent documents. If you read the paragraph on Palestine you will find that, I think. Recent statements made by one of its representatives indicate that we have to encourage them. It will not be so easy for the Arab League to be more moderate than the local people, any more than it is so easy for the Jewish Agency to be more moderate. But I do think that will be the case, and for that reason we feel at the beginning, however it may turn out afterwards, in order to bring this about, in order to bring people together which is what we want, and we want to bring them together upon the basis of actual live practical things, their own interests, you have to bring into the picture these larger international forces to persuade and to be persuaded. If it were possible just to say that this thing could be carried out, as we propose it, through turning it over to the local people, it would be very good. The way we propose is more complicated. I think, however, it is more practical.

- Q. You foresee the time when the local people will take over their own affairs, will that be in a decade, or a couple of decades?
 - A. However long it may be, yes, that is the objective.

NUMERICAL PARITY

As a long-term immigration policy we propose that, in the binational Palestine, the Jewish population should have the chance through immigration of becoming one half of the population. That means, that the Jews would, upon the basis of present population figures, have the opportunity of doubling their numbers, there being about 600,000 Jews here now and about 1,200,000 Arabs. It would really mean more than that, since the Arab natural increase is higher than the Jewish (2.7:1.3), thus leaving room, even after parity had been achieved, for additional numbers of Jews to catch up each year with the greater Arab natural increase.

Rate of Immigration

How long it would take, approximately, under favourable circumstances, for Jews through immigration and natural increase to reach parity, can be estimated upon the basis of the population trends on pages 281—282 of the Royal Commission's Report. Although these calculations were made in 1936, it would appear that the ratio of Arab increase and Jewish increase has remained stable. We can therefore take the figures of the Royal Commission as roughly correct for 1946. Upon that basis it would take eleven years from now, i.e. up to 1957, for the Jews to reach parity at the rate of 60,000 immigrants a year; 14 years, i.e. up to 1960, at the rate of 50,000 a year; 18 years, i.e. up to 1964, at the rate of 40,000 a year, and 24 years, i.e. up to 1970, to reach parity at the rate of 30,000 Jewish immigrants a year. Any annual Jewish immigration below 30,000 would never let the Jews catch up with the Arabs.

COMPASSIONATE IMMIGRATION

AND THE

SPIRIT OF JEWISH YOUTH

We pray, let us have these 100,000 people. What is the delay? When the terms of reference to this Committee were published on November 13th there was a great deal of discussion in this country, and I happened to be one of those who thought he could find within it a large number of positive aspects. I thought the association of America with it was one of these; I thought the emphasis on the desire for an agreed settlement was one of these, and I thought this was a positive side of it, that your Committee was authorised to make ad hoc interim recommendations. In the first place, the policy declared there would be no interruption of the then quota of Jewish immigration. There was this interruption unfortunately, though the numbers have been made good since. I would like to tell the Committee I have never seen quite so much distress, quite so much tension among all persons whatever political views they held as one could observe and feel then when it was realised that this quota of 1,500 a month had stopped. It stopped, I do not remember exactly for how long but for a couple of months I think, and then one was told: despite what is said in this document by the Secretary of State that everything was to be done to ensure that there was to be no interruption of the present rate of immigration, it was nevertheless interrupted. Then the Committee was authorised to make ad hoc interim recommendations upon its findings in Europe, and it seems to me the Committee did a wise thing, that was discussed here pro and con, in going to Europe first, because there is the scene of this tragedy. You have been there. Will you pardon me if I ask a question. Why are not the 100,000 permitted to come in? I am asking you now instead of you asking me.

- Mr. Macdonald: I suppose your question is, why did we not recommend in an interim report that they should be admitted?
- A. I should not want to put the thing in that way, that would be getting to close to the skin.
 - Q. You asked us why are they not admitted.
- A. That is what we are interested in, not in the interim report. We are interested in having them come. We want them and I can tell you, I have been attending these sessions and I have heard questions as to the economic absorptive capacity. We think economic absorptive capacity is a criterion of immigration in the long term of policy, but not with these 100,000. We want them in and we will share with them, if the country has not enough work — there is enough work we think, there is enough money here; there is more money in this country, unfortunately I would like to say, than there has ever been in its long history. Well, let some of that money be spent. There are some houses that have more rooms than they ought to have, let them be occupied. The people here are ready, I think you can accept it literally, people here are ready to share what they have. Give them opportunity for it. These 100,000 will open their hearts, it will be a saving work. I cannot put it in any other way. Why should it not be done? Why not? You have the authority to recommend it.
- Q. May I say first, so far as the interim report is concerned, I am sure its not having been issued was no indication that every member of this Committee did not feel the poignant tragedy and also the

Q. You mean you would ask the Mandatory Power to open the door?

A. Yes.

Sir Frederick Leggett: I take it you make your proposal with one important objective in mind, that is to provide a basis upon which these two parties can get together and get away from the two extreme courses to which they are now attached?

A. Yes.

Q. I take it you do that because the whole history of mankind shows agreements are not made between equals; they are often made between people each of whom can do the other very great harm. Now taking the evidence we have heard, is it not true that unless both sides see clearly the objective to which they are going and can agree upon it, that to bring new people here now would be to bring them into a battlefield.

A. No, I do not think so.

Q. Do you agree it is absolutely essential that the two sides should agree upon the objective?

A. I think it is very very desirable, but I do not think you are going to get that now. I think that is just chasing a will-o'-the-wisp. You will get it, not by sitting down and working for agreement in advance; you will get it through life, through these steps or other steps in actual practice that you take. It depends what the steps are. If they are steps directed to that end, I am sure you will get it in the course of many years. It will not come from today to tomorrow.

Q. I am afraid I did not make myself clear. Is it not your view that if these steps are taken, minds which are at present locked on one particular idea will begin to see the practical ways in which they could get to greater agreement, just as, for example, between the employers and workpeople in a particular industry, if there is a means by which they can get together and discuss matters, though they are not equal, they will probably find a way in which they can live together?

A. All the better if you can achieve that, if you can bring the Jews and Arabs together you will be fulfilling one of your great functions. I do not know if that is an answer to the question.

Q. It is partially, I think. Now may I raise another point. You were talking about urgency, and all of us who have been in Europe agree upon that urgency, but we saw there young men who were thinking they were coming here to fight. Since we have been here we found something of that atmosphere. I again ask you whether it would be right to bring those young children here if the only way open or the only way determined upon by either side is to fight.

A. I am going to give you an extreme answer — even though it were the only way I would bring them. But that is not the only way. All over the world young people have learned how to fight, that

is what this war has been teaching them, how to fight. It is impossible after a war of these dimensions to unlearn that today or tomorrow. That fighting atmosphere is unfortunately going to persist for years and years to come, a whole generation has been brought upon it. Unfortunately also a generation of my people. A generation of Americans too has now been brought up on something entirely new. There is probably going to be conscription or compulsory military service even there. Why should our young people be regarded by you as exceptions? It is the Jews who should take exception to this militarism among our people. I take exception to it. I take exception to this militarism, to this chauvinism, to this, I cannot use any other words, to this atmosphere of terror. We know it; you hear about it. We feel it in our flesh and blood; you read about it. You do not know the forms this terror takes. It is not only the terror of the bomb, and there are those among us who know what this is very well from their own experience. Nevertheless, I answer you again. If this were the only way, if we knew they were coming here in order to do this fighting, yes. But they are not coming here to do this fighting. Mr. Smilansky would just like to say a word. He says it becomes our duty to try and create conditions, so that this spoiling of our youth cease. That is what we want.

I cannot tell you how we condemn these things. I would like to say one more thing which will not be particularly popular, I am afraid. I have heard here in these sessions people express their great regret at what our youth are doing, some of our youth are doing. They mean that very sincerely. What I would like to say is, this is not just a question of our youth. Some of these young men who go out with bombs and guns are among our most idealistic youth, idealistic men and women, just as you find in other countries where rebellion goes on, ready to sacrifice their lives for what they believe to be a higher cause, to save their people, and the question I ask is, who sends them? It is not the young men who send them, it is older men who send them. Those are the people you should be directing your attention to.

Sir Frederick Leggett: Thank you. May I just say how wonderful it has been to hear this afternoon a counsel of conciliation put forward.

Mr. Buxton: You said something on a subject which may go to the very heart of the decision we are trying to make. You said perhaps a great many Jews would forego their aspirations, their passion for a Jewish State if liberal immigration were allowed; if that is your belief or conviction, not merely a hope or expectation, would you give me two or three reasons for that belief.

A. One reason is this, that some of my friends, not all, who are for the Jewish State, have no hesitation in saying, when they argue privately, that although they believe in the Jewish State with all their heart for various reasons that have been adduced here, they feel it probably will not be granted, and what they really do want is immigration. The argument oscillates back and forth between state and immigration. Some say, if we cannot get a Jewish State in all of Palestine, we want a Jewish State in part of Palestine, partition, because in that way the Jews would be recognized internationally as a unit, as an entity, and that has its advantages in helping Jews in other parts of the world. The argument is put forward, supposing Jews had a seat in the UNO it would not be necessary for somebody else to come and plead their cause. There are very good reasons for wanting this political representation. Some say if we cannot get the State, give us partition. There are

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many people, if you would talk to them, who say, to be sure, immigration is the thing that we want, and the reason we want the State is because through the State we will get immigration. There are on the other hand some who want the State for the State's sake. They are State mad, not realising that the State is something these days that perhaps needs revision in its whole conception and practice. They want the State for the sake of the State. There are others, however, who want the State for the sake of immigration. That is another reason why I say, if immigration were given without the State there would be many people who would not be satisfied a hundred per cent, but who would asquiesce, would forego the State.

Q. You are inclined to think the fervour of these folks would die down somewhat if they had this immediate relief to the Jewish problem?

A. If you could arrange in some way the immediate release, you might say from captivity, of these 100,000 human beings who are our brothers and sisters, I can almost guarantee you, that the tension which fills our lives and which destroys the morality of so many of our young people, would be relieved.

ORAL EVIDENCE

before the

UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PALESTINE at the public meeting held in Jerusalem on Monday, 14 July 1947

Chairman: Mr. Sandstrom (Sweden)

Dr. Magnes: Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I should like first to present the apologies of Mr. Smilansky who it was expected would appear before you. You have from him a memorandum on land in Palestine. Unfortunately, he is not well.

I also wish to introduce Dr. Reiner, who for twenty-five years was one of the chief engineers of the Department of Public Works in Palestine, and Mr. Gabriel Stern, who is the editor of the Hebrew Monthly, which the *Ihud* Association publishes.

We had not expected to deliver an opening address. We had expected, on the basis of the material which we handed to you, to spend the greater part of the time allotted to us for questions and answers. Inasmuch as the procedure seems to have been that an address should open the testimony, I have, within the past few days, jotted down what I believe has been distributed to you and what has been called an outline of the remarks I should like to make introducing what we really have to say. I will ask your pardon, therefore, for not having these remarks written out in full for you so that they may be followed with greater ease.

Arab-Jewish Cooperation - Necessary and Possible

Our contention is that Arab-Jewish cooperation is not only necessary for the peace of this part of the world, but that it is also possible. We contend, upon the basis of the experience of the past twenty-five years, that Arab-Jewish cooperation has never been made the chief objective of major policy, either by the Mandatory Government, by the Jewish Agency, or by those representing the Arabs. We regard this as the great sin of omission which has been committed throughout all these years.

Arab-Jewish relationship is the main political problem which one has to face. There may be attempts to evade facing this by placing emphasis on other very imporant aspects of the problem, but that is the kernel of the problem, and it must be faced courageously and with intelligence, and upon the basis of the experience of these past twenty-five years.

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Palestine is a land sui generis, and no one can have in Palestine everything that he wants. In all of the history of Palestine, no one has had everything that he wants. Palestine is not just a Jewish land; it is not just an Arab land. Among other things, Palestine is a Holy Land of three great monotheistic religions.

Arab Natural Rights and Jewish Historical Rights

The Arabs have great natural rights in Palestine. They have been here for centuries. The graves of their fathers are here. There are remains of Arab culture at every turn. The Mosque of Aksa is the third holy Mosque in Islam. The Mosque of Omar is one of the great architectural monuments in the world of Islam. The Arabs have tilled the soil throughout all these centuries; they have, as we say, great natural rights in Palestine.

The Jews, on the other hand, have great historical rights in Palestine. We have never forgotten this country. "If I forget Thee, O Jerusalem, may my right hand wither." That has been upon the lips of our children from generation to generation. The Book of Books was produced here, in this city, by our ancestors. From that time until the present day, there have been hymns, prayers, voyages, great stirrings among the Jewish people, indicating that this Holy Land has been engraven in their hearts all these centuries.

Moreover, since the return to Zion, during the past generation and more, the Jews have, by their sacrifice, by their scientific ability, by their love of the soil, by their hopes for its future, built up a national home of which in many respects they may well be proud. This labour also has given them a kind of right which is not to be despised.

Political Parity — An Honourable Compromise

We have, therefore, the Arab natural rights, on the one hand, and the Jewish historical rights on the other. The question therefore is, "How can an honourable and reasonable compromise be found?" There are those, we know, who reject the very idea of compromise. But no answer can be found for this complicated situation, except through compromise, that may be reasonable and feasible.

We are in full accord with Recommendation No. 3 of the Report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. You will permit me to read part of that: "...that Palestine shall be neither a Jewish State nor an Arab State", but "a country in which the legitimate national aspirations of both Jews and Arabs can be reconciled, without either side fearing the ascendancy of the other. In our view, this cannot be done under any form of constitution in which mere numerical majority is decisive ——" I should like to emphasize that they say that the answer cannot be found under any form of constitution in which a mere numerical majority is decisive —— "since it is precisely the struggle for a numerical majority which bedevils Arab-Jewish relations. To

ensure genuine self-government for both the Arab and the Jewish communities, this struggle" — that is, for majority — "must be made purposeless by the constitution itself."

The Anglo-American Committee did not, unhappily, propose the outlines of such a constitution. We regard this as the main weakness of their Report, with all of the recommendations of which we are in full accord. We are attempting to give the outlines of a constitution for Palestine in which the question of a mere numerical majority is not to be decisive.

We propose that Palestine become a bi-national country composed of two equal nationalities, the Jews and the Arabs, a country where each nationality is to have equal political powers, regardless of who is the majority or the minority. We call this 'Political Parity'.

Majority Rule or Multi-Nationalism?

Majority rule is, to be sure, the accepted working rule in countries which are uni-national as, for example, in the United States; but majority rule is not the universal working rule in multi-national countries such as Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Soviet Russia, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, where the equality of basic national rights of the different nationalities making up the state is protected against majority rule. It will not do, therefore, to try to apply to a country like Palestine the working rule of the majority in some such way as is done in countries of the West.

Bi-nationalism based on parity is a comparatively new way. It gives full protection to the various religions of the country, to the national languages, cultures, institutions, and yet, with all of that, there is full allegiance to the political state. Switzerland proves this possible. That, to be sure, is not so new, it is over one hundred years old. In Switzerland, there are three or four basic nationalities. There is no concurrence of religion, language, nationality in the twenty-two cantons. Some of them are divided up. Nevertheless, we find m Switzerland this great experiment that has been succeeding for more than one hundred years, of three distinct nationalities, each one guarding their own culture jealously, and at the same time proving faithful citizens of the political state.¹

We contend that multi-nationalism is a high ideal. It is not just something that is made to order to cover a given situation. The old way of having a major people and a minor people in a state of various nationalities we regard as reactionary. It will not do to have a dominant people and a dominated people. That leads to constant friction, breaks out in revolution, results in war. Parity, we contend, is the one just relationship between the different nationalities of a multi-national state.

1 On this point, see extracts from Prof. Janowsky's "Nationalism and Nationalities" reproduced on p. 24.

Arab and Jewish Concessions

It is not always easy to achieve a bi-national or multi-national state. In Palestine great concessions have to be made by all concerned. What are the concessions the Arabs would have to make? They would have to yield their ambition to set up in Palestine a uni-national, independent sovereign state. There are other Arab states which are uni-national, independent, sovereign. Yet, in yielding that great ambition of theirs, which is only natural and to be understood, they would enjoy the maximum of national freedom in a bi-national Palestine equally with their Jewish fellow-citizens.

What are the concessions that the Jews would have to make? They would have to give up their dream of a uni-national independent sovereign Jewish state. That is a great concession. This is the only country where such a thing is conceivable. Yet a bi-national Palestine based upon parity between the two nationalities would give the Jews what they have not in any other place. It would make them a constituent nation in this country. They would not be classified as a minority, because in the bi-national state, based upon parity, there is no such thing politically as majority and minority.

We have seen the minority guarantees of the Treaty of Versailles broke down at every point. Minorities can be protected only through parity; and the Jewish case, the Jewish cause in Palestine, can be protected here only upon the basis of bi-nationalism with two equal nationalities, so that they are in Palestine not a minority — to be sure, not a majority — and they, too, can have full national rights equally with their Arab fellow citizens.

There is another concession that the Jews would have to make, which is rather serious and which requires grave consideration. If there were a Jewish State, presumably that Jewish State would have its representation in the United Nations. This is a problem which requires very careful consideration. We are of the opinion that the Jews should have representation in the United Nations; exactly in what form remains to be seen, although we have certain views as to how that might be achieved.

Neutrality for the Holy Land

Now what are the concessions that the Administering Authority or the Mandatory, or whoever it is that is here, would have to make? This is a concession of very far-reaching importance. We say that Palestine is the Holy Land of three great monotheistic religions. Are there any practical consequences to be drawn from this? Does that merely mean that there will be a few so-called sacred places which will be held intact, to which access will be granted? That is not our conception of it. Our conception of Palestine as the Holy Land covers the whole country. Our historical and religious associations are with the whole of Palestine and not with a few isolated places. The practical

consequence to be drawn from that thesis is that Palestine should be made neutral, that perpetual neutrality should be accorded to Palestine. Switzerland has neutrality. The Vatican has neutrality. And what we mean by that is that Palestine should not be, should not become, a military base, or a naval base, or an air base for any of the Powers, whether that Power be the Mandatory or the Administering Authority or anyone else.

Self-Government

We have tried to set out in the documents presented to you how self-government based on parity might be introduced and carried out in Palestine. We have envisaged this in three stages:

First, while the Mandate lasts, however long that may be, we ask for the immediate appointment — now, today, tomorrow — of an equal number of Jews and Arabs to the Executive Council of the Government, to the Secretariat, as heads of the non-controversial central Government Departments, as Presidents of Courts, as District Comissioners. There are no Jews or Arabs in such positions in the Central Government. There is a considerable amount of local government, but Jews and Arabs have been excluded from all responsible posts in the Central Government, as I have tried to outline. The Anglo-American Committee stated that "British officials hold all the important positions. They exercise as much authority as in a country where the inhabitants are in a primitive stage of civilization."

Now I am not criticizing the British officials. I regard them as good and able men. There are many hundreds of British officials, aside from the police, in this tiny country. What we contend is, that there are Jews and Arabs — and many of them — who could fill these positions with equal distinction, and we see no reason in the world why in these posts of great authority in the Central Government there should be no Jews and no Arabs. We ask that that be done now, at once.

A Constitution for Palestine

Secondly, we favour — we have favoured, it is not only just before you that we have favoured — the transfer of Palestine for an agreed transitional period to the Trusteeship system of the United Nations. When and if that stage is reached we think that the first thing that ought to be done is the appointment of a Commission on Constitution which should be composed, among others, of an equal number of Jews and of Arabs. It will not be easy to work out a draft of a constitution for a bi-national Palestine based on parity. It may take a long time. It will require a great deal of expert help, particularly from such countries as are successfully multi-national today. It may be that there will be more than one report presented to the Constituent Assembly which we envisage. But it is necessary that this basic work

be done, under the auspices of the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations. If, at the Constituent Assembly which is to be elected upon the basis of parity between the Jews and the Arabs, there be no agreement on this or that point, we propose that on these moot points the decision be left to the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations.

Now we realize that one of the disadvantages of a bi-national system based upon parity is that there may be a deadlock, a stalemate, and that it may be hard to come to a decision. We think that on social and economic questions, as the Royal Commission expressed it in its Report, some Jews and some Arabs would vote together. On national questions, however, it may be that the Jewish representation and the Arab representation would find no way of coming to a conclusion. We propose, in order to meet this, that a tribunal of arbitration should be in constant existence, appointed by the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations.

Some of these provisions must be embodied in the organic law of the state. They would have to be removed from all danger of majorization, of being subject to a majority. It has been asked, for example, "How could the bi-national state legislate on immigration?" We propose that there be a standing Committee on Immigration on which should be represented the Jews, the Arabs and the United Nations. I shall deal with immigration later on, but the decisive voice would be that of the United Nations. We do not believe, in general, that it is possible, within the near future, for Palestine to be without some third party — the United Nations. It may be that in the course of Palestine's development that may be achieved. There certainly is required, I do not say a long period, but a considerable period of transition under the auspices of the Trusteeship system of the United Nations.

Why should that be so hard to accept? A bi-national Palestine would be a union, a federation of two peoples. Every union, every federation, lays certain limitations upon its constituent members. Even great powers turn to the United Nations or wish to turn to the International Court of Justice in order that some of these difficult problems may be considered and may be decided by someone other than themselves. Why should a tiny country like Palestine, a Holy Land of three religions, regard it as a disgrace to have to turn to the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations for help to bring them over these difficulties which history — a long and chequered history — has created?

Independent Palestine and the Middle East

We then envisage the third stage. After this transitional period of trusteeship, the bi-national Palestine of two equal nationalities is to become an independent state. It is to have the power of deciding whether and upon what terms it is to join a wider federation of neighbouring countries within the framework of the United Nations.

We are all for that, we have been for that these many years. We think that a bi-national Palestine based on parity has a great mission to help revive this Semitic world materially and spiritually. The Jews and the Arabs are the only two peoples remaining from Semitic antiquity. We are related. We have lived and worked together. We have fashioned cultural values together throughout our history. We regard it as the mission of the bi-national Palestine to bring about once again, within the Semitic world, this revival of the spirit which has characterized Semitic history from antiquity.

I have dealt thus far with the structure of the bi-national State based upon parity. If you have given attention to the documents which we have submitted, you will have seen that we have given in very great detail certain suggestions as to how this state should be constituted, suggestions which might be turned over to that Committee on Constitution which I mentioned. We talk of the Head of the State. We talk of the Federal Executive, the Federal Legislature. We talk of counties or cantons, however they may be called. We talk of the Executive and of the Advisory Council. We talk also of a consultative body to be constituted even during the time of the Mandate, or the Trusteeship. If you wish to go into some of these details in your questions, we shall try to do our best to answer. We do not pretend that the scheme we have drawn up cannot be improved. We do say that we have given it considerable thought.

Immigration

Now, just as the structure of the state is one side of the problem, so is immigration another side. Indeed, the question of Jewish immigration is in many ways the crux of the whole situation. We propose three principles upon which Jewish immigration is to be encouraged. You will note that I say "encouraged".

First, that Jewish immigration be permitted up to parity with the Arabs. We call this 'Numerical Parity.' (What I have been describing before is, I said, what we call 'political parity.') This would enable the Jews to bring in another 500,000 to 600,000 immigrants.

The second principle would be that immigration be regulated in accordance with the economic absorptive capacity of the country.

Third, that this economic absorptive capacity of the country be enlarged through a Development Plan, which is to be of benefit to all the inhabitants of the country.

May I take up these three principles or stages one by one as briefly as I can?

2 Cf. extracts from the Written Statement submitted to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry reproduced on pp. 22-24.

Number one. Why should not the 100,000 Jewish displaced persons be admitted into Palestine rapidly? President Truman began to speak of it, I think, almost two years ago. Admitting them into Palestine would of course mean an enormous enterprise. It will require great sums of money, great capacity for absorption, and great sacrifice on the part of the Jews of Palestine and perhaps of the rest of the world. We wish to express to you our opinion that if it be decided to admit these 100,000 Jews into Palestine as rapidly as possible, you will find the manpower, the organizational ability, the money, together with the money which the United States and Great Britain have already said they were ready to put into this enterprise. It will be a great challenge to the Jewish people. No one can say to you at the present time that these 100,000 can be absorbed in Palestine in a year, as was thought. But the Jewish people should be challenged with that. We have wanted these 100,000 of our brothers and sisters so intensely that it seems to us that it ought to be granted, if for no other reason than because the Jewish people have suffered this unspeakable tragedy. Forty per cent of the Jewish people have been annihilated. No other people has suffered anywhere near such losses. This challenge to the Jewish people, putting upon their backs this burden, this task, would in large measure calm them down and keep them from thinking constantly of what has happened to father, mother, and sister in those gas chambers. The Jewish people need to be saddled with this enterprise. One should not be particular and say that 1,500 or 4,000 or 5,000 a month, or however many a month, should be admitted. Give these certificates, 100,000 certificates, and tell the Jewish people that they are primarily responsible for the use of them. Those who have rooms to spare in our spacious homes will yield some of them. Those of us who have clothes to spare will turn some of them over. Those of us who have a little extra money, or no extra money, will turn the money over or go into debt. It is a matter of historic mercy. It is a psychological problem, and not so much a political or an economic problem. The Jewish people must be given something - not as a gift - not as charity - but given a task, a burden, an enterprise. One hundred thousand souls! What greater function can all of us see before ourselves than to do what we can to bring these brands from the burning into this new National Home?

The Arabs need not be afraid of these 100,000. In one of our documents 3 you will find that we have made a computation based upon authentic figures which will show that during the war there was very little Jewish immigration. The Arab natural increase is much greater than that of the Jews — almost twice as much. During the war, all these years, the Arab natural increase has brought the Arab population

3 The relevant passage is reproduced on p. 26

when we prepared these figures we found that if 100,000 Jews were brought into the country at once, the increase in the Jewish population in relation to the Arab would be only about 30,000, taking into account the lack of immigration during the war and the greater Arab natural increase. These 30,000 would not bring the Jewish state of which the Arabs are so afraid. We are convinced that if these 100,000 had been admitted, without all of this discussion going on for almost two years, the Arabs would have acquiesced. They would have protested, but we know that they are at heart our brothers, and that it would not have been on account of these 100,000 that any revolt would have taken place. We feel the same thing now despite the fact that the situation has been aggravated by these two years of bitter and acrimonious discussion.

Numerical Parity

The next stage that we envisage is, as I have said, up to parity with the Arabs. From where would these additional immigrants come? There are, in accordance with figures that I have seen lately, about 200,000 displaced persons in the camps of Europe. That would not make up the 500,000 to 600,000 to bring the Jewish numbers up to parity with the Arabs. These immigrants would probably come, in the first place, from North Africa. There are 300,000 to 400,000 Jews in North Africa, who are very unhappy. Then there are hundreds of thousands of Jews in Hungaria and Roumania. And in Jewish history, one can never tell, unfortunately, where the shoe will begin to pinch next. Moreover, there are many Jewish young men and women who want to give their strength to the upbuilding of the National Home, although they are not in need of migrating at all. All of these would make up, we think, the additional numbers.

Then the third stage is if parity were ever reached with the Arabs, what then? I mentioned to you, in the first place, the greater Arab natural increase. There would always be that much to catch up with. But the chief answer that we give is, that if in the course of those years Jews and Arabs find the way of peace and understanding together, they would come to some agreed conclusion as to how much additional Jewish immigration the Jews might be able to have.

Land and Development

As I have said to you, my friend, Mr. Smilansky, had expected to say something to you about legislation for land reform. His point is that all discriminatory restrictions should be removed and that adequate protection for small owners and tenant cultivators, particularly among the Arabs, should be provided for. I mentioned, in passing, the Development Plan. It has been said that the United States Government and the British Government are ready to invest large sums in the economic development of Palestine and the Middle East. We propose

that on the Development Board, that board which is to work out these plans, the Jews and the Arabs be equally represented, among others, just as we proposed the same thing for this Immigration Board, which I touched upon in passing.

Palestine — Divided or United?

We have no belief in Partition for many reasons — religious, historical, political, economic. Indeed we regard Partition as not only impracticable, but, should it be carried through, as a great misfortune for both Jews and Arabs. We have not wanted to encumber our documents to you by engaging in polemics with the advocates of Partition, whom we greatly respect. We have wanted to present a positive case for a united bi-national Palestine on its own merits. Should it, however, be desired, we are ready to formulate our arguments against Partition as well.4

We are greatly encouraged by the advocacy of the idea of a binational Palestine by some of the delegates at the Special Session on Palestine of the United Nations General Assembly. It has been said by the Chief Delegate of the U.S.S.R. that Partition is only to be considered if a bi-national solution should prove to be impossible.

We think it is the task of statesmanship to make this possible. In any event we think consideration of Partition entirely premature until the bi-national Palestine be given a full and fair chance to prove its worth over a number of years.

We regret to say that it has never been given this chance. Neither the British Government nor the Jewish and Arab leaders have ever made any determined and systematic attempt to make Jewish-Arab cooperation a chief objective of their policy. The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry made very important recommendations in this direction, but the leaders all around failed to accept them or to implement them.

Many Jews as well as many Arabs of all classes and sections — some openly and many more privately — anxiously look forward to a courageous lead from you which will deliver this unhappy country from the evils of political tension and nationalist passion, of mental and physical terror. We call upon you to take up this attempt, and not to accept counsels of despair, but to give a fair chance to constructive proposals which in the long run bear hope for real freedom, prosperity and peace for the two peoples of this land.

4 Since the Committee expressed this desire, two additional memoranda were handed them. These are reproduced on pp. 74-84,

INTERROGATION

Chairman: I thank you, Dr. Magnes. I understand that Dr. Reiner is not going to give an address. Is that right?

Dr. Magnes: No, Dr. Reiner is prepared particularly to give you details in relation to Partition should you require them, more especially in relation to the analysis of the Woodhead Commission which rejected, in its time, the proposal of the Peel Commission. Dr. Reiner can tell you a great deal about the water resources of the country, erosion, and other things. And should you so desire, he will answer your questions, if they come.

Chairman: Now we can begin our questions. Before I do that, I will ask you if you want a recess before we begin?

Dr. Magnes: No, I am ready for a long session with you.

Chairman: Then we will begin at once. I should first want to ascertain whether your suggestions now are the same as those you made before the Anglo-American Committee?

Dr. Magnes: Substantially the same.

Chairman: I understand there are very small modifications?


Dr. Magnes: Yes, we have taken into account some of the documents that have appeared during the past year, particularly the Morrison-Grady Report, and the 'Bevin proposals' of February 7, 1947,5 which are the latest of the British proposals, and we have addressed ourselves in some detail to those. But, essentially what we propose to you is what we proposed to the Anglo-American Committee, and for that reason our document to you is really rather thin. We thought that you would be called upon to read several thousand pages and if you found a thin document you might be tempted to read it.

Chairman: We appreciate that. Then I should want to ask some questions regarding the way in which your scheme for a bi-national state would operate. I want to know if I am right when I think that it would be partly through regional provinces, territorial provinces, and partly through communities without any territorial basis?

Voting by Counties

Dr. Magnes: Yes, we provide for the division of Palestine into counties, to use the English term, or cantons, to use the Swiss term. Some of these counties need not be territorially contiguous. Some of them would be mostly Arab or purely Arab. Some of them might be purely Jewish. Some of them would be mixed. They would be scattered throughout the

5 Some extracts from these proposals are reproduced in this publication.



country. That would be on the one hand. On the other hand, in our plan we provide for two National Councils, the Jewish National Council and the Arab National Council, which would have cultural functions, primarily. Then we provide also for the religious courts, both Jewish and Moslem, inasmuch as those are institutions that are rooted in the very ancient tradition of this country.

Chairman: I suppose that you mean the details of the constitution would be worked out by this Committee which would be set up for working out the constitution. But I should like to have your suggestion as to how the elections for the legislature would take place.

Dr. Magnes: We do not favour what is called "communal registers", "communal lists". By communal lists one means that all the Jews of the country would vote on one list of electors and all the Arabs of the country on another list. We favour the territorial method. We favour election, as I have said, by counties. In the purely Arab counties we presume that there might be two or three, or however many Arab tickets, to be voted for by the elector. The same in the purely Jewish counties. In the mixed counties we even go so far as to think that in some places the Arabs might even favour a Jewish candidate, and the Jews might even favour an Arab candidate. I do not want to become too personal, but I think I could mention a couple of mixed districts where that might very well take place. The voting would be by counties and be regulated in such a way as in the final analysis to produce in the Constituent Assembly in the first place an equal number of Jews and of Arabs, and in the Legislative Assembly, which we hope might result from the Constituent Assembly, an equal number of Jews and Arabs.

Chairman: There will be a provision in the constitution which would have the effect that an equal number would be elected?

Dr. Magnes: Yes.

The Principle of Parity

Chairman: I come now to the big dividing question — the question of immigration. I suppose the question of the 100,000 Jews who would be allowed to immigrate immediately would be a problem which would have to be provided for in the decision of the United Nations. When you came to your further immigration policy you mentioned the principle that the Jews would be allowed to immigrate up to a number which would equalize both groups, and you mentioned also that the principle would be the economic absorptive capacity. Do you mean that these principles could be inscribed in the original decision of the United Nations, or in the constitution? Or how have you envisaged that?

Dr. Magnes: Yes, I think it is absolutely required that those principles be enunciated from the beginning. Those would be principles that ought to be very clearly laid down because in that way you would be providing for two equal nationalities. That is the basis of our whole conception.

Cooperation Through Life

Chairman: I think your scheme is inspired by a great ideal. If one has hesitation it is, as you yourself pointed out, on the ground of the practical workability of the scheme, and the test for the workability of the scheme, I think you said yourself, would be cooperation. If you cannot bring about the necessary cooperation I think the scheme will fail. Do you agree with me on the importance of cooperation in the working of your scheme?

Dr. Magnes: Your question is how to bring that cooperation about. There are some who say that the Jews and the Arabs will have to agree in advance to certain abstract principles providing for cooperation between them. We say that cooperation is not produced in that way. We say that discussion, while very essential, can run out into the years and produce nothing practical. That has been the case right along in this country. There have been certain agreements, certain texts of agreements drawn up, certain discussions between Jews and Arabs. Our contention is that cooperation is brought about not through discussion, but through life itself. By life we mean, among other things, government.

Cooperation Through Self-Government

Why do we propose that there should be Jews and Arabs in the Executive Council? Why do we propose all of these things I have gone over? Because that is life. That is something that affects intimately the individual and the communal life of every person and of every community. Immigration affects it. Development affects it. Sitting in the Executive Council of Government affects it; being members of the Secretariat, being Presidents of Courts, being District Commissioners — a most important position, coming into contact with the people of the country. That is the way cooperation is brought about. Cooperation cannot be brought about, so we have learned, through agreement in advance. Had that been possible, that agreement would have been made long since because, whatever be the views of this one or that, there is hardly anyone who would deny that cooperation is much to be preferred to strife and animosity.

Why has cooperation not taken place up to this time? It is because the Jews and the Arabs have not been given the opportunity of creating together. One of the ways of creating together is through government. That is perhaps the chief way of creating together. And it is for that reason that we lay such great stress upon declaring in advance more or less what the form of government is to be.

A man in a municipality — a Jew or an Arab — knows that the paving of a street in front of his house, or the laying of a sewer, is an important thing. But we find that there have not been the opportunities for Jew and Arab to sit down together over these matters. There have been opportunities — I should like to correct myself — in relation to the municipality, but I am talking primarily now of central government.

That is the way, so we contend, cooperation can be brought about. By creating the conditions in life, people must come together and work together for their common good.

Chairman: I quite appreciate what you said. When you are striving for an ideal you are perhaps not engrossed in the difficulties, but on the other hand, you have to have the difficulties cleared before your eyes, and I suppose that you are quite aware that the difficulties in the way of cooperation in this case may be greater than in the case of those binational or federal states which you have quoted. We have, for instance, this difference of mentality between the two communities, the difference of general outlook on life, the difference in ways of living, the difference of standards of life. I suppose those are difficulties which have not existed to the same degree in the other multi-national or bi-national states of which you have spoken.

The Good Will for Bridge-Building

Dr. Magnes: I do not want to go into a description of the other multi-national states, although I think I could show that there are these differences in standards in some of them. But there are these facts which you have mentioned. There are these differences in the standard of life between the Jews and Arabs. But then those are the facts which we have to face together, the facts that we have to try to overcome together. It will not do, so it seems to us, to try to segregate the Jews from the Arabs, or the Arabs from the Jews, only because there happen to be differences in standards. One sees for example in the United States of America how in one generation — and it takes no longer than that, and sometimes half a generation — these differences of education and of tradition are completely wiped out, and the ignorant become the learned on an equal level with those who have the tradition of learning for a long time back.

Those are not insuperable problems. It requires merely the will to face them together. They cannot be faced by trying to put the Arabs into one compartment of an insane house, and the Jews into another compartment of an insane house.

In the Government memorandum I was struck by one phrase which, I must say, seemed to me to be very frank because it was in accord with what I had been observing for the past twenty-five years of my residence here. They said there — I do not think I can quote the exact words — that the Mandate did not apply itself to bridge-building. Well, it was always our conception that the Mandate was just for that purpose — to build the bridge between the two peoples. It would appear from this document — and that is not true, for example, of the administration of a High Commissioner like General Sir Arthur Wauchope, who was greatly interested in bridge-building and did a great deal of bridge-building between Arabs and Jews — that the Mandatory was a sort of referee in a prize-ring where two combatants were fighting one another.

These combatants were doing all the work and the referee was judging them. We do not regard the thing from that point of view at all. We think that the conception of bridge-building is a much higher conception. You build a bridge this way — from both ends — bringing peoples together. Or we have thought of it from the point of view of the teacher: The Mandatory as a teacher trying to teach two pupils not always equal in their standard of education, not always equal in many other respects, but teaching them, leading them. It says there, however, the Mandate does not apply itself to bridge-building.

What we propose is this bridge-building. It can be done. It will take a long time. We do not try to deceive ourselves, and we certainly are not trying to deceive anyone else. It will not be done overnight. It cannot be done from today to tomorrow. For that reason we do not think there can be any sort of finality about any answer that is given to this problem at the present time. This is a situation that has to be permitted to develop and to grow under happy auspices, under the direction of men of good will, teachers who understand what it is to have two pupils in one class, one backward and one more forward-looking. That is our whole contention. That is one of the reasons I have been talking about, one of the reasons we oppose Partition. It is along those lines we think.

The Fear of Domination

Chairman: One could certainly develop a good deal on the difficulties, and one of the difficulties is, of course, what you have pointed out, the separateness of the communities and the tendency of the Mandatory rule to widen the rift instead of bridging it. But I shall not go into that question. I shall only mention one difficulty, which I think might be the greatest, and that is this:—

When you state that the Arab standpoint, the Arab ambition, as you put it, is self-government, that is true; but I wonder whether the Arabs, in self-government, do not also put in a notion of proprietorship to the country and that they feel the Jewish immigration here is an invasion, a penetration, and that they resent this immigration. My question is whether the Arabs, in the scheme you propose, resent the insertion of this immigration as a condition of the cooperation. It is just the opposite of their aim, I think.

Dr. Magnes: You are right in saying that that is the chief objection the Arabs have to the Jews — that the Jews are coming here in too large numbers. And from a certain point of view, when they use the term "invasion" it may be right. People are coming from the outside who were not born here, and that might perhaps conceivably be called an invasion. We have great sympathy with the Arab fear of Jewish domination. That is what it arrives at. We do not believe that the Arabs ought to be dominated by the Jews. We do not think Palestine is a place for that. But we do not think that the Jews ought to be dominated by the Arabs. If we come here as invaders — to use that very harsh term —

it is not because we have found a new continent, as the early American settlers did, who found great riches before them and who wiped out the Indians in order to make a place for themselves in those vast spaces. We have not come into this country for wealth, because it can hardly be called a wealthy country from the material point of view. The wealth that is here we have more or less created by taking advantage of some of the natural resources which heretofore had been supposed not to exist as, for example, water. We have not come here because we happened to find on the map a country in 1917 where there were 800,000 inhabitants and which perhaps might hold 4,000,000; where the inhabitants are weak and we are going to overcome and dispossess them.

Spiritual Links and Material Claims

Why is it that we come here? Why is it that there are some of these younger men and women among the Jews coming here who have no need whatsoever, materially or even spiritually, of migrating from their homes? It is because this is Palestine. It is because this is Eretz Israel. It is because we have these links with this country. If the Arabs want to deny the substantiality of these spiritual links, that is of course their affair, but we think that these spiritual links are just as substantial as the kushan which my former landlord had, in the house where I lived, throughout his family for almost six hundred years. Before Columbus went to America his family had that title deed to that land. That is a mighty strong claim that he has. We contend that our claim is at least as strong — to be sure, not so material. This happens to be an instance where the Jewish people, which is accused of being a materialist people, is trying to emphasize spiritual bonds and trying to make these spiritual, historic bonds of equal validity at least with these material kushans, or deeds, which certain landlords have over the soil.

You have put the problem from the Arab point of view, and you must consider it from that point of view. I have tried to give you an answer from our point of view. There are some who criticize us and say that the Arab natural rights, as we have called them, are not to be considered as of equal validity with Jewish historical rights. Our whole conception is to try to make this something that is equal — equality. There may be a certain amount of artificiality in that. If you weigh the thing, if it were capable of being, weighed — these natural rights and these historical rights — heaven knows to which side the scale would tip. But this is a human situation and we think that situation can be met more or less successfully if we say to both of these peoples, both of whom have very good claims to this country, "Your claims are just; your claims have equal validity; now let us try to see if we cannot build up a common life together from that common background."

Chairman: You spoke of the somewhat artificial character of this principle of equality. That makes me ask another question. Would not the Arabs resent this artificial character of some of the most important

principles of the constitution? Would they not say that they had been conceived with the aim of keeping them down? I mean, I suppose they have the majority now in the country, and they could say that these principles aim at depriving them of this majority situation.

Multi-Nationalism — A Lofty Principle

Dr. Magnes: These principles do deprive the Arabs of what a majority has in uni-national states. If Palestine were an Arab state and the Arabs were in the majority, they would be the rulers of the state; they would be the dominant people, the Jews the dominated people. If this were a Jewish state and the tables were reversed, the Jews would be the dominant people and the Arabs the dominated people. We have tried to avoid that. We have tried to set up the principle of multinationalism.

It is not a principle which we ourselves have invented. There is a great literature to be studied on that principle. We quoted at least three books in some of our documents, all of them published in 1945: one on "Nationalism and Nationalities", by Professor Janowsky of New York; another "Eastern Europe between the Wars, 1918—1941" by Professor H. Seton-Watson; and another by Mr. A. Cobban on "National Self-Determination". It is not as though the situation in Yugoslavia, for example, which is the newest of the multi-national countries, were the same as in Switzerland, or that the situation in the Soviet Union were the same as in Belgium; the situation in Palestine is different from what it is in any of these; but there is this basic guiding principle of which we are advocates.

We contend that this principle is a lofty principle. It is lofty because it tries to do away with domination by a majority over a minority. And it is lofty because it tries to find a practical way of bringing together different types of human beings. It is history that has created that. It is history that has created this congeries of nationalities in the Balkans, for example, and in this country and in other countries. No one of us has created that. The question is, how are we going to try to meet that historical situation?

We contend that you have to have a principle. That principle is the principle of bi-nationalism. Within that principle you will have to find very many ingenious methods of meeting certain practical, day-to-day difficulties. We have tried to outline some of those — by no means all of them — and it is for that reason that we suggest that there be a Commission on Constitution, which is to work through, and take its time in working through, the details of this bi-national or multi-national state.

It is Never Too Late

Chairman: I look at the question the whole time from the point of view of the practical workability, and from that point of view I ask this question also. Would not this artificial character of the principle of

equality of which we have spoken give from the outset an invidious character to the constitution on the Arab side?

Dr. Magnes: It might well be. There are Arabs who say that. On the other hand, there are Arabs — and I can testify to this from my personal experience — who are altogether in favour of this bi-national idea of two equal peoples in Palestine. If there is another answer that is better than this, then that other answer ought to be applied. We think there is no better answer and we think therefore that the best must be made of this principle of bi-nationalism or of multi-nationalism.

Chairman: Would it not have been a good thing for the success of your idea — of your scheme — if it had been put to trial at an earlier stage — let us say ten years ago?

Dr. Magnes: You would not think that I was trying to be amusing if I said it would have been better if it had been tried twenty-five years ago.

Chairman: What I am aiming at is whether the situation has not deteriorated.

Dr. Magnes: It has deteriorated almost from year to year.

Chairman: And also, we may say, from the time when the Anglo-American Committee made its inquiry?

Dr. Magnes: It has deteriorated in certain respects since then, I think, primarily because of the failure to grant the 100,000 immigration certificates. On the other hand, since the Anglo-American Committee has been here, there have been discussions of the problem on the Arab side, not altogether in the spirit of the present Arab Higher Committee. I think you will find from some of the discussions of the Arab League, or from some of the members of the Arab League, a much more moderate attitude towards these proposals of ours than the present intransigent position of the Arab Higher Committee. But you are right; the situation has deteriorated. The situation has deteriorated especially in my view since the Jewish Agency adopted as its official programme the Jewish State for Palestine.

Mr. Granados (Guatemala): I should like to ask a question in this connection.

Chairman: I should like to put my questions first. Then I shall give the right to other Members to put their questions.

Mr. Granados: But it is related to this.

Chairman: Yes, but if it is related, you can also put the question afterwards.

Is it not right to say that the anxiety of the Arabs has been aroused by this claim for a Jewish State?

Dr. Magnes: There is no question of it.

Chairman: That the exasperation on both sides has increased?

Dr. Magnes: Yes.

Chairman: That there is a rather nervous state of affairs here?

Dr. Magnes: Yes.

Chairman: But you do not think it is too late to put your idea to a test?

Dr. Magnes: It is never too late to do a good thing!

The Trusteeship Period

Chairman: You envisage the continuation of the Mandate for a transitional period and then a Trusteeship. Would that not, to a certain degree, continue the present situation, with important modifications? I quite see the importance of, for instance, the elements of the population taking more part in the Government and of these attempts to bring about cooperation. But would it not be, in the main, about the same situation for the Trustee as it is for the Mandatory?

Dr. Magnes: If I understand the question, it means this: that whatever situation there is anywhere, a certain continuity is required, except if there be a revolution. If you have a revolution, then the existing situation can be overturned and continuity is destroyed. I do not know that anybody at the present time is planning that. So that it would necessarily follow that the Mandate would continue for a given period until the Trusteeship System made the Mandated Territory a Trust Territory. In order to do that, the Charter provides that a Trusteeship Agreement has to be drawn up with the Mandatory itself. That would take a considerable period, I should say. Whatever be the answer, the country cannot just be left to itself, all of a sudden, overnight.

Chairman: I am thinking more of the Trusteeship which would follow and which, in your opinion, would take quite a considerable time.

Dr. Magnes: Yes, I think that the Trusteeship System would take a number of years.

Chairman: I mean that during that period the same difficulties would be encountered.

Dr. Magnes: No. You know the Trusteeship terms better than I do, but if I have read these terms aright, it would seem to me to be a different situation. For example, the old League of Nations Mandates Commission was not permitted to visit Palestine. Well, under the Trusteeship Agreement, the Administering Authority would have no right to object to your Committee or some other Committee of the United Nations visiting Palestine. There are ever so many differences, it seems to me, between the Mandatory and the Trustee.

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Chairman: Then I shall only ask you one more question, and that is with regard to the section of the population which is in favour of your solution. I know that you do not represent a large organization, that it is a comparatively small organization, but I think it has been pointed out already to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry that there is quite a large portion of the population which, in the main, adheres to your ideas.

Dr. Magnes: There is a very large proportion of the population definitely committed to the bi-national state, and there is an even larger proportion of the population who would accept the bi-national state once the bi-national state were proposed, no matter what their present views were

Chairman: I suppose it is difficult to express in figures the section of the population which would be in favour of such a solution?

Dr. Magnes: Well, it is difficult, but I think it can be approximated. As you pointed out, our organization is not a political party. It is a small political group, a club — you might call it that — which publishes a Monthly, in Hebrew, 1300 copies a month. We know we have thousands and thousands of readers. We are partners with the Hashomer Hatzair Workers' Party in what is called the League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and Cooperation, which is going to appear before you, so I gather. It is we and they who make up this League, and it is they who advocate a bi-national state. Their votes during the last election here for members of the Vaad Leumi, if I remember rightly, were over 25,000. Then, there are the Communists, who were here before you yesterday. They are for a bi-national state. I would like to say that there are differences, of course, between all of us as to this and that detail. There is, I would like to add further, a large section of the inarticulate population very much in favour of some such accommodation with the Arabs. There is a large proportion of the Palestine Jewish population not concentrated in political parties. We get evidences of this constantly. I do, personally.

We published a book in February, a copy of which we submitted to the Members of your Committee, called "Towards Union in Palestine". We published 2,500 copies of that book. The copies were exhausted almost at once.

I was in New York last summer, and there we published the testimony which our organization gave before the Anglo-American Committee. We published 2,000 copies. Those 2,000 copies were taken up within a few days. We had to publish another 2,000 copies, and they were exhausted presently. In other words, we do get indications all around that a large part of the inarticulate Jewish population would be happy, would rejoice, if some way of accommodation between the Jews and Arabs along these lines, more or less, could be found. Just how many and what the proportion is, I do not know. But I have no doubt and I

am ready to admit that the majority of the Jewish population is in favour of a Jewish state.

Chairman: A uni-national Jewish state?

Dr. Magnes: In favour of a Jewish state of one sort or another. I think it is correct to say that.

Chairman: I thank you, Dr. Magnes, for your answers to my questions. I give you the right, Mr. Granados, to put your questions.

Mr. Granados (Guatemala): I thank you very much for the great favour you are granting to me. It seems that nowadays dictatorship is a bit contagious.

Why Were the Recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee

Not Implemented?

I should like to put to Dr. Magnes some questions relating to his plan, but not to the ultimate end of his plan. I should like to know just why this plan which, in a great part, was adopted by the Anglo-American Committee, was not carried out. For instance, the Anglo-American Committee asked for 100,000 immigrants to come in. The Anglo-American Committee accepted the idea of a bi-national state. More than a year has passed, and nothing has been done. Is there not something lacking at the base of the plan? What do you think, Dr. Magnes?

Dr. Magnes: I do not think that is the reason. I think there are other reasons, if I understand the situation. The Anglo-American Committee put forward this general idea: no Jewish State, no Arab State—and we call that a bi-national state. But they did not propose any constitution for that state.

It has been said, therefore, that the British Government held up the issuing of the 100,000 immigration certificates in order to try to bring together the two main aspects of the problem: immigration being one aspect and the form of the state - self-government - being the other. The Anglo-American Committee went into great detail concerning the one aspect, namely, immigration. The British Government therefore, if I read the situation aright — and I have no information except that which one gets from the press - proposed to the American Government that two committees of experts — they were called 'delegations' — were to meet in London in order to try and work out the second aspect of the problem, namely, the political. The result of those meetings was what is known as the Morrison-Grady Report. It is a great pity that the Morrison-Grady Report has not been published in full. I suppose you gentlemen have seen it in full; I think others have also seen it in full.6 You find there a considerable discussion as to how this recommendation, Recommendation No. 3 of the Anglo-American Committee which I read

6 Some remarks about the full text of the Morrison-Grady Report are to be found at the end of this publication.

to you, could be implemented. The purpose of the Morrison-Grady experts was to try to find a way of giving practical form to that.

Well, I think only a torso of the plan was produced by Mr. Morrison in the House of Commons at the time. It provided for two provinces, a Jewish Province and an Arab Province, as you know, with no participation of the Jews or the Arabs in central government whatsoever, and with many other drawbacks. At once, both sides — both the Jews and the Arabs — rejected the Morrison-Grady plan. The British Government therefore was not satisfied that the two aspects of the problem had been worked out together; the immigration aspect and the political, self-government aspect. What they did was to produce other plans. On February 5, 1947, they tried to call a conference, and all the rest of it. I need not go into those details.

At any rate, I think there are two reasons why the bi-national plan was not advocated. The one that I have just given, that there was no political aspect to the immigration side of the problem; and the second, that there was a tremendous propaganda for partition, particularly in England, throughout the whole of the past year. The Secretary of State for the Colonies was said to be in favour of partition. The London "Times" was in favour of partition. And a large number of other prominent individuals and publications were in favour of partition. I think it was for those two reasons, because of the lack of a clear-cut political solution, and because of the propaganda for partition, that the bi-national plan was put into the background.

Mr. Granados: Do you think there is a real chance of your plan or any other plan being carried out under a mandatory, or do you think that it would have more chance under an independent state?

Dr. Magnes: I think that in order to get an independent state you have to have a transitional period.

Mr. Granados: For how long?

Dr. Magnes: It is difficult, I must confess, for me to say. In these British proposals of 7th February 1947, Mr. Bevin proposes five years. I think that is too short a time. I think that is too short a time for two reasons. In the first place, you have to give the Jews a longer time within which to immigrate. In the second place, you have to give both the Jews and the Arabs a somewhat longer time to settle down together, to work out this constitution that I speak of. I would say that the interim period, the transitional period of trusteeship, should be measured by the time within which this constitution could be worked out.

Who Would Be the Trustee?

Mr. Granados: When you speak of trusteeship, do you envisage any particular country as a trustee?

Dr. Magnes: Yes. I do not know just what the result is going to be, but I assume that Britain is going to continue as a trustee. And why?

Because Britain, whatever is said, has interests in this part of the world. Your Trusteeship Agreement will have to be made with Great Britain, if it is to be made at all. And I should imagine that Great Britain would say: Well, we can remain a trustee. Moreover, Britain has had this tremendous experience here of twenty-five years, which is not just to be put aside. There are some of us, if I may make a confession to you, who have great admiration for the liberalism of Great Britain, for the traditional liberalism of Great Britain; and particularly now, if I may speak for myself, for the way in which Great Britain is trying to change her Empire, change her Imperialism, which has brought a great deal of unhappiness, into a Commonwealth; the way she has tried to do it in India, the way she has tried to do it in Burma, the way she is trying to do it in Egypt, whether with complete success or not. That is one of the great political movements of history. That is another reason — if you ask me the question - why I say Great Britain would probably be the trustee over this period.

I would like to add one more thing. We assume also that the Trusteeship Council is going to exercise control. We also assume that the Trusteeship Council is in a position different from that of the Council of the League of Nations in relation to that unhappy Mandates Commission.

Moreover, I hope that you have not overlooked what I said about neutrality in this country. I hope that some consideration may be given to that. I hope that Palestine or this part of the world might be very unattractive, and I hope it may be made very unattractive, to Great Britain or to any other power, if Palestine were to be forbidden as the base for armies, navies and air forces. Now I do not know if, in a neutralized Palestine, Great Britain would want to be the trustee and would insist on being the trustee when she makes the Trusteeship Agreements with you or with the United Nations. But I have tried to give an answer to your question as fully as I could.

Mr. Granados: You have lived in the country for the last twenty-five years. You have seen the results of the Mandate. Do you think that your people, the Jews, and your friends, the Arabs, would be happy under that Trusteeship?

Dr. Magnes: Whether they would be happy or not, I do not know. I think I can say this for the Jews, if you will permit me to; I cannot speak for the Arabs. I think that, once these problems can be met in some such spirit of cooperation as we have tried to indicate, the Jews would be happy to have Great Britain as the Trustee during this interim period. You may think that is strange, but I think I know my own people somewhat, and I think you can find expressions of that, even in the most extreme quarters. Moreover, who is to be here in place of Great Britain? If we knew that, we might perhaps be able to give you a better answer as to whether we would prefer that particular country to Great Britain.

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The Reason for Numerical Parity

Mr. Salazar (Peru): I wash to ask Dr. Magnes to explain something. You have stated that in a bi-national state with political parity the numerical relation between Arabs and Jews would have no importance whatever. And yet, you propose immigration until numerical parity is attained. I find an apparent contradiction between those two propositions. Will you make clear your proposal, please?

Dr. Magnes: Well, I admit to that contradiction. If, on the one hand, one says that a bi-national state with two equal nationalities, no matter who is the majority or the minority, is to be established, and in the same breath one says that the Jews are not to be enabled to go beyond parity, there is undoubtedly a contradiction there.

The Hashomer Hatzair Party, for example, who, with us, advocate a bi-national state, overcome that contradiction in a way that we have not been able to. They say, inasmuch as majority-minority is not to play a decisive role, let the Jews then become the majority, if they can, if there be need for that in the exigencies of Jewish life. Now, we have put this, you might say 'political', level on the increase of the Jewish population up to parity because of political considerations.

I have had the experience that in talking with Arabs there was understanding of parity in population, but no understanding whatsoever of the idea that inasmuch as majority-minority was not to play the decisive role, let the Jews become the majority. It is there for the sake of trying to work out some acceptable formula to both sides. Your logical contradiction, nevertheless, remains.

Function of the Jewish Agency

Mr. Blom (Netherlands): I would like to ask Dr. Magnes this: Dr. Magnes visualizes a transitional period. We do not know exactly—and he does not either—what the duration of this period will be. But Dr. Magnes gave the indication that five years, in his opinion, is too short. I think that was the way he put it. What I would like to know is this: What will be, during this transitional period in the Ihud's proposals, the authority and the position of the Jewish Agency? On the one hand, it is proposed that Jews will be appointed in central government jobs immediately, as well as Arabs. Now, what will then be the relation of the Jewish Agency to the central government, to Jewry all over the world? Perhaps Dr. Magnes will explain what he has in mind in this respect.

Dr. Magnes: You will pardon me if I cannot give a very brief answer to that question. We look upon the Jewish Agency as the repre-

sentative of all the Jews in the world in relation to Palestine. We tried, in our memorandum to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, to equate the Arab League with the Jewish Agency and to make the Arab League the representative of all the Arabs and Moslems of the world in relation to Palestine. We then said that the Mandatory or the Administering Authority would probably be the representative of all the Christians of the world in relation to Palestine. Palestine is not a country that has only local interests. As has been pointed out over and over again, as I tried to say this morning, this is a place that engages the affections and the interest of millions and millions of persons throughout the world, Jews, Arabs and Christians. We feel, therefore, that there should be in this whole set-up what we termed more or less a regional trusteeship council. I have not emphasized that, because that may be going into too great detail, but that Regional Trusteeship Council would contain representatives in equal numbers of the Jews, of the Arabs and of the Administering Authority. For what purpose? For the purpose of working out this problem of immigration, the numbers of immigrants, of working out the question of the economic absorptive capacity, of working out the Development Scheme. Those are three basic ideas, plans, schemes which one assumes would have to be taken into account whatever was done.

Now who should be the representatives of the Jews, of the Arabs, of the Moslems and of the Christians on this Regional Trusteeship Council? We think the Jewish Agency for the Jews; the Arab League for the Arabs; and the Administering Authority or the United Nations or some representative there for the rest of the world. The Jewish Agency, moreover, collects large sums of money from the Jews of the world. That cannot be done by government officials, whether they be Jews or whoever they be. The Jewish Agency also carries on certain work of settlement, the work of the buying of land, of education, which the Government has not done for the Jews. So that we find that the Jewish Agency would for some time to come have a great role to play, as long as the situation here was fluid, until the Jews and the Arabs themselves, in this independent bi-national Palestine based on parity, proved that they could be the trustees, as we hope they might, for their brethren throughout the world. Our objective is that in this independent Palestine the Jews of Palestine - not necessarily the Jewish Agency any more could be the trustee of all the Jews and the Arabs of Palestine the trustee of all the Arabs and Moslems of the world; but for a considerable period - how long one does not know - the Jewish Agency, we consider, would be a necessary link in this chain.

``Finality"

I should like to go on and continue a bit what I said before as to finality, because some of the questions that are put would seem to indicate that in the minds of some there could be finality given to this question. One of the arguments for Partition, for example, is finality. One of the arguments for the Arab State is finality.

There is no finality in this problem. This is the kind of problem that is going to tax the spirit of mankind for years to come; whether there be a Jewish partitioned state or a Jewish State in all of Palestine, or an Arab State in all of Palestine, there is no finality to this. This is a developing problem. If this is a Holy Land, it is not a Holy Land merely because it is a museum of antiquities, but a Holy Land in the spirit of living men today and tomorrow, developing their spiritual values, their intellectual values for today and for tomorrow. We do not look upon Palestine as a place where once and for all you can put the stamp of finality. Moreover, if you have in a Jewish partitioned state a tremendous Arab minority - and you can have no Jewish partitioned state without a tremendous Arab minority, almost as large as the Jewish majority itself - you would there have the same bi-national problem. Why not, then, in all of Palestine? Why use the term "finality" in all of this? Why try to say that a problem as complex as this, an historical problem that has been developing for hundreds, perhaps one might say for thousands of years, is to be met by some formula that will overnight, from today to tomorrow, pronounce: "The problem is settled now once and for all"?

We do not contend that our solution is a settlement of this problem once and for all. We merely contend that it gives the framework for the development of common interests between the Jews and the Arabs, who are both going to remain here unless the Arabs drive the Jews into the sea, as they say they once drove the Crusaders into the sea, or the Jews drive the Arabs into the desert, as some think perhaps they should be driven. We do not believe in that. We believe that the one practical hopeful solution — and we do not call it a solution either — the one hopeful, practical approach is that which we have tried to outline, so that it does not make so much difference, in our view, whether that interim period is one year shorter or one year longer. That would have to be determined, when the time came, by the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations.

Palestine and a Middle East Federation

Mr. Blom: I have two more points. One is this: Dr. Magnes has very eloquently expressed to us his belief, and that of the members of his Association, in the cooperation that will come about in life, in the daily necessity of dealing with practical problems of administration. What I would like to know is what, in Dr. Magnes' opinion, will be the influence from outside on this will to cooperate? I can quite see that the daily necessity of deciding practical points will bring about a lot of cooperation, but will or will not this cooperation be endangered by influences from outside countries, surrounding or not surrounding?

Dr. Magnes: So far as the neighbouring countries are concerned, we believe that the bi-national Palestine based upon parity should become a member in due course of a larger federation, a larger union, whether

it be the Arab Federation or a union of countries of the Middle East. From that point of view, the neighbouring countries would undoubtedly exercise a great deal of influence upon what is going on in Palestine, and Palestine, perhaps — so we hope — would exercise a beneficent influence upon them. One of the ways in which this influence could be felt would be this: that if in Palestine these problems of majority-minority were put into the background, it is perfectly conceivable that some of the other countries of this Federation would say, as some have said in days gone by: "We also would like to have some Jewish immigrants in order to help us build our land." That would not mean, of course, that the Jewish National Home would be extended into those countries. But Jewish scientific ability, Jewish organizing power, perhaps finance, perhaps the experience of the West, which many of the countries of this part of the world have need of, might be placed at their disposal for the good of this whole region. In this way reciprocal influence might be felt. To be sure, if I gathered the purport of your question, people from the outside can always interfere, can always harm. It is not Palestine alone that will have to face that problem.

Mr. Blom: I do not know whether this question is very easy to answer, but Dr. Magnes' associate might perhaps do so. If, just for the sake of argument, we exclude now any psychological and political arguments against partition, I would like to know whether in your opinion, from an entirely technical, economic, financial and agricultural point of view, there is a possibility of drawing up a partition scheme that is, from this point of view, feasible.

Chairman: That is a question for Dr. Reiner. I might ask, perhaps, if there is anyone who wants to put some more questions to Dr. Magnes. I think we might do that and then we might continue with Dr. Reiner later.

Communal or Territorial Electorates

Mr. Hood (Australia): I have one question of a constitutional nature for Dr. Magnes, relating to the general framework of the principle which he outlined this morning. I would like to ask Dr. Magnes whether the assumption on which the plan is to some extent based, namely, that the primary division of Palestine into counties or cantons or local divisions of one kind or another, is an essential assumption for the primary constitution of the bi-national state. Whether, in other words, a bi-national state, in his opinion, must necessarily be a federal state, or whether the division of Palestine into counties and local administrative areas is a proposal which arises from other motives. I hope I have made myself clear.

Dr. Magnes: The other alternative would be to have the two communities constitute the two parts of the state without any territorial

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divisions whatsoever. Instead of having these counties as we propose, the alternative would be that there be a register of the Jews and a register of the Arabs, and that these two communities carry on their elections in the way that they choose to do, sending to the Constituent Assembly, and later to the Legislative Assembly, an equal number of their citizens. That is, as far as I can make out, the only alternative to the plan which we propose. Drawing boundary lines for provinces, such as the Morrison-Grady plan did, we regard as dangerous, as almost impossible, because just as we think that it is dangerous and almost impossible to draw any boundary lines for the partition of Palestine, so we think it is almost impossible to draw administrative boundary lines if they are to mean two provinces, one Jewish and the other Arab.

We think, therefore, that the only two practical possibilities are — let me repeat — either these counties or these communal lists. We have effected in a certain way a synthesis of those two in what we call the National Councils. There is at the present time a Jewish National Council, the Vaad Leumi. In our proposals we give that Council and a corresponding Arab Council a definite function — cultural. Those two Councils would be responsible for the schools of those communities, etc. But basically, if I understood your question aright, I have given you the answer as to these two alternatives.

Potential Capacity for Cooperation

Mr. Rand (Canada): I am rather interested in the potential capacity for cooperation between these two groups. You spoke of them as the remaining representatives of the Semitic group of peoples. Would you say that from the standpoint of their fundamental attitudes and instinctive tendencies there would be more, or less, likelihood of an easy transition to cooperation than in the case, say, of the Central European multi-national countries?

Dr. Magnes: It is impossible for me to give a direct yes or no in answer to that. I think in some ways it would be more difficult, in other ways easier. It would be more difficult than, for example, in Yugoslavia, if I may be so bold as to mention that country in the presence of its representative here. There, although the alphabet of the Croat language is different from the alphabet of the other languages, nevertheless the basic roots and the basic forms are the same. So that from the point of view of language, it would be easier, despite these difficulties, in Yugoslavia for the various peoples to come together and form this tri- or quadri-national state. Here the basic languages are Hebrew and Arabic. They are sister languages, very closely related. I have here the prospectus of an Arabic-Hebrew dictionary, which the Hebrew University is about to publish in a week's time, almost 500 pages, and anyone who can go through that, who can read the alphabets, will find

out how closely related the Hebrew and Arabic languages are. Nevertheless it by no means follows that one who speaks Hebrew can speak Arabic, or the reverse; so that the language question here is more difficult than it would be, say, in Yugoslavia.

On the other hand, it has to be looked at from the point of view, so we think, of historical perspective. Why do we call the Jews and the Arabs Semitic peoples? It is because they have presumably more or less a common ancestry. There is no racial problem, therefore, between them. An Arab cannot say to a Jew, "You have a big nose", because a lot of Arabs have bigger noses, and a Jew cannot say to an Arab, "You are too clever a merchant", because we have very clever merchants among ourselves. There is no racial animosity. Moreover, as far as religion is concerned, there are many points of affinity between Judaism and Islam. I do not want to go into that, because that would take one very far afield. But some think there are even greater points of affinity than between Judaism and Christianity, in some respects. To be sure, it is easily possible to arouse the religious fanaticism of many of the Moslems, I am sorry to say. That was done here. I do not think it can be done so easily again by the same people who did it then. There is a great deal of affinity in the religious sense, and if I can use the term "spiritual and intellectual", in the spiritual and intellectual sense there is very much affinity between Jews and Arabs, if you take their history. The Jews and the Arabs, for example, were the intermediaries, the colporteurs of Greek civilisation to Europe. It was the Arabs and the Jews who translated into Arabic and into Hebrew, and it was these two peoples, particularly the Jews, who brought this translated Greek philosophy to the Catholic monasteries of Europe, where they put them into Latin and disseminated them throughout the European world at the time.

National Sensibility

Mr. Rand: What would you say about the development of what is called the concept of nationality among both groups? I ask that because essentially it is the impingement upon that sensibility in all governmental arrangements that produces, I would think, most of the antagonisms.

Dr. Magnes: If you knew a way of wiping that problem out —

Mr. Rand: I was wondering how sensitive it is in this country.

Dr. Magnes: It is very sensitive. Both the Jews and the Arabs are novices in relation to the feelings of nationality. The Jews always have held together by an invisible national bond, but by a more visible religious bond, so that when one talks of the bond of nationality among the Jews, one talks of a comparatively modern phenomenon. It is even more modern among the Arabs. The Arab awakening, from the point of view of nationality, is a comparatively recent development.

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Dr. Magnes: That has been the case, I think, with every developing sense of nationality.

Mr. Rand: Would you say that was so in Central Europe?

Dr. Magnes: I would say it was so in Central Europe, so much so that — but what do you mean by Central Europe?

Mr. Rand: I have in mind the old Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Dr. Magnes: They have had their fill. For them, national sensibility was no new thing. It was something that had grown stale in their mouths, something that had brought them nothing but pain and suffering, and for that reason the sensibility as to nationality in Austria-Hungary, for example, was, so I believe, a declining thing. This sensibility as to nationality among the Jews and among the Arabs is still on the rise. There are Jews who have passed beyond that sensibility. More of them, I think, many more of them, than among the Arabs, because the Jews have had experience of the disadvantages of this national sensibility; they have experienced it in their own lives, trying to work through their own problems of Jewish nationality, and they have come to the conclusion that that is not perhaps the final answer to things anyway. Nationality is something that undoubtedly still requires a great deal of clarification. But to answer your question as to this situation here: there is undoubtedly that sensibility as to feeling of nationality which makes the problem here much more difficult.

The Jewish Nationality

Sir Abdur Rahman (India): Do you not think that Jews who have been living in this country for a long time feel more akin to the Arabs than the Jews who have come from Europe and other places?

Dr. Magnes: That is only natural, because they get to know one another's mode of life, they get to know one another's language, they get to fear one another less, they appear less strange to one another.

Sir Abdur Rahman: Do you not think that the Jews who have been living here consider the Jews who have come from other places to be almost a different nation?

Dr. Magnes: Oh no! I should advise you not to believe anybody who told you that.

Sir Abdur Rahman: Then according to you religion and nationality are one and the same thing, so far as Jews are concerned?

Dr. Magnes: I do not know that I quite catch the purport of your question.

Sir Abdur Rahman: Whether you would identify the Jewish nationality with those who believe in the Jewish faith?

Dr. Magnes: No, there are those who have abandoned the Jewish faith, so they say, and who are yet Jews, pertaining to and belonging to the Jewish nationality. There are many such cases.

Sir Abdur Rahman: And the vice-versa of the statement you made just now?

Dr. Magnes: That is, those who are Jews by religion are not Jews by nationality? Well, I hardly think so. There may be certain Jews who have been converted to Judaism, who are not born Jews. They may contend that they are not members of the Jewish nationality, because Jewish nationality presupposes, in general, birth into the Jewish nation.

Jewish Representation in U.N.

Sir Abdur Rahman: One more question. How would you fit in the idea of Jewish representation in a bi-national state — you suggested a bi-national state — how would you fit in the idea of Jewish representation in the United Nations?

Dr. Magnes: I must confess it is a problem that I have not seen discussed as thoroughly as it should be and as it probably will be. But I would have the bi-national state appoint two representatives to the United Nations, a Jew and an Arab. They would receive instructions from the bi-national state as to their attitude in relation to this and that. The Jewish representative, however, would be granted the privilege by the bi-national state of representing the Jews - now here comes the difficult part for me - I have not worked out in my own mind just those specific things in which he would be the representative of the Jews. I would go further and I would say that it is not only the Jews of Palestine who are interested in problems affecting Jews coming up before the United Nations, but it is the Jews of the world. And I would have the Jews of the world, through some of their representative organizations, meet with the Jews of Palestine in order to discuss the problem as to how, together, they could all be represented before the United Nations.

One of the things that impressed me in reading the Charter of the United Nations originally was its flexibility. The Charter, for example, would be ready to let certain organizations appear before certain constituent bodies of the United Nations. The United Nations, I am sure, would find itself flexible enough to provide for a reasonable and just representation of the Jewish people before it. It will hardly do for the Jewish people, who still number, despite all of these massacres, many millions, to be left without direct access to the United Nations. As I have said to you, I have not worked it out for myself, and I have not seen that anybody else has. But I think that one of our functions ought to be to try to do that and come with a prepared plan in relation to it.

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Dr. Magnes: Does your question mean to imply that there would be no further Jewish immigration?

Sir Abdur Rahman: No, it does not imply that.

Dr. Magnes: Then I do not understand the question.

Sir Abdur Rahman: Taking the situation as a whole today, the question whether there is going to be future immigration or not may be left to be determined by the state which will come into being later on. But to settle the question today, is it not possible to achieve the same objective by safeguarding the civil, political and religious rights and liberties by constitution, and by providing that no change in the constitution should be effected unless something like seven-eights or four-fifths of the majority vote for the change?

Dr. Magnes: What you say has a great deal to it. On the other hand, I would like to ask you when that would begin? What would happen to Jewish immigration meanwhile? If I understand you aright, you would leave the determination of the problem of immigration to that bi-national state based on parity when it came into being. Now, I ask when will it come into being? What will happen to the Jews in these intervening years? If that state could come into being at once, then I would say that what you have proposed has a great deal to it. But there is no guarantee that that will happen.

Sir Abdur Rahman: But suppose it is suggested that independence be granted to Palestine and the Mandatory Power and the Trusteeship disappear altogether. I am just putting the idea before you to consider whether or not it is practical — we will go into details later on. Supposing independence is recognized for Palestine as such and a bi-national state is brought into being, and that that state is given the safeguards against infringements of political, religious and other liberties, will power be given to that constitution which comes into being in pursuance of that recommendation, if it is adopted by the Assembly, to settle the question itself?

Dr. Magnes: Is that a bi-national state based on parity?

Sir Abdur Rahman: That is what I am asking you. That is the very question. Can we, without resorting to numerical parity, safeguard the minority who are numerically less?

Dr. Magnes: I don't think so. I think the history of the past generation has taught us that the safeguarding of minority rights is

just nothing but words. The safeguarding of minority rights in the various countries where Jews were minorities, and where their rights were to be safeguarded, failed. That is the basis of our contention. We contend that there is one just, equitable, practicable way of meeting a minority-majority problem, and that is by wiping it out and making both the majority and the minority equal constituent partners.

Sir Abdur Rahman: Although numerically they may not be so?

Dr. Magnes: Although numerically they may not be so. A numerical majority, we contend, is all right for this place and for that place, but — it has not been decreed from Heaven for other places. And if one starts on the assumption that a numerical majority is going to be bound by a constitutional provision to protect the minority, history teaches us that the majority sooner or later becomes arrogant, becomes dominant, and subjects the minority to its will. It then has the civil service in its hands. It has the military in its power. It can wipe the minority out, if it wants to. And if there is any virtue in any constitution, it must be just that — that there be no minority and that there be no majority. There is, to be sure, the logical contradiction that was pointed out by the gentleman on the other side of the table (Mr. Salazar), but we have faced that logical contradiction and we think that our formula of parity is a formula that can be accepted by both the Jews and the Arabs. And, we know Arabs who do accept it.

U.N. to Guarantee the Constitution

Mr. Rand (Canada): I would just like to ask a question arising out of the last statement. You say that you can secure parity by constitutional provision but you cannot secure minority rights by the same kind of provision?

Dr. Magnes: I said if there is any virtue in a constitution at all — I do not know.

Mr. Rand: I was just wondering. I was suggesting that a majority that in fact would repudiate a provision to secure the minority would scarcely hesitate at repudiating a parity provision.

Dr. Magnes: But may I suggest to you that there is this difference: That if there be in the constitution that provision, minority-majority, all on the same level, there is now something there never was before — a United Nations. And it is the United Nations that would have to guarantee that Constitution. Now, if one is sceptical as to what the United Nations can do, well, then the fat is in the fire whichever way you put it. But if one is hopeful as to what the United Nations can become, and I must say I am one of the hopeful ones, then the situation becomes such that it is not love's labour lost to put it into the constitution, because despite what that majority would want to do, there would be this greater power behind it.

Mr. Rand: I quite sympathize with that view. What occasions my question is that I live under a constitution that has such minority provisions, and it would be rather shocking to me to have to feel that the majority would take the course, in contingencies that are conceivable, of making such a repudiation.

Dr. Magnes: You live under a constitution that has a rather long tradition.

Mr. Rand: Well, they all have to begin, I suppose.

Dr. Magnes: Yes, but your people have been trained in the exercise of self-government for a long time and you have not the nationalities problem before you, and I think there are many other differences that might be pointed out. I should say that you are very fortunate in not having to live under the fear of that majority.

I beg your pardon, I thought you were from Australia. I see you are from Canada. Then I should have given you a different answer, of course. I am not quite as ignorant as that! Do you want me to go over it all again?

Mr. Rand: No, it is not necessary.

Jewish Nationality Again

Mr. Simic (Yugoslavia): Dr. Magnes, you said that the Jewish nationality presupposed birth in the Jewish nation, if I have properly understood you. Are you sure that during the centuries there have been no conversions and that all existing Jews have been born into the Jewish nation?

Dr. Magnes: By no means. There have been many conversions to Judaism, and they are all Jews, and their children are Jews. Their children are, I should say, members of the Jewish nation. Whether they are or not, I am ready to include them also in the Jewish nation, although nationality to me conveys in some way or other also the conception of birth. But there have been conversions by the tens of thousands.

Chairman: Are there any further questions? (No response.)

Chairman: Well, then, I take it we have finished questioning Dr. Magnes. Before we question Dr. Reiner we shall have to take a recess. If you, Dr. Magnes, want to leave, I want to thank you once more. We appreciate very much that you under the circumstances have taken pains to come here and give your very interesting views. I thank you.

Dr. Magnes: Let me thank you also for your great courtesy. And I want to thank you for all those, and there are many in this country, who are looking forward to peace and cooperation and who are not taking the defeatist view that Jews and Arabs cannot live together. They live together, and they can live together. Let me thank you.

(The meeting adjourned for a brief recess).

The Technical Possibility of Partition

Mr. Blom (Netherlands): I should like to have the views of the representative of the *Ihud* with regard to the technical possibility of drawing up a partition plan, not including all the political and psychological aspects of partition.

(In answer to this question, Dr. Reiner read a statement which is embodied in the Memorandum on pp. 77—84, which was handed to the Commission at their request.)

Dr. Reiner: I think this is enough. It does not go into details. I am prepared to answer questions of detail.

Chairman: What you have said is laid down in a memorandum?

Dr. Magnes: We are going to present a memorandum on this.

Chairman: We will have copies of it?

Dr. Magnes: Yes.

Chairman: Do you have any questions, Mr. Blom?

Mr. Blom: (Netherlands) No. If we get the memorandum, then I think the views on the situation will be clear.

Chairman: You have spoken of a special partition scheme.

Dr. Reiner: Yes, sir.

Chairman: Of course, there are many possibilities with regard to partition.

Dr. Reiner: Yes. I have taken the maximum and I have stated what its disadvantages are. I have said that one of the disadvantages of the maximum area with regard to Arab and Jewish population is this very large minority. By reduction of the area this disadvantage could be overcome, but on the other hand, the area would be so small that it would not permit future, or little future Jewish immigration. So one is between the devil and the deep sea.

Chairman: Does anybody else wish to ask any questions?

Mr. Simic (Yugoslavia): I should like to put a question to Dr. Reiner. I see you are very well acquainted with all schemes and plans for the irrigation of Palestine as a whole. I have understood the biggest source for exploitation of water is the Jordan River. Is that so?

Dr. Reiner: Not the biggest, but one of the biggest.

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Mr. Rand (Canada): You think it would be impossible to segregate these essential features which you have mentioned under a joint control bearing an analogy to your bi-national administration? I mean assuming a physical partition of the land on the one hand, and on the other hand a common general administrative control over those features where the necessity for legislative and executive powers, which would be nullified by a straight partition, could be met.

Dr. Reiner: That would be possible with regard to the last-mentioned feature, development and water economy. It would, of course, not do away with the proportion of the Jews and Arabs in the Jewish State, nor do away with the difficulties of communications and customs.

Mr. Rand: Why couldn't the customs be brought -

Dr. Reiner: One could also have a customs union.

Mr. Rand: Not a customs union. Well, that would be the effect of it, but could you not have a central administrative power with limited jurisdiction, and all other powers of a state residing in the partitioned sectors?

Dr. Reiner: Yes. That would make the partition not really a partition into two sovereign states but a sort of federation of two areas.

Mr. Rand: That is really a question of names, is it not? Is not the essence of it the question of distribution of power?

Dr. Reiner: Well, I will leave that to Dr. Magnes, since that is a political question.

Dr. Magnes: It would appear from everything that one gathers in conversation and in reading that when partition is proposed there is in the background the idea that on certain basic features there would be a kind of joint administration. One of these features is water. Not only would the Jewish State and the Arab State have to come to some understanding on that, but that would include also the State of Transjordan, which is on the other side of the Jordan river, because they are also concerned with the uses of the water from the Jordan.

 $Mr.\ Rand:$ Yes, but that could be by agreement with any central authority.

The Joint Authority

Dr. Magnes: That could be by agreement with the joint authority or with each state separately. The question is just this: whether in setting up two partitioned states the joint authority or joint authorities are also to be included. If they are to be included, it would make the setting up of these partitioned states that much more reasonable. In view, however, of the opposition, which is very strong, both among the Arabs and among the Jews, to this division, the question remains whether these

joint controls are going to be agreed to. It may be that the force of life in the course of years would compel that. In any event, the establishment of joint controls, particularly if there be many of them, would be a point in favour of the idea of partition. Without these joint controls, some of these consequences that have been outlined by Dr. Reiner would undoubtedly ensue. Very great care would therefore have to be taken as to how these partitioned states were going to be set up.

Mr. Rand: Of course, it raises the question of whether or not what you might call a physical local habitation is a more or less essential element of the conception of nationality. You say no. I mean an exclusive area where you can stand upon it, or kneel upon it, or kiss it, as you like. It becomes a sort of sacred national soil. You exclude that feature. And I was wondering whether you do not consider or whether you do consider that as one of the fundamental components of the feeling, the spirit, the totality of what we call the national conception.

Dr. Magnes: May I just speak for myself for a moment. I have the feeling that every point in this country, every square foot of it, is something that I am in touch with, through my history, through my tradition. I cannot exclude Jenin, which was at one time in the Bible called Ein Ganim, which is going to be, under all calculations, in the Arab State.

Mr. Rand: But would it be a necessary result of an arrangement in which there would be a central administering body that you would be excluded from Jenin?

Federation, Provincial Autonomy, and Partition

Dr. Magnes: If you are going to have a central administering body, then you have almost a federation. If you have a central administering body, you have the Jewish State here and the Arab State there — — it does not matter much what you call them, province or state, or whatever else — — and the central administering body is then to be the important thing.

Mr. Rand: Well, necessarily? I am dealing purely hypothetically now. Suppose the fundamental administrative departments were land and immigration. Suppose those were committed to the States.

Dr. Magnes: You mean that each State could deal with its own immigration and each State could deal with its own land?

Mr. Rand: Yes.

Dr. Magnes: What would then be the part of the central administering authority?

Mr. Rand: Well, those features that have been mentioned, the customs, foreign trade, inter-communications of all sorts, works that affect both States.

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Dr. Magnes: Well, that is practically what the Morrison-Grady Plan proposed. The Morrison-Grady Plan said that in the Jewish Province we will be in control of immigration; we will be in control of land. In the Arab Province, the Arabs will be in control of immigration and of land. It may be that you have in mind some modification of the Morrison-Grady Plan.

Mr. Rand: Well, I am suggesting a modification of the field of central power, a lessening of it, a minimum. What is the fundamental objection to that?

Dr. Magnes: Well, the fundamental objection, to my mind, is that it segregates Arabs and Jews.

Mr. Rand: In a federal state, of course, the whole of the land is yours. I am a Canadian living in one of the provinces, but my Canadianism extends from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

Dr. Magnes: There you have a strong central government, have you not?

Mr. Rand: In that instance, yes. But the interest, the spread of the individual's conception over the total commonwealth, you might call it, is not affected by the fact that you have two states in which the residue of power may be committed to the state rather than to the central government.

Boundaries Are Dangerous

Dr. Magnes: Well, if I understand your point, it is this: That you would set up a joint commonwealth, an Arab-Jewish commonwealth with a central —

Mr. Rand: I am suggesting that as a possibility.

Dr. Magnes: I understand. I would like to try to understand it and to meet it. You are setting up a joint commonwealth, Arab-Jewish, and you are giving to the Arab state or province certain functions and powers, and the same practically to the Jewish. That is one way of doing it. There is no question about that. That is the essence of the Morrison-Grady Plan, except that you would whittle down the central powers that are so obtrusive in the Morrison-Grady Plan, all of them remaining in the hands of the British there. You would make the central powers limited in extent and confine them probably to water and to other matters of common interest.

The objection I have to that is this: You nevertheless set up boundaries. And, as I tried to indicate this morning, boundaries are not difficult to draw up but they are dangerous to maintain. You set up boundaries on either side of which the Jewish youth and the Arab youth are going to be trained in chauvinism and you make the creation of irredentism on either side of these boundaries a very simple thing. In one of the Hebrew papers yesterday I saw an abstract of a speech that was delivered by one of the foremost advocates of partition, in which

he said, trying to persuade his audience that partition was all right: "Boundaries are not eternal things." The example of Piedmont and Sardinia has been cited by some of our people. We know that in the unification of Italy that took place at the end of the fifties and the beginning of the sixties, it was Piedmont and Sardinia, far-separated Italian provinces, that were used as the springboards, as the jumping-off places for the unification of all of Italy. That history is most fascinating and illuminating when one reads it in the light of our present problem here.

The main objection that I have to what I gather to be your tentative suggestion is these boundaries. These boundaries that keep me here and keep him there, and those boundaries over which we are going to fight. What I would like to see is that there be a united Palestine without these boundaries. Set up the central administration, as you propose it, for the control of these waters. Why must you have the boundaries?

Mr. Rand: Well, even you suggested boundaries of counties.

Dr. Magnes: Yes, but those are purely local administrative boundaries.

Mr. Rand: What do you think these suggested boundaries would do in the way of impediments or obstacles to each group?

Dr. Magnes: There would be absolutely no need of a passport from one county to another.

Mr. Rand: There would not be in the case I suggested. You would be citizens, in effect, of the commonwealth.

Dr. Magnes: Well, that is an entirely different conception from what I understand partition to be.

Mr. Rand: I quite agree.

Dr. Magnes: I see. So we have been arguing at cross purposes, really.

Mr. Rand: No.

Lands and Immigration in a Federal State

Dr. Magnes: If you want to set up a commonwealth, call it binational. Why not?

Mr. Rand: Well, I think it is a question of names, so far as that goes.

Dr. Magnes: Yes, all right, do or do not call it bi-national. If you want to set up this commonwealth, give freedom of access to all citizens, to all parts of this commonwealth, and freedom for land purchase in all parts of that commonwealth —

Dr. Magnes: That is one of the things I would object to, that each state should have control over its lands. I would like to see a condition under which I could have land anywhere in this country, and an Arab could have land anywhere in this country.

Mr. Rand: Of course, I agree that that might be desirable, but I am not losing sight of the fact that no matter what is suggested, there will be objections to it. I was wondering whether we could not make progress towards that which might be least objectionable.

Dr. Magnes: You might find it less objectionable to the Arabs; but you will find it very objectionable, in the eyes of the Jews, to be excluded from lands here, there, and anywhere.

Mr. Rand: So far as they would be willing to accept partition, they would accept land restriction in a commonwealth?

Dr. Magnes: That is one of the reasons why I would not want them to accept partition.

Loyalties for a Joint State

Mr. Rand: Might it not depend upon the underlying setting in which you would look upon a commonwealth, and is your analogy to Piedmont and Sardinia quite apt? Here, as you properly stressed, you have a Holy Land in which millions all through the world are interested. That sets it apart somewhat, does it not, from the rest of the earth?

Dr. Magnes: Yes, and would that conception play any part in the picture which you may have of administrative areas? I just do not quite gather the purport of your question.

Mr. Rand: Loyalties must cluster around ideas, or feelings, at least sentiments. Here, it seems to me that we are lacking in the framework of a conception in which loyalty in a Palestinian sense can arise. I think it was the Peel Commission that said it was nonsense to think that either the Jews or the Arabs in the present condition of things took any pride in Palestine, or even contemplated his relation to it as that of a citizen of one state. Now could you modify that by a change in setting?

Dr. Magnes: Might I read you the last paragraph in our statement to the Anglo-American Committee? It is headed "A Palestine Solution":

"What a boon to mankind it would be if the Jews and the Arabs of Palestine were to strive together to make their Holy Land into a striving, peaceful Switzerland, situated at the heart of this ancient highway between East and West. A 'Palestine Solution' is required for the Palestine problem. This would have an incalculable political and spiritual influence in all the Middle East and far beyond. A bi-national Palestine could become a beacon of peace in the world."

What I say is that one of our problems is the creation of just those loyalties that you so rightly emphasize. A loyalty for a Palestine State and not just for a Jewish State or for an Arab State. If that be our ideal, the question is, how is it to be brought about? and it seems to me that the fewer barriers set up between the Arabs and the Jews — territorial or political or economic — the better chance you have of creating common loyalties for this Palestine State.

Mr. Rand: Yes, the only question would be whether the one or the other practically is realizable. Which would be the more likely to attract that new conception of loyalty which is a necessary condition, but which seems today to be absent?

Dr. Magnes: Undoubtedly if you have a Jewish State or if you have an Arab State, a uni-national state creates national loyalties much more quickly than a bi-national state could. On the other hand, as you know and as you have said about Canada, your loyalty extends to all parts of it, from east to west, and to all sections, whatever language be spoken there. Now it has not been so easy in Canada, because I read, 2 or 3 years ago, I should say, in the American Foreign Affairs an article by someone from Canada who talked about fundamental difficulties that are still to come, because of the basic differences in language and in customs and in European connections, and so forth. But the fact that it has not been entirely simple in Canada does not mean that it has not been possible.

It has not been simple in South Africa — more difficult there than it has been in Canada. On the other hand, you have there a kind of bi-national state where very deep loyalties have been engendered in the hearts of many Englishmen and many Africaners towards a South African unified state. The Premier of South Africa at the present time is not an Englishman, the Vice-Premier is not an Englishman. You have these loyalties on the part of the dominant political parties, and on the other hand you have the Nationalist Party in South Africa, which is by no means satisfied for South Africa to remain as it is under this present-day bi-national conception.

The Most Likely Ideal to be Carried Out

The question is what is one going to strive for? What is the higher ideal, and what is the more likely ideal to be carried out? That is the question you ask. Now I would like to answer that. It may be that any answer that is given will have more or less to be imposed by the

7 Judith Robinson: "Canada's Split Personality" (Foreign Affairs, October 1943); Blair Fraser: "Political Ferments in Canada" (Foreign Affairs, October 1944).

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United Nations. The question is, "What can be imposed with least difficulty?" That is the way I should like to formulate it.

I think partition can not be imposed. It is going to create war. The great majority of the Arabs are against it. Large numbers of Jews, both extremists and moderates and among the religious groups of the Jews, are against it. It is going to create these irredentas and these outbursts. The bi-national state, however, is here. We are a binational state. We do not have to draw any new boundaries. We do not have to persuade anybody that that part of the country is land for the Arabs and this part of the country is land for the Jews. It would hardly have to be imposed. It will come into being. If you begin with the appointment, for example, of a Jew and an Arab — take the most modest of all requirements — as members of the Executive Council, sitting with the High Comissioner of this country during the period of the Mandate, that is nothing that you will have to go to war for, or all these other things that I tried to outline in the government of the country. Those things arise almost naturally. They are organic. You do not have to segregate people in any sense of the term, physically or spiritually. So that I have not the slightest doubt myself that if anything is to be imposed, the one thing that can be imposed is the bi-national state, because using the word 'imposed' about that is a very strong term. We are here already a bi-national state, and any attempt to make these divisions is going to be something that will stir up animosity that does not at the present time exist.

The Jewish Yearning for a Home

Mr. Rand: I was thinking of the more or less universal objective or dream or, you might say, spiritual aim of the Jewish people to have some part of this earth's surface which it might say was its own exclusively.

Dr. Magnes: Well, if it were all left to me and we had a free hand, I would create a Jewish State. I am not among those who have objections in principle to a Jewish State. There are many Jews throughout the world, in America and elsewhere, who object to a Jewish State in principle; I am not one of those. I would like to see the Jewish people burdened with the task of conducting a state. They might, perhaps, add to the spiritual treasures of mankind if they were given that burden.

But it has not been left to me. There is no tabula rasa. We are here in this country with two peoples. One of the ways of trying to evade that has been to try to find some other territory. The British Government at one time offered the Jews a settlement in Uganda. The Jewish people refused that settlement. Why? Because it was not Palestine. There may be other countries in the world which would offer space for Jewish homeless people. The Jewish people are not interested in that. I must say I am surprised some of the great

countries of the world have not opened their gates to some of the Jewish displaced persons, but all constantly concentrated only and exclusively on Palestine for the reception of these unhappy languishing victims of this terrible holocaust. But the Jewish people would turn it all down. When I say Jewish people, I mean Jewish history, I mean the Jewish future, would turn it down as it has turned it down thus far.

So that we find ourselves in this peculiar position; a peculiar people — that is what we are called in our Bible — and we are a peculiar people, sometimes in the good sense and sometimes, perhaps, not in so good a sense; and this is a peculiar land, with, as we have agreed, millions of people interested in it; and it is here we want to set up our National Home for good and true purposes, and where we are setting up our National Home.

A Creative Jewish People in an Undivided Palestine

Now if you think that by this division, this partition, you are answering the century-long yearning of the Jewish people for a niche in the world, for a home, for their own state, I think myself that is a mistaken conception. This does not answer the Jewish need for that. It is too small. It has too large a minority of Arabs in that particular state, too many administrative, economic, social and educational difficulties. If you could give to the Jewish people Palestine, all of Palestine, as many of our Jews want — we have our parties who say that all of this talk, all our partition talk and the rest of it is all rot; what the Jewish people require is Palestine on both sides of the Jordan River — and some go as far as the Euphrates River — (which you could not do, of course) — that, perhaps, might meet this great historical need of the Jewish people for some kind of a state that would make this the equivalent in statehood of some of the other peoples in the world. But to take this tiny country - you have seen how small it is ---

Mr. Rand: It necessarily has to be symbolic, by its geographical limits, but what you say is that that yearning must remain forever unsatisfied.

by two peoples and as long as we have not had one or two generations of experience and experiment, of hit-and-miss, of working things out together, — I say that the Jewish people will have to do without that as it has done without that for many hundreds of years. I am convinced in my own heart that the Jewish people here can be creative: that is what we are after, most of all. In addition, by increasing immigration up to parity in this bi-national state, even though we do not achieve our legitimate ambition to have one state in the world that we may call our own, I am sure the solution will be more easily found. I do not think the task could be accomplished otherwise.

THE CASE AGAINST PARTITION

Additional Memorandum presented to UNSCOP

We have been asked for a statement as to why we are against the partition of Palestine. I shall try to make the argument clear and concise.

- 1. Primarily because we are against further mangling this Holy Land. It is worth every effort to keep it whole. Our religious and historical associations are with the whole country. Partition would keep us from free access to large parts of the country. We want to help develop all of the country and not just a part of it, and this for the sake of all its inhabitants and in order to increase the possibilities of settlement for new Jewish immigrants in all of the country.
- 2. We have no wish to be segregated from the Arabs. We and the Arabs are the only Semitic peoples remaining from antiquity. They are here and we are here, and we want to live and work together with them. Moreover, there is no need to try to segregate us. There is no fundamental enmity between us. We are not ready to yield to the defeatist cry that these two peoples must be separated politically and territorially so as not to kill one another. The political leadership on either side may have worked itself up into this state of mind. This is not the case with the great majority of the plain people. Given the chance, we shall overcome the political animosities of yesterday and today.
- 3. Not only is segregation undesirable and unnecessary, but we also believe genuine segregation to be impossible. No matter where you draw the boundaries of the Jewish state, there will always be a very large Arab minority. In a recent study published in the *Ha'aretz* on June 13, 1947, a population expert, analysing the situation upon the basis of facts and figures, comes to the following conclusion: "Any Jewish state in a partitioned Palestine will in effect be a bi-national state whatever be its boundaries". Moreover, the important urban centres have a mixed population. On this account the Peel Commission has proposed that Tiberias, Safad, Haifa and Acre be segregated from both the Jewish and the Arab states.
- 4. A Jewish state without Jerusalem is inconceivable to us. There is no practicable plan for partition which includes Jerusalem in the Jewish state. To include Jaffa in the Jewish state strikes us as absurd,

and the difficulty of this situation is very clearly brought out by the unworkable proposal of the Peel Commission for a Jaffa-Jerusalem corridor.

- 5. It is impossible to draw satisfactory economic boundaries. The larger the Jewish state, the more Arabs it contains. The larger the Jewish state, the more impossible becomes the economic existence of the Arab state. The Peel Commission recommended, therefore, that the Jewish state give the Arab state a large annual subvention. Is it conceivable that this would be done? In a bi-national state Jews would help finance the Arab economy in order to raise the standard of life of the whole country.
- 6. Satisfactory "national" boundaries, if the object is to promote peace, cannot be drawn. Wherever you draw these boundaries, you create irredentas on either side of the border. Irredentas almost invariably lead to war. In order that the war spirit may be kept up to pitch, chauvinism is taught in the schools. There are those who say that we should accept partition now, because, as was declared recently in an address delivered in Paris by one of the chief advocates of partition, "borders are not eternal". One of the historical precedents which we hear quoted upon occasion is that of Piedmont and Sardinia, two widely separated Italian provinces, which were independent and from which issued the movement for the later unification of Italy. In other words, the partitioned Jewish Palestine would be a bridge-head for the further conquest of the whole country.
- 7. Water is a great basic need for the further development of the country. The river Jordan is one of the chief sources of water. Through a large part of its length and at its outlet at the Dead Sea it would be in the territory of the Arab state, even assuming that its head-waters are to be within the Jewish state. Moreover, the water which is now being piped into the Negev is undersurface water in the Gaza region, which is in the Arab state. Furthermore, the largest quantities of rain-water fall in the hills of the Arab state and the use of this water in the plains and valleys of the Jewish state requires an undivided Palestine for its proper regulation.
- 8. In view of these and similar difficulties the Peel Report declared that the whole scheme of partition is dependent upon the transfer either forcibly or voluntarily of Arab lands and of Arab population. The Labour Party accepted this at one time, but the Jewish Agency, to its credit, rejected it. But this Peel Commission conclusion is there staring us in the face.
- 9. The time element is of importance to the Jews. If partition be decided upon, it will take too long a time getting it going. A Commission will have to be appointed for fixing the boundaries and regulating other important questions affecting the two divided states such as the

rights of the Arab minority, the Jewish minority, security, water, customs, railroads, roads and the Holy Places.

the official programme of the Zionist organization, although it has not been so declared, clearly and frankly. But there are very many Jews, moderates and extremists, religious and not religious, who are opposed to partition. Almost all the Arabs are opposed to partition. Aside from the fact that they declare Palestine to be an Arab land, partition would leave some of their most important economic possessions in the Jewish state, and the Jewish possession of the sea coast is described by them as a dagger into the Arab heart. "Imposing" partition would therefore be a hazardous undertaking.

11. Under all these circumstances we find it strange that anyone should claim for partition that it, at least, gives finality. To us it seems to be but the beginning of real warfare — warfare perhaps between Jew and Jew, and warfare between Jew and Arab.

The bi-national Palestine does not require the re-drafting of boundaries or any of these dangerous or complicated arrangements which will be required if partition is to be carried out. The bi-national Palestine is here. Jews and Arabs do live and work together. What is required is that we try to bring home to everyone the idea that Jews and Arabs in a bi-national state are to be equal nationalities, that the question of majority and minority is not to be the dominating factor. There are a number of multi-national states, as for example Switzerland, where the question of majority-minority is relegated to the background. We set up the principle of political parity just as we set up the principle of numerical parity. If there is something artificial about this, it is certainly less artificial and more hopeful than any other way of approaching the problem.

Jerusalem, July 23, 1947.

J. L. MAGNES

SOME REMARKS ON THE IMPRACTICABILITY OF PARTITION

Memorandum presented to the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine at their request. See page 65.

For the solution of the Palestine Problem, Partition has been proposed first in 1937 by the Royal (Peel) Commission, and last by Dr. Weizmann before your Committee. The representatives of the Jewish Agency, while not actually proposing Partition, have indicated that they would be ready to consider it. It is safe to say that almost all Arabs, and a substantial part of the Jews, are against partition.

We want to state at the outset that we consider partition, if carried out, as disastrous to the interests of the country; and that we do not believe it will be carried out. It may thus be asked why we deem it necessary to present the case against partition. It is to do what we can to prevent further unnecessary delays. For if your Committee should recommend Partition, and supposing the General Assembly accepted it, it would then appoint a technical commission to work out the details of the scheme. That commission would come to Palestine and spend much time investigating into the details, only to find, so we believe, as happened with the Palestine Partition (Woodhead) Commission before, that the scheme is impracticable. The situation in Palestine and the plight of the Displaced Jews in Europe would by then have become still more grave than it is even now. It is in order to help prevent this that we submit the following for consideration.

The area usually contemplated as the future Jewish State is that proposed by the Peel Commission plus the Negev (i.e., the Beersheba sub-district).

The partition plan of the Peel Commission consists, as may be remembered, of two areas, a larger one to the north and a smaller area to the south, divided by a corridor from Jerusalem to Jaffa. If the Negev is added, it would also be separated from the other two parts by another area belonging to the Arab State; it has not been claimed that this area, roughly the Gaza sub-district, should belong to the Jewish State. There would therefore be three separate areas, and there would be two corridors to connect these areas, and also a cross-corridor to connect the Gaza area with the main part of the Arab State. We will take this proposal, which in some respects is the best scheme of partition put forward, as the basis of our analysis.

Our remarks in the present memorandum will deal only with the following aspects of partition, without going into a discussion of the

- (i) Population and immigration
- (ii) Land
- (iii) Customs
- (iv) Communications
- (v) Defence
- (vi) Development and water economy.

(i) Population and Immigration

Within the boundaries as proposed by the Peel Commission, but with the Negev added to the Jewish State, the population of the Jewish State, the Arab State and the Jerusalem and Nazareth Enclaves would be roughly as follows:

	Jewish	State	Arab	State	Encla	ves	Total	
	001125-	%		%		%		%
Torra	490,000	53	10,000	2	100,000	27	600,000	32
Jews Arabs	430,000*)		580,000	9 8	265,000	73	1,275,000*)	68
rotal	920,000	100	590,000	100	365,000	100	1,875,000*)	100

*) of these about 75,000 in the Negev.

In 1938, at the time of the Woodhead Commission, the percentages in the Jewish State were 51% Jews and 49% Arabs. With the increase and change of distribution of population these figures would now be 58% and 42%, but the inclusion of the Negev has added about 75,000 Arabs, and changed the percentage to 53 and 47 respectively.

The existence of such a large Arab minority would certainly prove a most serious hindrance to the smooth and successful operation of partition. The Peel Commission therefore contemplated that the problem created by this large Arab minority should be solved by the transfer to the Arab State of the greater part of the Arabs constituting that minority. However, the Jewish Agency and the Jews in general have on several occasions expressed themselves as opposed to any degree of compulsion, and this in any case could only be effected by military operations which are out of the question. Nor can the problem be solved by an exchange of population, the number of Jews in the Arab State and the Enclaves being insufficient — apart from the fact that the majority of Jews in Jerusalem will be unwilling to leave the city in which many of them live from religious motives.

With the proportion of Jews and Arabs in the Jewish State as . it is, the Jewish State would be Jewish by name only. It could not be, in Dr. Weizmann's words, "as Jewish as England is English", because the Arabs would keep their nationality within a "Jewish Citizenship", the latter being an entirely empty concept.

The Jewish Agency has realized this, and relies upon large immigration in a transitional period to effect a radical change in proportions. It is assumed

- (i) that the Jewish State can economically absorb a yearly increase of 100,000, and
- (ii) that the natural increase of the population is about two per
- (iii) that all immigration is Jewish.

Accepting all these assumptions, a simple calculation will show that after 7 years the population of the Jewish State would be over 1,600,000, with about 1,100,000 Jews and about 500,000 Arabs, or 69 and 31 per cent. respectively. This works out at a density in the area outside the Negev of 270 persons per sq. km., the same as in Belgium, the most densely populated country in Europe; and at 100 persons per sq. km. in that part of the Negev which is at all suitable for settlement.

Even after this maximum immigration of Jews, the Arab minority would be so considerable as to exclude a homogeneous national Jewish State and make it actually a bi-national state, not much different from an undivided bi-national Palestine.

The Jewish State could only be made more Jewish by reducing its area, excluding purely Arab districts. This was attempted by the Woodhead Commission, but the cure would kill the patient. The area of what was called Plan C would be about 1200 sq. km., which with double the density of Belgium could support a population of not more than 600,000, while the present population is already nearly 400,000. The disadvantages of another scheme called Plan B are intermediate between Plans A and C.

(ii) Land

With regard to landownership, conditions are still worse. At the time of the Woodhead Report, the Jewish State in the Peel area would have comprised a total area of 5,000 sq. km., of which 1,150 sq. km. were in Jewish possession, and 3,850 in Arab possession, or 23% and 77% respectively. The inclusion of the Negev adds about 12,000 sq. km. Since 1938, the situation has changed to the advantage of the Jews, but not to such an extent as to reverse the proportion. Here, too, the authors of the Woodhead Report saw no other remedy than a reduction of the area of the Jewish State, which would of course seriously affect its abscrptive capacity. Unless it is contemplated that the authorities of the Jewish State should have the right to expropriate Arab lands — which might lead, in some cases, to clashes — the actual landowners in the Jewish State will thus be predominantly Arab. It will of course be possible for Jews, both private individuals and the Jewish National Fund, to buy lands, and probably even on a large scale; but, again, such transfers are unlikely to reverse the proportion of Jewish and Arab landowners,

The Woodhead Commission, while recommending "some form of customs union between the Arab and Jewish State" as "necessary to provide for the economic welfare of those states", nevertheless realized that "the tariff requirements of the Arab and Jewish States are likely to be fundamentally different", with the Jewish "expected to pursue a policy of high tariffs for the protection of their industries". The carrying out of such a policy would, however, be extremely difficult with the shape of the Jewish State as contemplated. It is difficult to visualize something less than walls being erected along the whole boundary and constantly patrolled by customs guards along its whole length. This is what the Woodhead Commission considered as necessary for securing the boundary between Jaffa and Tel-Aviv (p. 41 of their Report):

> "In our opinion... (one) would have a road as a boundary between the two towns. Down the middle of it a high iron railing must be constructed which would form the actual boundary and would be the joint property of the two states. At intervals where the boundary would cut important roads there would be gates to allow of the passage of traffic between the two towns. Such an arrangement would enable the police of each state to patrol the boundary and would provide a reasonably effective barrier between two potentially hostile communities... This arrangement... is not perfect. In the event of disturbances no barrier could prevent shots from being fired... the substitution of a wall for a railing, would, it is true, prevent shots from being fired from street levels, but would not prevent the throwing of bombs... it would doubtless also be possible for small articles to be smuggled through the railing, but again provision of a wall instead of a railing would not wholly prevent the smuggling of such articles".

This sounds fantastic, but the Woodhead Commission, considering other ways and methods, found none. And the very earnestness in which it suggested this wall serves to show to what lengths Partition must lead.

I estimate the cost of such a wall along the greater part of the boundary between the Jewish and Arab States at about two million pounds with a yearly cost of maintenance of at least LP. 20,000. Barbed wire fences as erected by the Palestine Government along the northern boundary some years ago proved to be insufficient. A solid concrete wall of about 21/2 metres height would be required.

(iv) Communications

The Palestine Railways consist of the Palestine Railway proper and the Hejaz Railway. The workshops for both are located at Haifa and would therefore be in the Jewish State. New workshops would have to be built in the Arab State. Also some of the line would have to be relaid, e.g. near Tulkarm where the line would pass over Arab territory. These measures, while expensive, do not present unsurmountable difficulties. Taken as a whole, the railways will be less efficient and more costly. The same applies to roads.

The personal freedom of movement between the States will be restricted and this will be especially felt with regard to the movement of Jews between the Jerusalem Enclave and the Jewish State. Some Jews of Jerusalem earn their living in Tel-Aviv and even "commute" for weekends between Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem. The greatest drawback will, however, be caused by the "corridors". There will be the corridor connecting Jaffa with the Jerusalem Enclave and this will necessitate a corridor crossing that corridor, to connect the northern with the central section of the Jewish State. Then there will have to be a corridor between the southern section of the Jewish State and the Negev of some 80 km. length crossing the Arab State. It is difficult to imagine how the traffic through these corridors will be organised, especially when the necessity for preventing smuggling is kept in mind. Should the last mentioned corridor be fenced in on both sides by high walls? And how will Arabs communicate between both sections of the Arab area cut in two by that corridor? Will traffic be by enclosed, locked and guarded vehicles as through the Danzig Corridor? One should not forget that the Danzig Corridor was one of the sores from which the second world war started.

(v) Defence

In 1938, the military authorities impressed upon the Woodhead Commission that "no boundary can be found west of the Jordan which affords a satisfactory strategic line." Since then the experience of modern warfare during the last war has shown that an area which in vital parts is only 15 to 20 km. deep can be cut into small portions by means of tanks, aerial artillery and selfpropelled guns in the course of a few hours. Even should the Arab State, as may be hoped, not possess these armaments, it should not be overlooked that the Jewish State would border in the north upon two sovereign Arab States and be within easy air-reach of other sovereign Arab States in the east and south. All offensive armaments of the Jewish State, even if procured at unbearable cost, would be of no avail against this danger, and defensive works would be of no use because of the unfortunate shape of the country, which from the beginning would consist of three separate areas, the central part being a narrow strip, and the southern part (Negev) being separated from the "metropolitan" part by nearly 100 km. length of Arab country.

(vi) Development and water economy

While the objections under the headings (i) to (v) are substantially the same as led the Woodhead Commission to consider the Peel Plan impracticable, a formidable objection is added now under the heading of development and water economy. The main purpose of the Jewish State is immigration and the settlement of Jews. This necessitates the development of the land, mainly by utilizing its water

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A large number of schemes have been worked out in considerable detail, the Hays-Savage scheme being the most notable. You will have occasion to examine them. If you do so you will note that they can be carried out in an undivided Palestine only. Even in the United States where every single State is immeasurably greater than the whole of Palestine, it has become necessary to establish interstate and federal agencies of water catchment areas, the single states being too small for a rational water economy. It would therefore be surprising if Palestine's water economy could suffer partition. Actually, on the contrary, any rational water economy and development plan would require the tapping of the Jordan just above the northern boundary of Palestine and the inclusion of the winter waters of the Litani, at present running waste into the sea.

All development schemes, different though they may be, have some essential features in common. The first of these is the utilization of the Jordan waters. The smaller rivers which together make up the Jordan come into Palestine from Syria. These waters at present run to waste into the Dead Sea, and every development scheme assumes the utilization of these waters by leading them on to lands where irrigation is required.

Now in the proposed partition plan, the greater part of the Jordan as well as the Dead Sea would lie in the Arab State. Then, in accordance with the usual international practice, only such water as is at present taken off the Jordan or its tributaries up to the northern boundary of that future Arab State belongs to the Jewish State; all the rest must be allowed to enter the Arab territory, as it does at present, even if it there goes to waste. The Arab State may legally object, and they would probably be found right, e.g. on the ground of the argument that while they do not use the water at present, they may perhaps use it at some future date. Thus partition would make it impossible to make full use of the Jordan waters for any comprehensive irrigation project.

The second main installation for irrigation is an intercepting channel. Palestine is divided by a range of hills and has two catchment areas, one to the east going down to the Jordan, and the other to the west going down to the Mediterranean Sea. There is a tremendous amount of rain water falling down on the western catchment area. At present this flows down into the Mediterranean without serving any purpose. All development schemes provide for an intercepting channel, going from north to south along the foot of the hills, and intercepting these waters in the wadis, as the valleys are called.

Now the plains will belong to the Jewish State, but the hills will belong to the Arab State. The Arab State would have no interest in putting up works in the hills, which would not be of immediate service to them, but would serve only the Jews in the plains. According to all present plans, this channel will lie just east of the boundary of the

Jewish State, within the Arab State. But even if the boundaries are extended so as to include the area where the intercepting channel is to run, it would be just alongside the boundary, and could easily be sabotaged. Its protection would add considerably to the heavy burden of the protection of frontiers. Thus, partition would make that part of the development scheme extremely costly and precarious.

The third source of water is surface water which cannot be stored in reservoirs or collected in the intercepting channel. The schemes provide for forcing such water underground, so that it may enrich the ground water of the plains. This has, of course, to be done in the hills, by means of wells and small dams and by draining the water, while the benefit would accrue to the plains. It is obvious that if the plains and the hills belong to different states, such a project would hardly be possible.

Erosion is a case where the necessity of cooperation in an undivided country is particularly spectacular. The danger of erosion is twofold. First, it takes off the soil from the fields in the hills; secondly, it deposits it on the fields in the plains in ways and places where it is not useful, but harmful. Thus the Arab in the hills and the Jew in the plain are both interested in the prevention of erosion. But they are interested in it to different degrees and at different stages, the hill farmer immediately, the plain-farmer only as a measure to be taken as long range planning. There exists a community of interests, but only if the planning is country-wide.

Immediate and ultimate advantages must be balanced and made to complement each other. The details of any development scheme have to be worked out so that part of it could be of immediate interest for one or the other community. If it is of ultimate advantage, say, for the Jews, it must be of immediate interest to the Arabs. If it is of ultimate interest to the Arabs, it must hold some immediate advantage for the Jews. It is obvious that that kind of planning cannot be done in a partitioned Palestine, where the interest of the Arabs and those of the Jews are opposed to each other, if only for political and economic reasons. Every development makes it imperative that a common interest be established, maintained, and furthered.

It has been proposed to meet some of the difficulties mentioned by ad hoc agreements between the two states for cooperation in certain fields, e.g. a common railway administration, a customs union and the like, and also a common administration of the development schemes. Such agreements are of course technically possible, and will work in some fields, where cooperation does not require emotional efforts and does not present controversial financial issues. A customs union, for instance, is of course possible; but it is precisely the question of protective tariffs and different customs duties which is one of the main arguments in favour of partition. A customs union would deprive partition of one of its principal advantages.

As to a joint development authority, this would of course make things much easier. But it would seem too much to expect cooperation between the citizens of different states in a comprehensive development scheme, where in many cases the inhabitants of one area would be called upon to make sacrifices for the good of some area of the other state. It is quite another thing if all areas belong to one state which has the interest of all its inhabitants at heart, who might then reasonably be supposed to guard the interest of the whole state even if the advantages to some of them may become evident only at a later stage. No matter where development makes the best progress, the increased wealth of a common state benefits the underdeveloped areas as well. This is not the case if international boundaries artificially cut and divide the natural development zone.

A genuine cooperation in the fields of development and economic planning would thus require a very great measure of mutual good will and confidence as well as a strong central (or federal) authority with very wide powers. In this case, the Jewish State and the Arab State would have to yield much of their sovereignty and independence, and would be bound together to such an extent that the result would practically be a bi-national state.

M. REINER

ONE UNION OF TWO NATIONS

STATEMENT OF DR. ERNST SIMON

on behalf of the League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and Co-operation before UNSCOP in Jerusalem on July 15, 1947.

We appreciate very deeply the privilege you have granted us to appear before the Special Committee which was sent here by the United Nations — an organisation which strives for the unity of the entire human race. Our aim is to achieve one Union of two nations in this country. Such an effort, we believe, can be our greatest contribution to the welfare and unity of the world, especially since we dwell on one of its danger spots.

The League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and Co-operation is not a political party. It is composed of a number of organisations * and personalities in the Jewish community. The League does not speak in the name of the Yishuv or the Zionist movement. It wishes to offer you the opinion of a group which has devoted a great deal of thought and a considerable measure of action to the solution of the Jewish-Arab problem. While a party is built upon an all-inclusive program relating to most problems of life, a league like ours unites its members through one central aim. We all see in the matter of Jewish-Arab relations the crux of the political situation in this country. We believe that failing to solve this problem, no satisfactory solution is conceivable for the aims of Zionism or for the development and progress of the inhabitants of this country and its newcomers.

All the members of the League are united in their belief that the solution to the political situation in this country must be based upon the principle of bi-nationalism, namely: full equality of rights for both nations. It is not sufficient to grant equality to the individual Jew or the individual Arab. This equality must be possessed by the Jewish people returning to its homeland by right and not on sufferance, and by the Arab people dwelling here in its homeland, also by right and not on sufferance. This equality for which we strive must guarantee each nation what it needs most: to the Jews, the right of immigration and settlement; to the Arabs, economic and social development; and to both, the prospect for peace and joint independence.

This common belief unites all members of the League. While there may be amongst us differences of emphasis why such political ag-

* Mainly the Hashomer Hatzair Workers' Party and the Ihud (Union)

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reement between the two nations has not been reached in the past, all of us agree that all the three political factors involved in Palestine are, in one way or another, to be blamed for the impasse. We do not indulge merely in casting accusations against others. We are constantly struggling for our ideas within the Jewish community and we do not deter from open criticism at the proper occasion. At this moment, when we stand before an international forum, we wish to touch upon the international aspects of this problem, and we believe that our criticism within our community gives us the moral right to assess the responsibility of outside forces.

We know how to appraise the fine traits of the English people, its heroic efforts during the last war, especially when it stood alone against the enemy of mankind. But we are concerned here with the Jewish-Arab problem, and in this matter we cannot exonerate the various British Governments from perilous negligence and at times even from harmful actions.

One more word about the activity of the League within the Jewish community. As we stated in our memorandum, the League was founded in 1939 in the midst of the riots when it seemed that there was almost no hope for better relations between the two nations. The founding of the League crystallised in an organised way certain trends and activities which existed already for many years. One of the greatest dangers which lurks for the Jew in the Diaspora as well as in his homeland is the danger of despair. The cause for this despair may be very well understood. When a human being loses a third of his blood, then he becomes mortally ill. Certainly, the Jewish people which has lost a third of its members has cause to be gravely ill — the illness of despair. The first symptoms of this illnes were apparent in the very year when the League was founded. They increased in intensity during the terrible slaughters of the war in Europe, during the era of the White Paper in Palestine.

The members of the League still believe in man, in the brother-hood of nations, in the progress of mankind and in the eventual triumph of the progressive forces within it. They feel that they are part of one world front fighting for the victory of certain ideals without which there will be no hope for the liberation of the Jewish people. Our efforts are devoted to heal the woes of our people by showing the way to a brighter future. We feel that it is not sufficient to preach the brotherhood of nations and international unity abroad without making the first steps here. Charity begins at home.

We began our work at home. It is not an easy task. We are swimming against the current of all the three political forces involved. We may assume that the testimony of the economic experts has proven beyond doubt that Jewish immigration to Palestine has been benefiting the Arabs economically. However, we know that a nation does not sell

its national birthright for a pot of lentils of economic development, just as we, the Jewish community of Palestine, are not ready to give up our right to take in our brothers from overseas at the price of equality within an Arab State promised us by Arab leaders.

We, as Jews of national consciousness, understand and honour the Arab national movement in Palestine as well as in the neighbouring countries. We believe that there is a reciprocal relationship between the two national movements. Any progress made by Zionism automatically strengthens Arab nationalism. The problem is how to direct this additional strength not against the aspirations of the Jewish people, not to destructive warfare, but rather how to direct it into positive channels so that the Arabs may become active partners in the constructive upbuilding of the country.

The solution to this problem lies in the setting of a common political goal. As long as the economic benefits which the Jews are bringing to the Arabs are counterweighted by political demands, the situation is almost hopeless. However, if we set as our goal bi-nationalism — the creation of bi-national facts leading to a bi-national regime, then the economic benefits brought by Jewish immigration will assume their full positive value. The Arabs will cease to see in them political danger.

Meanwhile, Jewish immigration must continue on a large scale. We cannot — gentlemen, you cannot — punish the Jews who are knocking on the gates of this country — those remnants, victims of fascism, who two years after the close of the war are still rotting in their camps and find the doors of Palestine shut in their faces. It is unforgiveable that they should be punished and continue their suffering because of the political entanglement in this country. Their right as human beings to reach a haven in the land of their desires precedes any political settlement. However, we believe that if bi-nationalism were set as the political aim, it would minimize to no small extent the opposition of our neighbours, the Arabs, to Jewish immigration. Of all the solutions offered to you, gentlemen, we think that this solution holds the greatest promise of peace, especially if bi-national self-government be granted as soon as possible to the Jews and Arabs of Palestine, who deserve it as much as any other nation in the east as well as in the west.

Professor Weizmann spoke about the normalisation which Zionism seeks to bring in the life of a sick and wandering people. This normalisation has three aspects:

First, it refers to the attitude of the Jewish nation to itself, to its own cultural heritage. There is no contradiction whatsoever between satisfactory neighbourly relations among peoples in one country and the fostering of their respective languages, cultures, and educational systems. Certainly the example of Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Canada, and Soviet Russia proves this fact.

Secondly, normalisation in relationship between the Jewish people and their land.

Thirdly, normalisation in the relationship of the Jewish people to the outside world — a nation among nations.

The League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and Co-operation seeks to promote these aims. The return of the Jewish people to its homeland and its entrenchment within it, should be accompanied by the reestablishment of the proper healthy relations between the Jewish and other nations; above all, with the neighbouring Arab nation to whom it is closest related, racially, territorially, and also in the respective aspirations of the two nations for national and social liberation and freedom.

Jewish-Arab co-operation is not only desirable but is of utmost necessity for the welfare of both peoples. Governments and political regimes may come and go, but these two nations, who are bound forever to this land, will always live side by side. Their true freedom and prosperity depend upon their mutual co-operation. Since this is necessary, it must be made possible. It is the noble task of all statesmen who sincerely seek to contribute a lasting solution to the fate of this country and to the peace of the world to help these two nations find their mutual way.

THE PEOPLE OF PALESTINE WANT PEACE

VISCOUNT SAMUEL'S SPEECH

in the Palestine Debate in the House of Lords, April 23rd, 1947.

The Curse of Terrorism

I must first refer to the matter which I am sure is uppermost in the minds of all — namely, the continuance of the terrible terrorist outrages in Palestine. In view of my long connection with the Palestinian question, since before the Balfour Declaration, and the fact that I devoted five years of my life in the attempt to establish a stable and prosperous Government in Palestine, it is a matter upon which I feel perhaps more deeply than can any other Member of your Lordships' House. This group of fanatics, mostly very young enthusiasts, are animated by that abominable doctrine that the end justifies the means; that any purpose which is held to be good in itself may warrant any efforts in its pursuit, however wicked they may be. That doctrine has been the curse of mankind all through its history.

The Jewish people have always taken pride in the good deeds performed and the distinctions won by their members; in the number of scientists, writers, musicians, philosophers and statesmen, who have come from the Jewish ranks, far out of proportion to their numbers. They remember that in the distant past it was the Jewish people who laid the foundations for the three greatest religions of the world. Here in this city, and all the great cities of the West, vast cathedrals and abbeys are dedicated to the names of men of Jewish stock; their psalms are sung and their prayers are recited in these places.

Today these same people have given birth to a set of assassins, who, disguised in false uniforms, waylay soldiers and policemen, hurl bombs promiscuously, blow up trains, and are responsible for the terrible list of casualties, particulars of which have been given to your Lordships, only this afternoon. I feel bound to say to-day, as I have said before in this House, that the Jewish population of Palestine and the Jewish Agency are blameworthy for not having, by resolute determination and at whatever cost, extirpated this curse which has brought shame upon all members of the Jewish community.

I do not to-day say that the Government should take this or that action in order to end this terrorism — far from it. On the contrary, if the British Government were to say that until the terrorism stops nothing else could be done, it might perhaps be justified, although it might not be statesmanlike. I urge to-day that action should be taken, not because of it but in spite of it.

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With regard to immigration, I look upon that from an entirely different point of view. I do not put that on the same footing. I think that there the noble Lord, Lord Altrincham, has missed the real point, which is that the Jews of Palestine — of all sections, from the most moderate and law-abiding to the most violent and extreme — with hardly a single exception, support this immigration and approve of it. They declare that it is not illegal and that what is illegal is the ordinance that forbids it. That is the point to which the noble Lord did not give any attention. It may seem rash to claim, after all these controversies have raged for so many years about Palestine, that anyone can bring forward a new point; yet I think this afternoon there is one thing new which can be said. It arises out of a recent speech by the Foreign Secretary, Mr Bevin, in another place, and it touches very closely this point of whether the prohibition of immigration is itself legal or illegal.

Speaking in another place on February 25th last, Mr Bevin discussed whether there should be in Palestine a Jewish State, or an Arab State, or a mixed State. He said that the British Government had no power to decide that point, and that, therefore, it must be taken to the United Nations. I quote his next words because they are exceedingly important. He said:—

"That, therefore, raises the issue which has got to be decided and we, as Mandatory Power, cannot solve that problem until the United Nations have recommended which of these three alternatives is to form the basis of the future organisation of Palestine. We, as Mandatory Power, have no power to make that decision. Nothing that I can find in any of the documents, either at the League of Nations or in the discussion between the Powers at Versailles and after, indicate that we have that power. The Mandate certainly does not give it . . . "

It may not be thought that is relevant to the particular point; but it is, because he declares that the British Government cannot decide this but must refer it to the United Nations because the Mandate would not authorise anything of this kind — any one of these three courses departing from the existing conditions. But has the Mandate authorised the prohibition of Jewish immigration into Palestine? Where is there anything in the Mandate that would confer that power upon the British Government, acting under it and with the approval of the League of Nations?

The White Paper of 1939 (which is the root of the whole of the present difficulties and which was enacted by the Chamberlain Government) declared that after five years from that date there was to be no more Jewish immigration into Palestine at all, unless the Arab community of Palestine gave their assent to it. Everyone knew that there was no reason why the Arabs of Palestine should give their assent; that was universally agreed. Consequently, there was to be, after five

years, a prohibition of Jewish immigration into Palestine. Is that in accordance with the Balfour Declaration? The Balfour Declaration declared — and this is embodied textually in the Mandate itself — that the Mandatory Power should favour the establishment of a Jewish National Home, should encourage Jewish immigration and should enact such laws with regard to land settlement and so forth as would conduce to it. That was approved, first of all, by all the great Powers — the United States, France, Italy and others — and afterwards, formally, by the League of Nations itself in 1922.

How the Mandate is to be interpreted was not left to the Mandatory Power itself; it was not for the British Government to say, "This is allowed and this is not allowed," as Mr. Bevin very frankly and clearly stated. The League of Nations set up a Mandates Commission which was to exercise supervision over all the Mandates entrusted to various Powers and to be the authority charged with the duty of interpreting the Mandates. The White Paper of 1939 was brought before that Mandates Commission in June of that year, and it occupied their attention at a number of sittings. They heard Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, the then Colonial Secretary, with regard to it, and they went into the whole subject with the utmost thoroughness. The Mandates Commission was an extremely competent body, consisting largely of representatives of the smaller Powers, some of them with Colonial experience. They were perfectly impartial. When I was High Commissioner I had the privilege of appearing before them for three days, and I was greatly impressed by their competence and their impartiality. On this occasion the views of the members diverged, but they were unanimous on one point.

I have lately been refreshing my memory by reference to the voluminous reports of that Commission — a great volume of some 300 or 400 pages — and there I find these records. This is one paragraph, on page 275:—

"From the first, one fact forced itself to the notice of the Commission — namely, that the policy set out in the White Paper was not in accordance with the interpretation which, in agreement with the Mandatory Power and the Council, the Commission had always placed upon the Palestine Mandate."

That was unanimous. The White Paper put a different interpretation upon the Mandate from that which had been, for many years until then — this was 1939 and the Mandate was 1922 — adopted by the Mandatory Power, by the Commission and by the Council of the League. Then they said:—

that is the Commission -

"It" ---

"went on to consider whether the Palestine Mandate might not perhaps be open to a new interpretation which, while still respecting its main principles, would be sufficiently flexible for the White Paper not to appear at variance with it." COPYRIGHT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

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The noble Lord, Lord Hankey — the British Government representative — supported by two other Members, held that existing circumstances would justify the policy of the White Paper, provided that the Council did not oppose it; that is, that the matter ought to be referred to the Council and then, if they did not oppose it, it might be held that this restriction on immigration was in accordance with the letter or the spirit — I do not know what their view was — of the Mandate. But the majority of the Commission — four members — refused to say — I quote again —

"that the policy of the White Paper was in conformity with the Mandate, any contrary conclusion appearing to them to be ruled out by the very terms of the Mandate and by the fundamental intentions of its authors."

Here is the argument which I wish to address to your Lordships. The Foreign Secretary has lately stated that proposed future arrangements for Palestine must be referred to the United Nations, because the Government here have no authority under the Mandate to adopt any one of the three courses or any substantial departure from the Mandate. The international body which was appointed to interpret the Mandate considered this prohibition of Jewish immigration. They were unanimous that the new departure differed from all previous interpretations of the Mandate. Four of the Commission held that it was contrary to the terms of the Mandate. That was the majority view; that it was not justified by the Mandate, and was contrary to its terms. Three of them held that it might be justified, subject to any action by the Council of the League. But the war came and the Council of the League had never considered this matter, never assented, and never even had an opportunity of declaring its opposition.

Thus the present Foreign Secretary, by saying that he has no power to adopt this policy, is saying in effect that his predecessors, the Chamberlain Government and Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, as Colonial Secretary, had no power to do this very thing which is now in dispute. That is the reason why the Jewish community of Palestine, Jews throughout the world and the Zionist Organisation, say that the illegality is not on the part of the immigrants, but was on the part of the British Government here, at the time of Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, who declared that five years from then the doors of the Jewish national home should be closed, and this prohibition should be clamped down upon Zionists throughout the world who were seeking to go to Palestine. That is the essence of the whole present situation. When the noble Lord denounces with so much vehemence the horrible conditions in which these immigrants

are coming in, and says we must uphold the law, the Government of the United States and other Governments are inclined to ask: "How dare you shut out these Jews, and stop this immigration in defiance of the very spirit of the Mandate which you purport to administer?"

Lord Altrincham: As the noble Viscount has questioned my interpretation of the Mandate, may I say that the Mandates Commission was not the body set up to interpret the Mandate? The only body to interpret the Mandate was the League itself. The Mandates Commission was set up simply to go into the detailed administration of Mandates in various parts of the world. This question was never put to the League of Nations, and there is no reason whatever to assume that because of a majority of four to three in the Mandates Commission on one particular view, that view would necessarily have been taken by the League before the matter had ever been submitted.

Lord Calverley: Would the noble Viscount say if he approves of these coffin ships?

Viscount Samuel: The answer to what the noble Lord, Lord Altrincham, has said — which is a point worth notice — is that it is quite correct that the Mandates Commission was a Commission of the whole body, like a Committee of this House; but the League was always very greatly guided by the Mandates Commission, which went into these matters with the utmost care and made the most elaborate reports to the Council of the League. The League naturally gave the greatest possible attention to the reports of these experts. The Commission were unanimous that a new interpretation was being put upon the Mandate — there was no question of four to three — and said that this might be held to be justified, provided that the Council did not object. How can you say it was authorised to be done, when the Council had no opportunity either of objecting or of not objecting?

For all these reasons the present Government, in fact, have rather belatedly stated quite clearly that they are not accepting the White Paper and are not acting upon it. The Prime Minister said in another place on July 1st of last year:—

"It is quite wrong to say that we are carrying on the White Paper policy."

They disapprove of it themselves, and yet they support these measures for the prevention of immigration into Palestine. As a matter of fact, they are allowing a certain amount of immigration into Palestine in defiance of the White Paper of 1939.

Viscount Hall: Might I ask the noble Viscount whether he is now arguing that immigration can be admitted into Palestine, irrespective of numbers or its effect upon the Arab community?

Viscount Samuel: I am coming to that a little later on. What I am now dealing with is the question of illegality — on which side the law

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rests. The Government says: "We have passed an ordinance and that is the law." The Zionist Organisation says: "The law you have passed is itself an infringement of the law, an international law, approved by the League of Nations." Mr. Bevin says he cannot act contrary to the Mandate in this or that without the sanction of the League of Nations, yet this was done without the League of Nations.

Viscount Hall: On specific points.

A Home for Jewish Survivors — in Palestine!

Viscount Samuel: That is what I am saying. Let me turn to another aspect. We in this generation have been faced with what is unquestionably and literally the greatest crime in the whole history of the world. At the Nuremberg Trials Lord Justice Lawrence — now Lord Oaksey — in his judgment accepted the calculation that 6,000,000 human beings had been murdered by the Nazis in the concentration camps and in other ways. They were not all Jews, and undoubtedly vast numbers had nothing to do with the Jewish community but were Hitler's political opponents. All the great crimes in history, the massacres of Attila, of Jenghiz Khan, the St. Bartholomew Massacre, and the massacre of a large part of the Armenian nation, fall into almost insignificance compared with the scale of this latest crime committed in cold blood by the madman Adolf Hitler, who was on the throne of absolute power.

A few days ago it was announced in the Press that a man named Hoess, who was in charge of the Auschwitz concentration camp, had been hanged, having been shown guilty of the murder in gas chambers of 4,000,000 people in that camp. It was stated in the Press that he protested against this, and said there were not more than 2,000,000; but he confessed to 2,000,000. This fact was printed in small type in little paragraphs in the newspapers, and it attracted no particular attention that a man who was found guilty of having murdered 4,000,000 people had been hanged.

We are too close to these events to be able to see them in their true scale and to recognise them for the enormity that they present. There is no shock in our present-day civilisation — hardly a tremor. What people are chiefly concerned about is that, of the survivors who have escaped, as few as possible shall be admitted into this country, or the United States or into other lands. There have been some survivors, and I have met some of them, whose fathers, mothers, brothers and sisters — whole families — have been murdered in the gas chambers. They were collected from Belgium, Holland, Poland, Austria and elsewhere, and form part of the 6,000,000 who have been murdered. Some of those who survived went back to their homes and received no very warm welcome, because the property they owned and the industries they had built up had been seized and looted and sold to other people. These are very unwelcome ghosts who, not having been killed, have the impertinence to claim their own property.

As a result they wish to move away to start a new life and try to forget the awful horror of their past. They want to go to Palestine, where they can be sure they can be free and live according to their own ways and customs. A Committee of the House of Commons on National Expenditure reported the other day that the movement of Jews through Austria on their way to Palestine amounted to a second exodus. Whether it be a second exodus, or a tenth or a twentieth, these people are tired; they want to go and settle somewhere. And Palestine is a place where they would wish to go.

A Noble Lord: All of them?

Viscount Samuel: They go under conditions of the utmost hardship and in abominable circumstances, which have already been referred to by the noble lord who has just spoken. They have survived the massacre of their families, and have crowded in hundreds, even thousands into little ships, under conditions which the noble Lord, Lord Altrincham, rightly says recall the conditions of the slave trade. They have reached Palestine, which was to be the National Home of their race, only to find British destroyers patrolling off the coast. They are brought into harbour and then sent off to internment camps and called "illegal immigrants," while the British Army of 100,000 is holding down the Jewish population of Palestine, which is only too eager to welcome them. There is no question of their not being able to find accommodation. Accommodation could easily be found for 100,000 or more. It is not a question of being unable to find ships, because the United States have undertaken to provide all the means of transport that may be required. It is not a case of going there to crowd into some slum district. The Jewish National Home has been a brilliant success. The Anglo-American Commission reported that it was a miracle, both of physical achievement and spiritual endeavour, and the Peel Commission some years ago spoke in similar terms. Those are the facts of the case.

Noble lords will ask: "What is your solution?" To my mind the most urgent matter is to settle this question of immigration. The Government say they are no longer pursuing the White Paper policy. In defiance of the White Paper policy they have for some time past allowed 1,800 immigrants a month to go in.

A Noble Lord: 1,500.

Viscount Samuel: I thought it had been increased to 1,800; but let us say, 1,500 a month. That amounts to less than 20,000 a year — an exceedingly small total in view of conditions both in Europe and in Palestine. In my judgment, 40,000 to 50,000 a year could quite easily be absorbed by the country. There is a great shortage of labour in Palestine to-day; the amount of capital awaiting investment in industry and trade amounts to scores of millions of pounds, and it cannot be used. In addition, there is an immense demand for all kinds of commodities as well as for exports.

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If I am asked what policy I would recommend, I would say that I would allow immigration of perhaps 50,000 a year, and date it back to the time when the Anglo-American Commission made their recommendations — that is, to April, 1946. From that number should be deducted those already admitted, and others should be allowed in to bring it up to that rate. The principle should be laid down that that should continue for so long as economic conditions permitted.

No Jewish State, No Arab State

As to the future government of Palestine — this is the concluding portion of my observations - I do not agree with a common assertion that there are only three possible courses: A Jewish State, an Arab State or a geographical partition. I think all three are wrong. I can only repeat what I said previously. Neither a Jewish State nor an Arab State is practicable; nor is geographical partition. But there is a fourth course. I am not one of those who say that because three solutions are impracticable, therefore the whole question is insoluble. The Jewish State has been the aspiration of the Jewish people for centuries. It is an aspiration which at the present day cannot be realised. It is not contained in the Balfour Declaration. If the Balfour Declaration had intended that a Palestine State should be set up, it would have said so. What was said, and what was said in speeches by those who drew it up, was that it might be that future conditions would be such that there would be a Jewish majority there; and there might be a Jewish State. There was no promise of a Jewish State. What was promised was that the British Government would favour the creation of a Jewish National Home — the term was most carefully chosen — in Palestine. The Declaration did not say that Palestine should be the Jewish National Home, but that it favoured a Jewish National Home in Palestine, without prejudice to the civil and religious rights of the Arab population.

In 1922, in the White Paper quoted, the British Government of the day reaffirmed that Declaration. In view of the Jews' historic connection with Palestine the White Paper said they should be regarded as going there as of right, and not by sufferance. That does not justify the Zionists or the Jewish population in Palestine saying that the Arabs are there on sufferance and not as of right. Arabs who have been there for thousands of years also have definite rights in Palestine; that must be admitted and acknowledged, and that is clearly admitted in the above Declaration. The Declaration in 1917 with regard to the Jewish National Home, the Balfour Declaration, and the White Paper of 1922, issued when Mr. Churchill was Colonial Secretary, were accepted by the Zionist Organisation - the first one with expressions of warm gratitude which were published at the time. The second was met by a formal declaration of the Zionist Organisation saying that they accepted the policy of the White Paper and that their own policy would be made to conform with it. The country was at peace for years afterwards. It is untrue to say that it is impossible for Jews and Arabs to live together. There was a disturbance in Jaffa in 1921, when I was High Commissioner, but after that, although there was political tension during the remainder of my term until 1925, for eight years the country was at peace. There were no disturbances, no assassinations, not a blow struck between the two nations. And all that time the question of a Jewish State was never brought into the foreground. It was never mentioned. No claim was pressed.

Unhappily, during the war, the American Zionists thought it desirable to bring it to the front. By a resolution called the Biltmore Resolution, from the place where it was passed, they demanded that Palestine as a whole should be declared to be a Jewish Commonwealth or State — either word was used on different occasions. They declared also that all the inhabitants should have equal political rights from the outset. These resolutions were endorsed by the World Zionist Organisation in August, 1945.

I have always regarded that as a disastrous political blunder. It was an aim quite impossible of fulfilment, and indeed was meaningless as propounded, for in Palestine to-day Arabs are two to one as compared to the Jews. And if you were to make a declaration that it is a Jewish State, it would not in fact be a Jewish State. If the Jews were equal in numbers to the Arabs it would not be a Jewish State — it would be half Jewish and half Arab. Even if the Jews were twice as many as the Arabs in the future, it would still not be a Jewish State. You might declare that it was, but, as a matter of fact, it would be a mixed State. Therefore, this declaration of the American Zionists, endorsed by the World Zionist Organisation, merely had the effect of arousing the maximum opposition from the Arabs and everyone else and achieving the minimum of results.

An Arab State in Palestine, in my view, is also impracticable in view of the Balfour Declaration. As the noble Lord, Lord Altrincham, has quite frankly pointed out, what this country has said it must stand to. Therefore there must be a Jewish National Home in Palestine, and an Arab State would very gravely shake the stability of anything that could really be called a Jewish National Home. The good faith of this country must be maintained. On the strength of the Balfour Declaration 500,000 people have gone there, and they have started to build up a marvellous community. Putting it on a merely monetary basis, hundreds of millions of pounds have been invested and spent there. In recent years, since the war of 1914-18, the Arabs have enjoyed advantages far in excess of any possible expectations of theirs at that time. An immense stretch of the world's surface has now, in a single generation, been erected into a series of independent Arab States — Saudi Arabia, a kingdom, Transjordan, an independent kingdom, Iraq, a third kingdom, Syria, an independent republic, Lebanon, an independent republic. All these, together with Egypt also, have formed themselves into a powerful league. It would surely be no very great hardship if this one little bit in Palestine were declared to be a mixed State, and not purely a State under an Arab sovereign or republic. To my mind that is the right solution.

I do not support partition, because knowing the country as I do it seems to me to be geographically impossible. It would create as many problems as it would solve. Instead of one minority problem as there is now, we should have two. Mr. Bevin said that the best scheme of partition which he had seen would create a Jewish State which would have a population of 450,000 Jews and 360,000 Arabs. That would be nearly half and half. That was to be called a Jewish State. There would be a minority there in that community, and there would be about 150,000 Jews left outside. You would have to impose a frontier between the two without any natural boundaries, and this would give rise to all sorts of difficulties. Criminals could step with ease from one side of the boundary to the other. You could never have anything in the nature of a tariff. Immigration could not be confined to one part. It could easily seep through into the other part. When the Peel Commission reported in favour of partition, an expert Commission was appointed to draw up a boundary, and declared that it was not possible to do so.

The problem which presents itself is unique in the world. We are so accustomed, in this country and in the United States, to look upon democracy as Government by a representative body which is elected by geographical constituencies that we always think there must be some areas which will elect members by a majority, and that the minority will acquiesce in the decisions of the majority. A democracy of this kind cannot be maintained in countries where you have — as there are in Palestine — two communities, each imbued with a passionate feeling of the justice of their several causes. You must provide not on a basis of geography but on a basis of communities, unless (as in Ireland) you can draw a line and make two sides of a frontier between them. In any case, that gives rise to all sorts of difficulties, and it cannot be done in Palestine.

When I was High Commissioner I tried to build up two organisations on a communal basis. The present representative Council of the Jewish community — the Va'ad Leumi — was set up by ordinance, looking after their own finances, their schools, and their own concerns in general, while keeping in direct touch with the Executive. I was intending to do the same for the Arabs, but they were too divided. However, we passed an ordinance and established a Moslem Council, elected by Moslems to look after endowments and their ecclesiastical courts. We should have been ready to do the same for the Christian community if they had wished it, but they were politically identified with the Moslem Arabs.

The constitution which I envisage — this is not new, for I have been saying this for years, in this House and elsewhere — is the kind of constitution that the Anglo-American Committee unanimously recommended. The recommendation has been ignored. The British Mandate should remain for a series of years, until the country is more settled.

It should be accountable to the Trusteeship Committee of the United Nations.

There should not be a British Dominion. I do not agree with the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, in advocating a British Dominion. We have declared loudly, again and again, that there are to be no annexations by any of the great Powers. To attach Palestine to the British Empire under the name of a Dominion would give rise to the strongest protests in various directions. We should be accused of Imperialism, in addition to which, so far as I can see, the Dominion policy would dispose of none of our present problems — immigration, the tension between the two communities, and majorities and minorities. All these would remain equally if it were called a British Dominion as if it were called a British Mandate.

A Constitution — Based on Equal Communities

Therefore in my view, there ought to be constituted two communities — a Jewish community as it now exists, with its own representative body, and an Arab community, with a third Christian community if it were desired, though I do not think it would be. They would manage their own schools, hospitals and social services. They would have their own finances, and would be in direct and constant touch with the Executive. It might be hoped that in course of time these two would grow together. At first, no doubt, they would be separate, and would communicate separately with the British Administration. But after a time they might grow more together. Their first joint effort under the pressure of practical need might be to form joint committees dealing with particular subjects; and then they might gradually combine, until perhaps in a few years' time they could form a Joint Council, which, in turn, would become a proper system of government for the country as a whole regardless of majorities, regardless of minorities, and regardless of geographical distribution based upon the system of communities.

Local government, dealing with the question of roads, drains, lighting, and the like, would be effected, as now, by a local government body which in Tel-Aviv is Jewish, in Nablus is mostly Moslem, while as in Haifa, they now have mixed municipalities working happily together, except that in Jerusalem it has been temporarily suspended. Immigration must be decided on the authority of the United Nations before the new Constitution has been brought into being, and numbers should be decided which would hold good over a series of years, subject to modification by the Executive only on grounds of economic conditions. That is the plan that I have previously advanced in this House and in my evidence before the Anglo-American Commission. Doctor Magnes in Palestine has formed a party advocating much the same proposals. The Anglo-American Commission's Report has been very much on the same lines — no Jewish State, no Arab State, and no partition.

We all knew that the Conference in London would be perfectly futile. Everybody knew from the beginning that to bring Jews and

Arabs together in London to decide these matters would lead to no result whatsoever. It was merely regarded as an effort by the British Government to effect delay because it did not know what to do.

This very solution could probably be accepted by the Arab League. They have all this vast territory under their own control. It would be an act of magnanimity and of good grace to consent to a mixed Constitution of this kind, and it would be greatly to the advantage of the Arab population of Palestine, who have flourished under the mandate. They have not been oppressed, they have not been driven out, their population has increased by as many as the Jewish population has increased, and they have reached a state of economic prosperity greater than they have ever known.

People say, "Well, they all want a final settlement — to have something settled now which will last in perpetuity." It cannot be done. They must consent to have a mixed Constitution for the time being that will grow into something better, and a system of immigration that may be subject to review in later years as conditions alter. Both this Government and the United States Government might accept a scheme of that kind if it could be based upon a unanimous report of the Joint Committee appointed by both of them.

Viscount Hall: The British Government did accept that scheme, and endeavoured to get the Jews, the Arabs, and the Government of the United States of America to agree.

Viscount Samuel: I am delighted to hear it, but what has been suggested is still on a geographical basis, with provincial governments. Drawing lines on maps to form provinces which should have quasi-governmental powers is not the same thing. You must get away from that idea of drawing lines on a map; it will not do. The provincial lines that were drawn in these proposals are exactly the matters that gave rise to the intense controversy, and it is not a similar plan to the one I have suggested. It is a geographical plan, and the frontiers of the provinces, and the powers within the provinces which are to be Arab or Jewish, is partition in a different form. You should abandon that and get a really admirable scheme. The Government came closer than ever to a wise scheme, but must cling on to the idea of constituencies and of separate authorities, each having quasi-governmental powers.

If such a plan as I suggest were now to be adopted, frankly and definitely, by the Government, if it were backed by the American Government, and, above all, if it came forward with the immense authority of the United Nations, representing the opinion of the vast majority of mankind, then it might well be accepted by the Arab League and by the Jewish community in Palestine. The people of Palestine want peace. They want peace now. It is only a minority of extremists on each side that keep the country in turmoil. Put forward a comprehensive and definite scheme of that kind and then the controversy might perhaps be ended; and at last the warfare of Zion would be accomplished and Jerusalem be comforted.

APPENDIX

I.

EXTRACTS FROM THE BRITISH PROPOSALS

of February 7, 1947 (Cmd. 7044, pp. 11-14)

6. The essential features of the proposed Trusteeship Agreement are outlined in the succeeding paragraphs.

Local Government

- 7. Areas of local administration would be delimited in such a way as to include in each a substantial majority either of Arabs or of Jews. To the local Administrations the Central Government would devolve a wide range of powers, legislative, administrative and financial, including some share in responsibility for the police. As the local administrative boundaries would not have the character of State frontiers, it would not necessarily follow that all the Arab or all the Jewish territory need be contiguous.
- 8. Safeguards would be provided for the rights of the Jewish population in Arab areas and of the Arab population in Jewish areas. The rights of these minorities would include:—
 - (a) Adequate representation in local legislatures;
 - (b) A reasonable proportion of posts in the local Administration;
 (c) Freedom of religious practice in accordance with the status quo, including the maintenance of separate religious courts for matters of personal status;
 - (d) The right to maintain their own educational institutions;
 - (e) The right to use their own language in their communications with the Administration and in the Courts of Law.
- It would be a special responsibility of the High Commissioner to ensure the maintenance of these rights.

Immigration

- 9. The British Delegation cannot accept the contention of the representatives of the Jewish Agency that the rate of Jewish immigration into Palestine as a whole should be determined by the Jews alone. Nor can they accept the demand of the Arab Delegations that all Jewish immigration into Palestine should cease forthwith. They do not contemplate either a settlement which would bring to an end the development of the Jewish National Home, or the admission of Jewish immigrants without reference to the effect of their entry on the rights and position of the population of the country. Any provision made for future Jewish immigration must rest upon consideration for the well-being of Palestine as a whole.
- 10. With this end in view the Trusteeship Agreement would provide for Jewish immigration, at a rate of 4,000 monthly, for a period of two years. This would guarantee the entry of approximately 100,000 additional Jewish immigrants. During the remainder of the period of Trusteeship, the continuance of immigration and the rate of entry would be determined, with due regard to the principle of economic absorptive



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capacity, by the High Commissioner in consultation with his Advisory Council; and in the event of disagreement the final decision would rest with an arbitration tribunal appointed by the United Nations.

Land Transfer

11. Control over transfer of land, including the power to amend the existing Land Transfer Regulations, would be conferred on the local authorities.

Central Government

- legislative and executive authority. He would, however, endeavour to form an Advisory Council so composed as to include representatives, not only of the Arab and Jewish local Administrations, but also of labour and other organised interests. Despite this composition, it is probable that voting in the Advisory Council would tend at first to follow communal lines. Since, however, the functions of the Council would be advisory and not legislative, the High Commissioner would be required to give due attention to the views of minorities. On the conclusion of the Trusteeship Agreement, the Jewish members of the Advisory Council would supersede the Jewish Agency for Palestine as the official channel of communication between the Jewish community and the High Commissioner.
- 13. During the period of trusteeship, the High Commissioner would introduce Palestinians into his Executive Council, and would progressively increase the proportion of Palestinian members in that Council.
- 14. It would be the duty of the central Government to stimulate the economic development of the country through the Agency of Development Boards including both Arab and Jewish members.
- 15. The central Government would be responsible for ensuring that adequate provision was made by the local Administrations for the enforcement of minimum wage rates and conditions of labour.

Termination of Trusteeship Agreement

- 16. At the end of four years a Constituent Assembly would be elected. If agreement was reached between a majority of the Jewish representatives and a majority of the Arab representatives in the Constituent Assembly, the High Commissioner would proceed forthwith to take whatever steps were necessary to establish the institutions of the independent State.
- 17. In the event of disagreement in the Constituent Assembly, the various drafts prepared for its consideration and the record of its debates would be submitted to the Trusteeship Council which would be asked to advise upon future procedure

EXTRACTS FROM THE SPEECH OF MR. A. GROMYKO

at the Special Session on Palestine of the General Assembly of the United Nations (May 1947)*

II.

M. A. Gromyko, in the course of his speech, after pointing to the fact that the Mandate system had failed and that Palestine has become a kind of semi-military and police state, said:—

The Plight of the Jewish People

"During the last war the Jewish people experienced exceptional calamities and sufferings which defy description. It is difficult to obtain an idea of them merely from rows of figures about losses inflicted by the Fascist invaders on the Jewish people. In the territories where the Hitlerites ruled, the Jews were almost completely exterminated. The total of the Jewish population annihilated by the Fascist executioners is approximately 6,000,000. Only about one and a half million Jews in Western Europe survived the war. These figures convey an idea of the losses inflicted on the Jewish people by the Fascist aggressors, but they give no idea of the grave conditions in which the masses of the Jewish population found themselves after the war. The bulk of the surviving Jewish population of Europe has been deprived of its homelands, shelter and means of subsistence. Hundreds of thousands of Jews are wandering in various countries of Europe in search of means of subsistence and shelter. Many of them are kept in camps for displaced persons and continue to endure great hardships.

"It is permissible to ask whether, considering this grave situation of hundreds of thousands of the surviving Jewish population, the United Nations can show no interest in these people torn away from their countries and homes. U.N.O. cannot regard this situation with indifference, as that would be incompatible with the lofty principles proclaimed in its Charter, which provide for the defence of the rights of man, regardless of race, religious convictions or sex. It is time to render assistance to these people, not by words but by actual deeds. It is necessary to show concern about the urgent needs of a people that experienced grave sufferings as a result of the war started by Hitler Germany. This is the duty of the United Nations...

"Past experience, especially that of the Second World War, has shown that no single state in Western Europe proved capable of rendering the Jewish people the necessary assistance in defending its rights and its very existence against violation on the part of the Hitlerites and their allies. This is a grave fact, but it should be admitted as all facts should. The fact that no single Western European state proved capable of ensuring the defence of the elementary rights of the Jewish people, and of protecting it against violence on the part of Fascist hangmen, provides an explanation of the Jewish aspiration to create their own state. It would be unfair to refuse to reckon with it, or to deny the right of the Jewish people to satisfaction of this aspiration.

"A denial of this right of the Jewish people cannot be justified, especially in view of everything it experienced during the Second World

* See p. 40.

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War. Consequently the study of this aspect of the problem, and the preparation of appropriate proposals, should also form an important task of the Committee."

Palestine - A Homeland of Two Peoples

After analysing the various projects on the future of Palestine, Mr. Gromyko said:

"One should consider, in the first place, the specific nature of this problem. One should bear in mind the indisputable fact that Palestine is inhabited by two peoples — Arabs and Jews — each of which has historical roots in Palestine. Palestine has become the homeland of both these peoples, each of whom occupies a prominent place in the economic and cultural life of the country.

"Neither the history nor the present conditions in Palestine can justify any one-sided solution of the Palestine problem, either in favour of the creation of an independent Arab state, ignoring the lawful rights of the Jewish people, or in favour of the creation of an independent Jewish state, ignoring the lawful rights of the Arab population. Neither of these extreme solutions would bring about a just settlement of this complex problem, first and foremost since they both fail to guarantee the regulations of the relations between Arabs and Jews, which is the most important task of all. A just settlement can be found only if account is taken in sufficient degree of the lawful interests of both peoples.

Equality and Cooperation in One Dual State

"This leads the Soviet delegation to draw the conclusion that the legitimate interests of both the Jewish and Arab peoples in Palestine can be properly protected only by the creation of one dual independent democratic Arab-Jewish State. Such a state should be based on equal rights for the Jewish and Arab populations, and this would lay the foundation for the co-operation of these two peoples in their common interests and for their mutual benefit.

"Is it not clear that in solving the question of Palestine it would be very useful to take into account the experience gained through such friendly co-existence and friendly community of life between different nationalities within the framework of a single state?

"Thus the creation of a single Arab-Jewish State, with equal rights for Jews and Arabs, can be regarded as one of the possible ways for settling this complicated problem and one deserving the greatest attention. This decision could provide a sound foundation for the peaceful co-existence and co-operation of the Arab and Jewish populations of Palestine, in the interests of both these peoples, and for the good of the whole population of Palestine and of peace and security in the Near East.

Partition only if Co-existence Proved Impossible

"If this solution were to prove impracticable, in view of the bad relation; between Jews and Arabs — and it is highly important that we have the opinion of the Committee on this question — then it would be necessary to consider a second project also current in Palestine, which provides for the division of Palestine into two independent states — Jewish and Arab.

"I repeat that this solution would only be justified in the event of it being proved that relations between the Jewish and Arab populations were actually so bad that they could not be improved upon and their peaceful co-existence could not be ensured."

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